Tag Archive for: Jairo Izquierdo

Dealing with two arguments against Kalam

As I was reviewing one of the many emails we received, one of them raised two objections against the Kalam cosmological argument, specifically the argument offered for God as the cause of the beginning of the universe. A version of the Kalam cosmological argument can be formulated as follows:

  1. Whatever begins to exist has a cause of its existence.
  2. The universe began to exist.
    2.1 Argument based on the impossibility of an actual infinite:
    2.1.1 An actual infinite cannot exist.
    2.1.2 An infinite temporal regress of events is an actual infinite.
    2.1.3 Therefore, an infinite temporal regress of events cannot exist.
    2.2 Argument based on the impossibility of the formation of an actual infinite by successive addition:
    2.2.1 A collection formed by successive addition cannot be actually infinite.
    2.2.2 The temporal series of past events is a collection formed by successive addition.
    2.2.3 Therefore, the temporal series of past events cannot be actually infinite.
    2.3 Confirmation based on the expansion of the universe.
    2.4 Confirmation based on the thermodynamic properties of the universe.
  3. Therefore, the universe has a cause of its existence.
  4. If the universe has a cause of its existence, then an uncaused, personal Creator of the universe exists, who sans creation is beginningless, changeless, immaterial, timeless, spaceless, and enormously powerful and intelligent.
    4.1 Argument that the cause of the universe is a personal Creator:
    4.1.1 The universe was brought into being either by a mechanically operating set of necessary and sufficient conditions or by a personal, free agent.
    4.1.2 The universe could not have been brought into being by a mechanically operating set of necessary and sufficient conditions.
    4.1.3 Therefore, the universe was brought into being by a personal, free agent.
    4.2 Argument that the Creator sans creation is uncaused, beginningless, changeless, immaterial, timeless, spaceless, and enormously powerful and intelligent:
    4.2.1 The Creator is uncaused.
    4.2.1.1 An infinite temporal regress of causes cannot exist. (2.13, 2.23)
    4.2.2 The Creator is beginningless.
    4.2.2.1 Whatever is uncaused does not begin to exist. (1)
    4.2.3 The Creator is changeless.
    4.2.3.1 An infinite temporal regress of changes cannot exist. (2.13, 2.23)
    4.2.4 The Creator is immaterial.
    4.2.4.1 Whatever is material involves change on the atomic and molecular levels, but the Creator is changeless. (4.23)
    4.2.5 The Creator is timeless.
    4.2.5.1 In the complete absence of change, time does not exist, and the Creator is changeless. (4.23)
    4.2.6 The Creator is spaceless.
    4.2.6.1 Whatever is immaterial and timeless cannot be spatial, and the Creator is immaterial and timeless (4.24, 4.25)
    4.2.7 The Creator is enormously powerful.
    4.2.7.1 He brought the universe into being out of nothing. (3)
    4.2.8 The Creator is enormously intelligent.
    4.2.8.1 The initial conditions of the universe involve incomprehensible fine-tuning that points to intelligent design.
  5. Therefore, an uncaused, personal Creator of the universe exists, who sans creation is “beginningless,” changeless, immaterial, timeless, spaceless, and enormously powerful and intelligent.

Now let’s look at the following objection to what I have called the Argument of Immutability Against a Personal Cause (AIAPC):

  1. If God is timeless, then He is immutable.
  2. If God is immutable, then God cannot act to bring the universe into existence.
  3. God is a personal being who without creation is timeless (given by the Kalam).
  4. God is unchangeable (from 1 and 3)
  5. Therefore, God cannot act to bring the universe into existence (from 2 and 4).

As you can see, the argument attacks the premises (4.1.3), (4.2.3), and (4.2.5) of this version of the Kalam by trying to demonstrate that there is an inconsistency between God’s properties of being personal, immutable, and timeless.

How solid is the argument? Well, not that good. First, the detractor seems to think that since there is no time without the universe, God is immutable, but this is not the case. What the argument says is this:

  1. In the total absence of change, time does not exist, and the Creator does not change. (4.2.5.1.)
  2. Therefore, God is timeless (4.2.5.)

Y

  • There cannot be an infinite temporal regression of changes. (4.2.3.1)
  • Therefore, God is changeless (4.2.3)

Note that the argument does not say that God’s immutability is inferred from His timelessness; rather, that immutability is inferred from the impossibility of an infinite regression of changes, and timelessness is inferred from His immutability. But what do we mean by the “absence of all change?” Simple, it is not doing something different. Some activities do not require either change or time, for example, knowing something (God can know all truths in that immutable state without time). And the same could be said about our intentions: as long as these do not change, we can sustain them timelessly. So, we can say that (1) of the AIAPC is false.

Second, (2) it is false too. The premise seems to assert that the immutability of God is equivalent to immobility, which would be true if we were talking about an impersonal cause, but we have seen that we can infer that the cause is personal, so that it has volition to simply decide to create the universe from eternity. As William Lane Craig explains when he uses the example of a man sitting from eternity

…my thought experiment serves to illustrate a point about free will. A person can exist unchangeably and then freely execute a certain intention because free will does not require some predetermined condition. The very nature of free will is the absence of causal determinants. So, a free action has the appearance of a purely spontaneous event. Man can simply and freely desire to get up. So, you can get a timeless effect from an immutable cause if that cause is a free agent. Now, in the case of God, God exists unchangeably without the universe. Creation is an act of free will which, when it occurs, brings time into existence along with the universe. Therefore, to say that “from a finite time a Creator endowed with free will could have wanted to bring the world into existence at that moment” does not imply that there was a time prior to that moment.[1]

Now, at this point, there is an objection that time then does not begin with the beginning of the universe, but at the moment when God decides to bring the universe into existence, which is contradictory to the implications of the beginning of the universe of the Big Bang. Now, even when Dr. Craig does not argue that God has to deliberate temporarily, he has responded to similar objections by making a distinction between physical time and metaphysical time:

Metaphysical time is independent of physical processes, for example, if God was counting down, he could say, “3, 2, 1, let there be light,” and in this case, we would have a sequence of mental events, we would have time prior to the beginning of the universe. What would begin at the beginning of the universe would be physical time, the time which is the subject of study in the field of physics.[2]

So, with all this, we can say that the AIAPC is not a solid argument after all.

Now let’s move on to the next argument which I have called the Argument of the Timelessness Against Causation (ATAC):

  1. If God is timeless without creation, time intervals do not exist (granted by the kalam).
  2. God is timeless without creation.
  3. Therefore, time intervals do not exist (from1 and 2).
  4. If the time intervals do not exist, the cause-effect relationship cannot occur without creation.
  5. The cause-effect relationship cannot occur without creation (from 3 and 4)

When one analyzes this argument, one will notice that in essence, it is similar to the first one, only the immutability is omitted, but the timelessness factor is still there, specifically, that it takes time intervals for a God-type cause and effect to exist by deciding to create the universe and then another time when the universe comes into existence. To this William Lane Craig has responded on another occasion that:

[…] it seems to me that this assumption is false. For under His omniscience, God’s choices are not events, since He does not temporarily deliberate nor does Him will move from a state of indecision to a decision. He simply has free will determinations to execute certain actions, and any deliberation can only be said to be explanatory, not temporary, before His decrees.[3]

Let us now return to the matter that the cause must precede the effect. I consider (4) to be false because it depends on the unjustified belief that cause-effect cannot be simultaneous and that the cause-effect relationship cannot exist without time. But Dr. Craig has already explained that there is no reason to accept these conditions and that it is possible to have cause and effect simultaneously[4] so that the creation of the universe is simultaneous with the origin of the universe[5]. Moreover, there is the possibility that every cause and effect relationship is ultimately simultaneous:

I do not see any conceptual inconsistency in thinking that a cause and effect can be simultaneous. Philosophers will often talk about how the direction of the causal influence between A and B is perceived when A and B are simultaneous. A and B may be at the same time, they may be simultaneous, but how do you draw the line of causal influence? Is A causing B, or is B causing A? Philosophers will argue about that. So, I don’t see any inconsistency in the notion of simultaneous causation. Some metaphysicists have argued that all causes are ultimately simultaneous because until the cause impacts some other object to produce an effect, there is no way that the causal influence can jump through time, from t2 to t1, to produce the effect in t1. That cause must last until the moment t1 and then produce its effect at that moment. But there is no way that a causal influence can travel through time and jump from t2 to t1 to produce the event. So many philosophers will say that all causation is ultimately simultaneous.

I think that’s a very persuasive argument. I can’t see how you can have a causal influence by jumping through time. It seems to me that effect will not occur until the cause impacts the thing to produce its effect; for example, the cue must hit the billiard ball to set it in motion. And until it does, there is no way that the causal influence of the cue’s movement will jump in time to make the ball move.[6]

Conclusion

We have seen that the AIAPC fails because of a misunderstanding of the meaning of immutability and how immutability is inferred. On the other hand, although the ATAC is a better argument, it is not entirely sound; since there are no good reasons to reject the simultaneity of cause and effect.

Notes

[1] William Lane Craig, “God and Time” on William Lane Craig: A Reasonable Response.

[2] An Explanation of Physical Time and Metaphysical Time.

[3] Timelessness and Creation.

[4] Causation and Spacetime.

[5] God, Time and Creation

[6] Misunderstandings About God and the Big Bang.

Recommended resources related to the topic:

God’s Crime Scene: Cold-Case…Evidence for a Divinely Created Universe (Paperback), (Mp4 Download), and (DVD Set) by J. Warner Wallace

God’s Crime Scene: The Case for God’s Existence from the Appearance of Design (mp4 Download Set) by J. Warner Wallace 

God’s Crime Scene: The Case for God’s Existence from the Appearance of Design in Biology DVD Set by J. Warner Wallace 

What is God Like? Look to the Heavens by Dr. Frank Turek (DVD and Mp4) I Don’t Have Enough Faith to Be an Atheist (Paperback), and (Sermon) by Norman Geisler and Frank Turek

Jairo Izquierdo is an author and Community Manager for the Christian organization Cross Examined. He studies philosophy and theology, his current focus of study being classical logic, epistemology and molinism. He is co-founder of Filósofo Cristiano and editor at World View Media. Jairo resides in Puebla, Mexico and is an active member of Cristo es la Respuesta Church.

/by

The Fire-Breathing Dragon in The Garage vs God

,

In the year 2018 the debate “What Best Explains Reality: Theism or Atheism? (Frank Turek vs. Michael Shermer)” took place. Frank presented his case for the existence of God as the best explanation for some facts about reality, such as the origin and fine-tuned of the universe and the objective moral values and duties. One of Shermer’s arguments to demonstrate the deficiency of the hypothesis of God was to present the famous analogy of “The Dragon in The Garage”, used for the first time by Carl Sagan in his book The Demon-Haunted World.

This is the original analogy:

Suppose I seriously make such an assertion to you. Surely, you’d want to check it out, see for yourself. There have been innumerable stories of dragons over the centuries, but no real evidence. What an opportunity!

“Show me,” you say. I lead you to my garage. You look inside and see a ladder, empty paint cans, an old tricycle–but no dragon.

“Where’s the dragon?” you ask.

“Oh, she’s right here,” I reply, waving vaguely. “I neglected to mention that she’s an invisible dragon.” 

You propose spreading flour on the floor of the garage to capture the dragon’s footprints.

“Good idea,” I say, “but this dragon floats in the air.”

Then you’ll use an infrared sensor to detect the invisible fire.

“Good idea, but the invisible fire is also heatless.”

You’ll spray-paint the dragon and make her visible.

“Good idea, but she’s an incorporeal dragon and the paint won’t stick.”

And so on. I counter every physical test you propose with a special explanation of why it won’t work.

Now, what’s the difference between an invisible, incorporeal, floating dragon who spits heatless fire and no dragon at all? If there’s no way to disprove my contention, no conceivable experiment that would count against it, what does it mean to say that my dragon exists? Your inability to invalidate my hypothesis is not at all the same thing as proving it true. Claims that cannot be tested, assertions immune to disproof are veridically worthless, whatever value they may have in inspiring us or in exciting our sense of wonder. What I’m asking you to do comes down to believing, in the absence of evidence, on my say-so.

Shermer’s version has some variants to ridicule Frank’s stance on the existence of God as an explanation of the origin of the universe, the objective moral values, ​​and duties and the fine-tuning of the universe. The main objective of Shermer is to prove that the existence of God is impossible to refute in the same way that theists can’t refute the existence of the dragon in the garage. But is this a good argument? Not really. Let me explain why.

The first thing that Shermer wants us to believe using Sagan’s analogy is that the properties of God that the theists attribute to him are mere gratuitous affirmations without any evidence. Here Shermer has in mind the revealed theology, those attributes that we know that God possesses through his word revealed to us. But in the debate with Frank one does not affirm the attributes of God as in the case of the dragon in the garage. And although it is not necessary, let me compare the fire-breathing dragon and God with their respective attributes.

The case for the Fire-Breathing Dragon in The Garage

Invisibility. This attribute is granted without any evidence.

Floating in the air. Neither is inferred based on any evidence.

Cold Fire. Like the previous ones, there is no argument to attribute this property to the dragon; moreover, the property is self-contradictory.

Immateriality. Zero arguments, and like cold fire-breathing, this is a contradictory property of a dragon. For a dragon to be a dragon, it must have a body with certain essential properties of a dragon, it can’t be incorporeal.

The case for God

Creator, metaphysically necessary, self-existent. These attributes are inferred through the argument of contingent beings and the ontological argument.

Transcendent, personal cause, beginningless, uncaused, timeless, non-spatial, immaterial, extremely powerful. These attributes are required given the nature of a cause that transcends the universe and through the cosmological kalam argument.

Designer and extremely intelligent. These attributes are inferred by the fine-tuning argument of the universe.

Perfectly good whose nature is the standard of goodness and whose mandates constitute our moral duties. And this last attribute is concluded through the moral argument.

As we can see, the fire-breathing dragon is completely deficient in comparison to God.

Shermer also qualifies the hypothesis of God as a fallacy of the special pleading, but we have seen with this comparison that this is not the case. No serious apologist in a debate intends to refute the objections against the arguments in favor of the existence of God affirming that the atheist can’t understand the properties of God as the best explanation to some facts of reality.

Another important point is that Shermer also uses the dragon in the garage as a parody of God as an explanation to the following facts about reality: the absolute origin of the universe, fine-tuning, and the foundation for objective moral values ​​and duties. But his parody fails miserably for two reasons: the first is, as we have already seen, that some of the attributes that the fire-breathing dragon possesses are self-contradictory, more than enough reason to determine that such a dragon is impossible to exist. Second, for the sake of argument, I will be very kind in modifying the dragon by removing all its contradictory properties and adding the property of omnipotence. Can the dragon be the transcendent cause of the origin of the universe being that it has enough power to bring the universe to exist? ¡Of course not! An essential property of the dragon is that it has to be material/corporeal/physical, without that property it would cease to be a dragon. But if our version of the omnipotent dragon is corporeal, if it is a physical being, then it can’t be the cause of the origin of the universe, because one of the properties that the transcendent cause must have is to be immaterial, it can’t be material because matter arrives at existence with the origin of the universe. The same goes to be the foundation of the objective moral values ​​and duties, our dragon can’t be eternal, it had to come to exist together with the universe, therefore, it is contingent, and no contingent being can be the foundation for the objectivity of morality.

Conclusion

We have seen that the analogy of the fire-breathing dragon in the garage as presented by Michael Shermer as an argument against the hypothesis of God is deficient for four reasons:

  1. Thanks to the contradictory properties of the dragon in the garage, we can affirm that its existence is impossible.
  2. The properties of God are inferred using deductive arguments, which does not happen with the fire-breathing dragon.
  3. Defend the properties of the dragon in the way Shermer presented, surely it is to commit the fallacy of special pleading, but it is not in the case of God.

Even if we were to grant the Dragon possible existence by removing its contradictory properties, it would fail to be the transcendent cause of the absolute origin of the universe.

Recommended resources related to the topic:

I Don’t Have Enough Faith to Be an Atheist (Paperback), and (Sermon) by Norman Geisler and Frank Turek

God’s Crime Scene: Cold-Case…Evidence for a Divinely Created Universe (Paperback), (Mp4 Download), and (DVD Set) by J. Warner Wallace

God’s Crime Scene: The Case for God’s Existence from the Appearance of Design (mp4 Download Set) by J. Warner Wallace 

God’s Crime Scene: The Case for God’s Existence from the Appearance of Design in Biology DVD Set by J. Warner Wallace What is God Like? Look to the Heavens by Dr. Frank Turek (DVD and Mp4)

Jairo Izquierdo is an author and Community Manager for the Christian organization Cross Examined. He studies philosophy and theology, his current focus of study being classical logic, epistemology and molinism. He is co-founder of Filósofo Cristiano and editor at World View Media. Jairo resides in Puebla, Mexico and is an active member of Cristo es la Respuesta Church.

/by

El realismo modal, libre albedrío y el infinito actual en Dark

INTRODUCCIÓN

En este escrito aprovecho de algunas cuestiones filosóficas y científicas mencionadas en la serie Dark para explicarlas de manera sencilla a personas que tal vez no habían escuchado o que habían usado erróneamente y que de alguna manera guardan relación con la teología cristiana.

Definiendo conceptos

En la serie de Dark se suele hablar de términos como “realidad” o “mundos” para distinguir entre el mundo de Jonas, el mundo de Martha y el mundo de origen. Asimismo, algunos youtuberos que analizaron la serie mencionaron “línea temporal” y “universo”. ¿Pero son todos estos conceptos la misma cosa? Bueno, eso depende del contexto. Déjame mostrarte cómo es que yo distinguiría estos términos y que podrían ayudarte para abordar cuestiones metafísicas relacionadas con la teología o la apologética, tales como los mundos posibles y el multiverso.

Definiré realidad como la suma de todas las cosas reales. En este sentido, la realidad es una categoría o clase más que un estado o atributo.

Por mundo quiero decir la suma total de todo lo que existe, incluidas las entidades abstractas no espaciotemporales. Ahora, si las entidades abstractas existen, entonces, tanto mundo como realidad son lo mismo en el presente contexto.

El universo significa el sistema total espaciotemporal de materia y energía (impersonal), es decir, la suma total de objetos materiales, de alguna manera accesible a los sentidos y a la investigación científica.

En cuanto a la línea temporal, este sería algo relativo. Por ejemplo, la línea temporal puede ser tanto la historia de principio a fin de la realidad como la de cada uno de sus universos que pudiera contener.

Y hablando de universos paralelos, por multiverso me refiero a la hipótesis que habla sobre la existencia de un conjunto de universos como el nuestro. Ahora, dado que establecimos que la realidad o el mundo contienen todas las cosas que son reales, entonces los universos sería más bien un subconjunto dentro de un mundo. Así que la idea de que universos paralelos que están conectados unos con otros como lo plantea la serie de DARK, es, al menos, lógicamente posible (si es físicamente posible, es algo que dejaré a los astrofísicos resolver).

Un mundo posible, es un mundo que podría haber sido diferente al actual, o sea, al mundo en el que nosotros vivimos.

Y si hablamos de mundos posibles, entonces estamos obligados a hablar del realismo modal de David Kellogg Lewis. Su teoría propone principalmente que todos los mundos posibles lógicos son tan reales como nuestro mundo (el mundo real o actual). Los mundos posibles en el realismo modal tienen las siguientes 6 características[1]:

  1. Los mundos posibles existen: son tan reales como nuestro mundo.
  2. Los mundos posibles son el mismo tipo de cosas que nuestro mundo: difieren en el contenido, no en la clase.
  3. Los mundos posibles no pueden reducirse a algo más básico: son entidades irreductibles por derecho propio.
  4. La “actualidad” es indexada. Cuando distinguimos nuestro mundo de otros mundos posibles al afirmar que solo es real, solo queremos decir que es “nuestro” mundo.
  5. Los mundos posibles están unificados por las interrelaciones espaciotemporales de sus partes; Cada mundo está aislado espacialmente de todos los demás mundos.
  6. Los mundos posibles están causalmente aislados unos de otros.

Así que como puedes ver, dado 5 y 6, la serie de Dark estaría en lo incorrecto al hablar de mundos que se interconectan o de un mundo que da origen a otros mundos. Así que lo que realmente sucede en la serie, es que existe un mundo, una sola realidad, donde existen varios universos que se interconectan unos con otros a través de la máquina transuniversal de la que nunca se toman la molestia de describir su funcionamiento.

Libre albedrío

Para hablar de libre albedrío, es necesario definir el determinismo. Tomo la siguiente definición:

El determinismo es la visión de que para cada evento que ocurre, hay condiciones tales que, dadas, nada más podría haber ocurrido. Por cada acontecimiento que ocurre, su ocurrencia fue causada o requerida por factores previos, de manera que, dados esos factores previos, el acontecimiento en cuestión tenía que ocurrir. Una forma de determinismo lo define como la postura de que todo acontecimiento es causado por acontecimientos causales anteriores y las leyes pertinentes son suficientes para la producción de ese acontecimiento. En cualquier momento t, sólo hay un mundo futuro físicamente posible que se puede obtener. Cada evento es el resultado inexorable de una cadena de eventos que conducen a ese evento y son suficientes para él.[2]

Con esto en mente, ahora pasemos a hablar sobre el libre albedrío como es expuesto en la serie. Según DARK (y varios youtuberos que analizaron la serie) no existe el libre albedrío como tal por el simple hecho de que los personajes nunca toman decisiones diferentes a como lo hicieron en el ciclo de tiempo anterior, cada vez que se repite el ciclo de tiempo, todos ellos “eligen” siempre lo mismo, lo que demuestra que el libre albedrío no es más que una ilusión—todo está determinado. Así, el único personaje con libre albedrío en la serie resultó ser Cluadia (al menos la Claudia del último ciclo). Ya que es ella quien logra escoger una opción diferente a como lo habían hechos las anteriores Claudias, y esto da paso a que se rompa el bucle temporal y la serie logra terminar en la forma a como lo hizo.

El problema con esto es que se vuelve incomprensible porque solo en Claudia se aplica el PPA y en los demás personajes no si todo está determinado.[3] Una vez que se repite el ciclo, este comienza con las mismas condiciones que el anterior y como todo lo físico está sujeto a las leyes de la causalidad, pues no hay forma de que las cosas ocurran de diferente manera[4].

Pero regresemos a la cuestión del libre albedrío que es lo que nos compete aquí. Mi mayor problema es la definición que toman de libre albedrío, que podría ser como sigue:

Las criaturas libres tienen la capacidad de elegir entre alternativas que compiten entre sí, y realmente podrían elegir una u otra de las alternativas.

Como ustedes pueden ver, en Dark se confunde el libre albedrío libertariano con el principio de posibilidades alternas. La única relación que existe entre ambos es que el PPA es suficiente para el LAL, pero no necesario. Y aunque existen muchas versiones del LAL, considero que la siguiente es correcta:

La libertad [libertaria] no requiere la habilidad de elegir de otra manera que no sea como uno lo hace. […] lo que es crítico para el libre albedrío [libertariano] no es la capacidad de elegir de manera diferente en circunstancias idénticas, sino más bien no ser causado a hacer algo por causas distintas a uno mismo.[5]

Creo que esta versión del libre albedrío es correcta porque las ilustraciones de Harry Frankfurt son demoledoras para demostrar que la libertad (libertariana) no requiere de la habilidad de escoger diferente a la manera que la persona lo hace:

Consideremos a un hombre que, sin saberlo, tiene su cerebro alambrado con electrodos controlados por un científico loco. El científico, quien apoya a Barack Obama, decide que va activar los electrodos para hacer al hombre votar por Obama si el hombre entra en la casilla para votar por Mitt Romney. Por otro lado, si él elige votar por Obama, entonces el científico no va a activar los electrodos. Supongamos, entonces, que el hombre entra en la casilla de votación y presiona el botón para botar por Obama. En ese caso parece que el hombre vota libremente por Obama. ¡Aun si no estaba dentro de su poder el hacer nada diferente![6]

Si aplicamos esta ilustración a los personajes de Dark, podemos concluir que no se requiere que ellos escojan de otra manera a como lo hicieron en los ciclos pasados para que puedan tener libre albedrío (al menos libre albedrío libertariano).

Infinitos actuales

La última cuestión filosófica de la que quiero hablar es el concepto de infinito utilizado en la serie. En el mundo de Dark, tanto en el universo de Jonas como en el de Martha, el tiempo se ha repetido una y otra vez infinidad de veces desde el pasado. Por supuesto, esto es posible puesto que el mundo de Dark adopta la teoría B del tiempo, donde el flujo del tiempo es solo una ilusión y que tanto el pasado, el presente y el futuro son igualmente reales, que el tiempo no tiene tensión, es decir, el devenir temporal no es una característica objetiva de la realidad. Por eso es por lo que, en el último capítulo de la tercera temporada, cuando Claudia se encuentra con Adán, le dice lo siguiente: “Lo que ha ocurrido hasta ahora ha sucedido una infinidad de veces, pero este momento entre tú y yo aquí, es la primera vez que ocurre”. Pero en una teoría A del tiempo, donde el devenir del tiempo es una característica objetiva del tiempo, esto es metafísicamente imposible.

Primero definamos lo que es un infinito potencial y uno actual:

El infinito potencial es la concepción de infinito como un proceso. Este proceso se construye empezando por los primeros pasos (por ejemplo 1, 2, 3 en la construcción del conjunto de los números naturales) que se refieren a una concepción acción. Repetir estos pasos (por la adición de 1 repetidamente) al infinito, requiere de la interiorización de estas acciones en un proceso. El infinito actual es el objeto mental que se obtiene de la encapsulación de este proceso.

…el infinito potencial se percibe como una transformación que se repite sin fin, en donde pueden generarse tantos elementos del proceso como se quiera. Por otra parte, el infinito actual hace referencia a una cosa terminada, un objeto estático que puede construirse a partir de un proceso.[7]

La relevancia filosófica de esta distinción es que algunos filósofos argumentan que el infinito actual no puede existir en la realidad. Por ejemplo, el filósofo medieval Al Gazali argumento a favor de la existencia del universo. Según Gazali, la serie de acontecimientos pasados fue formada al añadir un acontecimiento tras otro. La serie de acontecimientos pasados es como una secuencia de piezas de dominós cayendo una tras otra hasta que la última pieza que cae hoy es alcanzada. Pero él argumenta que ninguna serie formada por añadir un miembro tras otro puede ser actualmente infinita, pues uno no puede pasar por un número infinito de elementos a la vez.

William Lane Craig nos da el ejemplo de contar hasta el infinito:

No importa cuán alto uno pueda contar, siempre habrá una infinidad de números que contar. Si no es posible contar hasta o infinito, ¿cómo sería posible contar a partir del infinito? Sería como si alguien alegase haber hecho un contaje regresivo de todos los números negativos, terminando en cero: …, -3, -2, -1, 0. Eso parece una locura. Pues, antes de que él pueda contar 0, necesitaría contar -1 y, antes de contar -1, necesitaría contar -2, y así sucesivamente, de regreso al infinito. Antes que cualquier número pudiese ser contado, una infinidad de números tendrá que ser contada primero. Uno acaba de ser arrastrado cada vez más y más en el pasado, a tal punto que no es posible contar ningún número más.

Pero entonces, la última pieza del dominó jamás podría caer, si un número infinito de piezas tuviese que caer primero. Por lo tanto, hoy, nunca podría llegar. ¡Pero, obviamente, que aquí estamos! Eso muestra que la serie de acontecimientos pasados debe ser finita y debe tener un comienzo.[8]

Así que, si que, si la Teoría A del tiempo es correcta, esa escena donde Claudia se encuentra con Adán nunca llegaría a darse en primer lugar, porque no puedes pasar por una cadena de eventos infinitos desde el pasado hasta el presente.

Otra paradoja muy interesante que demuestra lo absurdo de esto, es la paradoja del ángel de la muerte propuesta por Alexander Pruss y Robert Koons[9]. De acuerdo con la paradoja, supón que existe una cantidad infinita de ángeles de la muerte. Digamos que tú estás vivo a la media noche. El ángel de la muerte núm. 1 te matará a la 1:00 a.m., si todavía estás vivo a esa hora. El ángel de la muerte núm. 2 te matará a la 12:30 a.m., si todavía está vivo en ese entonces. El ángel de la muerte núm. 3 te matará a la 12:15 a.m., y así sucesivamente. Una situación como esa parece obviamente concebible, dada la posibilidad de un número realmente infinito de cosas, más lleva a una imposibilidad: tú no puedes sobrevivir después de la media noche y, aun así, no puedes ser asesinado por ningún ángel de la muerte en ningún momento.

Este argumento se puede formular de la siguiente manera y es utilizado para argumentar a favor del pasado finito del universo:

  1. Un conjunto formado por adicción sucesiva no puede ser un infinito actual.
  2. La serie temporal de acontecimientos es un conjunto formado por adicción sucesiva.
  3. Por lo tanto, la serie temporal de acontecimientos no puede ser un infinito actual.

CONCLUSIÓN

A pesar de todas las preguntas que podrían haberse dejado sin responder en Dark, así como el uso impreciso de las teorías del tiempo y de algunos conceptos filosóficos, eso no amerita que sea mala, al contrario, jugar con las imposibilidades lógicas y metafísicas siempre le dará ese toque maravilloso a las obras de ciencia ficción, y más si se pueden utilizar de referencia para explicar algunos conceptos de filosofía que de otra manera sería aburrido para para el lector ajeno a estos temas.

Notas

[1] https://es.wikipedia.org/wiki/Realismo_modal (consultado el 29 de julio del 2020).

[2] W. L. Craig and J. P. Moreland, Philosophical Foundations for a Christian Worldview, p. 280.

[3] De acuerdo con los expertos en comentarios de YouTube, los personajes que existen debido a ellos mismos por culpa del bucle (abuelos y nietos son la misma persona) no poseen libre albedrío, solo los personajes “originales” que son del universo de origen pueden tener libre albedrío. Por supuesto, lo curioso es que esta explicación hace nada para proveer dicha distinción a un nivel ontológico.

[4] Existe otra explicación para que Claudia pudiera elegir de forma diferente con el transcurso de los ciclos: la indeterminación o que al menos el universo tiene un cierto grado de indeterminación. Lo que significaría que con cada ciclo que pasa, este sería diferente al anterior en un grado micro, pero da la posibilidad de que después de millones de ciclos exista uno que será muy diferente a comparación de los anteriores. Puedes ver esta explicación con más detalle aquí: https://youtu.be/2M4hJsSArF8

[5] https://es.reasonablefaith.org/question-answer/P270/el-libre-albedrio/?fbclid=IwAR3ugT8Yyvsx-8kV2YoxR-L1lLFD0huewXPyrzuU7yfSvEroiFWdKwRmOfQ (consultado el 29 de julio del 2020).

[6] Ibid.

[7] ROA FUENTES, Solange y OKTAC, Asuman. El infinito potencial y actual: descripción de caminos cognitivos para su construcción en un contexto de paradojas. Educ. mat [online]. 2014, vol.26, n.1 [citado 2020-07-29], pp.73-101. Disponible en: http://www.scielo.org.mx/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S1665-58262014000100004&lng=es&nrm=iso. ISSN 1665-5826

[8] https://www.reasonablefaith.org/writings/popular-writings/existence-nature-of-god/the-kalam-cosmological-argument/ (consultado el 29 de julio del 2020).

[9] http://robkoons.net/media/83c9b25c56d629ffffff810fffffd524.pdf (consultado el 29 de julio del 2020).

Recursos recomendados en Español:

Robándole a Dios (tapa blanda), (Guía de estudio para el profesor) y (Guía de estudio del estudiante) por el Dr. Frank Turek

Por qué no tengo suficiente fe para ser un ateo (serie de DVD completa), (Manual de trabajo del profesor) y (Manual del estudiante) del Dr. Frank Turek 

 

Jairo Izquierdo es miembro del equipo de Social Media y autor para la organización cristiana Cross Examined.  Estudia filosofía y teología, siendo su actual foco de estudio la lógica clásica, epistemología, doctrinas cristianas y filosofía del lenguaje.  Es cofundador de Filósofo Cristiano. Es miembro en la Christian Apologetics Alliance y director de alabanza en la iglesia cristiana bautista Cristo es la Respuesta en Puebla, México.

/by

Agradar a Dios en medio del confinamiento

In this writing I would like to share with you some reflections that we can learn from some people in the Bible who went through very difficult times and that we can apply in our days with respect to these moments of confinement and isolation in our homes.*

David’s response to suffering

Let’s see what the following verses in the Psalms say:

Save me, O God, For the waters have come up to my soul. I am drowned in deep mire, where I cannot stand; I have come to deep waters, and the flood has overflowed me. I am weary of calling; my throat is hoarse; my eyes fail from waiting for my God. (Psalm 69:1-3)

Lift me up out of the mire, that I may not be drowned; Let me be delivered from those who hate me, and from the depths of the waters. Let not the flood overwhelm me, Nor let the deep swallow me up, Nor let the pit close its mouth upon me. Answer me, O LORD, for Your loving-kindness is gracious; Look upon me according to the multitude of Your tender mercies. Hide not Your face from Your servant, For I am in distress; Make haste, hear me. Come near to my soul, redeem it; Deliver me from my enemies. You know my reproach, my confusion, and my disgrace; All my adversaries are before You. Scorn has broken my heart, and I am in distress. I looked for a compassionate man, but there was none; I looked for comforters, but I found none. (Psalm 69:14-20)

We can see that in these verses David is going through very difficult times; he expresses to God that he feels desperate, troubled, tired, distressed and dismayed.

But there is something else regarding David’s attitude in this situation that is revealed to us verses later:

I will give thanks to the name of God with a song; I will exalt him with thanksgiving. This will please the LORD more than a sacrifice of an ox, or a calf with horns and hooves. (Psalm 69:30, 31)

What was David’s response after expressing his deepest feelings to God? What did he say he would do? Did he say he would turn away from God or forget about Him? Of course not, he said he would praise God’s name with songs!

Habakkuk’s response to tribulation

David was not the only one who had a similar reaction. The Bible tells us the story of another who suffered tribulation, and in the midst of his troubles, he praised the name of God with songs:

Though the fig tree does not blossom, Though there is no fruit on the vines, Though the olive crop fails, Though the fields yield no food, Though the sheep are cut off from the fold, Though there is no herd in the stalls, Yet I will rejoice in the LORD, I will be joyful in God my Savior. The Lord GOD is my strength, He makes my feet like hinds’ feet, And makes me walk on my high places. (Habakkuk 3:17)

What did Habakkuk do when he heard this terrible news from God? He composed this beautiful praise in response! Habakkuk is aware that when misfortune after misfortune comes he will fall into grief, a reaction anyone would have. But will he let the pain consume him? Not at all! He promises that he will rejoice in the Lord.

Paul and Silas’ response to confinement

Now let’s see what Paul and Silas did when they were thrown into prison:

After they had severely beaten them [Paul and Silas], they threw them into prison and ordered the jailer to keep them safely. When he had received this order, he put them in the inner cell and fastened their feet in the stocks. But at midnight Paul and Silas were praying and singing hymns to God, and the prisoners heard them. Suddenly there was a great earthquake, so that the foundations of the prison were shaken. All the doors were immediately opened, and everyone’s chains were loosed. (Acts 16:23-27)

I don’t know about you, but if I got beaten up and then put in jail, the last thing I would want to do would be to sing. But notice that despite being in that situation, Paul and Silas prayed and sang to the Lord. Why? I don’t think they did it because they were happy, rather, I think they did it because they knew it would please God.

Our response to suffering and pain

The automatic response for most of us to suffering and pain is to grieve and mope, to feel sorry for ourselves, and to hope for comfort and encouragement from those around us. These people’s reaction was different. And they are a model of how we should respond to times of pain and tribulation in a way that pleases God. When you and I are at our best, when everything is going well, we have no problem praising God. However, praising Him when things are going badly, when everything seems to be going downhill, is not easy at all. The last thing on our minds is probably singing to Him! And yet, that is what pleases God: praising Him, exalting Him, thanking Him in the midst of suffering, that pleases God’s heart. I know it is very difficult to think of praising God because it pleases God, because you might think that He is pleased to see us suffer, but that is not the case. Praising God in the midst of pain shows something about us: that we have faith in Him, and this will open a way for God to work in our lives.

Three ways to please God in the midst of confinement [1]

What to do in times of confinement? Once again David seems to shed some light on this:

For he will hide me in his tabernacle in the day of trouble; he will conceal me in the secret place of his dwelling; he will set me high upon a rock. (Psalm 27:5)

The psalmist tells of a time he was living in when God would hide him and protect him from evil. From the context, it seems that David wants to teach us that, in the time of war, in the time when his kingdom was invaded, God would free him from his enemies by placing him in his tabernacle, His temple (Psalm 27: 3).

Now, think about our current situation where we are advised or commanded to stay at home to reduce the spread of the coronavirus. It seems that we can get at least three lessons from verses 3 to 5 of this psalm where David will be hidden in God’s dwelling place and then put him in a higher place where he cannot be reached.

  1. Deepen our relationship with God

Observe what David will do in the time of confinement, in the time of hiding:

One thing have I desired of the LORD, that will I seek after: that I may dwell in the house of the LORD all the days of my life, to gaze upon the beauty of the LORD, and to inquire in his temple. (Psalm 27:4)

We see that in the midst of the crisis (Psalm 27: 2, 3) David makes only one request: to be in the house of God all the days of his life. The first lesson we can learn here in this time of confinement is to deepen our relationship with God. David’s recommendation is not to invest time in passing entertainment, but to take this time that we are at home to meditate on how we are carrying out our relationship with God. Are we doing what pleases Him? Take David’s example, he says that he will make a plan to be closer to God while he is in hiding. Take some time to read or study the Bible, read books or take a time of prayer.

  1. Contemplate the beauty of God

Verse 4 also tells us that David only wanted to contemplate the beauty of God. This does not mean that we try to “see” God and remain in a kind of trance, but rather to reflect God’s love through our attitude. How do people around you notice when you are in love? Your attitude. Your attitude changes towards others: you become kinder, more caring, more helpful. Who will we reflect this attitude with? With our family. Maybe on normal days you don’t spend time with your family because everyone does some activity that prevents you from relating to them, but nothing prevents you from spending time with your loved ones now that we are in confinement. Spending time with your husband(wife), child(ren), brother(s) can be hard, no doubt, there may be more friction than usual, but David says that this is the best time to manifest God’s love with our loved ones through our attitude. Do not allow boredom, tiredness or annoyance to make you take it out on your family. Take advantage of the time to unify more with the beings you love.

  1. Deepening our knowledge of God

Finally, verse 4 tells us that David desires to inquire in His holy temple. To inquire means to get to know something through questioning. During this time of confinement, we will be tempted to distract ourselves with social media, streaming series , video games, whatever. But how much time will you spend to increase your knowledge? David tells us that when the time of confinement comes, he would use the time to investigate, ask questions, question himself to increase his knowledge. Entertainment at home is not bad, of course, but do not forget to use this valuable time that you may not have again to read the Bible or to study a book by a Christian author.

Grades

[1] I thank Pastor Josafath Izquierdo for his help in this section of the writing.

*You can find the video of this article here: https://youtu.be/julXojCRNAE

Recommended resources in Spanish:

Stealing from God ( Paperback ), ( Teacher Study Guide ), and ( Student Study Guide ) by Dr. Frank Turek

Why I Don’t Have Enough Faith to Be an Atheist ( Complete DVD Series ), ( Teacher’s Workbook ), and ( Student’s Handbook ) by Dr. Frank Turek 

 

Jairo Izquierdo is a member of the Social Media team and an author for the Christian organization Cross Examined . He studies philosophy and theology, with his current focus being classical logic, epistemology, Christian doctrines, and philosophy of language. He is co-founder of Filósofo Cristiano . He is a member of the Christian Apologetics Alliance and a worship director at the Christian Baptist church Cristo es la Respuesta in Puebla, Mexico.

/by

¿Qué es el posmodernismo?

Since this philosophical movement has become very popular these days on social media, I have found it necessary to write this note to explain what postmodernism really is; since I often notice that many people use the adjective “postmo” as a synonym for “progressive” or “chairo”, when they are not (although I do not mean to say that they are exclusive), or that being postmodern is unique to atheism, which is totally false.

Addressing the topic of postmodernism would require more than a few simple pages, so this writing will be to clarify in a simple and brief way what postmodernism represents in a very general way.

First, postmodernism covers not only the philosophical movement that followed modernism, but also cultural, artistic and literary movements. So keep in mind that the whole thing on social media is about philosophical ideology; so as not to think that when someone criticizes a “postmo” they are referring to some artist or literary person (although this may well be the case, but usually it is the philosopher).

Second, postmodernism covers a multitude of theses (or antitheses, depending on the case), so always keep in mind that one postmodern is not identical to another postmodern, nor does one hold each and every one of the positions we will see below, so it is important that when you come across a postmodern you first ask why he holds that position, what his specific points of view are.

Third. In general, postmodernism, as a philosophical movement, is above all an epistemic reinterpretation; that is, of what knowledge is and what counts as knowledge. Postmodernism goes beyond the issue of gender ideology, which is the most well-known topic of debate, but rather a cultural relativism about reality, truth, reason, value, linguistic meaning, logic, sameness, among other notions. The main exponents of postmodernism; the best known are Friedrich Nietzsche, Ludwig Wittgenstein, Jacques Derrida, Martin Heidegger, among others.

That said, let’s look at the most common philosophical positions held by postmodernism.

Metaphysical anti-realism. Postmodernism rejects the existence of language-independent reality, the reality of the external world, and the application of the laws of logic to reality. In other words you already know, “it’s a social construct,” the old reliable of postmodernism.

Rejection of theories of truth. “There is no such thing as objective truth.” “There are no absolute truths.” You’ve heard that, right? Well, that’s also postmodern. The reason? “It’s a social construct.”

Epistemic subjectivity: Since for postmodernists knowledge is a social construction and not an objective and justified representation of the reality of our mental states, it follows that there is no position from which knowledge itself can be defined without resorting to begging the question.

Anti-essentialism. Essentialism, in simple terms, is the position that some entities have both essential and accidental properties. An essential property is one that if the object were to cease to possess, it would cease to be what it is. For example, being an animal is a property of a cow. Accidental properties are ones that if the object in question were to cease to possess them, it would still be what it is. For example, the dog Snoopy has the accidental property of having white fur and black ears. If Snoopy were entirely brown instead of white with black ears, Snoopy would still be a dog. According to postmodernists, there is no objective distinction between essential and accidental properties, but rather they are relative to our own criteria of classification. At this point you will have noticed those who currently reject essentialism: the gender ideologues. For example, since there is no objective difference between the essential properties that make a man a man and a woman a woman, gender ideologists use this to impose their ideology that any person can be whatever they want.

Subjective meaning of language and thought. First, postmodernists reject the idea that language objects have authorial meaning, depriving the author of interpreting his own work. Second, they claim that thought cannot exist without language and that thought is nothing more than linguistic behavior relative to social groups.

Anti-metanarratives. A metanarrative is either a procedure for determining which conceptual scheme/worldview is true/rational or a reference to worldviews that have come to be accepted by large groups of people, such as atheism or Christianity, among others. By stating that there are no metanarratives, it follows that there is no way to decide which worldview is true or that any worldview is true.

There are other positions that are held by postmodernists, but those mentioned in this note are the most common and the most mentioned in the current social controversy. Therefore, it must be taken into account that although one can make fun of postmodern positions, these are reinterpretations of very deep philosophical positions that are topics of serious study for disciplines such as epistemology, axiology, metaphysics, philosophy of language, etc. Therefore, I invite the reader to dedicate time to study some article on these topics in question.

I also want to point out that postmodernism is not an ideology exclusive to atheism. There are currently theistic philosophers who share one or more of these postmodern positions with certain variations given their commitment to theism. For example, the Christian philosopher Alfonso Ropero maintains that there are no absolute truths, and that if they did exist, they could only be known by God.

Much more could be said about postmodernism, so I will leave a few resources at the end of the note so that the interested reader can delve deeper into the subject in question.

References

“Theories of Truth and Postmodernism” by JP Moreland and WL Craig in Philosophical Foundations for a Christian Worldview .

“Modernism and Postmodernism”. See:   http://www.monografias.com/trabajos/modypostmod/modypostmod.shtml (Accessed 30/Dec/2016).

“Do We Live in a Postmodern Society?” See:  http://www.reasonablefaith.org/spanish/vivimos-en-una-sociedad-postmoderna (Accessed 30/Dec/2016).

“Sexuality and Gender: Conclusions from Biology, Psychology and the Social Sciences” See: http://www.thenewatlantis.com/publications/preface (Accessed 12/30/2016).

 

Recommended resources in Spanish:

Stealing from God ( Paperback ), ( Teacher Study Guide ), and ( Student Study Guide ) by Dr. Frank Turek

Why I Don’t Have Enough Faith to Be an Atheist ( Complete DVD Series ), ( Teacher’s Workbook ), and ( Student’s Handbook ) by Dr. Frank Turek 

 

Jairo Izquierdo is a member of the Social Media team and an author for the Christian organization Cross Examined . He studies philosophy and theology, with his current focus being classical logic, epistemology, Christian doctrines, and philosophy of language. He is co-founder of Filósofo Cristiano . He is a member of the Christian Apologetics Alliance and a worship director at the Christian Baptist church Cristo es la Respuesta in Puebla, Mexico.

/by
Un caso contra el teísmo (Parte 4)

Un caso contra el teísmo (Parte 4)

In this post I will address one last argument in this series of objections from Randy. You can find part 1 here, part 2 here and part 3 here.

Randy presents an atheological argument which he calls “the full version of the Argument from Evil” and says:

1. God is omnipotent and omnibenevolent.

2. Omnipotence and omnibenevolence imply the nonexistence of evil.

3. Evil exists (via internal criticism, taken from the moral framework of omnibenevolence, I do not believe it really exists).

4. Either God is not omnipotent or he is not omnibenevolent.

5. God, not having one of those two properties and both being necessary for his existence, God does not exist.

This argument does not include the possibility of defending free will (which I do not believe exists since it is completely irrelevant). Let me explain: the defense of free will is that God, by giving us free will, we choose to do good or evil. My answer would be that God can make us omnibenevolent and we would not do evil, just as he himself is omnibenevolent and only does good, and if “free will” prevents that from being true, then does God not have free will? And if not, why is it so important that we have it? In other words, God could have made us omnibenevolent, but he could not, in that case he would not be omnipotent, or he did not want to, and in that case he would not be omnibenevolent, because then we would choose to do evil. In any case, it is logically impossible to escape from this dichotomy.

Once again, greetings from Cuba.

Randy, I agree with (1) and (3) of your argument, so there is nothing to argue about here.

The main problem with your argument is (2), since there are countless responses to this premise, I will just direct you to those resources that show that this premise is false. You can read a complete response here . So, in short, I can say that (2) is false because there is no explicit contradiction between the propositions:

       a. God (who is omnibenevolent and omnipotent) exists

AND

       b. Evil exists.

If the atheist believes that both propositions are mutually exclusive, then he must show some hidden or implicit premises that make this contradiction appear, but he does not bother to present them. Therefore, the logical problem of evil does not prove that there is any inconsistency between God and evil. [1]

Since there is no reason to think that God and evil are logically incompatible, we can say that (4) is false, so (5) no longer follows from the premises.

Now let’s go to your objections to the defense of free will:

This argument does not allow for the defense of free will (which I do not believe exists since it is completely irrelevant).

I think it’s pretty clear that from the premise that something is irrelevant it doesn’t follow that it doesn’t exist.

My answer would be that God can make us omnibenevolent and we would do no wrong, just as he himself is omnibenevolent and only does good…

Oh, Randy, but the problem is that omnibenevolence (or perfect goodness) is an artifact unique to God. As Dr. Craig explains:

A morally perfect being would completely approach the divine nature. He would be worthy of worship. Therefore, he would be God. But God is, necessarily, uncreable. He necessarily exists  in and of himself . So God could not create another God, a replica, so to speak, of himself. [2]

Given this response, someone may be tempted to mention Adam, but in Christian theology, Adam is not morally perfect, but morally innocent before the Fall.

…and if “free will” prevents that from being true, then doesn’t God have free will? And if not, why is it so important for us to have it?

I think God does have free will, but there are different versions of free will. The kind of free will I subscribe to is libertarian, which says that to have free will is to be free from causal determinism outside of yourself, the choice is up to you, it is not determined by causal factors outside of you. In the case of God, he is free in that sense because there are no causal factors outside of him.

Conclusion

In the end, Randy, your argument against the existence of God based on the problem of evil is not strong enough to deal with the objections I have presented: there is no logical contradiction between omnibenevolence/omnipotence and the existence of evil, just as your objections to the defense of freedom are not so good. [3]

Grades

[1] For a case against these supposed hidden premises see: https://youtu.be/4Q5zQC2BEVY?t=976 (accessed November 10, 2019).

[2] https://reasonablefaith.org/writings/question-of-the-week/could-god-create-a-morally-perfect-being-with-free-will (accessed November 7, 2019).

[3] For an extensive defense of free will, see Alvin Plantinga’s God, Freedom, and Evil .

 

Jairo Izquierdo is a member of the Social Media team and an author for the Christian organization Cross Examined . He studies philosophy and theology, with his current focus being classical logic, epistemology, Christian doctrines, and philosophy of language. He is co-founder of Filósofo Cristiano . He is a member of the Christian Apologetics Alliance and a worship director at the Christian Baptist church Cristo es la Respuesta in Puebla, Mexico.

/by
Un caso contra el teísmo (Parte 3)

Un caso contra el teísmo (Parte 3)

In a previous post I addressed an objection from Randy, an atheist from Cuba, who presented a case against theism. In this post I will address the second objection. Randy says that

The properties of God, being metaphysical, pose another problem: how do we know that he is omnipotent and not powerful enough to create the universe alone? What justifies the omni part, how can we know that?

Randy, you are right that God’s omnipotence is not inferred from the kalam cosmological argument, just that He is “extremely powerful” enough to bring the universe into existence. But as Dr. Craig himself states: “…the fact that an argument fails to prove that God is omnipotent does not imply that He  is not  omnipotent.” [1]

Then you ask the question:

How do you rule out there being a being more powerful than him?

Well, Randy, if there is a being more powerful than the one concluded by the kalam argument, it would be God! In reality, this objection does little to nothing to refute the existence of God as you can see.

How do you rule out in omniscience that he does not know everything, because he was created by a Supergod who created him making him believe that he knew everything when he does not know everything? Even God revealing to you that he knows everything, we cannot justify that he is omniscient because of the problem previously raised. This happens with all omni properties, they are unjustified.

Well, Randy, it seems you haven’t heard of Alvin Plantinga’s modal ontological argument, since the argument concludes in a Maximally Great Being possessing all the superlative attributes you claim cannot be justified.

Finally, it must be made clear that the arguments of natural theology do not aim to demonstrate all of God’s attributes, but rather to raise the possibility or probability that God exists.

Note:

[1] https://es.reasonablefaith.org/question-answer/P30/should-we-check-gods-superlative-attributes Accessed on October 31, 2019.

 

Jairo Izquierdo is a member of the Social Media team and an author for the Christian organization Cross Examined . He studies philosophy and theology, with his current focus being classical logic, epistemology, Christian doctrines, and philosophy of language. He is co-founder of Filósofo Cristiano . He is a member of the Christian Apologetics Alliance and a worship director at the Christian Baptist church Cristo es la Respuesta in Puebla, Mexico.

/by
Un caso contra el teísmo (Parte 2)

Un caso contra el teísmo (Parte 2)

In this article I will address the second of four objections that were presented to us a few months ago. You can find the first part here .

Randy claims that

Any empirical argument ( kalam , fine-tuning, design) is not evidence for God, since it would also apply as evidence for a property we have not discovered yet (naturalistic pantheism, magic, Goblin-Creates-Universes, etc.). If something is evidence for God, but is also evidence for naturalistic pantheism or magic, it cannot be evidence for either, here’s the reason: imagine a box and you say there is a rabbit in the box, and the reason for concluding that there is a rabbit in the box is that the box weighs 2 pounds, but that cannot be evidence for a rabbit because it could also be a snake or any 2-pound animal or object. By this analogy, we see that the evidence that applies to the things I mentioned above works the same as it does for God, [therefore,] they are not evidence for God. For example, the kalam , accepting it completely (which I don’t usually do because it’s wrong, but oh well) concludes that the universe has a cause, this can be a law that we have not discovered yet, magic, naturalistic pantheism or God, any of those explains it perfectly. If you argue that you use Occam’s Razor to stay with the simplest of all, the simplest would be a law that we have not discovered yet followed by naturalistic pantheism and then God.

Let us first look at a formulation of the kalam :

      1. Everything that begins to exist has a cause of its existence.

1.1 Confirmed by experience.

1.2 It is a metaphysical principle that nothing can come from nothing.

1.3 If something can really come into existence without a cause, why don’t we see this happening in reality?

      2. The universe began to exist.

2.1 Argument based on the impossibility of a current infinity:

2.1.1 An actual infinity cannot exist.

2.1.2 An infinite time regression of events is a current infinity.

2.1.3 Therefore, an infinite temporal regression of events cannot exist.

2.2 Argument based on the impossibility of forming an actual infinite by successive addition:

2.2.1 A collection formed by successive additions cannot actually be infinite.

2.2.2 The time series of past events is a collection formed by successive additions.

2.2.3 Therefore, the time series of past events cannot currently be infinite.

2.3 Confirmation based on the expansion of the universe.

2.4 Confirmation based on the thermodynamic properties of the universe.

      3. Therefore, the universe has a cause for its beginning into existence.

      4. If the universe has a cause of its existence, then there exists an uncaused personal Creator of the universe who, without creation, is unprincipled, immutable, immaterial, timeless, spaceless, and enormously powerful.

4.1 Argument that the cause of the universe is a personal Creator:

4.1.1 The universe was created by a set of necessary and sufficient conditions of mechanical functioning or by a personal free agent.

4.1.2 The universe could not have been created by a mechanical set of necessary and sufficient conditions.

4.1.3 Therefore, the universe was created by a personal free agent.

4.2 Argument that the Creator without creation is uncaused, unbeginning, immutable, immaterial, timeless, spaceless, and enormously powerful.

4.2.1 The Creator is uncaused.

4.2.1.1 There cannot be an infinite temporal regression of causes (2.1.3, 2.2.3).

4.2.2 The Creator is unprincipled.

4.2.2.1 Anything that is not caused does not begin to exist. (1)

4.2.3 The Creator is immutable.

4.2.3.1 There cannot be an infinite temporal regression of changes. (2.1.3, 2.2.3)

4.2.4 The Creator is immaterial.

4.2.4.1 Whatever is material implies a change at the atomic and molecular levels, but the Creator does not change. (4.2.3)

4.2.5 The Creator is timeless.

4.2.5.1 In the total absence of change, time does not exist, and the Creator does not change. (4.2.3)

4.2.6 The Creator is spaceless.

4.2.6.1 Whatever is immaterial and timeless cannot be spatial, and the Creator is immaterial and timeless (4.2.4, 4.2.5)

4.2.7 The Creator is enormously powerful.

4.2.7.1 He created the universe out of nothing. (3)

    5. Therefore, there is a personal, uncaused Creator of the universe, who without creation is unprincipled, immutable, immaterial, timeless, spaceless, and enormously powerful.

With this argument in hand, we can now respond to each of the objections presented.

(1) Any empirical argument ( kalam , fine-tuning, design) is not evidence for God, since it would also apply as evidence for a property that we have not yet discovered […] the kalam , accepting it completely […] it is concluded that the universe has a cause, this can be a law that we have not yet discovered, magic, naturalistic pantheism, [Goblins-Create-universes] or God, any of those explains it perfectly.

As can be seen from premise (4) of kalam, the cause of the universe must have, at a minimum, the following characteristics:

a. Immateriality

b. Incausality

c. Spatiality

d. Timelessness

e. Imprincipiality

f. Eternity

g. Immutability

h. Will

i. Enormous power

Randy mentions that kalam points to an unknown property, but there is at least one problem with this proposal: a property could only satisfy characteristics a – g , but not h or i , because its very nature as an abstract object makes it causally impotent, as Craig always puts it: “The number 7 causes nothing.”

What about naturalistic pantheism? Roughly defined, it is the position that God is the sum of all natural phenomena unified, but if this is true, then by definition natural phenomena cannot meet any of the characteristics (maybe i , if we are being kind).

What about magic? The problem with this is that we have good references to the fantastic origins of magic, not to mention that contemporary magic is nothing but tricks and skills to deceive the spectator. But even if we concede that the existence of magic is possible (in the broad logical sense), the problem with this “cause” is that it has different definitions depending on the place of origin (there are both natural and non-natural magics), but in most of them, a magician is always required to use it. Probably Randy, taking advantage of how difficult it is to define magic, would be tempted to say that there could be a magic that not only meets the characteristics a–g , but also h and i , but this would be the same case that occurred in the Craig–Woolper debate, in which the atheist begins to say a string of incoherencies, such as that the cause of the universe is a Supercomputer that meets a–i , to which Craig simply points out that, by definition, that would no longer be a computer, but God himself. [1]

Let’s go with Universe-Creating Goblins. By definition, a goblin is humanoid in shape, but about the size of a small child. A description of a material being, so goblins don’t fit the a–g criteria , but they do fit the h and i criteria . Of course, Randy, you can pull the Woolper tactic and say, “Oh, but these are Super Goblins!” But we’ve already seen what the problem with that is, and it honestly has no seriousness whatsoever.

Finally, that the cause of the universe is a law that has not yet been discovered. Dr. John Lennox has a perfect answer to the claim that mathematics or natural laws are causes:

What is the nature of a law? Do laws create things? No, of course not. […] I’m a mathematician and it’s honestly the stupidest thing I’ve ever heard [that mathematics created the universe]. […] I mean, 1 + 1 = 2, right? Has that ever put two euros in your pocket? […] But mathematics doesn’t create anything. It’s just descriptions.

Newton’s laws of motion will describe the motion of billiard balls, at least in part, but they do not make the balls move – for that you need someone with a billiard stick. And here we have another big confusion: that the laws of nature are causes, but they are not! They are just descriptions of what there is. So the law of gravity is meaningless if gravity is not present. [2]

So it is clear that appealing to some unknown law does not solve the problem. Now let’s move on to the next thing:

(2) Imagine a box and you say that there is a rabbit in the box, and that the reason for concluding that there is a rabbit in the box is that the box weighs 2 pounds, but that cannot be evidence of a rabbit because it could also be a snake or any 2-pound animal or object.

But Randy, this analogy is too weak. A stronger analogy of God as the cause of the origin of the universe from premise (4) would be something like this: Imagine someone shows you a box about 12 inches long x 12 inches wide and tells you to guess what’s inside it. You take the box, weigh it, and find that it weighs 2 pounds; then you notice something moving around inside the box, the movements are random, so you rule out a toy, at which point you know it’s an animal. Then you hear the animal inside start meowing. Bingo! At this point you know that at least the animal inside is a feline, and it can’t be a snake or any other 2-pound animal. Can you tell the difference? So when you get to the cause of the universe, it, just as in the box analogy, must have certain properties given the nature of the case, such as having all the properties ai . The theist here is not making gratuitous claims about the characteristics of the cause of the universe.

(3) By this analogy, we see that the evidences that can be applied to the things I mentioned above function the same as for God, [therefore,] they are not evidence of God.

The problem is that it is a weak analogy fallacy.

(4) If you argue that you use Occam’s Razor to stay with the simplest of all, the simplest would be a law that we have not yet discovered followed by naturalistic pantheism and then God.

There is no need to appeal to Occam’s Razor to choose the best explanation for the cause of the origin of the universe because it has already been shown that all the other possible causes that Randy has postulated do not meet the necessary characteristics.

Grades:

[1] Link: https://youtu.be/LgdkFOg7utY (accessed Nov. 12, 2019).

[2] Link: https://youtu.be/rSlGMXIYKD8 (accessed November 12, 2019).

 

Jairo Izquierdo is a member of the Social Media team and an author for the Christian organization Cross Examined . He studies philosophy and theology, with his current focus being classical logic, epistemology, Christian doctrines, and philosophy of language. He is co-founder of Filósofo Cristiano . He is a member of the Christian Apologetics Alliance and a worship director at the Christian Baptist church Cristo es la Respuesta in Puebla, Mexico.

/by
The Action Lab y el Argumento de la Intencionalidad

The Action Lab y el Argumento de la Intencionalidad

Alvin Plantinga desarrolló un argumento en contra del materialismo que puedes encontrar aquí. Pero si quieres una versión algo más fácil de digerir, puedes leer la versión de Craig aquí (solo inglés). Recomiendo leer ambos recursos para un mayor entendimiento del argumento en general de que la existencia de los estados intencionales (o la consciencia) son evidencia de que Dios existe.  Para los propósitos de este artículo, simplemente citaré la exposición de Craig sobre este argumento en el debate de Rosenberg:

Dios es la mejor explicación de los estados intencionales de conciencia en el mundo. Los filósofos están desconcertados por los estados de intencionalidad. La intencionalidad es la propiedad de ser sobre algo. Significa la atención hacia el objeto de nuestros pensamientos.

Por ejemplo, puedo pensar sobre mis vacaciones de verano o acerca de mi esposa. Ningún objeto físico tiene este tipo de intencionalidad. Una silla o una piedra o una bola de tejido muscular como el cerebro no atienden hacia alguna cosa. Solo los estados mentales o los estados de conciencia atienden a otras cosas. Como materialista, el Dr. Rosenberg reconoce eso y concluye que en el ateísmo realmente no hay estados intencionales.

El Dr. Rosenberg afirma audazmente que nunca pensamos realmente en nada. Pero esto parece increíble. Obviamente estoy pensando en el argumento del Dr. Rosenberg. Esto me parece una reducción al absurdo del ateísmo. Por el contrario, en el teísmo, porque Dios es una mente, no es sorprendente que haya mentes finitas. Así, los estados intencionales se ajustan cómodamente a una cosmovisión teísta.

Entonces podemos argumentar:

  1. Si Dios no existiera, los estados intencionales de conciencia no existirían.

  2. ¡Pero existen estados intencionales de consciencia!

  3. Por lo tanto, Dios existe.

Ahora, muchos detractores del argumento señalarán que se comete (entre otras) una falacia de petición de principio, ya que simplemente el argumento presupone la existencia de Dios. Pero como el Dr. Craig señala, ¡el Dr. Rosenberg cree que la premisa (1) del argumento es verdadera! Así que no parece una afirmación exclusiva del teísta que, en un mundo natural (sin ninguna clase de ser espiritual como Dios o los ángeles) los estados de consciencia no existen. Pero ¿existe algún otro no teísta aparte de Rosenberg que crea que la premisa (1) es verdad? Al parecer sí, y no de un parte de un filósofo, sino de un científico, me refiero al autor del canal de YouTube The Action Lab.

Dejaré el video aquí mismo para que veas las conclusiones a las que llega el autor sobre la consciencia basándose en los experimentos de Libet (que suelen citar los naturalistas para demostrar que el libre albedrío y la consciencia inmaterial no existen, nada más lejos de la realidad[i]). Pero si no quieres ver todo el video ni los divertidos experimentos que realiza o tu inglés no es lo suficientemente bueno para entenderlo, no te preocupes, puedes saltarte el video e ir directamente a la traducción que he realizado para este artículo.

Esto es lo que The Action Lab explica a partir del minuto 6:51 sobre los experimentos realizados:

Así que puede que no hayas pensado mucho en ello, pero ¿qué sucede realmente cuando haces esto (cierra y abre la palma de la mano)?, ¿cómo decidí mover mi brazo? Bien, cuando decides mover el brazo, parece un pensamiento consciente, piensas en moverlo y se mueve. Así que ahora mismo estoy decidiendo mover mi brazo, pero ¿mi cerebro consciente decidió moverlo o hay algo más?

Así que se han realizado múltiples estudios sobre esto y lo extraño es que en realidad hay algo que se llama potencial de preparación (muestra una gráfica sobre cómo el voltaje se eleva antes del tiempo consciente al 0s.) que sucede en tu cerebro antes del pensamiento consciente y el movimiento de tu brazo. Así que, lo que quiero decir, es que tienes el pensamiento consciente para mover tu brazo, pero lo que sucede antes es que hay un potencial que se eleva en tu cerebro, así que hay algo que sucede en tu cerebro incluso antes de tener la idea de mover el brazo.

Ahora, como algunos han leído este dato, significa que nuestro subconsciente realmente está tomando todas las decisiones, por lo que nuestro subconsciente realmente decide mover el dedo y luego después de decidir el potencial de preparación aumenta hasta que se produce la sinapsis que provoca la reacción en cadena que realmente mueve el dedo. Por lo que esto debería ser un poco molesto para ti, porque significa que nuestra consciencia no está realmente tomando la decisión de hacer algo, sino que en realidad es nuestro subconsciente el que toma la decisión y luego lo inserta en nuestra consciencia como si fuera nuestro propio pensamiento consciente haciéndolo.

Pero en 2016, los científicos en Berlín realizaron un experimento para probar si es la consciencia o la subconsciencia la que toma estas decisiones. De modo que, lo que hicieron estos científicos, es que utilizaron una computadora para medir estos potenciales de preparación en el cerebro y trataron de ver si este programa en la computadora podía predecir en tiempo real los pensamientos o los movimientos conscientes de alguien, por lo que esperaban medir el potencial de preparación en el cerebro antes de que la persona realmente tuviera el pensamiento consciente de mover alguna extremidad y pudiera predecir que se moviera algo. Pero la parte interesante, es que los sujetos en el experimento realmente aprendieron cómo engañar a la computadora, de modo que lo que sucedería en su cerebro es que el potencial de preparación se elevaría, pero el movimiento no se produciría porque la persona conscientemente había pensado que no haría el movimiento, por lo que parece contradecir la opinión de que la consciencia es un subproducto de la subconsciencia, porque ¿cómo conscientemente decides cancelar un movimiento que realiza tu subconsciente que en realidad está controlando tu consciencia? Parece que la consciencia es en realidad la que tiene el control, no la subconsciencia.

Pero esto se vuelve aún más raro. Por ejemplo, un científico llamado Benjamín Libet se dispuso a responder la misma pregunta de si es la consciencia o la subconsciencia la que está involucrada en la toma de decisiones y en la elección de lo que hacemos en nuestra vida diaria. Así que lo que hizo Libet fue que se sometió a pacientes a una cirugía cerebral, de modo que su cerebro estaba abierto y colocó electrodos en su corteza somatosensorial, de modo que pudo medir el impulso creado al tocar la mano de una persona. Así que él tocaba su mano y podía medirlo en su cerebro.  De modo que, lo que midió, fue que cuando tocaba su dedo había un retraso de aproximadamente 30 milisegundos de la señal que se movía hacia su cerebro y luego después de esos 30 milisegundos tenían el pensamiento consciente de que alguien había tocado su dedo, y, luego de que esos 30 milisegundos y del pensamiento consciente aumentaran, tenían alrededor de 500 milisegundos de actividad de picos de voltaje en su cerebro en esa área de la corteza somatosensorial donde eso corresponde a su dedo.

Toque de la mano → 30ms → Picos de voltaje → 500ms
        La consciencia nota el toque   Picos de voltaje

Después, lo que hizo fue que, en lugar de tocar realmente su dedo, simplemente tocaba la parte de su cerebro que correspondía con alguien tocando su dedo y, en ese caso, el paciente tenía alrededor de 500 milisegundos de actividad en su cerebro y sentían que alguien les tocaba el dedo.

Toque del cerebro → 500ms → La consciencia nota el toque
    Picos de voltaje    

Luego lo que hizo fue estimular el tálamo en el cerebro del paciente y que daba lugar a un pico de voltaje inicial después de 30 milisegundos, pero no a los picos potenciales de voltaje 500 milisegundos en el cerebro, por lo que el experimento demostró que, para tener la idea consciente de que alguien tocaba su dedo, tenía que tener esos 500 milisegundos de la actividad cerebral en curso en la corteza somatosensorial.

Toque del tálamo → 30ms → Picos de voltaje → No más actividad
        La consciencia NO nota el toque    

Pero la parte extraña de esto es como el paciente inicialmente siente y tiene el pensamiento consciente de que alguien tocó su dedo después de solo 30 milisegundos si se requieren 500 milisegundos de potencial en su cerebro para que tenga ese pensamiento. Lo que Libet propone es que los 500 milisegundos que suceden después en realidad se remiten antes en el tiempo, por lo que el paciente realmente es consciente de que eso sucederá después, porque si eso no sucediera después, no debería haber tenido el pensamiento consciente de que sucedió.

Ahora esto suena un poco loco, si Libet tiene razón, lo que significa es que nuestra consciencia está realmente a cargo y tenemos libre albedrío en nuestra consciencia, pero la información en realidad se remite hacia atrás en el tiempo para que nuestra subconsciencia obtenga el potencial de preparación listo antes de que realmente tengamos el pensamiento consciente de hacer algo.

Por supuesto, en la escala macro esto simplemente suena una locura, porque eso significaría que… digamos que tienes un balón de fútbol allí, luego el balón de fútbol comienza a moverse repentinamente y luego mueves tu pie para patearlo, y dices que la razón por la que el balón de fútbol comenzó a moverse fue porque lo pateaste más tarde en el tiempo, lo que no tiene ningún sentido, ya que la causa siempre tiene que venir antes que el efecto en la escala macro (aunque en la escala cuántica, a veces la causa puede ser posterior al efecto).

Así que no está claro si es nuestra consciencia o nuestra subconsciencia la que está liderando el camino y las decisiones que tomamos a diario. De hecho, la consciencia es uno de los aspectos menos entendidos en la ciencia, por ejemplo, ¿por qué una computadora, con todas las señales en movimiento y la información que ocurre en ella, no puede experimentar algo; pero para mí, cuando tengo todas estas sinapsis que están ocurriendo en mi cerebro, ¿puedo tener una experiencia?

Actualmente no hay nada en la ciencia que pueda explicar por qué tenemos sensaciones reales, los científicos pueden explicar el mecanismo que hay detrás, sabemos muy bien cómo ocurren las sinapsis y el mecanismo real del por qué están ocurriendo como si fuéramos una gran máquina en movimiento, pero no hay nada que pueda explicar la sensación real de ello. ¿Por qué experimentamos el color? Sabemos cómo se produce el color y qué es y qué lo causa, pero no sabemos por qué experimentamos el color. Y la consciencia es una de esas cosas de las que no estoy seguro de si alguna vez se resolverá en la ciencia. No estoy seguro de si alguna vez podremos explicar científicamente por qué tenemos sensaciones, por qué podemos sentir y experimentar cosas, mientras que algún otro objeto que tiene las mismas reacciones atómicas y movimientos mecánicos y un movimiento molecular no experimenta algo.

Ahora, la consciencia es tan difícil que ha sido apodada El problema de la consciencia en la ciencia. Esta es la razón por la que algunas personas pueden recurrir a la religión para explicar cosas como esta, por ejemplo, tal vez se deba a algo que no es físico, sino a algo espiritual que sucede dentro de ti y que realmente te hace tener consciencia. Ahora, hay muchas teorías religiosas, filosóficas y científicas, y tú eliges lo que decides creer de dónde viene la consciencia, porque la ciencia no ha resuelto esto aún.

Desconozco si The Action Lab se ha pronunciado alguna vez como ateo o agnóstico, pero es claro por todo lo que acabas de leer que no es algún tipo de teísta. Pero observen que él ofrece las mismas razones que el Dr. Craig y el Dr. Rosenberg sobre por qué parece imposible que los estados intencionales existan en un mundo puramente material. Y, lo más interesante, son las conclusiones distintas a las que llegan los no teístas: Rosenberg se aferra a su cosmovisión ateísta y decide creer que los estados intencionales no existen, ¡una postura bastante radical con tal de evitar la conclusión de que Dios existe! En cambio, The Action Lab termina sosteniendo una postura más débil y que a pocos ateos les agradará: los estados intencionales no pueden y probablemente nunca puedan ser explicados por la metodología científica. Por supuesto, él no admite que Dios sea la mejor explicación debido a su compromiso científico; pero tampoco cree que sea irrazonable postular causas sobrenaturales, al menos no en este terreno sobre la consciencia.

NOTAS

[i] Para una discusión teísta sobre estos experimentos: https://es.reasonablefaith.org/question-answer/P230/el-experimento-de-libet-y-el-determinismo

 

Jairo Izquierdo es miembro del equipo de Social Media y autor para la organización cristiana Cross Examined.  Estudia filosofía y teología, siendo su actual foco de estudio la lógica clásica, epistemología, doctrinas cristianas y filosofía del lenguaje.  Es cofundador de Filósofo Cristiano. Es miembro en la Christian Apologetics Alliance y director de alabanza en la iglesia cristiana bautista Cristo es la Respuesta en Puebla, México.

/by
Un caso contra el teísmo (Parte 1)

Un caso contra el teísmo (Parte 1)

A while ago Jorge Gil received a message on one of his social networks from an atheist, it was a series of objections against theism. Of course, my friend Jorge does not have the time to respond to each of the messages or emails he receives, so he asked me to be the one to respond to the objections; and well, here I am. Since the text sent is extensive, I have decided to address his argument in four parts: three are objections to the general case in favor of theism and one is an atheological argument.

This is the first objection that Randy Riverol Arevalo, from Cuba, presents to us:

Hello, greetings from Cuba. I see that you are one of the few Spanish speakers who has a good command of the philosophy of religion. I wanted to explain my position and hear your thoughts on it.

I am an atheist, by this I mean that I believe that there are no arguments that indicate the existence of God. This is only valid if God is meant to be omniscient, omnipotent, omnibenevolent, and necessary. God’s properties are metaphysical (that is, they refer to the ontology and basis of reality), for these properties to be justified, they require metaphysical evidence, since, of the three categories: conceptual, empirical, and metaphysical, [these] require evidence of their respective category, and, therefore, you cannot prove a metaphysical property with empirical evidence. For example, philosophical naturalism is the claim that only the natural exists, even with all or much knowledge of the natural world we are not justified in concluding that everything that exists is natural, since there could be something that we do not know or have not discovered. To prove philosophical naturalism, you would need metaphysical evidence, which we do not currently have a methodology to obtain. Therefore, if you try to justify a metaphysical property with empirical evidence, it is not justified, and if you try to justify it with the fact that induction is not perfect and that it always has this margin of error, [well] that is my point, you are trying to obtain a “metaphysical” deductive conclusion using “empirical” induction, committing a category error.

Ok. Let’s go step by step:

  • The properties of God are metaphysical (that is, they refer to the ontology and basis of reality).

If by (a) you mean that properties tell us something about the essence of the object being predicated, then I see no problem.

  • …for these properties to be justified requires metaphysical evidence, since, of the three categories: conceptual, empirical and metaphysical, [these] require evidence from their respective category, and therefore, you cannot prove a metaphysical property with empirical evidence.

Talking about the nature of properties is one of the broadest topics in metaphysics, so much so that I find your classification insufficient and problematic. [1] For example, what do you mean by empirical properties? You offer no definition, not a single example. If I were to take your classification literally, an empirical property would be one that is subject to sensory experience, but how is this even possible? For example, from the statement Peter is good you seem to mean that since Peter is an object of our senses, so is the property of being good. Is this what you mean by an empirical property? This seems to me to make no sense at all; not even a Platonist would claim that the property of being good is some kind of empirical object.

Since you don’t set out any clear concepts for your classifications of properties, I find it very difficult to understand why an empirical property requires empirical evidence. What kind of empirical evidence do you have to justify Peter’s property of being good? Why believe that the property of being good is empirical in Peter, but metaphysical in, say, the angel Gabriel? It’s like saying that the property of being good has the property of being empirical in a physical object, but has the property of being metaphysical in a metaphysical object. This certainly seems to me to be a rather complicated, if not absurd, ontology of properties. I think it’s a language for talking about properties that no philosopher holds.

So, for the sake of argument, let’s say that I accept your classification of properties. So, in what sense should I take your statements about properties? It seems to me that conventional language without metaphysical baggage is the best option. Instead of asking: What empirical evidence do you have to justify the empirical property of being good in Peter? I would ask: How do you prove that Peter is good? In response to this question, one could simply tell you to observe Peter’s actions to know that he is good; testimonies from people who know Peter would also help. In this way, I would understand that this methodology cannot be applied in the case of immaterial beings like God because he cannot be observed as in the case of Peter, but it does not follow from that that it is therefore impossible to know the properties of God, the only thing that follows is that at least another type of methodology is required to know the properties of God.

  • To prove philosophical naturalism, you would need metaphysical evidence, which we currently have no methodology to obtain.

But Randy, why would you require metaphysical evidence to prove naturalism? If the claim of naturalism is that only the natural exists and under your own criteria of justification of properties, doesn’t this imply that you require physical evidence to prove naturalism and metaphysical evidence to prove supernaturalism? Now I don’t understand you.

  • …if you try to justify [a metaphysical property] with the fact that induction is not perfect and that it always has that margin of error, [well] that is my point, you are trying to obtain a “metaphysical” deductive conclusion using “empirical” induction, committing a category error.

The problem is that you never bother to define an empirical property. Furthermore, if we apply your criterion of justification that only the metaphysical can prove the metaphysical and only the empirical can prove the empirical, then how do you claim that metaphysical properties, which are non-physical entities, refer to the ontology of reality, which in your worldview is physical? In the end, your own criterion of justification makes your classification of properties impossible.

To summarize, there are two problems with your objection:

  1. An insufficient and problematic classification of properties.
  2. A criterion of justification for properties that conflicts with the very definition of metaphysical properties.

Note:

[1] https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/properties/#KinPro

 

Jairo Izquierdo is a member of the Social Media team and an author for the Christian organization Cross Examined . He studies philosophy and theology, with his current focus being classical logic, epistemology, Christian doctrines, and philosophy of language. He is co-founder of Filósofo Cristiano . He is a member of the Christian Apologetics Alliance and a worship director at the Christian Baptist church Cristo es la Respuesta in Puebla, Mexico.

/by