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Por Brian Chilton

Cuando llegué a tener dificultades con mi fe, no las tuve en el área de la ciencia. He creído que la ciencia y la fe pueden coexistir, y aún lo creo. El Dios que dio la revelación especial de la Biblia, es también el mismo Dios que creó los cielos y la tierra de ninguna materia existente. Mis luchas, fueron en el área de la historia. En 1997, me topé con el trabajo de un grupo llamado El Seminario de Jesús (compuesto de individuos tales como: Jhon Dominic Crossan, Robert Funk, y Marcus Borg) los cuales afirmaban que la mayoría de las palabras de Jesús, como están escritas en los evangelios, no podían ser históricamente verificadas. Más tarde me percaté en que El Seminario de Jesús, no tenía evidencias para apoyar sus afirmaciones si no que, solo contaban con sus propias presuposiciones.

Sin embargo, cuando comencé a estudiar las áreas de historia, filosofía y teología, noté que los detalles esenciales de la vida de Jesús de Nazaret pueden ser conocidos con gran certeza. Uno de mis profesores en “Liberty”, Gary Habermas, desarrolló lo que él llama “acercamiento mínimo de hechos”. Este enfoque enumera seis áreas de la vida de Jesús que son universalmente aceptadas por todos los historiadores. También agregó una séptima, la cual sostiene un gran peso como evidencia; aunque quizás no al grado que las otras seis. Entonces, ¿cuáles son estos siete aspectos históricos de la vida de Jesús que se pueden considerar con tanta certeza? Son los siguientes:

  1. Jesús murió en una cruz romana. Es universalmente aceptado que Jesús de Nazaret murió por crucifixión. Incluso el agnóstico de inclinación atea erudito del Nuevo Testamento Barth Ehrman, declara que “La crucifixión de Jesús, por los Romanos, es uno de los hechos más seguros que tenemos acerca de su vida”[1]. Los romanos eran asesinos eficientes. Ellos se aseguraban de que los individuos a quienes tenían que matar murieran, de no ser así, sus vidas tomarían el lugar de las víctimas.
  2. Los discípulos tuvieron experiencias que los llevaron a creer que Jesús había resucitado de entre los muertos. Podría sorprenderte esto, pero la mayoría de los historiadores aceptan que los discípulos tuvieron experiencias que los llevaron a creer en la resurrección de Jesús. Gran parte de los estudiosos están de acuerdo que algo sucedió ese primer domingo de Pascua. Pero en donde sí difieren, es en lo que ocurrió.
  3. Los discípulos fueron transformados por sus experiencias a tal punto que estaban dispuestos a morir por lo que ellos sabían que era verdad.  Las personas mueren por algo que es mentira todo el tiempo. Muchos individuos han caído en guerras por naciones sin causas nobles. Sin embargo, es muy diferente cuando la persona muere por algo que conoce que es verdad o mentira.  Los primeros discípulos estaban dispuestos a entregar sus vidas, y aun las vidas de aquellos a quienes ellos amaban, por lo que ellos sabían que era verdadero o falso. Ellos creían que Jesús literalmente había resucitado de entre los muertos.
  4. El mensaje de la resurrección fue difundido temprano en la historia de la iglesia. Este es uno de los puntos que me emociona. Espero escribir mi disertación sobre este mismo tópico. En todo el Nuevo Testamento hay credos que preceden los documentos del Nuevo Testamento. Uno de los más antiguos es 1 Corintios 15:3-7, el cual habla de las apariciones de la resurrección de Jesús a sus discípulos, Esteban, y en un momento dado a 500 testigos. La elaboración del credo es extremadamente antigua. Bart Ehrman, un agnóstico, considera que el material data “cerca de los años 30 de la era común”[2]. James D. G. Dunn afirma que el material data “entre uno a dos años de los mismos eventos”[3]. Lo más probable es que el credo data al mismo año de la muerte, sepultura, y resurrección de Jesús. Esto, junto con Gálatas 1:18-19 y los primeros credos, están entre los documentos más antiguos en todo el registro del Nuevo Testamento.
  5. Pablo de Tarso, el antes adversario del cristianismo, se convirtió en cristiano después de tener un encuentro con el Jesús resucitado. Nadie niega que Pablo de Tarso tuvo una experiencia camino a Damasco que transformó radicalmente su vida. ¿Qué pudo haber sido lo que transformó a este Fariseo de Fariseos, quien era miembro del Sanedrín o alguien que iba camino a convertirse en uno (Una posición que pagaba extremadamente bien)? El haber tenido tal encuentro con el Jesús resucitado realmente, hubiese provocado tal transformación.
  6. Santiago el hermano de Jesús, que era escéptico, se convirtió en cristiano después de tener un encuentro con el Jesús resucitado. Lo mismo sucedió con Santiago, el hermano de Jesús, el cual no era un seguidor de Jesús hasta después de la resurrección. Santiago desaprobaba el ministerio de Jesús (mirar Juan 7:5). Quizás en parte porque se esperaba que el hijo mayor de la familia se hiciera cargo del negocio de la familia. Jesús no lo hizo. En lugar de hacer eso, se fue a predicar. Probablemente Santiago sintió un gran resentimiento hacia Jesús durante el inicio de su ministerio. Sin embargo, su experiencia con el Jesús resucitado cambio todo eso.
  7. La tumba fue encontrada vacía. Mientras que este hecho no es tan aceptado como los otros seis, el 75% de eruditos de historia aceptan que la tumba de Jesús se encontraba vacía el primer Domingo de Pascua. De igual manera, es interesante notar que la predicación de la resurrección empezó justo después que sucedieran estas cosas en Jerusalén. Esto es convincente, ya que el escéptico sabría dónde estaría localizada la tumba de José de Arimatea. La tumba podría ser corroborada fácilmente. Jesús no estaba ahí.

Es muy probable que, a medida que nos acercamos a la temporada de Pascua, usted se encontrará con programas de televisión, libros, y folletos que intentarán disuadirlo de creer que Jesús se levantó de entre los muertos. La realidad es que la mejor evidencia no solo apoya que Jesús vivió y murió, pero que también se levantó de entre los muertos. De la misma manera que Santiago y Pablo fueron transformados por la resurrección de Jesús, ¡tú también puedes serlo! Exclamemos en triunfo con los ángeles parados junto a la tumba de Jesús, “Él no está aquí, ¡ha resucitado!” (Lc. 24:6).

Notas

[1] Bart D. Ehrman, Porqué Jesus fué asesinado?, Edición Kindle

[2] Bart D Ehrman, Jesús existió?  Este argumento histórico de Jesús de Nazaret (New York: HarperOne, 2012), 141.

[3] James D.G. Dunn, Jesús recordado, Cristianismo en la fabricación, vol.1 (Grand Rapids;Cambridge,UK: Eerdmans,2003),864.

 


Brian G. Chilton es el fundador de BellatorChristi.com y es el presentador de The Bellator Christi Podcast. Recibió su Maestría en Divinidad en Liberty University (con alta distinción); su Licenciatura en Ciencias en Estudios Religiosos y Filosofía de la Universidad Gardner-Webb (con honores); y recibió la certificación en Christian Apologetics (Apologética cristiana) de la Universidad de Biola. Brian actualmente está inscrito en el programa Ph.D. en Teología y apologética en Liberty University. Brian ha estado en el ministerio por más de 15 años y sirve como pastor en el noroeste de Carolina del Norte.

Blog Original: http://bit.ly/2CGBvlK  

Traducido por Natalia Armando

Editado por Billy Morales

Hemos llegado a la penúltima parte de nuestras lecciones sobre lógica de predicados. En esta sección hablaré sobre las cuatro reglas de inferencia que hay para argumentos con proposiciones universal y existencialmente cuantificadas y que añadiremos a las reglas que ya vimos para la lógica proposicional.

OBSERVACIONES PRELIMINARES

Antes de comenzar a explicar nuestras reglas de inferencia, es importante recalcar la importancia de ciertas características de los objetos, individuos o miembros de los cuales se está predicando y que son las propiedades de ser específico, arbitrario y previamente introducido. Cuando hablamos de un objeto específico, nos referimos a que conocemos la identidad del objeto en cuestión. Cuando hablamos de un objeto arbitrario, nos referimos a un objeto del cuál no conocemos su identidad. Y cuando hablamos de un objeto previamente introducido, nos referimos a un objeto arbitrario que ha aparecido antes en alguna premisa y que ahora se está predicando en una nueva. Con estas propiedades en mente de nuestros objetos de los que vamos a predicar algo, ahora podemos pasar a explicar nuestras reglas de inferencia para proposiciones cuantificadas.

  1. GENERALIZACIÓN EXISTENCIAL (EG)

Forma lógica

𝛗f

———-

∴ ∃x𝛗x

Esta es la regla más fácil de entender. Nos dice que, de la predicación de cualquier individuo específico elegido, se infieren proposiciones generales existencialmente cuantificadas (f puede ser cualquier constante).

Ejemplo:

  1. Tomoko sacó una A en clase.
  2. Por lo tanto, alguien sacó una A en clase.

Observa que no hay forma que el enunciado (1) sea verdad mientras que el enunciado (2) sea falso. Si es verdad que Tomoko sacó una A en clase, entonces es verdad que alguien (Tomoko, al menos) sacó una A.

  1. INSTANCIACIÓN EXISTENCIAL (EI)

Forma lógica

x 𝛗x

———-

∴ 𝛗g

A diferencia de EG, esta regla es difícil de comprender al principio, porque si se define como la inferencia de cualquiera de las instancias de una generalización existencial, tendríamos que de

  1. Alguien es matemático.
  2. Por lo tanto, Superman es matemático.

Este sería un razonamiento verdadero, pero es obvio que no lo es, y la razón es que esta regla no nos permite inferir a un objeto específico.

El método

¿Qué hacemos entonces? Lo que necesitamos aquí es un método que nos permita inferir a partir de una generalización existencial. Sabemos que una proposición cuantificada existencialmente predica algo de al menos un individuo, pero como no sabemos quién es ese individuo, lo que hacemos es usar un nombre temporal (o nombre nuevo) para referirnos a dicho individuo en nuestra prueba y asumir que nombra a un objeto (sea lo que sea) que determina que la generalización existencial es verdadera.

Ejemplo

Argumento

Algún falsificador ha reemplazado las pinturas del museo. Quien remplazó las pinturas tiene un cómplice en el personal del museo. Por lo tanto, algún falsificador tiene un cómplice en el personal del museo.

Prueba

Sabemos que algún falsificador remplazó las pinturas; llamémosle Juan Pérez (Fulano es otro nombre muy común para referirnos a alguien que no conocemos, pero del que sabemos algo). Dado que quien remplazó las pinturas tiene un cómplice en el personal del museo, se deduce que Juan Pérez tiene tal cómplice. Pero Juan Pérez es un falsificador, y Juan Pérez tiene un cómplice en el personal. Por lo tanto, algún falsificador tiene un cómplice en el personal.

La regla

  • Tenemos una generalización existencial como una línea en nuestra prueba, digamos ∃x 𝛗x.
  • Hemos asumido una instancia de esa generalización, digamos 𝛗g, como un supuesto temporal.
  • A partir de ese supuesto, hemos derivado alguna conclusión, digamos 𝛙, en la que g no ocurre.

Luego la regla nos permite ingresar la conclusión 𝛙 a la que acabamos de llegar como una nueva línea, pero que depende de la generalización existencial ∃x 𝛗x en lugar de la instancia 𝛗g que asumimos temporalmente.

Explicación

Nuestro ejemplo siguió este procedimiento: 𝛗x era x es un falsificador y x remplazó las pinturas del museo, g fue Juan Pérez y 𝛙 fue Algún falsificador tiene un cómplice en el personal. Nuestra suposición llegó en el momento en que dijimos llamémosle Juan Pérez.

La Restricción

Existe una restricción a la regla de EI, y es que cuando usamos el nombre temporal para la instancia, esta tiene que ser una constante individual que no ha aparecido en una premisa anterior de la prueba.

Ejemplo

  1. Hubo alguien que obtuvo una B en el curso de música.
  2. Llamemos j a quien obtuvo una B.

Nuestra letra j no la hemos utilizado anteriormente, pero si en nuestra prueba tenemos más proposiciones cuantificadas existencialmente sobre el mismo dominio, debemos usar una letra diferente o numerarlas conforme vayan apareciendo.

Ejemplos

  1. Hay alguien del curso de música que es atractivo.
  2. Llamemos j1 a quien es atractivo.
  3. Hay alguien del curso que es rico.
  4. Llamemos j2 a quien es rico.

Con estos ejemplos queda claro que, si usamos j para todas las premisas sin enumerarlas, estaríamos cometiendo el error de inferir que j es quien sacó una B en el curso de música y que también es atractivo y es rico, y esto no lo podemos comprobar. Por esta razón debemos usar letras distintas o la misma letra con números que la distingan de otras y que no hayamos usado antes (nota que si en lugar de j hubiera usado g que ya ha sido utilizada anteriormente, estaríamos afirmando que el falsificador de pinturas también sacó una B en el curso, que es rico y es atractivo).

  1. INSTANCIACIÓN UNIVERSAL (UI)

Forma lógica

x 𝛗x

———-

∴ 𝛗h

Otra regla fácil. UI nos dice que lo que se predica de todos o ninguno de los individuos de un dominio, también se predica para cualquier individuo de ese dominio, ya sea específica, arbitraria o previamente introducido en premisas anteriores.

Objeto Específico

Veamos primero cómo se aplica la regla a un individuo específicamente elegido donde 𝛗h es el resultado de la sustitución de h para todas las ocurrencias de x en 𝛗x. Nuestro dominio en cuestión serán simplemente todas las personas y de las cuáles Tomoko será nuestro individuo específicamente elegido. Así podemos formular una proposición cuantificada universalmente como la siguiente:

  1. Todas las personas pueden razonar.

De la que podemos concluir que

  1. Por lo tanto, Tomoko puede razonar.

Objeto previamente introducido

Recordemos que j1 y j2 de las formulas anteriores también son personas, por lo que también podemos concluir que

  1. Por lo tanto, j1 puede razonar.
  2. Por lo tanto, j2 puede razonar.

Objeto Arbitrario

Y, por último, partiendo de (1) y de que es posible decir “sea i una persona arbitraria”, entonces se sigue que

  1. Por lo tanto, i puede razonar.

Restricción

En el caso del objeto arbitrario, es importante no saber otra cosa acerca i dada la siguiente regla.

  1. GENERALIZACIÓN UNIVERSAL (UG)

Forma lógica:

𝛗i

———-

∴ ∀x 𝛗x

Sin duda la regla más controversial es la de UG, y es que, si se define como la norma que establece que, a partir de cualquier instancia de una generalización universal, infieres esa generalización, entonces nos encontraremos con razonamientos como el siguiente:

  1. William Lane Craig es Cristiano,
  2. Por lo tanto, todos son cristianos.

Lo cual es falso. Para evitar este tipo de razonamientos falaces, necesitamos de un método al igual que hicimos con EI.

El método

Primero, de nuestra prueba escogemos a un individuo de forma arbitraria y temporalmente le damos un nuevo. Luego probamos algo sobre el individuo elegido al azar. Finalmente, podemos inferir que lo que hemos probado acerca de este individuo elegido al azar es válido universalmente; es decir, podemos inferir una generalización universal.

¿Pero cómo hacemos esto? Usando la prueba por condición general. Este es un método para probar proposiciones condicionales generalizadas; es decir, las proposiciones de la forma Todo P es Q. La técnica consiste en tomar alguna instancia arbitraria de P y luego probar que también es una instancia de Q. Habiendo probado que esta instancia arbitraria de P es también una instancia de Q, podemos inferir que cualquier instancia de P es una instancia de Q.

Ejemplo

Para probar que

  1. Para cualquier x, si x es presidente de México, entonces x es un ciudadano mexicano.

Luego, por regla de UI podemos decir: “sea i un presidente de México arbitrariamente elegido”, entonces se sigue que

  1. i es un ciudadano mexicano.

Luego por UG podemos concluir que

  1. Para cualquier x, si x es un presidente de México, entonces x es un ciudadano mexicano.

Ahora, es importante recordar que no necesitamos estar seguros de que realmente hemos tomado una instancia de P, que no pasa nada si no existe ninguno. Esto se debe a que la certeza no es una condición necesaria, que haya una instancia de P escogida arbitrariamente es solo una asunción que estamos haciendo y que luego desecharemos. Recuerda que esta prueba condicional es similar a la que utilizamos para la lógica proposicional, por lo que nuestra prueba no depende de si realmente existe dicha instancia, sino que, si hay tal instancia, entonces también será una instancia de Q.

Así, para cualquier proposición ∀x (Px → Qx) se procede a probar de la siguiente forma:

  • Asumir alguna instancia de Px, digamos Pi, donde i denota cualquier individuo arbitrariamente elegido (pero no uno específico).
  • Probamos Qi.
  • Desechamos el supuesto y esbozamos la conclusión ∀x (Px → Qx).

Una aplicación práctica de esta regla sería la siguiente: imagina que le preguntas a un amigo tuyo: “¿Si alguien rompe tu celular nuevo, te molestarías con él?” Tú amigo responde: “Sí”. Ahora sabes que, dado que “alguien” podría ser “cualquiera”, concluyes por generalización universal que “Para cualquier x, si x rompe el celular de mi amigo, él se molestará con x”. Ahora puedes aplicar la regla de UI y concluir: “Si yo rompo el celular de mi amigo, él se molestará conmigo”.

La Restricción

Esta regla tiene la restricción de no inferir generalizaciones de proposiciones de un individuo específico. Por ejemplo, imaginemos un caso similar al anterior, solo que ahora le preguntas a tu amigo: “Si tu novia rompe tu iPad nuevo, ¿te molestarás con ella?” Y él responde “No”. Tú no puedes aplicar UG como en el caso del celular por que la “novia” no es alguien arbitrariamente elegido: si tú eres el que rompe su iPad, tu amigo podría enojarse contigo.

 


Jairo Izquierdo es Director de Social Media y autor para la organización cristiana Cross Examined.  Estudia filosofía y teología, siendo su actual foco de estudio la lógica clásica, epistemología, doctrinas cristianas y lingüística.  Es cofundador de Filósofo Cristiano. Es miembro en la Christian Apologetics Alliance y ministro de alabanza en la iglesia cristiana bautista Cristo es la Respuesta en Puebla, México.

By Maverick Christian

To begin, I will quote Alvin Plantinga:

The argument, in essence, is this: that we ordinarily think that the content of a belief, or an intention, or an action is relevant to the actions caused by beliefs, intentions, and actions. I believe that there is a beer in the fridge; we ordinarily think that it is in virtue of its content that this belief causes me to go to the fridge. I intend to get a beer from the fridge and I intend to do so; we ordinarily think that the content of this intention and of carrying it out is causally relevant to my action of going to the fridge. We don’t just ordinarily think these things; they are nothing but sobering truth. I’m going to argue that if materialism about us human beings… were true, then these things are false: It would not be in virtue of their content that beliefs, intentions, and actions do what they do. [1]

For simplicity, let’s just consider beliefs. In materialism, the belief coin has two sides: the neurophysiological/NF properties (certain neurons wire in a certain way, etc.) of the belief, and the actual semantic content of the belief (e.g., there’s a beer in the fridge ). In dualism (the idea that our minds are a composite of the physical brain and a nonphysical mental component, e.g., the soul) it is possible that the content of a belief can modify behavior; e.g., I believe something and on the basis of this belief my soul impacts my neural pathways in a certain way to cause a behavior.

On materialism, however, the content of a belief is causally irrelevant in the sense that (given materialism) a belief causes an effect in virtue of its NF properties, and not in virtue of its content. We can see this by doing a little thought experiment. Suppose a given person’s belief, say, the belief that there is a cold soda in the fridge , had the same NF properties, but a completely different content, such as that the moon is made of green cheese . Would the person’s behavior be different if the belief had the same NF properties, but different content? It wouldn’t, because having the same neurophysiological properties means that we would have the same electrical impulses traveling along the same neural pathways and thus emitting the same muscular contractions. So if materialism were true, the content of our beliefs would be causally irrelevant. The argument in a nutshell is this:

  1. If materialism is true, then the content of our beliefs is causally irrelevant.
  2. But the content of our beliefs is causally relevant.
  3. Therefore, materialism is false.

In response one might say that there is something wrong with the thought experiment, since it is metaphysically impossible for a given set of neurophysiological properties to have distinct semantic content. Even if I were a materialist, this does not seem at all plausible to me. The idea of ​​moving subatomic particles around producing semantic content seems almost mystical, and it seems easily conceivable that there is a possible world in which the same moving subatomic particles generate different semantic content, although as a materialist I would like to believe that this might involve the fine-tuning of some kind of physical necessity that makes the moving subatomic particles generate mental states. Still, to my mind’s eye such an adjustment seems conceivable and metaphysically possible.

But even if it is not possible for a given set of NF properties to have a different semantic content associated with it, does this prevent the statement “If a given set of NF properties were to have a different content, the behavior would be the same” from being meaningfully true? I think not. In philosophy, propositions of the form “If P were true, then Q would be true,” where P is an impossibility, are called counterpossible. There seem to be counterpossible statements that are meaningfully true. For example, suppose the renowned mathematician Kurt Gödel proved a certain theorem; it is impossible for theorems to turn out to be false, since they are necessarily true. However, as Alvin Plantinga points out, “If Mic were to prove that Gödel was wrong, mathematicians everywhere would be astonished; it is not true that if Mic were to prove that Gödel was wrong, mathematicians everywhere would yawn with boredom.” [2] So even if “if a given set of NF properties were to have a different content, it would result in the same behavior” were contra-possible, this does not seem to prevent the statement from being meaningfully true.

Reductive and non-reductionist materialism

Another way to try to avoid the semantic content of a belief being causally irrelevant is to take the view that a belief is just a combination of physical properties; the view that beliefs are reducible to physical states in this sort of way is called reductive materialism . Suppose we have P1, P2, P3… Pn to represent various physical properties (e.g., human neurophysiological properties), and let ∨ represent “or.” A reductive materialist might believe that a certain belief is just the disjunction (a set of things related by “or”) of certain physical properties like these:

P1∨ P2 ∨ P3…

Most likely, on reductive materialism a belief would be (merely) a disjunction of a set of physical properties that constitute a given mental state, something like this where & represents “and”:

(P1& P7 & P11…) ∨ (P5 & P63 &…) ∨…

The “∨” is necessary, since it is possible for different sets of physical states to correspond to a given belief (if materialism is true, for example, it would seem that alien neurophysiologies or mechanical silicon brains could also be configured to have a given belief). The above sort of structure “(A & B) ∨ (C & D & E) ∨…” is what logic and math gurus call a boolean combination . In contrast to reductionist materialism which says that beliefs are reducible to NF properties in the way described above, non-reductionist materialism denies this, but does make the claim that beliefs are determined by physical states. One might believe that a belief emerges from physical properties in a way that is roughly analogous to moisture emerging from the combination of hydrogen and oxygen in H2O.

A reductionist materialist might claim that since beliefs are just a (Boolean) combination of NF properties, it might well be that it is in virtue of having semantic content that a belief is causally relevant (this is not necessarily so, because belief is really a disjunction of sets of NF properties, so it would still be possible for a person’s belief to produce behavior in virtue of its NF properties rather than its semantic content, but a reductionist materialist might believe that it is at least possible for a human being’s belief to produce behavior in virtue of having content).

The problem with reductive materialism

Plantinga argues that even if it is true that a belief is causally relevant in virtue of its having a certain content, it does not follow that the semantic content is itself causally relevant. Plantinga gives the following illustration. Suppose Alvin throws a ball that has a mass of 0.2 kilograms, and the ball hits a glass window, causing it to break. If the ball had been much lighter (say, the mass of a feather), it would not have broken the glass, so the ball breaks the window in virtue of (among other things) its being 0.2 kilograms. Now suppose that the property of having a mass of 0.2 kg is Sam’s favorite property. Thus, we have the following:

Having a mass of 0.2 kg = Sam’s favorite property

Since having a mass of 0.2 kg is Sam’s favorite property (which is not his favorite property by definition, but reductionist materialists similarly do not [normally] believe that the identity relation between a belief and a boolean combination of NF properties holds by definition), then it follows that a ball breaks the window in virtue of having Sam’s favorite property. And yet:

Having a mass of 0.2 kg is Sam’s favorite property.

It doesn’t actually seem to have anything to do with the ball breaking the window, even though it is in virtue of having Sam’s favorite property of the ball breaking the window. Similarly, the fact that a set of NF properties is a belief doesn’t seem to have anything to do with the set of NF properties causing behavior, even though it is true that a belief causes behavior in virtue of having a certain semantic content.

I think we can make this clearer by considering the following thought experiment. Suppose that reductionist materialism is true and a mad scientist inserts a belief interface device (BID) into Smith’s brain, which acts as a new interface between Smith’s belief and behavior. For example, the mad scientist sets up the BID so that when Smith believes that I am thirsty, the NF properties of this belief electrochemically affect the BID and the BID subsequently causes Smith’s body to take a drink of water. The mad scientist can set up the BID at will so that any given belief can cause almost any behavior. For example, the mad scientist sets up the BID so that the NF properties of the belief that drinking water will kill me and I don’t want to die trigger an electrochemical reaction that (thanks to the belief interface device) causes Smith’s body to get a drink of water. The mad scientist sets up the CID again so that the NF properties of the belief that I will never see a Nicolas Cage movie cause Smith to go see a Nicolas Cage movie, and the NF properties of the belief that grass is air cause Smith to eat coconut ice cream after a fish dinner. All of this would be possible on reductionist materialism because a human being’s belief causes effects in virtue of its NF properties, not its semantic content, even if it were the case that beliefs are just (boolean) combinations of NF properties.

The DIC scenario shows that it is the NF properties of a belief and how those properties interact with the rest of the physical system that determines our behavior. DIC may be science fiction, but even in our own naturally occurring belief interface system, it is the NF properties of a belief and how those properties interact with the rest of our physiology that determines our behavior. To look at this slightly differently, let PS1, PS2, PS3… PSn each be a set of physical properties, e.g. PS1 is short for (P1 & P7 & P11…). Now suppose that the semantic content of the belief that I am thirsty is just a boolean combination of the physical properties like this:

PS1∨ PS2 ∨ PS3 ∨… ∨ PSn

Now imagine that Smith’s belief that I am thirsty is PS1. Plantinga would say that Smith’s belief does things in virtue of its physical (in this case, neurophysiological) properties rather than in virtue of the physical properties of being part of the Boolean combination that I am thirsty—just as when the ball breaks the window, in virtue of having a mass of 0.2 kilograms rather than in virtue of having a mass of 0.2 kg being Sam’s favorite property.

We can see that this is the case with any other thought experiment. Modifying Smith’s physiology a little, holding the NF properties of the belief (PS1) constant, and the NF properties of Smith’s belief that I am thirsty could cause something quite different, e.g. the physical properties of PS1 triggering an electrochemical reaction causing Smith to ignore the water around him and have to eat sand instead. This would be physically possible, since it is the NF properties of a belief and how those properties interact with the rest of the physical system that determine our behavior. Given materialism, it would just be a matter of luck (e.g. favorable physical laws) that belief and behavior are linked in a “rational” way by mimicking the semantic content influencing behavior, e.g. the NF properties of the belief that this plant is poisonous and hence I will not eat it causes me not to eat the plant, unlike the NF properties of the belief that grass is air causes me not to eat the plant. In any case, the thought experiment does illustrate that it is the NF properties of the belief and how those properties interact with the rest of the physical system that determine our behavior. Just as having a mass of 0.2 kg being Sam’s favorite property doesn’t seem to have anything to do with why the ball breaks the window, so too does PS1 being a member of the Boolean combination of I’m thirsty not seem to have anything to do with why PS1 does the things it does. If that is true, then the semantic content of a belief seems to be causally irrelevant in the sense that a belief does things in virtue of its NF properties, and not because of its semantic content.

Conclusion

Given materialism, the semantic content of a belief is causally irrelevant in the sense that a belief does things in virtue of its NF properties, not because of its semantic content. If a given set of NF properties had different semantic content, it would result in the same behavior (the same neurophysiological properties means we would have the same electrical impulses traveling along the same neural pathways and thus emitting the same muscle contractions). Even if reductionist materialism were true, beliefs seem to cause behavior in virtue of their NF properties, not because of their semantic content. The DIC scenario in particular illustrates that even on reductionist materialism, the semantic content of a belief can be absolutely unrelated to the person’s external environment when that belief causes behavior, for example, the situation in which the NF properties of the belief that grass is air cause Smith to eat coconut ice cream. So we have the following argument:

  1. If materialism is true, then the content of our beliefs is causally irrelevant.
  2. But the content of our beliefs is causally relevant.
  3. Therefore, materialism is false.

If materialism were true, a belief would do things in virtue of its NF properties and how those properties interact with the rest of the physical system. Even if the semantic content of a belief is just a boolean combination of physical properties, a set of physical properties that is a member of that boolean combination seems to have nothing to do with why that set of physical properties causally affects other things in one’s body, just as having a mass of 0.2 kg being Sam’s favorite property seems to have nothing to do with why the ball breaks the window.

Grades

[1] Plantinga, Alvin. “A New Argument against Materialism”  Philosophia Christi  14.1 (Summer 2012) p. 9

[2] Plantinga, Alvin. “A New Argument against Materialism”  Philosophia Christi  14.1 (Summer 2012) p. 21

 


Original Blog: http://bit.ly/2ZVw4bT

Translated and edited by Jairo Izquierdo

By Greg Koukl

Why did God destroy Sodom and Gomorrah? Was it really because of the sin of inhospitality and not because of homosexuality, the greatest judgment found in the Bible outside of the book of Revelation?

People find what they want in the Bible. But if you look hard enough, you can find “biblical” support for reincarnation, Eastern religions, Jesus as a guru, divorce for any reason, and flying saucers. Every sect of Christianity uses the Bible to validate its claims, as do some who practice the occult.

It is not surprising, then, that a recent trend among biblical scholars holds that a careful reading of Genesis in its historical context provides no solid basis for concluding that the destruction of Sodom and Gomorrah has anything to do with homosexuality.

This view may seem far-fetched to biblical conservatives, but it is taken very seriously in academic circles. It represents a significant challenge to the average Christian who finds in the Genesis account a direct condemnation of homosexual behavior.

My goal is to provide an answer to that challenge. I have no interest in defaming, insulting, offending, attacking, lashing out, denigrating, much less belittling a group of people. I just want to determine one thing: why did God destroy those two cities? Did it have anything to do with homosexuality itself? Simply put, what was the sin (or sins) of Sodom and Gomorrah?

Genesis 18:16-19:29

Although the context of the story in question begins in Genesis 18:16 during God’s conversation with Abraham by the oaks of Mamre, the details of the encounter in Sodom are found in Genesis 19:4-13:

They had not yet gone to bed, when the men of the city, the men of Sodom, surrounded the house, both young and old, all the people without exception. And they called to Lot, and said to him, “Where are the men who came to you tonight? Bring them out so that we may know them.” Then Lot went out to them at the entrance and shut the door behind him, and said, “My brothers, I beg you not to do wickedly. Behold, I have two daughters who have not known a man; let me bring them out to you and do with them as seems good to you; but do not do anything to these men, for they have come under my roof.” But they said, “Stand aside!” And they said, “This man came as a stranger, and is already acting as a judge; now we will deal worse with you than with them.” And they rushed at Lot and were about to break down the door, but the two men put out their hands and brought Lot into the house with them, and shut the door. And they struck the men who were at the entrance of the house with blindness, from the smallest to the greatest, so that they were wearied trying to find the entrance.

Then the two men said to Lot, “Who else do you have here? Your sons-in-law, your sons, your daughters, and whoever you have in the city—get them out of this place, for we are going to destroy this place, for its outcry has become so great before the Lord that the Lord has sent us to destroy it.”

What was the sin of Sodom and Gomorrah? Why did God destroy the two cities? The traditional view is that homosexuality was the primary offense (“I beg you, my brothers, do not act wickedly.”).

Yale historian John Boswell offers four possible reasons for the destruction of Sodom:

(1) The Sodomites were destroyed because of the general wickedness that prompted the Lord to send angels into the city to investigate in the first place; (2) the city was destroyed because the people of Sodom had attempted to rape the angels; (3) the city was destroyed because the men of Sodom had attempted to engage in homosexual relations with the angels…; (4) the city was destroyed because of the inhospitable treatment of the visitors sent by the Lord. [1]

John Boswell thinks that explanation (2) “is the most obvious of the four,” although it has been “widely ignored by biblical scholars” [2] . Boswell expands on explanation (4), which he seems to favor as the most consistent with “modern scholarship” since 1955:

Lot was violating the custom of Sodom… by welcoming unknown guests into the city walls at night without obtaining permission from the city elders. When the men of Sodom gathered together to demand that the strangers be brought out before them “so that they might know them,” it only meant that they wanted to “know” who they were, and consequently, the city was destroyed not because of sexual immorality, but because of the sin of inhospitality to strangers [3] .

The Englishman D. Sherwin Bailey also makes this argument in Homosexuality and the Western Christian Tradition (1955). The men of Sodom only wanted to question Lot’s guests to see if they were spies. The sin of gang rape was also in view, not homosexuality. In a broader sense, the men of Sodom were inhospitable to Lot’s guests.

Apparently it did not occur to Boswell that possibilities (2) and (4) seemed to be in conflict. If “meeting” the angels basically means questioning them, then there is not an attempt at rape, but an attempt at interrogation. If, on the other hand, the men intended to have sexual relations with the visitors (according to the traditional view) and are guilty of attempted rape, then the interrogation explanation must be abandoned (as the interpretation of Boswell’s above summary with respect to the views of modern scholarship is somewhat incoherent).

Some of these explanations, however, are not mutually exclusive and may have been influenced differently. For example, the general wickedness of Sodom and Gomorrah (1) may have included rape (2) and/or inhospitality (4).

My primary interest here is to determine whether the biblical record indicates that (4) homosexuality was a significant factor.

Text clues

Why did God destroy Sodom and Gomorrah? We can find clues not only in the Genesis account, but also in the books of the prophets and in 2 Peter and Jude in the New Testament. These give us insight into the way ancient Jewish thinkers, steeped in Jewish culture, understood these texts.

First, Sodom and Gomorrah were judged for a serious sin. Genesis 18:20 says, “The cry of Sodom and Gomorrah is great, and their sin is exceedingly grievous.” In fact, not even ten righteous people could be found in the city.

Second, it seems that the judgment of these cities was to serve as a lesson to Abraham and others that wickedness would be punished. In 2 Peter 2:6 we see that God condemned and destroyed the cities as an “example to those who would live ungodly afterward.”

Third, Jude and Peter describe the unique qualities of sin. Jude 7 portrays the activity as “they became corrupt” and went after “strange flesh” [4] . Peter wrote that Lot was “overwhelmed by the sensual conduct of unchaste men,” and “from what he saw and heard as he lived among them, he was daily tormented in his righteous soul by their unrighteous deeds.” They are “those who walk after the flesh in its corrupt desires and despise authority” (2 Peter 2:7-10).

Fourth, there are 27 references outside Genesis to the city of Sodom. It is the emblem of gross immorality, the deepest depravity, and great judgment.

Gathering the biblical evidence gives us a picture of the offense of Sodom. The sin of Sodom and Gomorrah was a grievous, continual, debauched, sensual act that Lot saw, heard, and was tormented by as he witnessed it day after day. It was an act in which the inhabitants gave themselves over to their corrupt desires, going after strange flesh, ultimately bringing upon themselves the greatest judgment found in the Bible outside of the book of Revelation.

What do we know about the behavior of the men of Sodom and Gomorrah that fits this description?

Just a couple of questions

Was the city destroyed because the men of Sodom attempted to rape the angels (option (2) above)? The answer is obviously no. God’s judgment could not have been for the rapacious attempt itself, since His decision to destroy the cities was made days before the encounter (see Genesis 18:20). Furthermore, Peter makes it clear that the evil acts were ongoing (“day after day”), not a one-time incident. The cry had already gone up before God for some time [5] .

Was it merely an interrogation? Although the Hebrew word “yada” (“to know”) [6]  has a variety of nuances, the New Living Translation appropriately translates it as “to have sex” [7] . Although the word does not always have sexual connotations, it often does, and this translation is more consistent with the context of Genesis 9:5. There is no evidence that a harmless interview was what the men of the city had in mind. Lot’s response—“I beg you, my brothers, do not act wickedly”—makes it clear that they had other intentions.

Furthermore, the same verb is used in the immediate context to describe daughters who have not “known” a man and who were offered to the crowd instead of the visitors. Are we to understand Lot here as saying, “Please do not question my guests, but rather speak to my daughters who have never been interviewed”?

Did God judge Sodom and Gomorrah because of inhospitality? Is it true that God’s judgment was not because of homosexuality per se, but because the men of the town were not courteous to the visitors, violating sacred customs by attempting to outrage them? Serious questions arise if we make a couple of observations.

First, the implication itself is strange. To say that the men of Sodom were inhospitable because of the attempted rape is like saying that a husband who has beaten his wife is an insensitive spouse. That may be true, but it is hardly an important observation given the seriousness of the crime.

Second—and this has more to do with textual evidence—it does not fit the collective biblical description of the behavior that provoked God’s wrath: perverted, lawless, sensual behavior that Lot saw and heard day after day, in which men went after strange flesh.

Third, are we to believe that God wiped out two entire cities just because they had bad manners, even granting that such manners were more important then than now? There is no textual evidence that inhospitality was a capital offense. Yet homosexuality was punishable by death in Israel (Leviticus 18:22; 20:13). Did God overlook the capital offense, and yet wipe out two entire cities for an evil that is nowhere listed as a serious offense?

The only reason that fits

The prevailing modern view of the sin of Sodom and Gomorrah is that the attempted rape of Lot’s visitors violated the high code of Middle Eastern hospitality (19:9). However, this inhospitality is an inference, not a specific point made in the text itself.

Moreover, the charge of inhospitality depends on—and is overshadowed by—the grave crime of rape, though neither of these could be the sin of Sodom and Gomorrah because God had decided to judge the cities long before they were committed. What choice is left? Only one.

We know that the men of Sodom and Gomorrah were homosexuals, “both young and old, all the people without exception” (19:4), to the point of despising available women (19:5-8). They even persisted after being struck with blindness (19:11). These men were totally given over to an overwhelming passion that did not abate despite being supernaturally blinded by angels.

Homosexuality fits the biblical details. It was the sin that represented the flagrant wickedness of Sodom and Gomorrah—the “gross,” “ungodly,” “wicked,” “sensual conduct of the profligate men” that tormented Lot as he “saw and heard” it “day after day,” the “perverse desire” of those who followed “strange flesh.”

In their defense, some might cite Ezekiel 16:49-50: “Behold, this was the iniquity of your sister Sodom: Arrogance, plenty of bread, and complete idleness were her and her daughters; yet they did not help the poor and needy, but they were haughty and committed abominations before me [8] . And when I saw it, I put them to death.” There is no mention of homosexuality here.

Clearly, the overall wickedness of Sodom and Gomorrah was great. That is not in question. Our interest here is whether homosexuality was part of that wickedness. Our analysis of Genesis reveals that homosexuality was the primary behavior in question in that passage. Ezekiel simply lists additional sins. The prophet does not contradict Moses, but rather gives more details.

Pettiness and arrogance alone did not attract God’s wrath. Ezekiel headed the list of crimes with the word “abominations.” This word brings us back to homosexuality. The behavior that Moses refers to in Genesis 18 and later describes in Leviticus as “abomination” in the eyes of God.

Levitical

The Mosaic Law has two explicit citations regarding homosexuality. Leviticus 18:22 says, “You shall not lie with a male as one lies with a woman; it is an abomination” [9] . It is an abomination [toebah] [10] . Leviticus 20:13 says, “If a man lies with a male as one lies with a woman, both of them have committed an abomination [toebah]; they shall surely be put to death; their bloodguilt is upon them.”

John Boswell offers the most common rebuttal to what appears to be the obvious biblical prohibition of homosexuality:

The Hebrew word “toebah,” here translated as “abomination,” typically does not mean something intrinsically evil, such as rape or theft… but rather something that is ritually unclean for Jews, such as eating pork or engaging in sexual relations during menstruation, both of which are prohibited in these same chapters. [11]

As implied, Leviticus is not where we generally go for moral instruction. The sections cited deal with the worship service: sacrifices, priesthood, ceremonial washings, etc. These instructions have to do with ritual purity, not moral purity. A Jew who observed these laws could not worship after ceremonial defilement until he had cleansed himself to perform the ritual.

Others have pointed out that many details of the Mosaic law are archaic. Who cares about mixing wool with linen (Deuteronomy 22:11)? The death penalty itself does not mark homosexuality as particularly abhorrent. Disobedience to parents was also a capital offense, as was gathering firewood on the Sabbath, and yet no one considers these things punishable offenses today. [12]

This answer is riddled with inconsistencies. First, even if this prohibition were restricted only to ceremonial purity and worship, then it would apply only to Jewish clerics. However, many who use this approach see no problem with homosexual rabbis and defend such “diversity” as a religious virtue. On the other hand, if the Torah’s prohibitions no longer apply at all, then the difference between the ceremonial and moral aspects of Mosaic law is moot; none of it applies anyway.

Second, it is a grave mistake to conclude that if something in the Torah no longer applies, then nothing is applicable. Jewish thinker Dennis Prager observed: “It is one thing not to carry out a Torah punishment, and quite another to declare that a Torah sin is no longer a sin.” [13]  [emphasis in original]

Third, it is true that much of the law seems to deal with religious activity rather than universal morality. However, this observation alone is not sufficient to dismiss the Torah as a source of obligatory moral instruction altogether. Ceremonial and moral purity are not always distinct from one another.

Here, context is king. Note where the verses fit in. The “toebah” of homosexuality is found between adultery (18:20), child sacrifice (18:21), and bestiality (18:23). Was Moses saying that if a priest committed adultery, had sex with an animal, or burned his son on the altar to Molech, he must make sure to wash before coming to the temple?

More to the point, these sections were not addressed to the priests, but to all the “children of Israel” (18:2, 20:2). In addition to the prohibitions regarding adultery, child sacrifice, and bestiality already mentioned, Moses also prohibited spiritism (20:6) and incest (20:12).

The conclusion of Leviticus 18 contains these words:

Speak to [the “children of Israel” (v. 2)], but as for you, you shall keep my statutes and my laws and you shall not do any of these abominations, neither the native nor the stranger residing among you; for the men of this land who were before you have done all these abominations, and the land has become defiled. (18:26-27)

Moses spoke just as clearly as in Genesis. The cities of Sodom and Gomorrah were guilty of many things, but chief among them was the sin of homosexuality.

In this section of Leviticus, God gives instructions not only regarding ceremonial purity, but also commandments that were to be observed by every Jew and even by every visitor.

Homosexuality was a sin for Jews. It was also a sin for Gentiles who visited Jews (“strangers”). It was even an abomination that defiled the land when pagan inhabitants in Canaan practiced it long before the Jews arrived.

Homosexuality is a defiling sin, no matter who practices it. It has no place before God among any people, in any age, neither before nor now.

Grades

[1] John Boswell, “Christianity, Social Tolerance, and Homosexuality” (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980), p. 93.

[2] Ibid.

[3] Ibid.

[4] Some have suggested that the sin was seeking sexual union with angels (“strange flesh”). While this may be a possible interpretation, there is no indication that the men knew that Lot’s visitors were angels. Jude’s point is that the Sodomites, like the angels, “did not retain their original dominion, but abandoned their rightful dwelling” (v. 6). The “strange flesh”—the improper dominion—was not angelic flesh, but homosexual flesh.

[5] The answer that homosexual rape could still qualify as ongoing activity is unconvincing. Who would be the ongoing victims? They were not the men of the city.

Because of their sexual orientation, they were unlikely to be able to resist homosexual advances. Visitors would have to be targeted. But if those who did come were harassed “day after day,” I am sure that would put an end to the tourist business. The continuous supply of sexual candidates would quickly diminish once word got out, and many would avoid the area.

[6] Strong’s #3045.

[7] “To know” a person carnally, to have sexual relations… suj. and obj. Male (of sodomy) Gen. 19:5).” Brown, Driver and Briggs, The Brown-Driver-Briggs Hebrew and

English Lexicon (Hendrickson Publishers, Peabody ME: 1996), 394. See also Judges 19:22 ff.

[8] Curiously, this last sentence was overlooked in Boswell’s citation of the text.

[9] “Lie down” is the Hebrew word “shakab” and means “to lie down” (Strong’s #7901). In this case, it refers to sexual intercourse as in Genesis 19:32: “Come, let us make our father drink wine, and let us lie with him, that we may preserve our family through our father” (Brown, Driver, and Briggs, 1012).

[10] Strong’s #8441.

[11] Boswell, 100.

[12] It is curious that some choose to conclude that homosexuality was a lesser crime since it was no more offensive to God than gathering sticks on the Sabbath. Both were considered capital offenses. If you want to know how God really felt about this, look at the punishment He exacts.

[13] Dennis Prager, “Homosexuality, Judaism and Gay Rabbis,” The Prager Perspective, 3/1/97.

 


Greg Koukl is a Christian apologist, radio host, author, speaker, and founder of the Christian apologetics organization Stand To Reason. Greg received his M.A. in Philosophy of Religion and Ethics from Talbot School of Theology, graduating with high honors, and his M.A. in Christian Apologetics with honors from Simon Greenleaf University. He is an adjunct professor of Christian apologetics at Biola University.

Original Blog: http://bit.ly/2IplYdi

Translated by Natalia Armando

Edited by Maria Andreina Cerrada

By Carlos E. Rodriguez

In their arguments for the existence of a being that transcends the universe, Christian theists often identify this being with the name of God. What we are going to do is to provide a clear and simple meaning of this concept.

How do we define God?

This word can be used as a common noun or a proper noun. In my case, and in the case of many, I use it as a proper noun. It contains the concept of a being that possesses characteristic properties. There are two ways to know what properties this concept possesses: one comes through the theology revealed in the Bible, and another comes through Anselm’s theology of the perfect being . These two are not mutually exclusive, but rather use different paths to reach the same point.

We say that God is a proper name that is attributed to a being that possesses properties. From the theology of perfect being, we say that these properties are maximally great. In this way, when we speak of God, in Anselm’s terms, we speak of the maximally great being that can be conceived. If you can conceive of a being greater than him, you are conceiving of God. From this point of view, a maximally great being possesses maximal properties, such as Omnipotence, Omniscience, etc.

With all this in mind, we say that God is a personal being, worthy of worship, immaterial, timeless without the universe, a-spatial, perfectly free, eternal, Omnipotent, Omniscient, Omnipresent, the locus of goodness, creator of all things, etc. Instead of mentioning each property that the being that receives this name possesses, we summarize it (preferably) with the Anselmian statement: “the greatest being that exists.” Such a being possesses all the maximum properties and qualities that can be conceived.

In this way, we have a concept of what is meant by God.

Jehovah, the God mentioned in the Bible, is God

Why is Jehovah treated as God? Because the attributes or properties that he possesses are the same as those of a supremely great being. If we go to the Bible, and use a method that uses revealed theology as a source, we find that Jehovah is:

  1. Immaterial, for He is spirit. John 4:24, “God is spirit, and those who worship Him must worship in spirit and truth,” is also implied in several references to His invisibility (John 1:18; 1 Timothy 1:17; 6:15-16).
  2. Omniscient, for “he knows all things” (1 John 3:20).
  3. Necessary and self-existent (Isaiah 40:17-23; Revelation 4:11).
  4. Eternal (Psalms 90:1-4; 102:11-12, 25-27).
  5. Omnipresent (Psalms 139:7-12).
  6. Omnipotent (Genesis 17:1; Revelation 19:6).
  7. Holy (Leviticus 19:2).
  8. Love (1 John 4:7-21).

If Jehovah possesses the properties of a supremely great being, and this being is called God, then Jehovah is God. It is the attributes and properties, referred to in the Bible but also deducible through natural theology, that give Jehovah the right to be called God.

 


Carlos Enrique Rodríguez Alcántara is from the Dominican Republic, a blogger, preacher, teacher, speaker, and apologist. Husband of Carolina. Member of the Central Rock of Salvation Church, where he has been director of education and deputy director of education for the council. He has an associate degree in theology from ESFOTEBIC. He holds a certificate in philosophy, philosophy and science (with honors) and critical thinking from the University of Edinburgh, as well as philosophy, science, and religion from the same university.

Original Blog: http://bit.ly/2R8qdfS

By Maverick Christian

INTRODUCTION

For those of you who are philosophically unfamiliar, naturalism is the belief that only nature is real and that the supernatural does not exist. The Evolutionary Argument Against Naturalism (EAAN), put forward by Christian philosopher Alvin Plantinga, holds that the conjunction of naturalism and evolution is self-defeating. This is not an argument against evolution, but rather an argument against naturalism (since, if naturalism is true, then evolution is the “only game in town,” and if the conjunction of naturalism and evolution is self-defeating, so much the worse for naturalism).

To define some terms and abbreviations, a defeater is (roughly) something that eliminates or weakens rational grounds for accepting a belief; in the context of argument, the defeater is such that one is rationally compelled to abandon the defeated belief (i.e., one does not believe it, either by (1) remaining agnostic about it, or (2) believing it to be false). Suppose, for example, that I arrive in a town and see what appears to be a barn fifty yards away. I later learn that last week some crank put up fake barns all over the area, along with the real ones, and that these fake barns are indistinguishable from real barns when viewed from a distance of thirty yards or more. I now have a defeater for my belief that I had seen a barn. I realize that I might have seen a barn, but I do not have sufficient grounds to continue accepting the belief. The rational thing for me to do is to abandon my belief that I had seen a barn. Suppose I later learn that the eccentric removed all the fake granaries before my arrival. Then I would have something that nullifies the defeater’s defeating force, i.e., a defeater of defeaters. The EAAN claims that the naturalist who believes in evolution acquires a defeater for his belief in evolution + naturalism. Commonly used abbreviations for the EAAN:

                 F = our cognitive faculties are reliable.

                N = Naturalism is true.

                 E = Evolution is true.

Pr(F/N&E) = the Probability of F given N and E.

That is, Pr(F/N&E) refers to the probability that (our cognitive faculties are reliable given naturalism and evolution), part of the argument is as follows:

  1. Pr(F/N&E) is low.
  2. The person who believes in N&E (naturalism and evolution) and sees that Pr(F/N&E) is low has a defeater for F.
  3. Anyone who has a defeater for F has a defeater for almost any other belief including (if he believed it) N&E.
  4. Therefore, the N&E devotee (at least the devotee who is aware of the truth of premise 1) has a self-defeating belief.

Let’s call premise (1) the Defeat Thesis and let’s call premise (2) the Probability Thesis. Denying the truth of evolution is not the best option for the naturalist, so if the above evolutionary argument against naturalism is sound, the naturalist is in serious trouble. But defeaters themselves can be defeated, as in the case of the barn scenario I described, so is it possible that a defeater of defeaters is present for the naturalist here? Couldn’t the naturalist run a series of tests to confirm his cognitive reliability? Not quite, since the naturalist relies on his cognitive faculties even to believe that there is such a thing as scientists and cognitive tests, plus the belief that he has done those tests, and if he has a defeater for F, he is pretty much screwed. So the defeater mentioned in premise (2) would be an invincible defeater.

Next, I will refer to the two fundamental premises.

THE PROBABILITY THESIS

Why do you think Pr(F/N&E) is low? Normally you might think that true beliefs help you survive. That’s certainly the case if beliefs are causally relevant to behavior (e.g., I think this plant is poisonous, so I’m not going to eat it). But if the truth of our beliefs isn’t so causally relevant, then that factor will be invisible to natural selection. The content of our beliefs could be anything, true or not, and it wouldn’t affect our behavior. Whether the belief content is 2+2=4, 2+2=67, or 2+2=4.096 would make no difference to how we behave. If that’s true, then Pr(F/N&E) is low.

The kind of naturalism being discussed here assumes that human beings are purely nonphysical creatures without minds or souls. In my Plantinga Argument Against Materialism article I described Alvin Plantinga’s argument for the idea that if materialism about human beings were true (i.e., if we were purely physical beings), then the propositional content of our beliefs (e.g., there is a cold soda in the fridge ) would not be causally relevant. So for a better understanding of how the semantic content of a belief is causally relevant to behavior go to The Epistemological Argument Against Materialism.

So why would it matter if N&E implies that the semantic content of our beliefs is causally irrelevant? To avoid bias against our own species, let’s not think about ourselves, but about alien creatures whose physiology is radically different from ours. N&E is true for these aliens, so the semantic content of their beliefs is causally irrelevant. Then the N&E of the electrochemical reactions that cause these aliens’ behavior could generate any semantic content (e.g., 2+2=1 or grass is air), without the content affecting behavior. The semantic content could even be “junk” beliefs that bear no relation to the external environment, such as in dreams, and it would still not affect behavior. It would still be possible that electrochemical reactions that produce advantageous behavior also generate mostly true beliefs, but given the causal irrelevance of semantic content, it would seem like the most serendipitous of coincidences, if that were to happen. Therefore, in the absence of further relevant data, the likelihood that his cognitive abilities are reliable (given N&E) is low.

One might object that while the probability of cognitive reliability is low given only N&E, we know more relevant data P such that Pr(F/N&E&P) is high, e.g. we know that, for physiology, the link between content and behavior is favorable for our species, such that we act as if semantic content influences our behavior in a way worthy of a rational agent. Perhaps that is true, but that is an objection to the Defeatist Thesis and not the Probability Thesis. For now we are only concerned with justifying that Pr(F/N&E) is low. In any case, let FA stand for the cognitive faculties of aliens being reliable . I have argued that Pr(FA/N&E) is true for the following argument:

  1. If Pr(FA/N&E) is low, then Pr(F/N&E) is low.
  2. Pr (FA/N&E) is low.
  3. Therefore, Pr(F/N&E) is low.

In light of the fact that in N&E, the semantic content of a belief is causally irrelevant, the probability of FA given N&E is low. Similarly, what is true for aliens is true for us (remember, we are basically taking into account the probability of F in just N&E). But suppose that, even after reading the rest of my post on Plantinga’s argument against materialism, one is still not convinced that a belief does things in virtue of its NF properties and not its semantic content. Is there another way to argue for the Probability Thesis?

The DNFA scenario

For the sake of having a label handy, let’s call semantic epiphenomenalism (SE) the view that a belief does things in virtue of its NF properties rather than its semantic content, as some philosophers call it. It seems to be the case that Pr(F/N&E&SE) is low, but what if SE were false? What if, despite Plantinga’s argument against materialism, one is still convinced that the semantic content of a belief is causally relevant? In that case there is another thought experiment that I’ll call the “DNFA scenario.”

Suppose a mad scientist creates an artificial neurophysiological device (ANPD), a multi-tentacled device implanted near Smith’s brain stem that controls both his thoughts and behavior. The mad scientist can remotely control the ANPD’s electrochemical processes to vary Smith’s beliefs and behavior in countless different ways. For example, Smith is dehydrated, and the mad scientist, wanting his victim to be healthy, uses the ANPD to force Smith to drink some water while simultaneously making him believe “I’m thirsty and water will quench my thirst.” The second time Smith is dehydrated, the mad scientist uses a different electrochemical setting to make Smith believe ” Drinking this water will grant me superpowers in the afterlife” while simultaneously producing the same drinking behavior (and suppose this belief is false). In this case, the electrochemical process that produces the mental-enhancing behavior also produces a false belief. The DNFA can even produce “junk” semantic beliefs that have little to do with the coerced behavior, such as making Bill believe that “grass is air” or that ” 1+1=3 ” while simultaneously making Smith drink the water. The third time Smith gets dehydrated the mad scientist does just that, causing Smith to drink the water while also making him believe that “1+1=3.” Indeed, the mad scientist can associate almost any belief with the same drinking behavior . Even if a person’s semantic content is only NF properties, it is how the NF properties interact with the rest of the system that determines the behavior. An artificial neurophysiological device is not only metaphysically possible, but also appears to be physically possible (given that beliefs and behavior can be produced by electrochemical means).

The DNFA scenario shows that false beliefs can be associated with mental state-enhancing behavior, to the point where false beliefs are garbage beliefs (beliefs that are extremely unrelated to the external environment, as in dreams). But if the artificial neurophysiology scenario is physically possible, then it is at least metaphysically possible for the natural neurophysiology of an evolved being to have the same “disconnect” between semantics and behavior. Even if it were possible that the semantic content of a belief is causally relevant (one might think that semantic content is just the NF properties), the DNFA scenario shows that for any given behavior B, there are innumerable semantic contents C – even of C extremely unrelated to the external environment – that could be associated with B. Like ES, this would still allow for the possibility that beliefs and behaviors are linked in a “rational” way (e.g., I think a plant is poisonous, so I won’t eat it) but like ES it would still be possible for even junk beliefs to be associated with advantageous behavior. Someone might argue that the relation between semantic content and behavior is in this sense functionally equivalent to ES, despite the falsity of ES. Call this view semantic pseudo-epiphenomenalism (SEP).

Two key claims of the PES are (1) ES is false; (2) even though ES is false, it is still possible for even rubbish beliefs to be associated with advantageous behaviour – and the DNFA scenario shows that this is in fact physically possible (since the device is physically possible). Thus the DNFA scenario shows that if ES is not true, then PES is. Both ES and PES allow for a large divorce between beliefs and behaviour (again, think of the case where grass is air is associated with Smith drinking clean water). On second thought, it is very easy to imagine a moving set of atoms creating advantageous behaviour while producing beliefs unrelated to the external world, and it is easy to take for granted our more fortunate truth-leading relation between belief and behaviour, since it is so familiar to us.

To again avoid bias towards our own species, they don’t think of us, but of alien creatures from another world on which they have N&E&PES. While it’s easy to assume that beliefs and behaviors would be linked in a “rational” way (e.g. a man believing that water will quench his thirst so he drinks it), there’s nothing in N&E&ES or N&E&PES to believe that such a link would occur in aliens (whose physiology, we can assume, differs from ours), since both ES and ESP easily allow junk beliefs to be connected with favorable behavior. Because ESP is functionally equivalent to ES, and given the enormous variety of diverse beliefs that might be associated with a given behavior (“bachelors are married”, “grass is air”, “2+2=1”, “2+2=2”, “2+2=3”, etc.) an evolving race of alien creatures suffering from ESP has a low probability of evolving reliable cognitive faculties as if they were affected by ES. In sum, naturalism implies that either ES or ESP is true, and since Pr(FA/N&E&ES) and Pr(FA/N&E&PES) are low/inscrutable, it follows that Pr(FA/N&E) is also low/inscrutable. But then if Pr(FA/N&E) is low/inscrutable, then Pr(F/N&E) is also low/inscrutable (since, as with the aliens, we are considering the possibility of F in N&E without further information).

An objection

In response, one might propose the following rebuttal. Although naturalism inevitably involves an ES-type problem—whether via semantic epiphenomenalism or semantic pseudo-epiphenomenalism—the mental-state-enhancing neurophysiological properties that are most likely to be selected for by natural selection (say, a certain neurophysiology is selectable just in case it is most likely to be selected for by natural selection) happen to be the ones that are conducive to truth. The DNFA scenario is obviously engineered and produces certain behavioral belief pairs that are not likely to obtain in human physiology in real time. The most efficient and selectable way for neurophysiology to produce advantageous behavior also produces true beliefs. Thus, although the ES-type situation exists for semantics and behavior, luckily for us the physiological relation between semantics and behavior is such that true beliefs usually obtain.

All of that may be true, but as an objection against the Probability Thesis it falls short. A major problem is that even if a favorable physiological relationship between beliefs and behaviors obtains for our species, such a favorable relationship does not seem to be knowable from N&E&ES alone. It cannot be known from N&E&ES alone, nor from N&E&SPE alone. To illustrate the problem, consider a planet with aliens whose neurophysiology differs radically from ours (though we don’t know much else about this). On N&E&ES where the semantic content of a belief is causally irrelevant, it would still be possible for mostly true beliefs to be associated with advantageous behavior, but since the semantic content of their beliefs could be anything and it wouldn’t matter, it would be the most serendipitous of coincidences, if it ever happened. Similarly in N&E&PES where even garbage beliefs can be associated with advantageous behavior, it would still be possible that alien electrochemical reactions that cause advantageous behavior also generate mostly true beliefs, but it would be a rather fortuitous coincidence if that were to happen, given the enormous variety of beliefs that can be associated with a given behavior (as the DNFA scenario suggests) and given that we have no additional relevant information about alien physiology.

One could grant that the probability of F given N&E (only) is low, but also claim that we know some proposition P (perhaps that the physiological relation between belief and behavior happens to be benevolent for our species) such that Pr(F/N&E&P) is high, and we have excellent reasons to believe that P is true. Therefore, Pr(F/N&E) being low does not defeat F for the evolutionary naturalist. However, this would be an objection against the defeater thesis rather than the probability thesis, so it will not be discussed in this section. Can the Defeatist Thesis withstand this objection? For that matter, why accept the Defeatist Thesis in the first place?

THE THESIS OF THE DEFEATER

Scenarios S1A through S5A below are features of the XX drug, a medication that renders cognitive abilities unreliable for a high percentage of people who take it, although those affected are unable to detect their cognitive unreliability. A small percentage of people who have a gene called the “blocking gene” produce a protein that blocks the reliability-destroying effects of the XX drugs, but no one else is immune to the drug. Some scenarios refer to the XX mutation, a mutation that causes the body to naturally produce and release the XX drug into the body shortly after birth.

Scenario ( S1A) : I know that my friend Sam has taken the drug XX, a medication that renders cognitive faculties unreliable for a high percentage of people who take it, although those affected are unable to detect its cognitive unreliability. I know, however, that Sam later comes to believe that extensive testing has established its cognitive reliability, although I have no independent reason to think that this occurred. And since Sam obtained his belief about cognitive testing long after he took the drug XX, I conclude that the belief was probably produced by unreliable cognitive faculties, and I have a defeater of my belief that Sam’s cognitive faculties are reliable.

Scenario (S2A) : I, as a three-year-old, ingest drug XX, being aware of its possible effects. I am not aware of any relevant differences that distinguish my case from Sam’s. Sam’s case, acquiring drug XX, and ingesting drug XX are my earliest memories. Some years after the incident I come to believe that I have undergone extensive testing establishing my cognitive reliability, but since this belief was long after I ingested drug XX, I come to the conclusion that my belief was probably the product of unreliable cognitive faculties and that I have a defeater for my belief that my cognitive faculties are reliable.

Scenario ( S3A): I have been injected with drug XX by a doctor shortly after I was born (the doctor mistakenly thought he had injected me with an important vaccine), and I come to believe the following. At first I believe that I am the product of some kind of evolution that makes the reliability of my cognitive faculties highly probable. I am a renowned scientist who has built a machine that I know is capable of reliably detecting when drug XX has entered a person’s bloodstream. I administer the test to myself, and the machine reports that drug XX entered my bloodstream at the time I was born. I later come to believe that I have gone through extensive testing establishing my cognitive reliability, but since this belief was long after drug XX entered my bloodstream, I come to the conclusion that I have a defeater of my belief that my cognitive faculties are reliable.

Scenario ( S4A): Natural evolution gave me the XX mutation and I come to believe the following. I am a renowned scientist who has built a machine that I know is capable of reliably detecting when the XX drug has entered a person’s bloodstream. For most of my life I have believed that I am the product of some sort of evolution that makes my cognitive reliability highly probable. After a few years, I administer the test and the machine reports that the XX drug entered my bloodstream at birth. I later come to believe that I have gone through extensive testing establishing my cognitive reliability, but since this belief was long after the XX drug entered my bloodstream, I come to the conclusion that I have a defeater of my belief that my cognitive abilities are reliable.

Scenario (S5A) : The only humanoid species on my planet is homo sapiens, and all of us have the XX mutation. I come to believe the following. Through an ingenious combination of scientific and philosophical argument, it is proven beyond a reasonable doubt that natural evolution implies that the XX mutation is inevitably a part of any humanoid’s genetics. Although there is the small possibility of a humanoid species that also has the blocking gene as part of its normal genetics, no other humanoid species would evolve the blocking gene. I come to the conclusion that the likelihood of my humanoid cognitive faculties being reliable is low given that I am a product of natural evolution. I later come to believe that there is overwhelming evidence for my cognitive reliability (for example, I believe credible scientists have told me that we all have the blocking gene), but since this belief occurred after the XX drug entered my bloodstream, I come to the conclusion that my belief in the blocking gene, etc. It was probably produced by unreliable cognitive faculties, and I have a defeater for my belief that my cognitive faculties are reliable.

Scenario ( S6A): The Probability Thesis is true and Pr(F/N&E) is low, but I initially did not believe this and instead believe that I am the product of some kind of evolution which makes my cognitive reliability very probable. Later, however, I study philosophy and see for myself that the probability of my humanoid cognitive faculties being reliable given that I am a product of natural evolution is low. I have since come to believe that I have undergone extensive testing establishing my cognitive reliability, but since this belief was long after N&E had already affected my cognitive faculties, I come to the conclusion that I have a defeater for my belief that my cognitive faculties are reliable.

So above we have a slippery slope of scenarios. The idea is that if F is defeated in (S1A), then it is defeated in (S2A), and if F is defeated in (S3), then it is defeated in (S4A), and so on. If F is not defeated in (S6A), where does the slippery slope stop and why? When is there a relevant difference between two scenarios that save F from defeat?

It is particularly difficult to find a relevant difference between (S5) and (S6A). One might say, in (S6A) we know from overwhelming evidence that N&E makes F likely, but why exactly do we know this in (S6A) but not in (S5)? To make the problem more explicit, imagine that the two worlds in (S5) and (S6) are essentially identical apart from the differences in (S5), so that I believe that my species-specific type of natural evolution is a product of giving me genes that (along with adequate nutrition, etc.) make it likely that my cognitive faculties are reliable, that cognitive science and evolutionary biology have given us strong evidence for human cognitive reliability, that truth-leading faculties are adaptive in Earth primates, and so on. I also believe that we have the gene-blocker to override the effects of the XX mutation. On top of that, let’s say that people in scenarios (S1 A) through (S5) were lucky to the point that everyone has the blocking gene. However, the belief in cognitive reliability is still defeated when people believe that all the supposed evidence for cognitive reliability is obtained long after drug XX enters the bloodstream. So how exactly is it that the supposed evidence for F is defeated in scenario (S5), but not in scenario (S6A)? If there is an important difference between the two scenarios, what is it?

One might think that the relevant difference between scenarios (S5) and (S6A) is the N&E mechanism of likely cognitive unreliability, i.e. the mechanism that makes Pr(F/N&E) low. In (S5) the naturally-evolved mechanism of likely cognitive unreliability is drug XX, whereas in (S6A) it is (probably) some other physiological process. But this hardly seems like a relevant difference in different causes that produce essentially the same effect: making humanoid cognitive faculties unlikely to be reliable given that they are a product of natural evolution. In scenarios (S5) and (S6A), whatever the mechanism of likely cognitive unreliability is for N&E (whether drug XX or some other mechanism) does not seem to matter.

CONCLUSION

The evolutionary argument against naturalism is as follows:

  1. Pr(F/N&E) is low.
  2. The person who believes in N&E (naturalism and evolution) and sees that Pr(F/N&E) is low has a defeater for F.
  3. Anyone who has a defeater for F has a defeater for almost any other belief including (if he believed it) N&E.
  4. Therefore, the N&E devotee (at least the devotee who is aware of the truth of premise 1) has a self-defeating belief.

One of the big reasons for accepting the Likelihood Thesis (premise 1) is that if N&E were true, then the semantic content of our beliefs is causally irrelevant in the sense that a belief does things in virtue of its neurophysiological (NF) properties and not because of its semantic content. If a belief had the same NF properties but different content, it would result in the same behavior (the same neurophysiological properties means we would have the same electrical impulses traveling along the same neural pathways and emitting the same muscle contractions). Even if that were not the case, the DNFA scenario suggests that it is still possible for “junk” beliefs to be associated with electrochemical reactions that produce advantageous behavior. If semantic epiphenomenalism (SE) is not true in N&E, then semantic pseudo-epiphenomenalism (SEP) is, and both Pr(F/N&E&SE) and Pr(F/N&E&SEP) are low, so Pr(F/N&E) is low.

The argument for the Defeatist Thesis (premise 2) is that if F is defeated in (S1), then it is defeated in (S2), and if F is defeated in (S3), then it is defeated in (S4), and so on, where (S6) is the scenario of a person who accepts both N&E and the Probability Thesis. The general idea is that the effect of an evolutionary naturalist believing Pr(F/N&E) to be low is similar to believing that drug XX has entered the body (where drug XX destroys the cognitive reliability of most who take it).

The upshot of all this is that there is a serious conflict between science and naturalism, since the conjunction of naturalism and evolution is an interesting way of self-refutation.

 


Original Blog: http://bit.ly/2MyZ47h
Translated and edited
by Jairo Izquierdo

In the previous post we saw about predicate logic and its formal language. Now we will talk about quantifiers.

UNIVERSAL QUANTIFICATION

Universally quantified propositions are those that speak of a group or set of all or none:

Universal affirmative : All humans are mortal.

Universal negative : No human is mortal .

These propositions have the form of the “if…then” type. So, for example, when we say that “All humans are mortal” we are logically saying, “If something is a human, then it is mortal.” Recalling our previous post on the formalization of subject-predicate propositions, we can now symbolize our universal affirmative in the following way:

x (H x → M x )

Which reads “For all x , if x is a human, then x is mortal.” In the same way, we symbolize our universal negative:

∀x (Hx → ¬Mx)

Which reads “For all x , if x is a human, then x is not mortal.”

EXISTENTIAL QUANTIFICATION

Existentially quantified propositions are those that speak only of some while of a group or set:

Existential affirmative : Some humans are mortal.

Existential Negative : Some humans are not mortal.

These propositions tell us that there is at least one thing that has or lacks the property in question, and they take the form of conjunctions. For example, the proposition “Some dogs are German Shepherds” is not reporting that there is at least one object in the world that is both a dog and black. We can now symbolize our existential affirmation:

∃x (Hx ^ Mx)

Which can be read as “There exists at least one x such that x is a human and x is a mortal.” We now symbolize our existential refusal:

 ∃x (Hx ^ ¬Mx)

Which reads “There exists at least one x such that x is a human and x is not mortal.”

Finally, using the Greek letters 𝛗 and 𝛙 to represent any property symbol, we can represent our general propositions with the following square diagram:

logic 09

When analyzing this table we can observe two things:

  • The propositions [∀x (𝛗x → 𝛙x)] and ∃x [(𝛗x ^ ¬𝛙x)] are contradictory . Thus, from the universal affirmative “For any x , if x is a dog, then x has fleas” and the existential negative “There exists at least one x , such that x is a dog and does not have fleas”, only one of them can be true.
  • The propositions [∃x (𝛗x ^ 𝛙x)] and [∀x (𝛗x → ¬𝛙x)] are also contradictory . In other words, of the existential affirmative “There exists at least one x such that x is a dog and x has fleas” and of the universal negative “For any x , if x is a dog, then x does not have fleas” only one can be true, but not both.

Now, what about the contraries relations in our square diagram from our previous post? Shouldn’t the propositions [∀x (𝛗x → 𝛙x)] and [∀x (𝛗x → ¬𝛙x)] be equally contraries where both cannot be true, but both can be false? Not really, and the reason is this: since universally quantified propositions are in the form of conditional statements and if it is the case that the antecedent is false, then no matter the truth value of the consequent, the proposition will be true. Let’s look at an example with both propositions:

  1. For any x , if x is a square planet, then x has an orbit.
  2. For any x , if x is a square planet, then x does not have an orbit.

Suppose that the antecedent for both propositions is false; while the consequent of (1) is true but false for (2). Then, according to the truth tables for conditional statements [1] , both propositions are true, so the necessary condition for them to be contrary propositions no longer holds (i.e., they cannot both be true).

In the case of propositions [∃x (𝛗x ^ 𝛙x)] and ∃x [(𝛗x ^ ¬𝛙x)] they cannot be subcontraries either (both can be true but not false), since if “? x” is a propositional function with no true substitution instance, then no matter what “? x ” means, both propositions will be false, and the reason is because existentially quantified propositions have the form of conjunctions , and the truth table for this type of propositions tells us that if the first conjunct is false, then the conjunction in its entirety is false [2] , so the necessary condition to be subcontrary is not met. Let’s see an example with affirmative and negative existential propositions respectively:

  1. There exists at least one x such that x is a dragon and x is green.
  2. There exists at least one x such that x is a dragon and x is not green.

Assuming that the first conjunct is false (x is a dragon) for both propositions, false for the second conjunct of (3), and true for (4), then in both cases the propositions are false.

Finally, the implication relation between the subalterns of the diagram from the previous post also does not hold, since we have seen that the propositions [∀x (𝛗x → 𝛙x)] and [∀x (𝛗x → ¬𝛙x)] can be true while the propositions [∃x (𝛗x ^ 𝛙x)] and [∃x [(𝛗x ^ ¬𝛙x)] can be false, so the truth of a universally quantified proposition does not imply the truth of an existentially quantified proposition.

Grades

[1] Truth table for conditionals:

𝛗 𝛙 𝛗 → 𝛙
V V V
V F F
F V V
F F V

 

 

As you can see, if the substitution instances for ? are false, the entire conditional will be true.

[2] Truth table for conjunctions:

𝛗 𝛙 𝛗 ^ 𝛙
V V V
V F F
F V F
F F F

 


Jairo Izquierdo is Director of Social Media and author for the Christian organization Cross Examined . He studies philosophy and theology, with his current focus being classical logic, epistemology, Christian doctrines and linguistics. He is co-founder of Filósofo Cristiano . He is a member of the Christian Apologetics Alliance and a minister of worship at the Christian Baptist church Cristo es la Respuesta in Puebla, Mexico.

By J. Brian Huffling

Many Christians believe that philosophy is a pagan discipline practiced either by ivory tower professors or Starbucks hippies. This belief has led some to object to the importance of philosophy, believing that only a relatively small group can do it, or that it deals with problems so mysterious or abstract that it would be a waste of time. Many Christian theologians object that philosophy is rooted in paganism and therefore has no place in Christian theology. After explaining what philosophy is about, it should be abundantly clear that these objections are not only incorrect, but that philosophy is inevitable.

‘Philosophy’ literally means “love (philo) of wisdom (sofia).” It is the search for knowledge, truth, and how to live the good (moral) life. There are several general branches of philosophy. Among them, one and the most fundamental, is metaphysics. Metaphysics is the study of being, or what it means to be true. While biologists study life as things happen, mathematicians study beings according to their number, and physicists study beings according to their physical parts or motion, the metaphysician studies what it means to be in general. They ask questions like, “What is the difference between Snoopy and the bloodhound you might go for a walk with?” Another branch of philosophy is epistemology, which is the study of knowledge. Epistemologists ask the questions, “How can knowledge be obtained?” “What is knowledge?” and “Is there a difference between knowledge and belief?” Moral philosophy seeks to know what it means to be good in the moral sense. Where does goodness come from, and what makes something good? Logic studies correct reasoning and the mistakes (fallacies) that are often made when making a rational argument. Aesthetics studies the nature of beauty, asking questions like, “What does it mean to be beautiful? Is beauty objective?” And so on.

A large number of philosophical fields emerge from these categories. The philosophy of mathematics deals with the nature of numbers, and asks whether numbers are real (for example, does the number 4 really exist?). In other words, it deals with the nature of mathematics. The philosophy of science deals with the nature of science. The philosophy of history deals with the nature of history and historical knowledge. My area is the philosophy of religion, which deals with issues such as the existence of God and His nature, how we talk about Him, the problem of evil, and the nature of miracles.

When you say something that purports to be true, you are talking about reality and claiming to know something about it. You are also making a logical claim. In addition, you are assuming (explicitly or implicitly) a certain perspective on how language works (philosophy of language). Even when you are talking about the tree in your front yard, you are saying something about the existence of the tree and of nature. I am not saying that everyone is a “philosopher” in the strict academic sense. What I am saying is that it is not possible to make claims about the world, God, or the Bible without taking philosophical positions, regardless of whether you know them or not.

The same is true of theology and the study/interpretation of the Bible. We cannot make theological claims without using philosophy. For example, when we talk about Jesus taking on a human nature, we must understand what a “nature” is. This is a philosophical category. When a scholar says that biblical interpreters cannot be objective because of their biases, this is a philosophical claim about the nature of objectivity, bias, the knower, and the process of knowing.

Far from being a pagan practice, this is how God made us. He made us rational beings. This is what sets us apart from other animals. Philosophy is useful and inevitable. Instead of trying to avoid it, we should try to become better philosophers, and worship God with our minds.

 


J. Brian Huffling, Ph.D., holds a B.A. in History from Lee University, M.A. (3 M.A.s.) in Apologetics, Philosophy, and Biblical Studies from Southern Evangelical Seminary (SES), and a Ph.D. in Philosophy of Religion from SES. He is the Director of the Doctoral Program and Associate Professor of Philosophy and Theology at SES. He also teaches courses for Apologia Online Academy. He previously taught at the Art Institute of Charlotte. He has served in the Marine Corps, Navy, and is currently an Air Force Reserve Chaplain at Maxwell Air Force Base. His hobbies include golf, backyard astronomy, martial arts, and guitar.

Original Blog: http://bit.ly/2EiStYA

Translated by Natalia Armando

Edited by Malachi Toro Vielma

Por Carlos E. Rodríguez

¡Dios les bendiga!

Mi interés en este blog es proporcionar, para el cristiano, herramientas para defender su fe cristiana. Aunque, también quiero hacerle ver al ateo lo errada que está su cosmovisión, y que la existencia de Dios puede ser probada más allá de toda duda razonable.

Hace unos meses desarrollé una serie de posts para recomendar a nuestros lectores y amigos ateos que no usen los argumentos que señalamos, por ser falaces, ya que no dicen nada ni aportan a este tema. Ahora, comienzo con una nueva serie, pero esta vez hablando de los argumentos que un teísta cristiano no debe de usar, por cometer falacias lógicas. Aunque soy cristiano, esto no me hace ser ciego y reconocer que muchos usan argumentos que no son muy buenos. Por esto escribo esta serie: para mejorar estos fallos y ayudarles a presentar una mejor defensa del cristianismo.

El argumento que veremos hoy es usado por cristianos cuando se les pide evidencia sobre la persona de Dios. Se les pide que presenten una evidencia física. Los cristianos suelen responder (no todos):

  1. Si Dios no existe, entonces el aire tampoco, pues no lo puedo ver aunque sí sentir.
  2. No puedo ver al aire, aunque sí sentirlo.
  3. Por lo tanto, Dios existe.

Los problemas que tiene este argumento son varios, y graves.

Lo primero es que comete un error de categoría. Debo reconocer que no todos los cristianos están preparados para responder este tipo de peguntas, y no por falta de lectura apologética, sino por no entender algunas cosas sobre Dios. Dios es un ser inmaterial, es espíritu, y por lo tanto, no puede ser medido por ningún método científico, pues este solo trabaja con realidades materiales que se pueden medir. Este es su límite. No se puede esperar que este método haga más de lo que puede hacer. Así, como la pregunta es: ¿tienes evidencia de la persona de Dios? ¿Dónde está? ¿Lo puedo ver? La respuesta no puede ser este argumento, pues supone que Dios es material. La respuesta debe ser: “Dios, su persona, no puede ser conocida empíricamente como un objeto que se estudia, pero sí podemos usar la ciencia para ver sus efectos, los cuales son señales que apuntan a él como mejor explicación. Ejemplo de esto: la creación del universo, la moral objetiva, el ajuste fino del universo, etc”. De esta manera, se responde satisfactoriamente la pregunta. Además, después de esta respuesta, se puede invitar a considerar experimentar a Dios a través del testimonio interno del Espíritu Santo.

Con esto dicho, vemos que el otro problema es que esta analogía es falsa. Compara a Dios con el aire, es decir que Dios es material, lo cual es imposible. Si se persiste en esto, el ateo de seguro respondería: “el aire se puede medir, Dios no”. Con esta respuesta por parte del ateo pone en jaque mate al creyente, pues la conversación se basará en el error de que Dios debe ser medido como objeto o experimentado como objeto material, para así ser real y creíble.

Entonces, por ser una falsa analogía y un error de categoría, insto a los creyentes a dejar de usar este pésimo argumento para demostrar la existencia de la persona de Dios. Lo mejor que puedes hacer es presentar las causas que tienen como mejor explicación a Dios, como las ya expuestas, y otras más. Y, si la persona tiene aún más interés en conocer, puedes invitarle a experimentar en su vida la realidad de Dios a través del testimonio interno del Espíritu Santo, que no es un modo de demostrar la verdad del cristianismo, sino de saber que es verdad, pues hay muchos que saben que es verdad a través de este testimonio interno, aunque no sepan demostrar la verdad del cristianismo. Así que aconsejo que, si su oyente quedó convencido por las evidencias, solo así, invítelo a dar este otro paso.

 


Carlos Enrique Rodríguez Alcántara es de República Dominicana, bloguero, predicador, maestro, conferencista y apologista. Esposo de Carolina. Miembro de la Iglesia Roca de Salvación Central, en donde ha sido director de educación y sub-director de educación del concilio. Tiene un grado asociado en teología de ESFOTEBIC. Certificado en filosofía, filosofía y ciencias (con honores) y pensamiento crítico por la universidad de Edimburgo, además de filosofía, ciencia y religión por la misma universidad.

Blog Original: http://bit.ly/2IiFfir

Veamos el siguiente silogismo:

  1. Todos los hombres son mortales.
  2. Sócrates es un hombre.
  3. Sócrates es mortal.

Por lógica de predicados de primer orden nos referimos a las oraciones que predican alguna propiedad de un sujeto. Cabe destacar que la formalización en la lógica de predicado es diferente de proposicional, porque si quisiéramos usar la lógica de predicados para nuestro argumento tendríamos algo como esto:

  1. P
  2. Q
  3. R

Por lo que es imposible que pudiéramos validar nuestro argumento por medio de las reglas hasta ahora aprendidas. Pero la formalización en lógica de predicados no es complicada, y en este artículo te enseñaré a cómo hacerlo.

Volvamos a nuestro argumento del inicio. la segunda premisa es una proposición singular; afirma que el individuo Sócrates (término sujeto) posee la propiedad de ser humano (término predicado). Usamos letras minúsculas para denotar a los individuos en las proposiciones singulares, de la a a la w, tomando la primera letra del nombre del individuo para denotarlo y los llamaremos constantes individuales. Y utilizando el mismo principio, utilizamos letras mayúsculas para designar los atributos. De esta forma, Sócrates se simboliza con s, mientras que los atributos de “humano” y “mortal” con H y M.

La razón por la que usamos las letras de la ‘a’ a la ‘w’ para los individuos es porque la letra x se utiliza para simbolizar el patrón común de todas las proposiciones singulares: los individuos que tienen cierto atributo. En este caso, distintos individuos pueden poseer el atributo humano, así que para simbolizar “Algo es humano” utilizamos Hx. Expresiones de este tipo son consideradas funciones proposicionales, que contienen variables individuales que se convierten en proposiciones cuando estas variables son reemplazadas por constantes individuales. Por ejemplo, la x en la función proposicional Hx (algo es humano) puede ser reemplazada por s, obteniendo ahora la proposición singular Hs (Sócrates es humano). A este proceso se le llama instanciación, y la proposición singular obtenida se le considera instancia de sustitución. Es importante recordar estos conceptos, ya que los veremos más adelante cuando lleguemos a las reglas de inferencia para las proposiciones cuantificadas.

Una proposición general es del tipo “Todo es mortal” y “Algo es mortal”. Esta se distingue de la proposición singular en que no contienen nombres de individuos (ej. Sócrates es mortal). Mientras que una proposición singular se obtiene por instanciación, las proposiciones generales se obtienen por el proceso llamado generalización o cuantificación. Nuestro primer ejemplo, “Todo es mortal”, se parafrasea de la siguiente forma

Para toda cosa individual, esta es mortal.

Luego, utilizamos la x para referirnos a esa cosa individual

Para todo x, x es mortal.

Ahora, usamos nuestra notación para formar el enunciado

Para todo x, Mx.

Por último, la expresión “Para todo x” es un cuantificador universal y se simboliza ∀x. Ahora tenemos ya nuestra forma lógica de nuestra proposición general:

∀xMx

Lo mismo hacemos para la proposición general “Algo es mortal”:

Existe al menos una cosa que es mortal.

Existe al menos una cosa tal que esta es mortal.

Existe al menos un x tal que x es mortal.

Existe al menos un x tal que Mx.

“Existe al menos un x tal que” es un cuantificador existencial y se simboliza como ∃x. Ahora ya podemos tener nuestro símbolo para la presente proposición general:

∃xMx

De esto observamos que

  • La cuantificación universal de una función proposicional es verdadera si y solo si todas sus instancias de sustitución son verdaderas (ej. Todo perro tiene pulgas).
  • La cuantificación existencial de una función proposicional es verdadera si y solo si tiene al menos una instancia de sustitución verdadera (ej. Al menos un perro tiene pulgas).
  • Si hay al menos un individuo, entonces toda función proposicional tiene al menos una instancia de sustitución (verdadera o falsa).
  • Si la cuantificación universal de una función proposicional es verdadera, entonces su cuantificación existencial también lo es (ej. Si todo perro tiene pulgas, entonces algún un perro tiene pulgas).

Ahora, la negación de ∀x Mx (Para toda cosa individual, esta es mortal) es ∃x ¬Mx (Algo no es mortal), y la negación de ∃x Mx (Existe al menos una cosa que es mortal) es ∀x ¬Mx (Nada es mortal). Estableciendo la letra griega ? para representar cualquier símbolo de propiedad, podemos establecer las relaciones entre la cuantificación universal y existencial con el siguiente diagrama:

De nuestro diagrama observamos lo siguiente:

  • (∀x ?x) y (∀x ¬?x) son contrarias; es decir, ambas pueden ser falsas, pero no pueden ser verdaderas. Ejemplo: Todos los perros tienen pulgas y Ningún perro tiene pulgas. Si estas proposiciones fuesen falsas, se sigue que al menos un perro tiene pulgas.
  • (∃x ?x) y (∃x ¬?x) son subcontrarias; esto es, que ambas pueden ser verdaderas, pero no falsas. Ejemplo: Algún perro tiene pulgas y Algún perro no tiene pulgas. Si ambas fuesen verdaderas, esto solo quiere decir que estamos hablando de diferentes perros; pero si ambas son falsas, significaría que es verdad que Todo perro tiene pulgas y que Ningún perro tiene pulgas, lo cual ya vimos que no puede ser el caso.
  • Luego (∀x ?x) y (∃x ¬?x) son contradictorias; por lo que una de ellas debe ser verdadera y otra falsa. Ejemplo: Todos los perros tienen pulgas y Algún perro no tiene pulgas. Es claro que ambas ni pueden ser verdaderas ni falsas al mismo tiempo y en el mismo sentido.
  • (∀x ¬?x) y (∃x ?x) igualmente son contradictorias. Ejemplo: Ningún perro tiene pulgas y Algún perro tiene pulgas.
  • Las subalternas (∀x ?x) y (∀x ¬?x) implican la verdad de (∃x ?x) y (∃x ¬?x) respectivamente, porque si es verdad (falso) que Todos los perros tienen pulgas, entonces Algún perro tiene pulgas también es verdad (falso); de la misma manera, si es verdad (falso) que Ningún perro tiene pulgas, entonces también Algún perro no tiene pulgas será verdad (falso).

 


Jairo Izquierdo Hernández es Director de Social Media y autor para la organización cristiana Cross Examined.  Estudia filosofía y teología, siendo su actual foco de estudio la lógica clásica, epistemología, doctrinas cristianas y lingüística.  Es cofundador de Filósofo Cristiano. Es miembro en la Christian Apologetics Alliance y ministro de alabanza en la iglesia cristiana bautista Cristo es la Respuesta en Puebla, México.