Mientras revisaba uno de los tantos correos que recibimos, en uno de ellos se planteaban dos objeciones en contra del argumento cosmológico Kalam, en específico al argumento ofrecido para Dios como la causa del comienzo del universo. Una versión del argumento cosmológico kalam se puede formular de la siguiente forma:
1. Todo lo que comienza a existir tiene una causa de su existencia.
2. El universo comenzó a existir.
2.1. Argumento basado en la imposibilidad de un infinito actual:
2.1.1. Un infinito actual no puede existir.
2.1.2. Una regresión temporal infinita de eventos es un infinito actual.
2.1.3. Por lo tanto, una regresión temporal infinita de eventos no puede existir.
2.2. Argumento basado en la imposibilidad de la formación de un infinito actual por adición sucesiva:
2.2.1. Una colección formada por adiciones sucesivas no puede ser actualmente infinita.
2.2.2. La serie temporal de eventos pasados es una colección formada por adiciones sucesivas.
2.2.3. Por lo tanto, la serie temporal de eventos pasados no puede ser actualmente infinita.
2.3. Confirmación basada en la expansión del universo.
2.4. Confirmación basada en las propiedades termodinámicas del universo.
3. Por lo tanto, el universo tiene una causa de su comienzo a la existencia.
4. Si el universo tiene una causa de su existencia, entonces existe un Creador personal incausado del universo que, sin la creación, es imprincipiado, inmutable, inmaterial, atemporal, inespacial, y enormemente poderoso.
4.1. Argumento de que la causa del universo es un Creador personal:
4.1.1. El universo fue creado por un conjunto de condiciones necesarias y suficientes de funcionamiento mecánico o por un agente libre personal.
4.1.2. El universo no pudo haber sido creado por un conjunto mecánico de condiciones necesarias y suficientes.
4.1.3. Por lo tanto, el universo fue creado por un agente libre personal.
4.2. Argumento de que el Creador sin la creación es incausado, inprincipiado, inmutable, inmaterial, atemporal, inespacial y enormemente poderoso.
4.2.1. El Creador es incausado.
4.2.1.1. No puede existir una regresión temporal infinita de causas (2.1.3, 2.2.3).
4.2.2. El Creador es imprincipiado.
4.2.2.1. Cualquier cosa que no esté causada no comienza a existir. (1)
4.2.3. El Creador es inmutable.
4.2.3.1. No puede existir una regresión temporal infinita de cambios. (2.1.3, 2.2.3)
4.2.4. El Creador es inmaterial.
4.2.4.1. Lo que sea material implica un cambio en los niveles atómico y molecular, pero el Creador no cambia. (4.2.3)
4.2.5. El Creador es atemporal.
4.2.5.1. En ausencia total de cambio, el tiempo no existe, y el Creador no cambia. (4.2.3)
4.2.6. El Creador es inespacial.
4.2.6.1. Lo que sea inmaterial y atemporal no puede ser espacial, y el Creador es inmaterial y atemporal (4.2.4, 4.2.5)
4.2.7. El Creador es enormemente poderoso.
4.2.7.1. Él creó el universo de la nada. (3)
5. Por lo tanto, existe un Creador personal e incausado del universo, que sin la creación es imprincipiado, inmutable, inmaterial, atemporal, inespacial y enormemente poderoso.
Ahora veamos la siguiente objeción a la que he llamado Argumento de la Inmutabilidad Contra una Causa Personal (AICCP):
1.Si Dios es atemporal, entonces es inmutable.
2.Si Dios es inmutable, entonces Dios no puede actuar para traer el universo a la existencia.
3.Dios es un ser personal que sin la creación es atemporal (otorgado por el Kalam).
4.Dios es inmutable (de 1 y 3)
5.Por lo tanto, Dios no puede actuar para traer el universo a la existencia (de 2 y 4).
Como pueden ver, el argumento ataca las premisas (4.1.3), (4.2.3) y (4.2.5) de nuestra versión del Kalam al intentar demostrar que existe una incoherencia entre las propiedades de Dios de ser personal, inmutable y atemporal.
¿Qué tan sólido es el argumento? Pues no mucho. Primero, el detractor parece pensar que, dado que no hay tiempo sin el universo, Dios es inmutable, pero este no es el caso. Lo que al argumento realmente dice, es lo siguiente:
(a) En ausencia total de cambio, el tiempo no existe y el Creador no cambia. (4.2.5.1.)
(b) Por lo tanto, Dios es atemporal (4.2.5.)
Y
(c) No puede existir una regresión temporal infinita de cambios. (4.2.3.1)
(d) Por lo tanto, Dios es inmutable (4.2.3)
Observa que el argumento no dice que la inmutabilidad de Dios se infiere de su atemporalidad; sino que la inmutabilidad se infiere de la imposibilidad de una regresión infinita de cambios, y la atemporalidad se infiere de su inmutabilidad. ¿Pero qué queremos decir por “ausencia de todo cambio”? Simple, es no hacer algo diferente. Es claro que hay actividades que no requieren ni cambio ni tiempo, por ejemplo, tener conocimiento de algo (Dios puede conocer todas las verdades en ese estado inmutable sin tiempo). Y lo mismo podrías decir sobre nuestras intenciones: mientras estas no cambien, podemos sostenerlas atemporalmente. Por lo que podemos decir que (1) del AICCP es falsa.
Segundo, (2) es falsa también. La premisa parece afirmar que la inmutabilidad de Dios es equivalente a inmovilidad, lo cuál sería cierto si habláramos de una causa impersonal, pero hemos visto que podemos inferir que la causa es personal, por lo que tiene volición para simplemente decidir crear el universo desde la eternidad. Tal como William Lane Craig explica cuando utiliza el ejemplo de un hombre sentado desde la eternidad:
[…] mi experimento mental sirve para ilustrar un punto sobre el libre albedrío. Una persona puede existir inmutable y entonces libremente ejecuta una cierta intención porque el libre albedrío no requiere alguna condición antecedente determinante. La misma naturaleza del libre albedrío es la ausencia de determinantes causales. Así que una acción libre tiene la apariencia de un evento puramente espontáneo. El hombre puede simple y libremente desear levantarse. Por lo que puedes obtener un efecto atemporal de una causa inmutable, si esa causa es un agente libre. Ahora, en el caso de Dios, Dios existe inmutablemente sin el universo. La creación es un acto del libre albedrío que, cuando ocurre, trae el tiempo a la existencia junto con el universo. Por lo tanto, decir que “desde un tiempo finito un Creador dotado de libre albedrío podría haber querido traer el mundo a la existencia en ese momento” no implica que había tiempo previo a ese momento.[1]
Ahora, en este punto existe la objeción de que entonces el tiempo no comienza con el inicio del universo, sino en el momento en que Dios decide traer el universo a la existencia, lo cual es contradictorio que las implicaciones del inicio del universo del Big Bang. Ahora, incluso cuando el Dr. Craig no sostiene que Dios tenga que deliberar temporalmente, él ha respondido a objeciones similares haciendo distinción entre el tiempo físico y el tiempo metafísico:
El tiempo metafísico es independiente de los procesos físicos, por ejemplo, si Dios estuviera haciendo una cuenta regresiva, él podría decir: “3, 2, 1, ¡que se haga la luz!” Y en este caso tendríamos una secuencia de eventos mentales, tendríamos tiempo previo al comienzo del universo. Lo que iniciaría al comienzo del universo sería el tiempo físico, el tiempo que es objeto de estudio en el campo de la física.[2]
Así que, con todo esto, podemos decir que el AICCP no es un argumento sólido después de todo.
Ahora pasemos al siguiente argumento al que he llamado Argumento de la Atemporalidad Contra la Causación (AACC):
1.Causa y efecto requieren intervalos temporales respectivamente para que pueda darse dicha relación.
2.El estado en el que se encuentra Dios no existen los intervalos temporales (otorgado por el kalam).
3.Por lo tanto, en el estado en el que se encuentra Dios no puede darse la causa ni el efecto.
Cuando uno analiza este argumento, notará que en esencia es similar al primero, solo se omite la inmutabilidad, pero el factor de atemporalidad sigue ahí, en específico, que se requiere de intervalos de tiempo para que exista una causa y efecto del tipo Dios tomando la decisión de crear el universo y luego otro momento en el que el universo llega a existir. Para esto William Lane Craig ha respondido en otra ocasión que:
[…]me parece que esta suposición es falsa. Porque en virtud de su omnisciencia, las elecciones de Dios no son eventos, ya que Él no delibera temporalmente ni Su voluntad se mueve de un estado de indecisión a uno de decisión. Simplemente tiene determinaciones libres de la voluntad para ejecutar ciertas acciones, y cualquier deliberación solo puede decirse que es explicativa, no temporalmente, antes de sus decretos.[3]
Regresemos ahora al asunto de que la causa debe preceder al efecto. Aunque el Dr. Craig ya abordando antes de que no existe ninguna razón para aceptar esa condición y de que es posible tener causa y efecto simultáneamente[4], también existe la posibilidad de que, de hecho, toda causa y efecto es en última instancia, simultaneo:
No veo ninguna incoherencia conceptual al pensar que una causa y su efecto pueden ser simultáneos. De hecho, los filósofos a menudo hablarán sobre cómo se percibe la dirección de la influencia causal entre A y B cuando A y B son simultáneos. A y B pueden ser al mismo tiempo, pueden ser simultáneos, pero ¿de qué manera trazas la línea de influencia causal? ¿Es A lo que está causando B, o B lo que está causando A? Los filósofos discutirán sobre eso. Así que no veo ninguna incoherencia en la noción de causación simultánea. De hecho, algunos metafísicos han argumentado que todas las causas son en última instancia simultáneas porque hasta que la causa realmente incida en algún otro objeto para producir un efecto, no hay forma de que la influencia causal pueda saltar a través del tiempo, desde t2 hasta t1, para producir el efecto en t1. Esa causa debe durar hasta el momento t1 y luego producir su efecto en ese momento. Pero no hay forma de que una influencia causal pueda viajar a través del tiempo y saltar de t2 a t1 para producir el evento. Así que muchos filósofos dirán que toda causación es, en última instancia, simultánea.
Creo que es un argumento muy persuasivo. No puedo ver cómo puedes tener influencia causal saltando en el tiempo. Me parece que el efecto no se producirá hasta que la causa realmente incida sobre la cosa para producir su efecto; por ejemplo, el taco debe golpear la bola de billar para ponerla en movimiento. Y hasta que no lo haga, no hay forma de que la influencia causal del movimiento del taco vaya a saltar en el tiempo para hacer que la bola se mueva.[5]
Conclusión
Hemos visto que el AICCP falla debido a un mal entendimiento del significado de inmutabilidad y de como se infiere la inmutabilidad. Por otro lado, aunque el AACC es un argumento mejor, no es del todo sólido; ya que no existen buenas razones para rechazar la simultaneidad de la causa y el efecto.
Notas
[1] William Lane Craig, “God and Time” en William Lane Craig: A Reasonable Response.
[2] An Explanation of Physical Time and Metaphysical Time.
[3] William Lane Craig, “Timelessness and Creation”.
[4] William Lane Craig, “Causation and Spacetime”.
[5] Misunderstandings About God and the Big Bang.
Jairo Izquierdo es parte del equipo de Social Media y autor para la organización cristiana Cross Examined. Estudia filosofía y teología, siendo su actual foco de estudio la lógica clásica, epistemología, doctrinas cristianas y lingüística. Es cofundador de Filósofo Cristiano. Es miembro en la Christian Apologetics Alliance y ministro de alabanza en la iglesia cristiana bautista Cristo es la Respuesta en Puebla, México.
Leaving Christianity for new truth?
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Join Frank and he responds to these issues raised by Marty Sampsons, the Hillsong worship leader who says that his faith is now on “Incredibly shaky ground.” Frank also highlights some of the comments made about this by John Cooper, of the Christian rock band Skillet. Pray for Mr. Sampson. He says that he is familiar with the work of William Lane Craig, John Lennox, Ravi Zacharias, Michael Licona and Frank Turek. We pray he will get the answers he needs.
Frank also addressed a few of the questions you’ve sent in, including:
If you want to send us a question for the show, please email us at Hello@CrossExamined.org.
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Yale computer science professor David Gelernter expresses doubts about Darwinism
Philosophy of Science, Theology and Christian ApologeticsBy Wintery Knight
How did life begin?
I had to learn about David Gelernter when I was doing my Masters in computer science. We studied his book “Mirror Worlds”. A few weeks ago, I blogged about his impressions of the difficulty in forming a simple protein by chance – something that naturalistic mechanisms would have to do in order to avoid intelligent agency as a cause in nature. He found it very unlikely. But there’s more!
Recently, my friend Terrell sent me a video featuring Peter Robinson (who hosts the splendid Uncommon Knowledge show out of Stanford University), and three interesting people. First, there was Dr. Stephen C. Meyer, who is one of my two favorite thinkers. I’ve blogged on his work about the origin of life and the Cambrian explosion here many times. Then, there was Dr. David Berlinski, a secular Jewish professor of mathematics, who has studied origins issues. And then Dr. David Gelernter, who teaches computer science at Yale University, and is a legend in computer science research.
Here’s the video: (H/T Terrell)
Here is an article by Jennifer Kabbany in The College Fix about the video.
She writes about his recent Claremont Review of Books article, as well as the interview above:
I found this part the most interesting, since we are seeing so much intolerance from the secular left, whenever anyone disagrees with their dogma:
Dr. Gelernter cited three arguments in his article: the origin of life, and the Cambrian explosion, and genetic entropy. In the first two problems, there is a problem of huge amounts of biological information coming into being. We know that software engineers can write code like that, but there is no Darwinian mechanism for writing that much code and that short of a time period. The third problem shows that Darwinian mechanisms not only don’t produce functional code – they actually break it down.
I’ve covered both of the arguments before on this blog, but if you really want the details, you should pick up the books that convinced Dr. Gelernter: Dr. Stephen C. Meyer’s “Signature in the Cell” and “Darwin’s Doubt”. Each book tackles one of the arguments. For the third problem, a good book is Dr. Michael Behe’s “Darwin Devolves”. Even if you just read something about each book, then you’ll know about the arguments for intelligent causes being the best explanation for the history of life on this planet.
Original Blog Source: http://bit.ly/2ZF1Sll
Safeguarding Yours from the Modern Cult of Experts
Philosophy of Science, Theology and Christian ApologeticsBy Terrell Clemmons
Few years ago, Current Biology, a research journal published by Cell Press, carried an article titled, “The Negative Association between Religiousness and Children’s Altruism across the World.” The report, authored by seven psychologists from four continents, related the findings of experiments with approximately 1,200 children ages 5-12 from six nations. The study was funded by a grant from the John Templeton Foundation, Science of Philanthropy Initiative.
The article highlighted three findings: (1) that children from religious households are less altruistic than children from secular households, (2) that they are more harsh and punitive than children from secular households, and (3) that their parents don’t see them as less altruistic and more punitive but rather as kinder than other children in terms of empathy and sensitivity to injustice. “Together these results reveal the similarity across countries in how religion negatively influences children’s altruism, challenging the view that religiosity facilitates prosocial behavior,” the summary concluded. In other words, if you’ll pardon the snark, kids exposed to religion are anti-social, and their parents are clueless. Religion is a social pathogen.
As you can imagine, this was a windfall for the secular press. “Religious upbringing linked to less altruism,” announced Science Daily. “Children from nonreligious homes are more generous, altruistic than observant ones,” trumpeted Newsday. And the UK Guardian‘s header bordered on the childish: “Religious children are meaner than their secular counterparts.” Science Codex at least showed enough restraint to headline its report in the form of a question, “Does religion make kids less generous?”
Well, does it? Science said it. Does that settle it?
Of course, it doesn’t. As apologist Frank Turek says, science doesn’t say anything. Scientists do. And because scientists, science writers, and mainstream journalists are all fallible human beings, a level-headed response calls for some critical thinking every time a new finding is being heralded in the name of science.
Experts, Shmexperts
Critical thinking begins with examining exactly what is being said and by what authority. Let’s start with the question of authority. In Shmexperts: How Ideology and Power Politics Are Disguised as Science, Marc Fitch addresses what he calls “the modern myth of experts.” He begins by defining “experts” for his specific purpose. (Personally, I like “shmexperts” better, but I will go with his terminology for now.) First, an expert is not the working professional informed by relevant experience and skill—the man or woman “whose motivation in their work is to produce a result: an actual, testable piece of hardware or a theory that can be proven empirically.” A professional whose product is subject to external standards in this way is not what Fitch is talking about. Second, he’s not necessarily referring to intellectuals—those who make their living in the realm of ideas, although the lines between intellectuals and experts are apt to get blurred.
Experts, for Fitch’s treatment, are primarily defined by their transgression of the boundaries inherent to their fields of expertise. For example, a cell biologist may have a perfectly good, morally sound opinion on the social advisability of religion-based models of childrearing. Or he may be a cold-blooded moral monster. The point is, knowledge in the realm of science does not make him a credible authority in the realm of values. This should not need pointing out, but apparently, it does. Whenever anyone makes statements about non-material realms of thought, or pushes a moral argument, under the banner of science, then the science is not being used in its proper context. It is being coopted to advance an agenda.
When expert “authorities” advance an agenda this way, they are “avoiding an ethical, moral, or political argument,” Fitch points out, and are imbuing “the realm of human ideals with the faulty notion that somehow chemical, biological, or physical sciences can offer an answer to the human condition.” When scientists do this, they are not acting as scientists. They are acting as philosopher kings. The same goes for the gullible (or complicit) media granting them platforms from which to reign.
Critical Examination 101
Now let’s take a look at the Current Biology report on children, religion, and altruism. The first question that ought to come to mind is, What exactly does religion have to do with biology? What has philanthropy to do with biology? Or altruism? Or generosity? Of course, the answer is nothing. Although the study itself was done by psychologists, its publication in a biomedical journal raises a glaring red flag. Realms of thought have been mixed, boundaries blurred.
Now, let’s look at how the experts reached their findings. To assess altruism, they conducted an experiment called the Dictator Game. Children were allowed to choose ten stickers, which they were told: “are yours to keep.” They were also told that not all the children in their group would get stickers because the experimenters didn’t have time for everyone. The children were then given an opportunity to share the stickers they were given, right there on the spot. The experimenters counted the number of stickers each child shared, and that number became the measure of that child’s altruism. So, if a child opted to take his stickers home to share with his little sister or his buddy next door, he did not count as altruistic.
Here’s how they measured moral sensitivity. The children were shown short videos depicting mean actions—one child shoving another, for example. Then their reactions were somehow categorized according to how they judged the mean act they’d been shown. So if the same child exhibited judgment when he saw a boy shove a girl to the ground—if he said, Hey, that’s not fair; that boy should be punished! For example—then he counted as harsh and punitive.
Technically, that may be accurate, but ponder the perverse moral reasoning by which moral sensitivity is being assessed here. Those children exhibiting an indifference to injustice are being appraised as the “nice” ones, the pro-social ones. Meanwhile, those who censured meanness counted as, well, mean.
Should nothing be punished? We might ask. Toward whom should the child have shown sensitivity? Toward the boy doing the shoving? Or toward the girl who was shoved? Wouldn’t a fair-minded observer say the child objecting to meanness is actually more sensitive to injustice than the one who’s indifferent?
To be sure, these are judgment calls. And that is precisely the point. Judgment calls were factory-installed into this study. Either the experts knew it and have not been upfront about it, or they’re blithely clueless regarding their own massive bias.
How they defined “religiousness” is equally overripe for critical deconstruction, but you get the point.
Bad Science
If psychologists want to try to map people’s altruism or generosity or philanthropy in relation to their religiosity—however, they choose to define and quantify such non-exact entities—that’s fine. They can define their terms and presuppositions and have at it. But “The Negative Association between Religiousness and Children’s Altruism across the World” is, at best, bad psychology. And whatever it is, it certainly isn’t biology. It might better be called secular snobbery masquerading as objective science.
Cell Pressbills itself as “a leading publisher of cutting-edge biomedical research and reviews.” How such bunk qualified as biomedical research is a question every self-respecting biologist should be asking every sitting member of Current Biology‘s editorial board. All 103 of them. Anyone with a working baloney-detector can see the egregious transgression of boundaries.
In his book, Fitch touches on several agenda-driven narratives that have been or are (still) being foisted on the public by “experts”: population control; the supposed scientific basis for a host of “victimhood” narratives; the politics of health care; pot legalization; and—the granddaddy of global political agendas—environmentalism. And there are others that he doesn’t take up, but we should: psychiatry, for example, and the deluge of sex and gender “science” flooding the pipeline. To avoid subversion by shmexperts, everything must be put through a critical filter—everything.
Bad Religion
There’s a lot at stake. The ramifications of the modern cult of experts include:
A heightened generalized anxiety. How does one know whom among the “authorities” or what out of the swarming buzz of opinions to believe? The cacophony is enough to tempt anyone to tune it all out because it’s just too hard or too upsetting or too confusing. But tuning out leads to—
A softening of the mind. Widespread outsourcing of thought—and worse, of moral reasoning—renders the public increasingly subject to demagoguery, fear-mongering, and mob mentality. Groupthink sets in like dry rot and totalitarian thought control follows. This creates an environment hostile to sustaining basic political liberties. We already see a soft tyranny suffocating freedom of thought and conscience at the university.
A devaluing of the individual. When awe-inspiring reverence is conferred on those with degrees and titles over the non-academic-but-supremely-practical working Joe, a gap—real or perceived—widens between the intellectual haves and have-nots. This serves no one’s best interest. It breeds narcissism among the elite and a menacing mix of servile dependency and brooding discontent among the rest.
An outsourcing of salvation. The media cite and defer to experts who, for various reasons, sow fears and recommend government interventions. Politicians for their part are happy to promote policies they see as contributing to their immortal legacy. And they will, of course, need the experts to administer the policies, so the ruling class expands. “We rely on a small troupe of Chicken Littles,” Fitch writes, “each telling the world that the sky is falling, the earth is warming, markets are collapsing, diseases are spreading, and people are starving. They present the world of death as a great beast slouching toward your homes [and] they call upon the government to intercede and take further control to alleviate the ‘crisis.'”
It is just assumed that we unthinking, unwashed masses need the anointed elites to save our poor, helpless souls from the big bad world out there. Fitch doesn’t frame it in religious terms, but at some point, the would-be ruling class does assume the role of in loco savior and lord. Except that it can never save. It can only lord.
Sound Minds, Sound Society
Fitch offers some good suggestions for filtering shmexpert fare. Learn to separate empirical data from ethics and morality, and the hard sciences from the inexact, soft humanities. In many cases, bad science doesn’t so much need to be countered as it needs to be exposed to the light of scrutiny and deconstructed, as we have done with the Current Biology mashup on religiousness and altruism.
Most of all, learn to think in broader worldview terms. It is true that the world is not a safe place, and there is a role for government and legitimate experts to play in meeting the challenges people face. And while it is also true that we all stand in need of a savior, no government nor any shmexpert is up to that task.
Terrell Clemmons is a freelance writer and blogger on apologetics and matters of faith.
This article was originally published at salvomag.com: http://bit.ly/33l73Jm
P&R: ¿Prueba el Kalam solo el comienzo del tiempo y no del universo?
EspañolPregunta
¿Cómo puede el argumento filosófico para el argumento cosmológico kalam probar el comienzo del universo cuando todo lo que muestra es que el tiempo tiene un comienzo, pero que la materia y la energía del espacio no tienen un comienzo? ¿No significa que el universo en su totalidad tuvo un comienzo?
Y también la segunda ley de la termodinámica. La energía utilizable tiene un comienzo no significa que el universo sí.
Y si este es el caso, entonces el kalam es una vez un argumento de la ignorancia antes de que sepamos sobre el Big Bang. ¿Hay algún caso en contra de estos?
Kittinant Manasurarangkul
Respuesta
Hola, Kittinant. Veamos de forma detallada los argumentos filosóficos del kalam:
Argumento basado en la imposibilidad de un infinito actual:
Argumento basado en la imposibilidad de la formación de un infinito actual por adición sucesiva:
Con respecto a tu primera pregunta, observa que las premisas (1) de los argumentos se refieren a los infinitos actuales en general, cualquier colección de cosas que cuente como un infinito actual, incluyendo la materia, así que no solo se refiere al tiempo; por supuesto, la segunda premisa se específica en la imposibilidad de una regresión temporal infinita, ya que esta es la característica principal que entra en juego para determinar si el universo tuvo un comienzo o no. Así que, aunque los argumentos traten específicamente con el tiempo o series de eventos temporales, la premisa mayor incluye cualquier tipo de objetos, por ejemplo, el Hotel Infiito de Hilbert.
¿Qué hay de la segunda ley de la termodinámica? Dices que, aunque la energía utilizable tenga un comienzo no significa que el universo sí, pero Kittinant, ¡tú necesitas de un sistema físico para que haya energía! No se puede hablar de energía sin un sistema físico. También olvidas el hecho de que el universo es toda la realidad que conocemos, así que simplemente no puedes hablar de energía y de universo como si fueran cosas separadas.
Por último, el Kalam no es un argumento desde la ignorancia, ya que él mismo ofrece razones basadas en argumentos y sus premisas son apoyadas con evidencia. No es un argumento del tipo “dado que no se puede demostrar la imposibilidad de x, entonces x es el caso”.
Jairo Izquierdo es parte del equipo de Social Media y autor para la organización cristiana Cross Examined. Estudia filosofía y teología, siendo su actual foco de estudio la lógica clásica, epistemología, doctrinas cristianas y lingüística. Es cofundador de Filósofo Cristiano. Es miembro en la Christian Apologetics Alliance y ministro de alabanza en la iglesia cristiana bautista Cristo es la Respuesta en Puebla, México.
No, The Argument from Miracles Has Not Been Debunked (Pt. 2)
3. Are Miracles Possible?, Theology and Christian ApologeticsBy Erik Manning
Is the argument from miracles hopelessly fallacious? Stephen Woodford, AKA ‘Rationality Rules,’ believes so. In his popular YouTube video ‘The Argument From Miracles-Debunked’ Woodford says the argument from miracles commits four major fallacies.
In my last post, I looked at Woodford’s first two objections saw that they didn’t really hold up under scrutiny. I’d recommend giving it a read before continuing in this post. Go ahead; I’ll be right here when you get back.
Alright, now let’s turn to his final two objections and see if they do any better. Oh, and if you want to watch Rationality Rules’ video in full, here you go:
God of The Gaps?
Here’s Stephen’s 3rd objection:
What Stephen is saying here is the argument from miracles commits the God of the gaps fallacy. The popular atheist website Rational Wiki says the God of the gaps fallacy: “is a logical fallacy that occurs when believers invoke ‘Goddidit’ to account for some natural phenomena that science cannot (at the time of the argument) explain. This concept resembles what systems theorists refer to as an “explanatory principle.” “God of the gaps” is a bad argument not only on logical grounds but on empirical grounds: there is a long history of “gaps” being filled and the remaining gaps for God thus getting smaller and smaller, suggesting “we don’t know yet” as an alternative that works better in practice; naturalistic explanations for still-mysterious phenomena always remain possible, especially in the future where research may uncover more information.”
There’s a problem with this line of argument, however. As I argued in my previous post, the resurrection of Jesus would strongly imply theism and critics would agree. This is exactly why they attack the evidence. For example, they’ll argue against the historicity of the empty tomb or claim that the disciples’ experienced hallucinations to explain the data.
Since most skeptics clearly get the implications for Jesus’ resurrection, it seems crazy for Woodford to agree with Christians that Jesus was resurrected, but then to say that someday science will have a natural explanation for such an event.
As Christian thinker Michael Jones notes, this kind of reasoning commits the “future humans of the gaps” fallacy. A future human of the gaps argument would say “I don’t know the answer to the evidence we have, but I know that intelligent people in the future will have an answer and that it will confirm my atheistic worldview.” This is just blind faith and question-begging to the extreme.
Furthermore, the argument from miracles isn’t just about plugging God into gaps in our understanding. It just depends on the evidence that we have.
For example, if I were to come home and my back door was kicked in, my house was trashed, and my TV and computer was missing, I’d call the cops. If the police came, assessed the evidence and then accused me of committing a “burglar of the gaps” argument, I wouldn’t accept that. No sane person would.
Some things are clearly caused by agents, and not impersonal, natural causes. If Jesus’ resurrection happened, that would count as one such event. This is why we have to look at the evidence we have and see what best explains the data. We can’t just shrug and say, “we don’t know, but future humans will figure out that it happened naturalistically.”
Are Miracle Stories Just Based On Personal Anecdotes and Appeals to Emotion?
In the last part of the video, Stephen refers to fake faith healers. He claims that these miracles are just based on personal anecdotes and emotional experiences, and hence reasons that all miracle claims are like these examples.
These objections certainly could explain some so-called faith healings. That said, I’d recommend Woodford check out Dr. Craig Keener’s two-volume work on miracles and see if he still thinks all prayer-healing testimonies are fake. But let’s set that aside for now. If we don’t rule out miracles from the start, we could see if they pass some minimum, religiously-neutral criteria to see if they could be reasonably accepted:
What happens when we look at the resurrection through this filter?
While there was a messianic expectation during Jesus’ time, no one expected the Messiah to be crucified and resurrected ahead of the general resurrection that was to occur at the end of time. Tom Wright belabors this point in great detail in his magnum opus, The Resurrection of the Son of God.
Not only that, this miracle didn’t pass without inspection. Jesus’ opponents could have produced a body, and yet we read in Matthew and in Justin Martyr that the story given to explain the empty tomb was the disciples’ stole the body. (Matthew 28:12-13, Dialogue with Trypho, Ch. 108) Moreover, the disciples preached the resurrection in the city where Jesus was killed, in front of a hostile audience, within weeks after his death.
For comparison, if you want to start a faith-healing cult, you’re not going to go to Mecca to do it. You might not make it past baggage claim. But the disciples’ risked their necks to proclaim what they believed they witnessed.
For these reasons Jeff Lowder, one of the founders of infidels.org, says: “I remember thinking to myself that if I took the time to investigate the resurrection, I could make anyone who believed it look like a fool. Or so I thought… I was about to discard it as ‘another illogical religious belief,’… yet I found it extremely difficult to deal with as a critic.”
So far from debunking the argument from miracles, I think Woodford’s charges of fallaciousness miss the mark. We can’t excuse ourselves from looking at the evidence for miracle claims; they have to be judged on a case by case basis.
Erik Manning is a former atheist turned Christian after an experience with the Holy Spirit. He’s a freelance baseball writer and digital marketing specialist who is passionate about the intersection of evangelism and apologetics.
Is it arrogant to say you’re right? And many other questions
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Is it arrogant to say you’re right? And many other questions.
So you think you’re right and everyone else is wrong! You’re arrogant!
Is that true? Frank answers many of the questions you’ve emailed to Hello@Crossexamined.org including:
If you want to send us a question for the show, please email us at Hello@CrossExamined.org.
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Responding to NY Times Article Saying the Concept of God is Incoherent
Theology and Christian ApologeticsBy J. Brian Huffling
In a NY Times article titled “A God Problem: Perfect. All-powerful. All-knowing. The idea of the deity most Westerners accept is actually not coherent,” Peter Atterton argues, well, that the concept of God is not coherent. Atterton describes God in the classical sense as his subtitle suggests. He argues that such a view of God is logically incoherent because assuming one attribute, a problem seemingly arises with the others. I will briefly summarize his arguments and respond to them, focusing on his arguments about omniscience.
Atterton’s Argument
Atterton wants to “first consider the attribute of omnipotence.” After considering the cliché question, “Can God make a rock bigger than he can move,” he points to the way Thomas Aquinas’ would answer this question, namely, that such a thing would be a contradiction and even God can’t do what is contradictory (such as making a square circle).
Atterton then moves to question whether it is contradictory for God to create a world in which there was no evil. He avers that it should be possible to do so. So why didn’t God do that? This is basically where he leaves it and moves on to God’s omniscience.
He states,
Atterton believes that if God does, in fact, know what we know; this is a problem. This is the case because we know what lust and envy are; thus, God must know what lust and envy are. However, he says, “one cannot know lust and envy unless one has experienced them. But to have had feelings of lust and envy is to have sinned, in which case, God cannot be morally perfect.” Such can’t be the case, he claims, if God is morally perfect. So God does not know what we know. But then he is not omniscient, “and the concept of God is contradictory. God cannot be both omniscient and morally perfect. Hence, God could not exist.”
Atterton ends his article by referencing Blaise Pascal’s rejection of philosophy and taking God’s existence on faith alone. It is not clear to me from this article whether Atterton believes in the existence of God or whether he merely thinks that “the God of the philosophers” doesn’t exist or can’t be proven to exist. It is to the alleged incoherence that I wish to respond.
Response
Atterton does not make too much about God’s omnipotence other than casting doubt on it, so I’m going to focus on his objection to God’s knowledge, which is what he seems to think is a stronger point. My overall critique is that Atterton over-anthropomorphizes God. This is very typical of how people think of God. We usually think that because we do things a certain way, like know, then God must do them the same way too.
For Atterton, if God knows something, then the way in which he knows it must be similar, or the same, with how we know it. We know things passively through experience, such as a thing’s existence. For example, we know of a flea’s existence because we experience fleas and can sense them. We are creatures just like fleas. But should we think God knows in the same way as us?
Atterton references Aquinas regarding God’s omnipotence but doesn’t cite what Aquinas says about the way he believes God knows the world. This either betrays ignorance or negligence. Historically, classical theism (that teaches that God is all-knowing, powerful, etc.) has taught that God is impassible and yet all-knowing, infinite, and perfect. This means that God is not affected in any way, does not learn, for an infinite amount of knowledge cannot be added to, and he cannot gain in perfection.
It also means that God is not passive in his knowledge. As Aquinas teaches in Summa Theologiae part 1 question 14, God’s knowledge is not like ours. And why should it be, he’s not a limited, passible, changeable, material, temporal, finite, contingent human. Rather, he is the unlimited, impassible, unchangeable, immaterial, eternal, infinite, necessary Creator. How this detail escapes Atterton and others who over anthropomorphize God is nothing short of perplexing?
Rather than God’s knowledge being reactive and passive like ours, it is active and causative. We know imperfectly and through the effects of nature. God knows perfectly; not through effects, but through the cause of those effects. Such is surely a more perfect and complete knowledge. God does not have to “look at” something to know it as if the thing exists apart from God’s knowledge or sustaining power. God actively causes all things to exist and sustains those things for as long as they exist. So, contrary to Atterton and Saint Jerome, God not only has knowledge of seemingly trivial things like fleas, God upholds those fleas in existence as their cause of being. They, as contingent being, cannot account even for their own present existence without an efficient cause. God thus knows all of the universe simply by knowing himself as their cause.
Atterton’s “God” is more akin to a view of deism rather than classical theism. Many holds to such a view of God. This view of God that makes him dependent, passible, changeable, etc., sees God more as a creature rather than the Creator.
When it comes to imperfections such as lust, Atterton doesn’t even ask the question if it is possible for God to do such things. (He leaves the question of the incarnation of Jesus out of his discussion.) Rather, God must know lust since he knows what we do, and since we know lust, God must as well. However, we know lust through experience and because we have the capability to be imperfect. Lust is something that humans can do, which is imperfection. However, God is not human. Historically it has been held that such passions as lust are tied to a physical body. Since God does not have a physical body, he can’t lust. Further, lusting would require a change. If God is unchangeable and eternal, then he can’t lust. Further, such would require God to have the potency to lust; however, if such classical attributes of God as simplicity, then he has no potency to become anything other than he is. Finally, again, God does not know via experience, but by being the perfect cause of all contingent being. He thus knows his effects (i.e., the universe) by knowing himself as their perfect cause.
Rather than the concept of the classical view of God being incoherent, Atterton’s own view demonstrates either a complete lack of familiarity with classical theism or simply neglects to inform his readers of such views.
While Atterton’s attempt at killing the traditional concept of God is DOA, the God of the philosophers lives on.
J. Brian Huffling, PH.D. has a BA in History from Lee University, an MA in (3 majors) Apologetics, Philosophy, and Biblical Studies from Southern Evangelical Seminary (SES), and a Ph.D. in Philosophy of Religion from SES. He is the Director of the Ph.D. Program and Associate Professor of Philosophy and Theology at SES. He also teaches courses for Apologia Online Academy. He has previously taught at The Art Institute of Charlotte. He has served in the Marines, Navy, and is currently a reserve chaplain in the Air Force at Maxwell Air Force Base. His hobbies include golf, backyard astronomy, martial arts, and guitar.
Original Blog Source: http://bit.ly/2Oy0ShT
What Every Apologist Needs to Know About 1 Peter 3:15
Theology and Christian ApologeticsBy Mikel Del Rosario
Rules of Engagement
1 Peter 3 is about Apologetics and Cultural Engagement
What should our interactions with people look like as ambassadors of Jesus? Peter talks about both apologetics and cultural engagement in 1 Peter 3—the chapter where you find that famous apologetics memory verse, 1 Peter 3:15 (ESV):
But in your hearts honor Christ the Lord as holy, always being prepared to make a defense to anyone who asks you for a reason for the hope that is in you; yet do it with gentleness and respect.
We need to know what we believe and be prepared to respectfully explain our faith and the hope that we have in Jesus. Peter says this because our faith isn’t just about philosophical ideas. It’s about hope. What’s this hope about? It’s about how people can discover a loving relationship with the God who made everything that exists.
But even apologists can miss the context of this famous Bible verse. And it’s that context that shows us what our engagement should look like as ambassadors of Jesus. What every apologist needs to know about 1 Peter 3:15 is that it appears in a text that is not only about defending the faith. It’s also about the way God wants us to engage. In this post, I’ll share seven key lessons from this passage that should inform the way we operate as ambassadors of Jesus [1].
1. Expect Suffering and Blessing
Apologists talk about an objective standard of goodness, a moral “oughtness” that points us to God. In 1 Peter 3:13, Peter alludes to that outghtness—how the world should work. People should love each other, not hurt each other: “Now who is there to harm you if you are zealous for what is good?” Of course, people don’t always choose to do the right thing. That’s why Peter says, “But even if you should suffer for righteousness’ sake, you will be blessed…” (14a).
That’s the first part of the lead-up to our famous apologetics verse—knowing that we’re going to suffer for doing the right thing as ambassadors of Jesus. Jesus was very real about this: “In the world, you will have tribulation” (John 16:33) and “If they persecuted me, they will also persecute you” (John 15:20). So the push-back comes with the territory. But we’re blessed anyway because God sees when we’re being faithful in the midst of the tension. And we care more about his approval than other people think. This idea goes back even to Psalm 1. You also see it in the outcome of Paul’s engagement with the people in Athens (Acts 17).
2. Have No Fear
The second part of the lead-up to our famous apologetics verse says, “Have no fear of them, nor be troubled” (14). People you follow on social media probably show you how troubled Christians respond to what’s going on in the public square. When we’re overwhelmed with fear, we can say things that aren’t helpful and are tough to take back. It’s easy to feel pressure when our faith is challenged. Still, we don’t need to be afraid if our hope and identity are linked to God’s sovereignty in this world[2].
3. Make a Defense
This is where 1 Peter 3:15 comes in. We need to be prepared to engage the culture, make the case for Christianity, and defend the faith. Our ultimate message is a positive one about our hope in Jesus. But there’s a tension between how the gospel challenges our beliefs and actions on the one hand, and the invitation to know and experience God on the other.
Unfortunately, sometimes the “hope” part gets lots in the “challenge” part. New apologists can tend to emphasize what is wrong with society or various belief systems to the virtual exclusion of our hope in Christ. Others seem to portray our hope as only a future thing rather than explaining how that hope can be present in our lives today. Let’s never lose the message of hope in the midst of defending the faith. After all, the faith we defend is good news. And yes, truth matters. But tone matters, too.
4. Be Gentle and Respectful
The rest of Peter’s command tells us how we must defend the faith: “with gentleness and respect.” Not with fear, anger, or resentment. Part of the evidence for our hope should be the way we engage—not like people who feel threatened or get all defensive. There’s a good kind of meekness and humility that goes along with actually loving the people we challenge with Christian truth claims. Before walking into a spiritual conversation, ask God to help you care about the person and minister to them.
5. Prepare to be Slandered
Paul goes on to say, “…having a good conscience, so that, when you are slandered, those who revile your good behavior in Christ may be put to shame” (1 Peter 3:16). It’s no surprise that good behavior bolsters our case, while behaving badly undermines it. This is why holy living is key. Even when we engage with a clear conscience, though, we’re still going to get push-back. People don’t like to question their beliefs. But the challenge is an unavoidable part of our message. Still, the challenge should never drown out the very message of hope we are trying to defend. When they are rude to us, God sees it. When we respond with kindness, God sees it, too. And this is one reason we don’t need to be afraid.
6. Rise Above Evil
In verse 17, Paul says: “For it is better to suffer for doing good if that should be God’s will, than for doing evil.” The character we display when we are being treated unfairly matters. Spiritual conversations aren’t very productive when either participant gets mad. Rather than harbor evil thoughts or respond in anger, Christian apologists must rise above evil and show a different way of relating to people who reject our message.
7. Follow Jesus’ Example
All of these lessons are based on the example Jesus gave us. Paul says, “For Christ also suffered once for sins, the righteous for the unrighteous, that he might bring us to God, being put to death in the flesh but made alive in the spirit.” When we suffer, let’s suffer with Jesus’ example in mind. Don’t ever forget how God took the initiative to reach out to us while we had our backs turned to him. Even in this verse, Paul mentions the resurrection.
Conclusion
What every apologist needs to know about 1 Peter 3:15 is that it appears in a text that is not only about defending the faith. 1 Peter 3 is an important cultural engagement text, too. Let’s engage the culture, make the case for Christianity, and defend the faith while remembering the gracious way God treated us before we embraced him and his message.
Notes
[1] I’m indebted to my mentor, Darrell Bock, who helped me think through the context of 1 Peter 3:15 as it applies to dialogical apologetics and cultural engagement.
[2] And, in fact, in all possible worlds.
Mikel Del Rosario helps Christians explain their faith with courage and compassion. He is a doctoral student in the New Testament department at Dallas Theological Seminary. Mikel teaches Christian Apologetics and World Religion at William Jessup University. He is the author of Accessible Apologetics and has published over 20 journal articles on apologetics and cultural engagement with his mentor, Dr. Darrell Bock. Mikel holds an M.A. in Christian Apologetics with highest honors from Biola University and a Master of Theology (Th.M) from Dallas Theological Seminary where he serves as Cultural Engagement Manager at the Hendricks Center and a host of the Table Podcast. Visit his Web site at ApologeticsGuy.com
Original Blog Source: http://bit.ly/2YvQLd3
Dos argumentos contra el Kalam
EspañolMientras revisaba uno de los tantos correos que recibimos, en uno de ellos se planteaban dos objeciones en contra del argumento cosmológico Kalam, en específico al argumento ofrecido para Dios como la causa del comienzo del universo. Una versión del argumento cosmológico kalam se puede formular de la siguiente forma:
1. Todo lo que comienza a existir tiene una causa de su existencia.
2. El universo comenzó a existir.
2.1. Argumento basado en la imposibilidad de un infinito actual:
2.1.1. Un infinito actual no puede existir.
2.1.2. Una regresión temporal infinita de eventos es un infinito actual.
2.1.3. Por lo tanto, una regresión temporal infinita de eventos no puede existir.
2.2. Argumento basado en la imposibilidad de la formación de un infinito actual por adición sucesiva:
2.2.1. Una colección formada por adiciones sucesivas no puede ser actualmente infinita.
2.2.2. La serie temporal de eventos pasados es una colección formada por adiciones sucesivas.
2.2.3. Por lo tanto, la serie temporal de eventos pasados no puede ser actualmente infinita.
2.3. Confirmación basada en la expansión del universo.
2.4. Confirmación basada en las propiedades termodinámicas del universo.
3. Por lo tanto, el universo tiene una causa de su comienzo a la existencia.
4. Si el universo tiene una causa de su existencia, entonces existe un Creador personal incausado del universo que, sin la creación, es imprincipiado, inmutable, inmaterial, atemporal, inespacial, y enormemente poderoso.
4.1. Argumento de que la causa del universo es un Creador personal:
4.1.1. El universo fue creado por un conjunto de condiciones necesarias y suficientes de funcionamiento mecánico o por un agente libre personal.
4.1.2. El universo no pudo haber sido creado por un conjunto mecánico de condiciones necesarias y suficientes.
4.1.3. Por lo tanto, el universo fue creado por un agente libre personal.
4.2. Argumento de que el Creador sin la creación es incausado, inprincipiado, inmutable, inmaterial, atemporal, inespacial y enormemente poderoso.
4.2.1. El Creador es incausado.
4.2.1.1. No puede existir una regresión temporal infinita de causas (2.1.3, 2.2.3).
4.2.2. El Creador es imprincipiado.
4.2.2.1. Cualquier cosa que no esté causada no comienza a existir. (1)
4.2.3. El Creador es inmutable.
4.2.3.1. No puede existir una regresión temporal infinita de cambios. (2.1.3, 2.2.3)
4.2.4. El Creador es inmaterial.
4.2.4.1. Lo que sea material implica un cambio en los niveles atómico y molecular, pero el Creador no cambia. (4.2.3)
4.2.5. El Creador es atemporal.
4.2.5.1. En ausencia total de cambio, el tiempo no existe, y el Creador no cambia. (4.2.3)
4.2.6. El Creador es inespacial.
4.2.6.1. Lo que sea inmaterial y atemporal no puede ser espacial, y el Creador es inmaterial y atemporal (4.2.4, 4.2.5)
4.2.7. El Creador es enormemente poderoso.
4.2.7.1. Él creó el universo de la nada. (3)
5. Por lo tanto, existe un Creador personal e incausado del universo, que sin la creación es imprincipiado, inmutable, inmaterial, atemporal, inespacial y enormemente poderoso.
Ahora veamos la siguiente objeción a la que he llamado Argumento de la Inmutabilidad Contra una Causa Personal (AICCP):
1.Si Dios es atemporal, entonces es inmutable.
2.Si Dios es inmutable, entonces Dios no puede actuar para traer el universo a la existencia.
3.Dios es un ser personal que sin la creación es atemporal (otorgado por el Kalam).
4.Dios es inmutable (de 1 y 3)
5.Por lo tanto, Dios no puede actuar para traer el universo a la existencia (de 2 y 4).
Como pueden ver, el argumento ataca las premisas (4.1.3), (4.2.3) y (4.2.5) de nuestra versión del Kalam al intentar demostrar que existe una incoherencia entre las propiedades de Dios de ser personal, inmutable y atemporal.
¿Qué tan sólido es el argumento? Pues no mucho. Primero, el detractor parece pensar que, dado que no hay tiempo sin el universo, Dios es inmutable, pero este no es el caso. Lo que al argumento realmente dice, es lo siguiente:
(a) En ausencia total de cambio, el tiempo no existe y el Creador no cambia. (4.2.5.1.)
(b) Por lo tanto, Dios es atemporal (4.2.5.)
Y
(c) No puede existir una regresión temporal infinita de cambios. (4.2.3.1)
(d) Por lo tanto, Dios es inmutable (4.2.3)
Observa que el argumento no dice que la inmutabilidad de Dios se infiere de su atemporalidad; sino que la inmutabilidad se infiere de la imposibilidad de una regresión infinita de cambios, y la atemporalidad se infiere de su inmutabilidad. ¿Pero qué queremos decir por “ausencia de todo cambio”? Simple, es no hacer algo diferente. Es claro que hay actividades que no requieren ni cambio ni tiempo, por ejemplo, tener conocimiento de algo (Dios puede conocer todas las verdades en ese estado inmutable sin tiempo). Y lo mismo podrías decir sobre nuestras intenciones: mientras estas no cambien, podemos sostenerlas atemporalmente. Por lo que podemos decir que (1) del AICCP es falsa.
Segundo, (2) es falsa también. La premisa parece afirmar que la inmutabilidad de Dios es equivalente a inmovilidad, lo cuál sería cierto si habláramos de una causa impersonal, pero hemos visto que podemos inferir que la causa es personal, por lo que tiene volición para simplemente decidir crear el universo desde la eternidad. Tal como William Lane Craig explica cuando utiliza el ejemplo de un hombre sentado desde la eternidad:
Ahora, en este punto existe la objeción de que entonces el tiempo no comienza con el inicio del universo, sino en el momento en que Dios decide traer el universo a la existencia, lo cual es contradictorio que las implicaciones del inicio del universo del Big Bang. Ahora, incluso cuando el Dr. Craig no sostiene que Dios tenga que deliberar temporalmente, él ha respondido a objeciones similares haciendo distinción entre el tiempo físico y el tiempo metafísico:
Así que, con todo esto, podemos decir que el AICCP no es un argumento sólido después de todo.
Ahora pasemos al siguiente argumento al que he llamado Argumento de la Atemporalidad Contra la Causación (AACC):
1.Causa y efecto requieren intervalos temporales respectivamente para que pueda darse dicha relación.
2.El estado en el que se encuentra Dios no existen los intervalos temporales (otorgado por el kalam).
3.Por lo tanto, en el estado en el que se encuentra Dios no puede darse la causa ni el efecto.
Cuando uno analiza este argumento, notará que en esencia es similar al primero, solo se omite la inmutabilidad, pero el factor de atemporalidad sigue ahí, en específico, que se requiere de intervalos de tiempo para que exista una causa y efecto del tipo Dios tomando la decisión de crear el universo y luego otro momento en el que el universo llega a existir. Para esto William Lane Craig ha respondido en otra ocasión que:
Regresemos ahora al asunto de que la causa debe preceder al efecto. Aunque el Dr. Craig ya abordando antes de que no existe ninguna razón para aceptar esa condición y de que es posible tener causa y efecto simultáneamente[4], también existe la posibilidad de que, de hecho, toda causa y efecto es en última instancia, simultaneo:
No veo ninguna incoherencia conceptual al pensar que una causa y su efecto pueden ser simultáneos. De hecho, los filósofos a menudo hablarán sobre cómo se percibe la dirección de la influencia causal entre A y B cuando A y B son simultáneos. A y B pueden ser al mismo tiempo, pueden ser simultáneos, pero ¿de qué manera trazas la línea de influencia causal? ¿Es A lo que está causando B, o B lo que está causando A? Los filósofos discutirán sobre eso. Así que no veo ninguna incoherencia en la noción de causación simultánea. De hecho, algunos metafísicos han argumentado que todas las causas son en última instancia simultáneas porque hasta que la causa realmente incida en algún otro objeto para producir un efecto, no hay forma de que la influencia causal pueda saltar a través del tiempo, desde t2 hasta t1, para producir el efecto en t1. Esa causa debe durar hasta el momento t1 y luego producir su efecto en ese momento. Pero no hay forma de que una influencia causal pueda viajar a través del tiempo y saltar de t2 a t1 para producir el evento. Así que muchos filósofos dirán que toda causación es, en última instancia, simultánea.
Creo que es un argumento muy persuasivo. No puedo ver cómo puedes tener influencia causal saltando en el tiempo. Me parece que el efecto no se producirá hasta que la causa realmente incida sobre la cosa para producir su efecto; por ejemplo, el taco debe golpear la bola de billar para ponerla en movimiento. Y hasta que no lo haga, no hay forma de que la influencia causal del movimiento del taco vaya a saltar en el tiempo para hacer que la bola se mueva.[5]
Conclusión
Hemos visto que el AICCP falla debido a un mal entendimiento del significado de inmutabilidad y de como se infiere la inmutabilidad. Por otro lado, aunque el AACC es un argumento mejor, no es del todo sólido; ya que no existen buenas razones para rechazar la simultaneidad de la causa y el efecto.
Notas
[1] William Lane Craig, “God and Time” en William Lane Craig: A Reasonable Response.
[2] An Explanation of Physical Time and Metaphysical Time.
[3] William Lane Craig, “Timelessness and Creation”.
[4] William Lane Craig, “Causation and Spacetime”.
[5] Misunderstandings About God and the Big Bang.
Jairo Izquierdo es parte del equipo de Social Media y autor para la organización cristiana Cross Examined. Estudia filosofía y teología, siendo su actual foco de estudio la lógica clásica, epistemología, doctrinas cristianas y lingüística. Es cofundador de Filósofo Cristiano. Es miembro en la Christian Apologetics Alliance y ministro de alabanza en la iglesia cristiana bautista Cristo es la Respuesta en Puebla, México.
What Biblical Books are Included in the Earliest Canonical Lists?
Theology and Christian ApologeticsBy Ryan Leasure
There are two opposing ways to view the history of the canon. One would be to believe that the church, in its entirety, uniformly accepted all twenty-seven books of the New Testament as canonical from the very beginning. The other would be to suggest that the canon didn’t exist until an arbitrary church vote in the fourth or fifth century.
While either view might fit one’s preconceived agenda, the fact of the matter is that both views are terribly naive. The truth is, neither adequately deals with what history tells us.
I believe there’s a better, more balanced approach to the canon. It’s one that recognizes the canon’s development wasn’t as neat and tidy as some conservative scholars might think. Yet at the same time, it wasn’t a wild free-for-all like some other liberals suggest.
Instead, we find that the church affirmed a majority of the New Testament books at the beginning stages of Christianity. We might call these books the canonical core. Then as time progressed, the church, likewise, affirmed the peripheral books of the canon. To demonstrate this balanced approach, I want to highlight some of the early canonical lists from the first few centuries.
Irenaeus (AD 180)
While earlier church fathers quote New Testament books as Scripture, our first clear canon list comes from the Bishop of Lyons, Irenaeus. While he doesn’t include all twenty-seven books, Irenaeus gives us most of the New Testament. His canon includes:1Michael Kruger, The Canon Revisited, 228.
While Irenaeus’ list excludes four New Testament books (Philemon, 2 Peter, 3 John, and Jude), his list is impressive nonetheless. He’s clear on the Gospels as evidenced by his famous yet unscientific quote, “It is not possible that the gospels can be either more or fewer than the number they are. For, since there are four zones of the world in which we live and four principle winds.”2Irenaeus, Against Heresies, 3.11.8.
Moreover, his list contains the entire Pauline corpus (minus Philemon), Revelation, and about half of the shorter general epistles.
Muratorian Fragment (AD 180)
Named after its discoverer, Ludovico Antonio Muratori, this canonical list dating to the later part of the second century also confirms a core group of canonical books. The list includes:
Notice the similarity to Irenaeus’ list. Both include the four Gospels, Acts, and the entire Pauline corpus. It also includes 1 and 2 John and Revelation.
It’s worth noting that the Muratorian Canon includes the Apocalypse of Peter but with the caveat, “though some of us are not willing for the latter to be read in church.”3Muratorian Fragment, Line 72. Additionally, the fragment rejects the Shepherd of Hermas because it was written “quite recently, in our own times” and thus not backed by apostolic authority.4Muratorian Fragment, Line 74, 80.
There’s an important observation here. Both Irenaeus and the Muratorian Fragment indicate that the early church agreed on the core New Testament canon. And with that core agreement came an established theology.
Think about it. Almost all of Christian theology can be established using the four Gospels, Acts, Paul’s letters, 1 John, and Revelation. Not to downplay the importance of books like 3 John or Jude, but Christian theology doesn’t hang in the balance without them. This canonical list, then, should give us confidence that the early church agreed on key Christian doctrines (Trinity, creation, fall, salvation through Christ alone, the deity of Christ, etc.).
Eusebius (AD 320)
While much canonical development occurred over the next hundred years — especially with Clement of Alexandria and Origen — we now turn our attention to Eusebius of Caesarea. Known for writing the first church history, Eusebius gives us a canonical list recognized by the church. What’s interesting about his list is that he breaks it down into four distinct categories.5Eusebius, Church History, 3:25.
The Recognized Books
This list includes the books universally received by the church:
Disputed Books
Some disagreement surrounded the following books:
While Eusebius included these books in his disputed list, he makes an important statement about their validity. He writes that these books “are disputed yet known to most.”6Eusebius, Church History, 3.25. In other words, Eusebius indicates that most regarded these books as canonical even if a few were doubtful. Therefore, we shouldn’t think that most were on the fence with respect to these books — just a small minority.
What we find here, then, is the complete New Testament canon when you combine both the recognized and disputed books. The recognized books are essentially the same canonical core from the second century, plus the disputed books which most recognized as canonical.
Spurious Books
These books were ones that early Christians found helpful, but not canonical. They included:
These books would have been considered orthodox in their theology (much like a modern book by an orthodox Christian writer), but they weren’t backed by apostolic authority, and thus not canonical.
Heretical Books
These books were universally rejected by the early church:
Eusebius goes so far to argue that these books “ought not be reckoned even among the spurious books but discarded as impious and absurd.”7Eusebius, Church History, 3:25. His sentiments seem to fly in the face of modern liberal scholars who argue that the Gospel of Thomas is just as credible and authoritative as our four Gospels.
The Canon and Beyond
Following Eusebius, Athanasius gives us our precise twenty-seven book New Testament in his Festal Letter (AD 367). Additionally, regional church Synods at Hippo (AD 393) and Carthage (AD 397) both affirm the twenty-seven book New Testament canon.
You might ask what took so long to get all twenty-seven books affirmed? There could be a couple of reasons for the delay.
First, the peripheral books were generally shorter and made less of an impact on the church than the core books. It’s not hard for us to see how the church read Romans or Luke more than 3 John. For this reason, peripheral books didn’t circulate around the Roman Empire with the same frequency as the core ones. The truth is, many in the early church probably never read Jude or 3 John.
Another possible reason for the peripheral book’s late acceptance is the persecution of the early church. For example, in AD 303, Emperor Diocletian ordered all Christians to sacrifice to the pagan gods and to hand over all their biblical texts to be burned. It’s easy to see how Christians couldn’t just circulate their books willy-nilly.
Once Constantine legalized Christianity (AD 313); however, Scripture circulation came much easier. And quickly after that, we start finding complete canon lists.
So, did the early church have a neat and tidy agreed-upon canon at the end of the first century? No. But was the canon like the wild-wild West? No again. Instead, the church recognized a core canon from the very early stages, and they came to recognize the peripheral books later once all the books had time to circulate the Empire.
Ryan Leasure Holds a Master of Arts from Furman University and a Masters of Divinity from the Southern Baptist Theological Seminary. He currently serves as a pastor at Grace Bible Church in Moore, SC.
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