Abstract: James Sterba claims my Divine Love Theodicy does not address the working parts of his new logical problem of evil. In this paper I summarize Sterba’s new logical problem of evil, respond to it with an explanation of my Divine Love Theodicy, and point out how my theodicy does address the working parts of his logical problem of evil in that it satisfies the moral requirements he lays out. In addition, I will show that my Divine Love Theodicy also defeats Erik Wielenberg’s revised version of Sterba’s problem of evil argument which was published in 2022 in the journal Religions.
Introduction
James Sterba, Professor of Philosophy at Notre Dame, has made a tremendously strong claim. He has not claimed that ‘because there is horrendous suffering, it is difficult to believe God exists.’ I could sympathize with that sort of sentiment. But no, instead he has claimed that ‘because there is horrendous suffering, it is logically impossible for God to exist.’ While this type of logical problem of evil was popular around the middle of the twentieth century, even many atheist philosophers came to recognize it is incredibly difficult to defend such a strong claim. This is due in large part to philosophers like Alvin Plantinga, who pointed out that all one has to do to refute such a claim is provide a possible explanation for how God and evil could both exist. It does not even have to be the actual correct explanation because, since the claim—it is impossible for both God and evil to exist— is so strong, all that is required to refute the claim is a possible scenario where God and evil both exist. If something is at least possible, then, by definition, it is not impossible.
Because the logical problem of evil faces this formidable hurdle, today many consider it to be a dead argument. Atheist William Rowe, Professor of Philosophy at Purdue University, wrote “[s]ome philosophers have contended that the existence of evil is logically inconsistent with the existence of . . . God. No one, I think, has succeeded in establishing such an extravagant claim.”[1]
Has Sterba successfully resurrected this logical problem of evil? Hardly. Even atheist Erik Wielenberg, Professor of Philosophy at Depauw University, wrote “[Plantinga’s] basic strategy can be used to defeat Sterba’s newer logical argument from evil . . . .”[2] Wielenberg himself even proposed a possible model where God exists and permits horrendous suffering. He explained “[i]f this model is logically possible, then the first premise of Sterba’s argument is false . . . . Thus, Sterba’s new logical argument from evil succumbs to a modified version of Plantinga’s old free will defense.”[3] It should be noted that Wielenberg went on to revise Sterba’s argument and thus proposed his own problem of evil argument which I will discuss below.
In my debate with Sterba at the University of Nebraska in April 2024, I responded to his problem of evil argument with Plantinga’s basic strategy by presenting what I called a Divine Love Theodicy.[4] In our debate Sterba claimed my response did not address the working parts of his problem of evil argument. In this paper I will point out how my theodicy does address the working parts of Sterba’s argument in that it satisfies his proposed moral requirements. I will also address Wielenberg’s revised version of Sterba’s argument and thus argue that both Sterba’s and Wielenberg’s arguments should not lead us to conclude God does not exist.
Sterba’s Problem of Evil Argument
Sterba argues that the “horrendous evil consequences of immoral actions,” which I will refer to as horrendous suffering, is incompatible with the existence of God.[5] As for what he means by horrendous evil, he has in mind Marilyn Adams’ definition, that is, evils “the participation in which (that is, the doing or suffering of which) constitutes prima facie reason to doubt whether the participant’s life could (given their inclusion in it) be a great good to him/her on the whole.”[6]
Sterba often begins his argument, as he did in our debate, by laying out the following three moral requirements concerning goods God could provide to us:
- Prevent horrendous evil consequences when one can easily do so without violating anyone’s rights and no other goods are at stake.
- Do not secure a good using morally objectionable means when you can easily secure the same good by using morally unobjectionable means.
- Do not permit rather than prevent the infliction of especially horrendous evil consequences of immoral actions on their would-be victims in order to provide would-be beneficiaries with goods they would morally prefer not to have.
Sterba’s argument can be summarized as follows:
- An all-good, all-powerful God would necessarily follow these three moral requirements.
- If such a God followed these moral requirements, He would not allow horrendous suffering. In other words, God and horrendous suffering are logically incompatible.
- In this world there is horrendous suffering.
- Therefore, God does not exist.
One could push back on premise one by arguing that there might be reasons why God would not follow these moral requirements. Alternatively, one could push back on premise three by arguing that it is possible God has, in fact, prevented all truly horrendous suffering and all we actually experience in this world is what Sterba calls significant suffering, which he believes God would be justified in allowing, but since significant suffering is the worst we experience, we think of it as horrendous. However, I will push back on premise two by proposing a possible scenario where God does follow Sterba’s three moral requirements and yet still chooses to allow horrendous suffering.
A Divine Love Theodicy
My response to the problem of evil is based on aspects of previous theodicies I have found compelling combined with ideas from my Divine Love Theory.[7] I call my response a Divine Love Theodicy instead of Divine Love Defense because I believe this scenario, or something close to it, is what actually happened in reality. But even if I am wrong about this, all that is needed to defeat Sterba’s argument is a possible scenario (it does not have to be the actual one) where God and horrendous suffering both exist, because this would show that the two are not logically incompatible. Since I am merely describing a possible scenario, I will often use phrases like might be. . . , may have. . . , and it is possible that. . . .
Sometimes we think God could have created any set of circumstances we can imagine. People often refer to these different ways circumstances could play out as ‘possible worlds’ but I prefer the term ‘timelines,’ where each timeline includes everything that would happen from creation through eternity future. We could use the term ‘imaginable timelines‘ to refer to all the timelines we, or God, could imagine, which would be a large number indeed. For example, we can easily imagine a timeline where no one freely chooses to do evil that causes horrendous suffering, but it may be the case that this timeline would never actually happen. In other words, it very well could be that not all imaginable timelines are actually viable.
Why would some timelines not be viable? It might be the case that God imposed constraints on Himself which limited the number of timelines He could choose from. For example, He may have decided to create human beings with free will and constrain Himself from forcing them to do what He wants because that would violate their free will. Why would God impose this sort of constraint on Himself? One possible reason is that free will is required to experience the greatest good, that is, loving relationships with God and with others (this includes relationships in this life and the eternal afterlife).[8] Since love requires free will, if God forced us to love, then that would not be real love; we would just be puppets doing what God forced us to. Nobody wants to be in a relationship with someone who is forced to love them; rather, we want to be in relationship with someone who chooses to love us.[9]
If God chose to constrain Himself from forcing us to do what He wants, then this would have limited the timelines He had to choose from. For example, let us say it is the case that I would never freely choose to wear blue shorts under any circumstances in which God would place me. If that were true, then, even though we could imagine timelines where I would freely choose to wear blue shorts, none of those timelines would actually be viable since I would never freely choose to do that, and therefore God could not choose those timelines. Of course, God could force me to choose to wear blue shorts, but if He decided not to violate our free will, then those timelines where I freely chose them would not be available for God to choose from, i.e., they would not be viable. As a side note, readers familiar with the literature on this topic will notice that what I am calling imaginable timelines and viable timelines have historically been called possible worlds and feasible worlds, respectively. I am using these different terms because they better communicate the ideas I am trying to explain, they are easier for laypeople to understand, and I figure that people who are more familiar with the older terms should be able to easily follow along.[10]
It might be the case that in every timeline in which God gives us free will, some, possibly all, will always choose to do evil that causes horrendous suffering. If this were true, then even though we could imagine a timeline where no one freely chooses to do evil that causes horrendous suffering, such a timeline would not be viable. Keep in mind that the number of viable timelines are a smaller subset of the larger number of imaginable timelines. If this was the scenario that God faced, then He would have had to choose between these three options:
- Create no human beings.
- Create a timeline with human puppets that look like they are enjoying loving relationships and that never choose to do evil that causes horrendous evil, but really God is just pulling their strings and forcing them to do these things, and thus there would not be any real love.
- Create a timeline with human beings who have free will so that there would be true loving relationships, knowing that some, possibly all, would sometimes use their freedom to do evil which causes horrendous suffering.
It is reasonable to think God would choose the third option. Even though He knew it would involve some horrendous suffering, He also knew there would be real loving relationships, the value of which outweighs the suffering.
Now, within the third option there would be many different ways God could allow the circumstances to play out by, for example, placing people in different circumstances. If God is all powerful, surely He could have created a timeline almost like the one we are in but with less horrendous suffering, right? Maybe not. Keep in mind that the number of viable timelines would be limited because God constrains Himself from violating people’s free will. But could He not still orchestrate circumstances to minimize the horrendous suffering people caused by their evil choices? Maybe that is exactly what He did. Maybe, out of all the viable timelines within option three, He chose this timeline we are experiencing because this one had the least amount of horrendous suffering.
Additionally, it might be that if He prevented any specific horrendous suffering in this timeline, that would somehow lead to worse suffering later on. But could God not just step in and prevent that later suffering then too? Well, it might be that if God removed the horrendous consequences of our evil choices, then overall we would make many more evil choices. In other words, lowering horrendous suffering in this way might result, overall, in us making many more evil choices. Since evil choices themselves are intrinsically bad regardless of their consequences, it might be better overall to have many less evil choices and horrendous suffering than it would be to have no horrendous suffering and many more evil choices.
In addition, maybe minimizing evil choices and horrendous suffering was not God’s only goal. Maybe God had other goals in mind as well such as, for example, to maximize the greatest good—loving relationships with God and with others in this life and the afterlife. If that was the case, then, after evaluating every viable timeline, God chose the one that maximizes the quality and quantity of loving relationships for a given amount of horrendous suffering from our evil choices. That might be the timeline we are living in; we could be experiencing the best possible timeline, the one that maximizes loving relationships for a given amount of horrendous suffering. In game theory terminology, this timeline would be called a Pareto optimal scenario.
We might think God could lower the amount of horrendous suffering while keeping the quantity and quality of loving relationships the same, but that is impossible for us to know given our finite knowledge; we just cannot fathom all the ripple effects, either in this life or the next, that would come from adjusting various circumstances. It might not be the case that the quality and quantity of loving relationships are directly dependent upon evil and suffering, but it is reasonable to think that changing the circumstances to adjust the amount of horrendous suffering could have ripple effects that eventually affect the overall quantity or quality of loving relationships.
We might also think that the benefit of increasing loving relationships is not worth the cost of the extra horrendous suffering that might be entailed. But again, as finite beings, it is extremely difficult for us to do that sort of moral-tradeoff calculation. We tend to overestimate the cost of suffering, especially when we are in the midst of it. But if God is all-good and all-knowing, then He would know exactly how to calculate the best tradeoff and how to maximize the quantity and quality of loving relationships for a given amount of horrendous suffering.
Since this discussion is so conceptual, it might be helpful to walk through a specific hypothetical example to consider the process of how God may have chosen the particular timeline we are experiencing. Though it would be difficult to quantify, for the sake of thinking this through, let us assume we can measure the amount of horrendous suffering in a timeline on a scale of 0 to 100, with 0 being the least amount of such suffering and 100 being the most. Let us assume we can also measure the quality and quantity of loving relationships of a timeline on a similar scale of 0 to 100.
Of all the many imaginable timelines, consider timeline #42 where loving relationships are at maximum level of 100 and horrendous suffering is at the minimum level of zero. Clearly timeline #42 would be preferable to the timeline we are experiencing, but let us say this timeline, while it is imaginable, is not viable, because if God gave us free will, there are just no circumstances in which we would all make such free choices that would result in these levels. To keep things manageable in this illustration, let us suppose, because God constrained Himself from violating our free will, that there were just a few timelines that were actually viable from which God could choose from. Consider then these six timelines:
| Timeline |
Imaginable |
Viable |
Loving Relationships |
Suffering |
| #4 |
Yes |
Yes |
30 |
4 |
| #8 |
Yes |
Yes |
77 |
21 |
| #15 |
Yes |
Yes |
98 |
94 |
| #16 |
Yes |
Yes |
65 |
18 |
| #23 |
Yes |
No |
77 |
20 |
| #42 |
Yes |
No |
100 |
0 |
| All other timelines |
Yes |
No |
|
|
Presumably, there were many more viable timelines God could have chosen from, but I will be able to illustrate the type of constraints God might have faced by limiting the list to just these. After all, it is possible, though unlikely, God only had these four viable timelines to choose from. And, keep in mind, all that is needed to defeat Sterba’s logical problem of evil is a possible explanation.
Let us say God chose timeline #8 with loving relationships at level 77 and suffering at level 21. This seems reasonable considering the other viable options He had to choose from. We, and God, could certainly imagine a timeline such as #23 in which God orchestrated the circumstances (which would include Him stepping into history at times to prevent some horrendous suffering caused by our evil choices) such that there would be slightly less suffering, level 20 instead of 21, and yet loving relationships would stay at 77. However, let us say that this timeline was not possible because changing these circumstances would cause ripple effects (I am mostly thinking here of changes to our free will choices in response to these changed circumstances) that would lower the level of loving relationships.
God may have considered #15 since it would have a much higher level of loving relationships, 98 instead of 77, but it seems reasonable that He would not choose that option because it also drastically increases the level of suffering from 21 to 94. Similarly, God may have decided against timeline #4 because, even though suffering would drop from 21 to 4, loving relationships would drop from 77 to 30.
God could have chosen a timeline, say #16, in which He orchestrated the circumstances such that the level of suffering would be lowered from 21 to 18. But let us say that because the ripple effects of these changes would lower the loving relationships from 77 to 64, God would choose not to actualize this timeline.
In this scenario, if God did choose timeline #8, would He violate any of Sterba’s three moral requirements? Consider his first moral requirement that God should prevent horrendous evil consequences when He can easily do so without violating anyone’s rights and no other goods are at stake. God would not be violating this moral requirement because, though He could easily prevent some horrendous suffering by choosing another timeline, say #16, there are other goods, namely the level of loving relationships, that are at stake if He would do so.
Next, consider Sterba’s second moral requirement that God should not secure a good using morally objectionable means when He can easily secure the same good by using morally unobjectionable means. Sterba might be begging the question here by assuming that it is morally objectionable for God to allow horrendous suffering in order to secure a good. If so, then he needs to defend, and not just assume, his contention that it is morally objectionable for God to allow horrendous suffering in order to secure a good. Regardless, God would not be violating this moral requirement because, first, I would argue that it is not morally objectionable to choose timeline #8 to secure a good (loving relationships at level 77) even though it involves allowing people’s evil choices to cause horrendous suffering at level 21. Second, God could not secure the same good (that high of a level of loving relationships) using other means (choosing a timeline with the same level of loving relationships but a lower level of horrendous suffering) because no such timelines were viable.
Lastly, consider Sterba’s third moral requirement that God should not permit the horrendous evil consequences of immoral actions on their would-be victims in order to provide would-be beneficiaries with goods they would morally prefer not to have. In order for God to violate this proposed requirement within my Divine Love Theodicy, there would have to be some people who enjoyed the good of loving relationships with God and others who, once they know all the facts involved, preferred God had not chosen the timeline in which they had these relationships because it involved God allowing some to suffer horrendous evil consequences from people’s evil choices. First, because the morality of a decision is not dependent on people’s finicky preferences about the decision, it is highly questionable why God would have to follow this proposed requirement. In other words, I think it can be successfully argued that God would be justified in choosing #8 even if not all of the beneficiaries in that timeline would have preferred God make that choice.
Second, Sterba is making the large assumption here that there would be people who enjoy these loving relationships who, once they know all the facts involved, would prefer not to have these goods because the timeline which enabled such goods included God allowing people to suffer horrendous evil consequences of immoral actions. In other words, in order to show God would fail this moral requirement, Sterba would have to establish that that there would be such people who, once they know all the facts involved, have this preference. However, it is impossible for Sterba to know if there would be people with such preferences once they know all the facts involved. It is plausible, and at a minimum at least possible (which is all that is required to defeat Sterba’s logical problem of evil), that if my Divine Love Theodicy, or something close to it, is true and something similar to timeline #8 is the actual scenario we are experiencing, then when everyone fully knows all the facts involved, there will be no people with such preferences, and so God would not violate this moral requirement either. In conclusion, my Divine Love Theodicy shows it is at least possible, and I would argue quite plausible, that God could follow Sterba’s third moral requirement and still allow horrendous suffering.
Some might think the hypothetical scenario I have presented here is not probable or even plausible. I respectfully disagree. Regardless, it does not have to be probable or plausible; it only has to be possible in order to defeat Sterba’s claim that God and horrendous suffering are logically incompatible. And there is no good reason to think this scenario is impossible. Therefore, by providing a possible scenario where God and horrendous evil both exist, I have shown that Sterba’s logical problem of evil argument fails in its attempt to argue that God does not exist.
Erik Wielenberg’s Revised Version of Sterba’s Problem of Evil Argument
As I noted above, atheist philosopher Erik Wielenberg agreed that “[Plantinga’s] basic strategy can be used to defeat Sterba’s newer logical argument from evil.”[11] However, Wielenberg developed a revised version of Sterba’s argument which he formulated into a dilemma for theists. In this section I will address Wielenberg’s proposed dilemma.
Wielenberg began by defining a certain category of horrendous suffering he called prima facie life-ruining (pf-life-ruining for short) as suffering which is so bad that unless it is outweighed by some vastly better good, it renders the lives of those who experience it worse than no life at all.[12] He then described God facing an Omelas situation as follows:
“Suppose, then, that God faces the following dilemma: He can actualize a world in which a great many free creatures attain the great good of eternal loving union with Him only if He permits there to be one free creature that undergoes pf-life-ruining evil and that this creature not attain eternal loving union with God (or any other good that vastly outweighs the pf-life-ruining evil). In this imagined scenario, God faces what we may call an Omelas situation after Ursula Le Guin’s short story “The Ones Who Walk Away from Omelas.” Le Guin describes a city, Omelas, in which all the citizens save one live incredibly happy and joyous lives. However, their happiness and joy depend entirely (for reasons never fully explained) on the suffering of a single, feeble-minded child locked away in a small chamber somewhere beneath the city. Toward the end of the story, Le Guin explains that a tiny minority of Omelasians, upon coming to understand the conditions of happiness in Omelas, decide to leave Omelas altogether. Le Guin’s idea seems to be that these “ones who walk away from Omelas” correctly recognize the injustice of Omelas and their walking away symbolizes their rejection of the unjust arrangement.”[13]
Wielenberg suggested that God would face a similar Omelas situation if the only option He had to create a world with free creatures who enjoyed eternal loving union with God also included at least one free creature that experiences pf-life-ruining suffering and never acquires the good which vastly outweighs that suffering, i.e., eternal loving union with God.
Wielenberg argued that if a morally perfect God faced such an Omelas situation, He would choose not to create any free creatures at all because consigning one creature to such pf-life-ruining suffering in order to attain ultimate happiness for many others is deeply unfair. He wrote that this would be “treating the sacrificed creature as a mere means, using it like a pawn in chess” and that “13ivine justice is incompatible with God sacrificing some creatures in order to attain salvation for other creatures.”[14] He maintained it would be morally appropriate to create such a world with free creatures that experience pf-life-ruining suffering so as long as those who experience such suffering would eventually share in the vastly better good that outweighs the suffering, i.e., eternal loving union with God. In this regard he proposed the following (its name is a reference to Romans 3:8):
“Agent-Relative Pauline Principle: It is incompatible with God’s moral perfection for God to intentionally permit person P to experience pf-life-ruining evil in order to attain some good—unless that good vastly outweighs the pf-life-ruining evil, can be attained in no other way, and accrues to P.”[15]
After defining unredeemed pf-life-ruining evil as suffering that is not followed by a vastly greater good within the existence of the person who experiences it, he then put forth his revised version of Sterba’s argument:
- Necessarily, if God exists, then God does not intentionally permit unredeemed pf-life-ruining evils.
- Necessarily, if God exists and there are unredeemed pf-life-ruining evils, then God intentionally permits unredeemed pf-life-ruining evils.
- So: necessarily, if God exists, then there are no unredeemed pf-life-ruining evils.
- However, there are unredeemed pf-life-ruining evils.
- Therefore, God does not exist.[16]
Wielenberg anticipates that theists would most likely challenge premise four, the notion that there are unredeemed pf-life-ruining evils, by arguing that such evils are surely redeemed somehow in the afterlife. However, he points out that if such theists are correct that premise four is false, then this has the absurd result of turning common-sense morality upside down. This absurdity follows because it would cause us to have powerful reasons to inflict pf-life-ruining evils on people in order to force God’s hand to compensate them with tremendous goods in the afterlife. He explained that a “highly effective way of carrying out such a program would be to focus on children, who are particularly vulnerable and innocent: inflict pf-life-ruining evil on a child, kill the child, and you have guaranteed a great good for the child, a good in comparison with which your evil acts are insignificant.”[17] Thus he concludes by attempting to push the theist into a dilemma—either accept premise four and conclude there is no God or reject premise four and abandon commonsense morality by guaranteeing people a great good by inflicting upon them pf-life-ruining evils.
Instead of challenging premise four, I would push back against premise one which states that God does not intentionally permit unredeemed pf-life-ruining suffering. In other words, I argue that it would not be incompatible with God’s moral perfection for Him to allow unredeemed pf-life-ruining suffering in the lives of some people as long as He provides such people the opportunity to freely choose to experience a vastly better good that outweighs the suffering, i.e., eternal loving relationships with God and others. According to my Divine Love Theodicy, this is exactly what happened; though God knew not everyone who experiences pf-life-ruining suffering would choose to experience these loving relationships, He provided them the opportunity to freely choose such relationships, and thus He was morally justified in allowing such suffering. Wielenberg’s Omelas analogy breaks down because in the Omelas story the child who experienced pf-life-ruining suffering never had the opportunity to freely choose a vastly better good that would outweigh his suffering.
This first premise of Wielenberg’s argument that I am contesting is based on his Agent-Relative Pauline Principle, but I argue that this principle is mistaken because it is incomplete. This principle should be adjusted as follows:
Adjusted Agent-Relative Pauline Principle: It is incompatible with God’s moral perfection for God to intentionally permit person P to experience pf-life-ruining evil in order to attain some good—unless that good vastly outweighs the pf-life-ruining evil, can be attained in no other way, and, here is the adjustment—God gives P the free choice to receive that good or reject it.
This adjusted principle takes into consideration the choice of those who experience such suffering to freely receive or reject the outweighing good of loving relationships with God and others. In other words, God would not violate His perfect moral nature if He created a world where some free creatures experience pf-life-ruining suffering as long as God gives them the free choice to receive or reject the good that vastly outweighs the pf-life-ruining evil, namely, loving relationships with God and others.
Thus, my position accepts that there is unredeemed pf-life-ruining suffering but puts the final determination of that state into the hands of the free creatures. If their suffering is unredeemed, then it is ultimately because of their free choice, not God’s. According to my Divine Love Theodicy, even though God chooses to actualize this particular timeline, it is our choices that ultimately determine whether or not we experience loving relationships with God and others.[18]
To summarize, I am arguing that it is compatible with God’s moral perfection for Him to intentionally permit person P to experience pf-life-ruining suffering in order to attain some good as long as that good vastly outweighs such suffering, can be attained in no other way, and God gives P the choice to receive that good or reject it. And this is exactly what my Divine Love Theodicy proposes—that God has given us free will, which allows the possibility of pf-life-ruining suffering, in order for people to potentially enjoy loving relationships with Him and others, a good which vastly outweighs such suffering, that there was no other way to attain this good, and that God gives everyone, including those who experience such suffering, the free choice to participate in these loving relationships or reject them.
Conclusion
I am thankful that James Sterba is interested in exploring whether or not there is a God. I have enjoyed getting to know him and Erik Wielenberg personally as we have shared meals, interacted, and debated this important issue. While I appreciate their thoughtfulness, and that they are drawing people’s attention to this conversation about God, I have tried to show in this paper that their problem-of-evil arguments against the existence of God fall short.
Because horrendous suffering due to our evil choices is very real and utterly devastating, I sympathize with those who struggle to believe in God because of it. However, in this paper I have proposed a Divine Love Theodicy as a possible explanation for why God might allow this horrendous suffering. In this proposed scenario God allows horrendous suffering without violating Sterba’s three moral requirements. Therefore, at a minimum, this scenario demonstrates that horrendous suffering is not logically incompatible with the existence of God as Sterba has argued. In addition, I used my Divine Love Theodicy to show how Wielenberg’s revised version of Sterba’s argument failed to consider that God provides people the opportunity to freely choose to experience a vastly better good that outweighs their pf-life-ruining suffering. Lastly, if my Divine Love Theodicy, or something close to it, is what actually happened in reality, and I believe it has, then it helps us better understand God’s purposes in creating us and giving us free will so we can enjoy the greatest good—loving relationships with Him and with others.
While my Divine Love Theodicy relies on insights from previous free will defenses and theodicies, there are some unique aspects to it I pulled from my previous work in metaethics. In addition, hopefully I was able to explain my Divine Love Theodicy in a way that will help non-specialists understand free will defenses and theodicies and possibly shed more light on the issue even for specialists. Lastly, the most novel aspect of this paper is that it shows how a free will theodicy can address two recent attempts to revive the problem-of-evil argument.
References:
[1]William L. Rowe, “The Problem of Evil and Some Varieties of Atheism,” American Philosophical Quarterly 16 (1979): 335.
[2] Erik J. Wielenberg, “Sterba’s Logical Argument from Evil and the God Who Walks Away from Omelas,” Religions 13.782 (2022): 5.
[3] Wielenberg, 5–6.
[4] The debate can be watched or read at https://convincingproof.org/without-god-can-there-be-an-objective-ethics-debate/.
[5] James P. Sterba, Is a Good God Logically Possible? (Cham, Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan, 2019), 7n1.
[6] Sterba, Is a Good God Logically Possible?, 14. Sterba quoted this from Marilyn McCord Adams, Horrendous Evils and Goodness of God, Cornell Studies in the Philosophy of Religion, ed. William P. Alston (Ithica, New York: Cornell University Press, 1999), 26.
[7] Adam Lloyd Johnson, Divine Love Theory: How the Trinity Is the Source and Foundation of Morality (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Kregel Academic, 2023).
[8] Christian theologians have often described the greatest good we can experience as some sort of union, fellowship, communion, or friendship with God. Though it would take us beyond the scope of this paper, elsewhere I have argued that loving relationships with God and others are the very purpose and meaning life. I have also argued that loving relationships with God and others are our greatest good because, if good just is that which resembles God, such relationships resemble the ultimate good in God—the inner-trinitarian loving relationships. Johnson, Divine Love Theory: How the Trinity Is the Source and Foundation of Morality, 56–57, 154–57.
[9] The topic of free will is deep and broad. The type of free will I have in mind here has historically been called ‘agent-causal libertarian free will.’ Though it is beyond the scope of this paper, an important issue facing free will defenses such as my Divine Love Theodicy is specifically how babies, children who die young, and mentally challenged individuals meaningfully exercise freedom.
[10] In my live debate with Sterba, I actually used the term ‘possible timelines’ instead of ‘viable timelines’ for the smaller subset because I thought it would be even more understandable for laypeople, but I recognize now that using the term possible timelines for the smaller subset may cause confusion among those who are familiar with the older terms because historically the term ‘possible worlds’ was used to refer to the larger set. Oh my jargon!
[11] Wielenberg, 5.
[12] Wielenberg, 6.
[13] Ibid.
[14] Wielenberg, 7.
[15] Ibid.
[16] Ibid.
[17] Wielenberg, 8.
[18] Because it is beyond the scope of this paper, I am only assuming, and not arguing for, the proposition that everyone does, in fact, have the option to freely choose a relationship with God. Though I hold the position that everyone does have this option, I acknowledge that this is debated within Christian theology between those, for instance, who affirm humans have libertarian free will and those who hold to a more deterministic understanding of God’s sovereignty. Certainly at a minimum we can say that it is at least possible that God gives everyone this choice.
Recommended Resources:
If God, Why Evil? (DVD Set), (MP3 Set), and (mp4 Download Set) by Frank Turek
Why Doesn’t God Intervene More? (DVD Set), (MP3 Set), and (mp4 Download Set) by Frank Turek
Why does God allow Bad Things to Happen to Good People? (DVD) and (mp4 Download) by Frank Turek
Relief From the Worst Pain You’ll Ever Experience (DVD) (MP3) (Mp4 Download) by Gary Habermas
Adam Lloyd Johnson has served as the president of Convincing Proof Ministries since 2023. Prior to that, Adam was a university campus missionary with Ratio Christi at the University of Nebraska–Lincoln. He has also taught classes for Midwestern Baptist Theological Seminary and has spent time living and teaching at Rhineland Theological Seminary in Wölmersen, Germany. Adam received his PhD in Theological Studies with an emphasis in Philosophy of Religion from Southeastern Baptist Theological Seminary in 2020. Adam grew up in Nebraska and became a Christian as a teenager in 1994. He graduated from the University of Nebraska–Lincoln and then worked in the field of actuarial science for ten years in Lincoln, Nebraska. While in his twenties, he went through a crisis of faith: are there good reasons and evidence to believe God exists and that the Bible is really from Him? His search for answers led him to apologetics and propelled him into ministry with a passion to serve others by equipping Christians and encouraging non-Christians to trust in Christ. Adam served as a Southern Baptist pastor for eight years (2009-2017) but stepped down from the pastorate to serve others full-time in the area of apologetics. He’s been married to his wife Kristin since 1996, and they have four children – Caroline, Will, Xander, and Ray. Adam has presented his work at the National Apologetics Conference, the Society of Christian Philosophers, the Evangelical Philosophical Society, the International Society of Christian Apologetics, the Canadian Centre for Scholarship and the Christian Faith, the American Academy of Religion, and the Evangelical Theological Society. His work has been published in the Journal of the International Society of Christian Apologetics, Philosophia Christi, the Westminster Theological Journal, the Canadian Journal for Scholarship and the Christian Faith, the journal Eleutheria, and the journal Religions. Adam has spoken at numerous churches and conferences in America and around the world – Los Angeles, Chicago, Charlotte, Boston, Orlando, Denver, San Antonio, Canada, Germany, the United Kingdom, and Switzerland. He is the editor and co-author of the book A Debate on God and Morality: What is the Best Account of Objective Moral Values and Duties? published in 2020 by Routledge and co-authored with William Lane Craig, Erik Wielenberg, J. P. Moreland, and others. He is most recently the author of the book Divine Love Theory: How the Trinity is the Source and Foundation of Morality published by Kregel Academic in 2023.
Originally posted at: https://bit.ly/4ui6Um2
From Extreme Depression to Street Preacher: How God Saved His Life with Bryce Crawford
PodcastHow does a suicidal 17-year-old battling anxiety, depression, and doubts about God’s existence, become the founder of his own ministry and one of today’s most influential young evangelists five years later? Since 2024, Bryce Crawford has already reached 2 billion people through digital media and is filling venues around the country at just 22-years old.
But Bryce isn’t interested in building a platform for himself. Instead, he’s using his influence to reach a generation searching for truth, purpose, and hope in Christ—even when it means stepping into environments where rejection, ridicule, and hostility are almost guaranteed. Together, Frank and Bryce answer questions like:
From crowded city streets, college campuses, pride events, gay bars, and everywhere in between, Bryce’s ministry is a powerful reminder that people are often far more open to the Gospel than we think. His story challenges Christians of every generation to move beyond fear, meet people where they are, and lovingly point them to the freedom and hope found in Christ. Please support the work Bryce is doing by visiting his website in the list of resources below!
If you enjoyed this podcast episode PLEASE HELP US SPREAD THE TRUTH OF CHRISTIANITY BY SUPPORTING OUR MINISTRY USING THE LINK BELOW. 100% of your donation goes to ministry, 0% to buildings!
Resources mentioned during the episode:
Donate to CrossExamined
BryceCrawford.org
Preaching the Gospel at Pride Parade
Bryce Prays for Atheist Who Calls Himself “Atrophy”
Atrophy’s Baptism
My Testimony of How God Saved My Life
LGBTQ Member Wants to Legalize Bestiality
Preaching the Gospel at Gay Bars
If Life Ends at Death, Then Eat, Drink, and Be Merry, for Tomorrow We Die
Theology and Christian ApologeticsThe book of Ecclesiastes is notoriously difficult to interpret. In this article I share my best attempt at understanding and explaining what this book is about.
Many have argued that the main message of Ecclesiastes is that we shouldn’t look for meaning and purpose in this world or in this mortal life. While that might be a valid application of the truths found in Ecclesiastes, I don’t think that is its primary message. It seems to me that the main purpose of Ecclesiastes is to teach the following conditional:
If life ends at death, then life, and the toil of this life, is vanity because it’s fleeting, futile, meaningless, and absurd.
Yes, one of the applications we can learn from Ecclesiastes is not to look for ultimate meaning in this life or the things of this world. But I think, more than the main message, we’re supposed to take away from Ecclesiastes is that death is horrific. In this regard it’s a treatise on how terrible, crushing, horrific, awful, and unsettling death is. Death causes life to be meaningless. Thus, it fits into the overall corpus of Scripture in that it helps us to understand that death, which is the result of our evil choices, is terrible and destructive. Ecclesiastes helps us see how serious and terrible God’s punishment for us, death, truly is. The more we understand how crushing death is, the more we’ll appreciate God’s victory over death and the eternal life He offers us freely through faith in Christ.
What about Life After Death?
Someone may say, “Well, wouldn’t Solomon know that life doesn’t end at death, that there’s life after death?” Maybe and maybe not. God’s revelation is progressive in that He has given more details over time. It’s easy for us to know about life after death now because we have all 66 books of the Bible. But remember that Solomon didn’t have the New Testament, and not even all of the Old Testament had been written during his time. Thus, it might be the case that Solomon didn’t know there was life after death. There are even hints throughout Ecclesiastes that Solomon was uncertain about whether or not there was life after death (Eccl. 2:15-17, Eccl. 3:18-22, Eccl. 4:2-3, Eccl. 6:3-6, Eccl. 7:2, Eccl. 9:5-6, Eccl. 9:10). Also, even if Solomon did know that there’s life after death, he might still have decided to write Ecclesiastes to drive home in a powerful way this true conditional statement: “If life ends at death, then life, and the toil of this life, is vanity because it’s fleeting, futile, meaningless, and absurd.”
I’ve come to this conclusion about the main message of Ecclesiastes in part because Paul seems to teach the same conditional truth in 1 Corinthians 15—“If the dead are not raised, let us eat and drink, for tomorrow we die” (1 Cor. 15:32b). Below, I’ll include the pertinent verses from 1 Corinthians 15 so you can see how closely Paul’s message here aligns with the main message of Ecclesiastes. I’ll underline the sections that are especially pertinent to understanding Ecclesiastes.
“Now if Christ is preached, that He has been raised from the dead, how do some among you say that there is no resurrection of the dead? 13 But if there is no resurrection of the dead, not even Christ has been raised; 14 and if Christ has not been raised, then our preaching is vain, your faith also is vain….
16 For if the dead are not raised, not even Christ has been raised; 17 and if Christ has not been raised, your faith is worthless; you are still in your sins. 18 Then those also who have fallen asleep in Christ have perished.19 If we have hoped in Christ in this life only, we are of all men most to be pitied. 20 But now Christ has been raised from the dead, the first fruits of those who are asleep. 21 For since by a man came death, by a man also came the resurrection of the dead. 22 For as in Adam all die, so also in Christ all will be made alive. 23 But each in his own order: Christ the first fruits, after that those who are Christ’s at His coming, 24 then comes the end, when He hands over the kingdom to the God and Father, when He has abolished all rule and all authority and power. 25 For He must reign until He has put all His enemies under His feet. 26 The last enemy that will be abolished is death….
32 If from human motives I fought with wild beasts at Ephesus, what does it profit me? If the dead are not raised, let us eat and drink, for tomorrow we die….
41 There is one glory of the sun, and another glory of the moon, and another glory of the stars; for star differs from star in glory. 42 So also is the resurrection of the dead. It is sown a perishable body, it is raised an imperishable body; 43 it is sown in dishonor, it is raised in glory; it is sown in weakness, it is raised in power; 44 it is sown a natural body, it is raised a spiritual body. If there is a natural body, there is also a spiritual body. 45 So also it is written, “The first man, Adam, became a living soul.” The last Adam became a life-giving spirit. 46 However, the spiritual is not first, but the natural; then the spiritual. 47 The first man is from the earth, earthy; the second man is from heaven. 48 As is the earthy, so also are those who are earthy; and as is the heavenly, so also are those who are heavenly. 49 Just as we have borne the image of the earthy, we will also bear the image of the heavenly.
50 Now I say this, brethren, that flesh and blood cannot inherit the kingdom of God; nor does the perishable inherit the imperishable. 51 Behold, I tell you a mystery; we will not all sleep, but we will all be changed, 52 in a moment, in the twinkling of an eye, at the last trumpet; for the trumpet will sound, and the dead will be raised imperishable, and we will be changed. 53 For this perishable must put on the imperishable, and this mortal must put on immortality. 54 But when this perishable will have put on the imperishable, and this mortal will have put on immortality, then will come about the saying that is written, “Death is swallowed up in victory. 55 O death, where is your victory? O death, where is your sting?” 56 The sting of death is sin, and the power of sin is the law; 57 but thanks be to God, who gives us the victory through our Lord Jesus Christ. 58 Therefore, my beloved brethren, be steadfast, immovable, always abounding in the work of the Lord, knowing that your toil is not in vain in the Lord.” 1 Corinthians 15:12-50
In 1 Cor. 15 Paul affirmed the conditional truth of Ecclesiastes (if life ends at death, then life, and the toil of this life, is vanity because it’s fleeting, futile, meaningless, and absurd), as can especially be seen when he wrote, “If the dead are not raised, let us eat and drink, for tomorrow we die” (1 Cor. 15:32b). But then Paul pointed out that the first part of this conditional is wrong, that life doesn’t end at death because the dead will be raised. And Paul argued that in light of this, our toil in this life is not in vain (1 Cor. 15:58b). In other words, both of the following conditionals are true:
Here are various ideas found throughout Ecclesiastes that reinforce its main message, which is “If life ends at death, then life, and the toil of this life, is vanity because it’s fleeting, futile, meaningless, and absurd.”
Sections in which Solomon encourages the reader to “enjoy life” (Eccl. 2:24-26, Eccl. 3:9-15, Eccl. 3:22, Eccl. 5:18-20, Eccl. 8:14-15, Eccl. 9:7-10, Eccl. 10:19, Eccl. 11:8-10) are not positive encouragements to enjoy the gifts God gives us in this life; rather, they are actually sarcastic jabs similar to the statement “Eat, drink, and be merry for tomorrow we die.” Of course, we should enjoy the gifts God gives us in this life, that’s a true statement, but that’s not the point that Solomon is making in Ecclesiastes. Below are the verses that lead me to believe Solomon is making sarcastic jabs similar to “Eat, drink, and be merry for tomorrow we die.” I’ll underline the words that seem to indicate he’s being sarcastic:
“There is nothing better for a man than to eat and drink and tell himself that his labor is good.”Eccl. 2:24
“There is futility which is done on the earth, that is, there are righteous men to whom it happens according to the deeds of the wicked. On the other hand, there are evil men to whom it happens according to the deeds of the righteous. I say that this too is futility. So I commended pleasure, for there is nothing good for a man under the sun except to eat and to drink and to be merry, and this will stand by him in his toils throughout the days of his life which God has given him under the sun.”Eccl. 8:14-15
“Go then, eat your bread in happiness and drink your wine with a cheerful heart; for God has already approved your works. Let your clothes be white all the time, and let not oil be lacking on your head. Enjoy life with the woman whom you love all the days of your fleeting life which He has given to you under the sun; for this is your reward in life and in your toil in which you have labored under the sun. Whatever your hand finds to do, do it with all your might; for there is no activity or planning or knowledge or wisdom in Sheol where you are going.”Eccl. 9:7-10
“Indeed, if a man should live many years, let him rejoice in them all, and let him remember the days of darkness, for they will be many. Everything that is to come will be futility.” Eccl. 11:8
“Here is what I have seen to be good and fitting: to eat, to drink and enjoy oneself in all one’s labor in which he toils under the sun during the few years of his life which God has given him; for this is his reward. Furthermore, as for every man to whom God has given riches and wealth, He has also empowered him to eat from them and to receive his reward and rejoice in his labor; this is the gift of God. For he will not often consider the years of his life, because God keeps him occupied with the gladness of his heart.” Eccl. 5:18-20
In relation to these verses from Eccl. 5:18-20, it’s important to note that a recurring theme throughout Ecclesiastes is people occupying themselves with meaningless pursuits in this life to keep them busy so they don’t think about more serious things like mortality and the meaning of life. If life ends at death, it will be a frustrating waste of time to try to figure out the ultimate meaning and purpose of life. This is because if life ends at death, there is no ultimate meaning to life. Don’t even think about such things but instead just occupy your time with eating, drinking, and being merry (Eccl. 1:13-18, Eccl. 2:10-12, Eccl. 5:18-20, Eccl. 7:13-14, Eccl. 7:23-25, Eccl. 7:27-28a, Eccl. 8:14-17).
Solomon seems exasperated by trying to figure out these deep things about ultimate meaning and concludes it’s a waste of time. We’ll never be able to figure it out, so don’t even try. Just eat, drink, and be merry, and that’ll keep you from wasting time trying to understand what you’ll never be able to figure out. Trying to unlock this mystery will just make you frustrated and depressed, so instead occupy yourself with eating, drinking, and being merry for tomorrow we die. Again, I see this as a sarcastic jab in light of his overall message that if life ends at death, then life is vanity because it’s fleeting, futile, meaningless, and absurd. This is especially driven home in Eccl. 6:11b-12a: “What is the advantage for mankind? For who knows what is good for anyone in life, in the few days of his futile life that he spends like a shadow?”
Many have argued that the main point of Ecclesiastes is found in Eccl. 12:13: “The conclusion, when all has been heard, is: fear God and keep His commandments, because this applies to every person.” However, it seems to me that this is merely the main application of the book, which follows from the actual main point of the book that’s found in Eccl. 12:14: “For God will bring every act to judgment, everything which is hidden, whether it is good or evil.” In other words, if life ends at death, then we might as well live it up, eat, drink, and be merry, because, after all, you only live once! But because life doesn’t end at death, we can be assured that God will judge us in the next life for all we do in this life. In light of that truth, the application then follows: we shouldn’t merely live it up, eat, drink, and be merry, but instead keep God’s commands, not only out of fear of judgment for the bad things we do, though that should motivate us, but also out of the expectation of reward for the good things we do.
It might be tempting to think that Christians, since we know life doesn’t end at death, don’t have much to learn from Ecclesiastes. However, keep in mind that one of the major points of application from Ecclesiastes is that it’s a terrible mistake to look for ultimate meaning and purpose in this world. And unfortunately, Christians often make that mistake; I know I do. We focus too much on success or achievements in this life, or we get fixated on accumulating wealth, or we try to find fulfillment in power, influence, and fame. This even happens for those of us in ministry. I confess that I’m very achievement-oriented, and so I tend to seek fulfillment in accomplishments like degrees, ministry positions, getting a book published, speaking at a conference, etc. But if I’m not careful, those things can become more important to me as ends in themselves instead of merely means to serve other people.
When we tend to seek ultimate meaning and purpose in this world, we often end up frustrated and depressed like Solomon in Ecclesiastes because, as this book teaches us, there’s just no lasting fulfillment in this transitory life. So, Ecclesiastes can be a huge help in fixing our thinking and reminding us that true meaning is found in loving God and loving others, for that’s what we were created for. In this regard the main application of Ecclesiastes is similar to what Jesus taught:
“Do not store up for yourselves treasures on earth, where moth and rust destroy, and where thieves break in and steal. But store up for yourselves treasures in heaven, where neither moth nor rust destroys, and where thieves do not break in or steal; for where your treasure is, there your heart will be also” (Matt. 6:19-21).
It’s interesting to note that Western culture eventually came to this same conclusion, namely, that if this physical life is all there is, then life is utterly meaningless. This was the eventual conclusion of Modernism, that we’re merely the result of an accidental, haphazard process of evolution and there’s no meaning to life except to eat, drink, and procreate. This conclusion threw Western culture into an existential crisis in the 1800s, as Ecclesiastes teaches it should, and it was out of this crisis that Postmodernism was born. The key driving idea behind all of the Postmodern movements, starting with Romanticism in the early 1800s, culminating with Existentialism in the mid-1900s, and continuing through to today, is this: there is no objective meaning to life, but don’t despair, you can create your own subjective meaning by following your heart. I’m sure Solomon would find that idea absurd and futile. I know I do.
Recommended Resources:
How to Interpret Your Bible by Dr. Frank Turek DVD Complete Series, INSTRUCTOR Study Guide, and STUDENT Study Guide
Jesus, You and the Essentials of Christianity by Frank Turek (INSTRUCTOR Study Guide), (STUDENT Study Guide), and (DVD)
The Great Book of Romans by Dr. Frank Turek (Mp4, Mp3, DVD Complete series, STUDENT & INSTRUCTOR Study Guide, COMPLETE Instructor Set)
Why does God allow Bad Things to Happen to Good People? (DVD) and (mp4 Download) by Frank Turek
Adam Lloyd Johnson has served as the president of Convincing Proof Ministries since 2023. Prior to that, Adam was a university campus missionary with Ratio Christi at the University of Nebraska–Lincoln. He has also taught classes for Midwestern Baptist Theological Seminary and has spent time living and teaching at Rhineland Theological Seminary in Wölmersen, Germany. Adam received his PhD in Theological Studies with an emphasis in Philosophy of Religion from Southeastern Baptist Theological Seminary in 2020. Adam grew up in Nebraska and became a Christian as a teenager in 1994. He graduated from the University of Nebraska–Lincoln and then worked in the field of actuarial science for ten years in Lincoln, Nebraska. While in his twenties, he went through a crisis of faith: are there good reasons and evidence to believe God exists and that the Bible is really from Him? His search for answers led him to apologetics and propelled him into ministry with a passion to serve others by equipping Christians and encouraging non-Christians to trust in Christ. Adam served as a Southern Baptist pastor for eight years (2009-2017) but stepped down from the pastorate to serve others full-time in the area of apologetics. He’s been married to his wife Kristin since 1996, and they have four children – Caroline, Will, Xander, and Ray. Adam has presented his work at the National Apologetics Conference, the Society of Christian Philosophers, the Evangelical Philosophical Society, the International Society of Christian Apologetics, the Canadian Centre for Scholarship and the Christian Faith, the American Academy of Religion, and the Evangelical Theological Society. His work has been published in the Journal of the International Society of Christian Apologetics, Philosophia Christi, the Westminster Theological Journal, the Canadian Journal for Scholarship and the Christian Faith, the journal Eleutheria, and the journal Religions. Adam has spoken at numerous churches and conferences in America and around the world – Los Angeles, Chicago, Charlotte, Boston, Orlando, Denver, San Antonio, Canada, Germany, the United Kingdom, and Switzerland. He is the editor and co-author of the book A Debate on God and Morality: What is the Best Account of Objective Moral Values and Duties? published in 2020 by Routledge and co-authored with William Lane Craig, Erik Wielenberg, J. P. Moreland, and others. He is most recently the author of the book Divine Love Theory: How the Trinity is the Source and Foundation of Morality published by Kregel Academic in 2023.
Originally posted at: https://bit.ly/4vpIDLd
God the Artist: What You Never Knew About David & Goliath
Podcast“God can slay the giants in your life!” Is that REALLY the moral of the story when it comes to the infamous historical account of David and Goliath? Get ready as Frank peels back the curtain and reveals the hidden meaning behind the Bible’s most famous showdown in 1 Samuel 17. Tune is as he digs into the history, archaeology, and related Bible verses from this remarkable victory while answering questions like:
If you’ve ever wondered how the Old Testament connects to the New Testament, this episode brings the pieces together in a fascinating way. Once you see what’s happening beneath the surface of David and Goliath, you will never read it the same way again!
If you enjoyed this podcast episode PLEASE HELP US SPREAD THE TRUTH OF CHRISTIANITY BY SUPPORTING OUR MINISTRY USING THE LINK BELOW. 100% of your donation goes to ministry, 0% to buildings!
Resources mentioned during the episode:
Donate to CrossExamined
Archaeological Evidence for Giants in the Bible? with Joel Kramer
Bible Cross-References by Chris Harrison
Abortion Versus Sacrificial Living
Legislating Morality, Culture & PoliticsMatthew 16:24-25, NASB
Abortion isn’t just a surgical procedure. It’s not just an action, a choice, or a policy. It’s also a culture. Abortion-choice culture is a range of institutions and actions driven by a specific set of ideas about women, sex, motherhood, children, family, and liberty. Somewhere packed inside that culture is a set of expectations about what “normal” women and families should be like.
Revolutionary Motherhood
Rachel Jankovic, a mother of seven children, is decidedly abnormal. She writes:
Jankovic is happily wed in Christian marriage, to her first husband, and with her seven children, she is a walking testimony to the glory of biblical Christian family. Some would call her a countercultural hero. And she’s not the only one to recognize how abortion-choice ideas have saturated popular culture.
Abortion ideology often tells women their life is over once they have kids. It says that children are more burden than blessing, marriage is disposable, and sex is just a leisure activity with no strings attached.
Abortion-choice culture is hostile to many of the central values of Christian living.
Another woman, Frederica Mathewes-Green arrived at the same conclusion. But she began her journey on the inside of that culture, as a vocal pro-choice advocate. Speaking of her days advocating for abortion choice, before Roe v. Wade, she says:
This observation is a devastating to pro-choice ideology, where abortion is supposed to be the answer to women’s problems, the solution all the hardship her family and friends foresee for her. But, while its convenient and foregettable for her family and friends, she doesn’t have the leisure to forget it so easily. They don’t have to live with her abortion. But she does. They can forget about it. She can’t.
Mathewes-Green goes on to say that
Mathewes-Green is building a pro-life case from the fallen timbers of pro-choice ideology. In doing so, she’s explaining how abortion culture isn’t just mistaken, it’s layers of subversive violence and quiet oppression against women. She first realized this after viewing a recording of an abortion. Before the days of sonograms, people still might have thought a 19-week old child-in-utero was just an inchoate blob. So, she wasn’t sure what to expect in this chemical-injection abortion. The abortionist inserted the needle into the middle of the mother’s abdomen, into the baby’s chest. The syringe sat still for a few moments. Then it moved, vigorously. The tiny child was struggling against the needle, struggling for life. In her words:
Two Routes to the Same Place
These two women are coming from very different paths. Yet they arrive at the same conclusion. Popular culture is drenched in abortion-choice ideology, and that spells violent harm to women and their families. They both came to understand that . . .
Pro-life is Pro-woman.
Jankovic offers additional clarity on the subject, from a Christian perspective. Recognizing the opposition that pro-life Christians face in an abortion-friendly culture she says:
Jankovic might sound like she’s surrendering too much ground to abortion culture as she admits that women are deathly afraid of losing their individual identity in motherhood. Women are, justifiably, scared about the prospect of “dying” to themselves. Abortion sounds like it would make sense, in light of those fears. But she’s not done yet.
There’s more to the story when Christ is the main character.
“Christian[s] should have a different paradigm”, Jankovic says,
The prospect of motherhood, pregnancy, and childbirth can be really scary. Choosing life, especially with big families, can be terrifying because it’s wildly countercultural. But in the face of these fears, we don’t have to surrender, like cowards, to popular culture. We don’t have to retreat to abortion and kill our young like captured POW’s. No, we can be heroes to our children, laying down our lives in sacrificial living. And we do this not by our own strength. We draw strength from the risen Christ. Our life in Christ is resurrection powered. We can gladly lay down our lives for our loved ones because “whoever loses his life for Christ’s sake will find it.”
References:
Rachel Jankovic, “Motherhood is a Calling,” [online] DesiringGod.org (14 July 2011) at: https://www.desiringgod.org/articles/motherhood-is-a-calling
Frederica Mathewes-Green, “When Abortion Suddenly Stopped Making Sense,” [online] National Review (22 January 2026) at: https://www.nationalreview.com/2016/01/abortion-roe-v-wade-unborn-children-women-feminism-march-life/
Recommended Resources:
Correct not Politically Correct: About Same-Sex Marriage and Transgenderism by Frank Turek (Book, MP4, )
Stealing From God by Dr. Frank Turek (Book, 10-Part DVD Set, STUDENT Study Guide, TEACHER Study Guide)
Legislating Morality: Is it Wise? Is it Legal? Is it Possible? by Frank Turek (Book, DVD, Mp3, Mp4, PowerPoint download, PowerPoint CD)
The Case for Christian Activism (MP3 Set), (DVD Set), and (mp4 Download Set) by Frank Turek
Dr. John D. Ferrer is a speaker and content creator with Crossexamined. He’s also a graduate from the very first class of Crossexamined Instructors Academy. Having earned degrees from Southern Evangelical Seminary (MDiv) and Southwestern Baptist Theological Seminary (ThM, PhD), he’s now active in the pro-life community and in his home church in Pella Iowa. When he’s not helping his wife Hillary Ferrer with her ministry Mama Bear Apologetics, you can usually find John writing, researching, and teaching cultural apologetics.
Originally posted at: https://bit.ly/4xnf0vZ
What No One Ever Told You About the American Revolution with Eric Metaxas
PodcastThere’s never been a nation like the United States of America. But do you know the wild and true story of how it came into existence? On our 250th anniversary, the hunger for America’s story has never been greater, and who better to tell it than historian and radio host Eric Metaxas, author of seven New York Times bestsellers including the ground-breaking biography of Dietrich Bonhoeffer?
This week, Eric joins Frank to discuss his brand-new 600+ page book, ‘Revolution: The Birth of the Greatest Nation in the History of the World‘, which explores in-depth the divine providence and heroic stories behind the founding of the United States. Together, Eric and Frank answer questions like:
You definitely don’t want to miss this episode along with Eric’s book which will be a staple on your family’s bookshelf for generations to come. Unless we ourselves know the true story of the Revolution—what some have called America’s “founding myth”—we cannot play the role we are meant to play in the Revolution that still continues today.
If you enjoyed this podcast episode PLEASE HELP US SPREAD THE TRUTH OF CHRISTIANITY BY SUPPORTING OUR MINISTRY USING THE LINK BELOW. 100% of your donation goes to ministry, 0% to buildings!
Resources mentioned during the episode:
Donate to CrossExamined
Revolution by Eric Metaxas
EricMetaxas.com
U.S. Capitol Tour with Speaker Mike Johnson
Pinned by you
Did God Give Adam and Eve Enough Information to Make an “Informed Decision”?
Theology and Christian ApologeticsIn my previous post, I partially answered the question, “Why did God create the tree in the first place?” This question is a big one for little minds to wrap themselves around. For a child, creating the tree in the first place sounds like God was just asking for trouble. For the hardened skeptic, it sounds like God tricked us into needing a Savior by creating the means for us to sin in the first place. I argued in my previous post that this objection does not hold true when you examine it in the context of a loving relationship. For both love and relationship to exist, there must be free-will. For free-will to exist, there must be legitimate means to choose otherwise. God made it as easy as possible for Adam and Eve to choose Him, and they still chose to disobey. (If you have not read the previous post, please do so now. It lays the foundation for why the choice was necessary.)
One objection I hear to this line of reasoning is that Adam and Eve were “not fully informed.” Had they known what God meant by “And you shall surely die,” they never would have disobeyed. Thus, their sin is God’s fault for not providing enough information.
So, if God wanted to remain in a loving relationship with Adam and Eve, why didn’t He tell them the full story?! The answer is simpler than you would think: Establishing a loving relationship was not possible with full disclosure. That is a bold claim to make, so let me explain what I mean.
Was full disclosure possible without ruining the possibility for a loving relationship?
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1) What do I mean by “choice”?
I was illustrating this point to my nephew once, and asked him, “What is something you would never purposefully do to yourself because it would hurt?” He thought for a second, and then motioned like he was slamming his hand with a hammer. Most of us make the “choice” to not purposefully slam our hands with hammers. In fact, I’d wager that most of us make this “choice” every day! However, would you call that a choice? Not really. It has never entered my mind to do otherwise. Why? Because I’ve accidentally slammed my hand with hammer. It was not pleasant. Thus, I would never do it purposefully. I don’t consider it a “choice” to not purposefully slam my hand with a hammer. I just don’t do it. I don’t want to, and if someone wanted to use it as “proof” of my love or loyalty to them, it would prove nothing.
Only if we completely redefine the word ‘choice.’Share on X
2) Full disclosure can lead to coercion.
As mentioned before, love requires free-will, which necessitates the ability for a person to choose otherwise. However, someone can theoretically “force” you to choose something that you would never choose on your own. Forcing a choice might philosophically sound like it maintains free-will, but it doesn’t. Not really, and especially not if your end goal is a loving relationship.
For example, if you were kidnapped, and the kidnapper said to you, “The door will remain unlocked, and you can chooooooooose to leave whenever you like. However, I’m putting this device on your leg. And FYI, if you leave this room, it will administer 500 volts of electricity to you. In case you don’t believe me, let me lead you out of the room for a second so you can get a taste of what a fraction of that voltage is. BZZZZZZZZZZZ. . . Okay, now that you are “fully informed” about the weight of your decisions, it is my desire that you choose to stay here with me.”
If the kidnapper were caught, could he use the excuse that he didn’t “force” you to stay? After all, you could have exercised your free-will at any point. You had the “choice” to leave!
Ummmmm . . . . No.
That excuse wouldn’t hold up in court, and it doesn’t hold up here. You did not have actual free-will with the kidnapper. If you “chose” to stay, it was coerced, to say the least. And it for sure didn’t lead to a loving relationship!
This excuse wouldn’t hold up in court, and it doesn’t hold up here.Share on X
Could God have given Adam and Eve enough information to ensure that they would never disobey (i.e., always “chose” Him)? Sure. Could he have let them experience the full weight of their decisions beforehand? Absolutely. But their “choice” would no longer be a choice. As mentioned before, choosing to not slam my hand with a hammer fails to demonstrate my love or loyalty to anyone but myself. It’s an act of self-preservation. Similarly, full disclosure about the ramifications of sin would have robbed Adam and Eve of freely choosing God. It would have been coercion. It would have been an act of self-preservation, not an act of obedience or trust. If anything, it would probably have fueled as much resentment as we would have for our hypothetical kidnapper, because it would have been taunting them with the illusion of choice, without actually giving them a choice.
So, why did God create that tree?
Bringing this back to our original question, “Why did God create the tree in the first place?” let me summarize: It’s because He is a loving father who wanted a loving relationship with His children. He did not want robots. He did not want to force Himself on us, and He didn’t want to coerce us into loving Him by providing “full disclosure” of the ramifications of rebelling against a Holy God. None of those things would result in the kind of relationship that he desired. What did He do? He gave Adam and Eve enough information to know that He could be trusted, gave them one door by which to leave, and they took it. He didn’t hide the ramifications. He gave them enough disclosure whereby they understood what obedience and rebellion looked like, but He didn’t give so much information that they felt compelled to act in self-preservation.
Are we really free if our choice is coerced? Share on X
Recommended Resources:
What is God Really Like? A View from the Parables by Dr. Frank Turek (DVD, Mp3, and Mp4)
Is Original Sin Unfair? by Frank Turek (DVD, Mp3, and Mp4)
Was Jesus Intolerant? by Frank Turek (DVD and Mp4)
Stealing From God by Dr. Frank Turek (Book, 10-Part DVD Set, STUDENT Study Guide, TEACHER Study Guide)
Hillary Morgan Ferrer is the founder and President of Mama Bear Apologetics. She feels a burden for providing accessible apologetics resources for busy moms. She is the chief author and editor of the bestselling books Mama Bear Apologetics: Empowering Your Kids to Challenge Cultural Lies, Mama Bear Apologetics Guide to Sexuality: Empowering Your Kids to Understand and Live Out God’s Design, and the soon to be released Honest Prayers for Mama Bears. Hillary has her master’s degree in biology and loves helping moms to discern truths and lies in both science and culture. She and her husband, John, have been married for 16 years and minister together as an apologetics team. She can never sneak up on anybody because of her chronic hiccups, which you can hear occasionally on the podcast and in interviews.
Originally posted at: https://bit.ly/4o2Z8dK
Be Worthy of the Bullet That Charlie Kirk Took For You — Why Independence Day? with Steve Deace PLUS Q&A
PodcastHow do you take a BIG idea like the importance of Independence Day and make it accessible for young readers without watering down the truth? Look no further than Steve Deace and his new book, ‘Why Independence Day? America is Great Because God is Good‘. Steve recently joined Frank on his recent tour of the U.S. Capitol with Speaker Mike Johnson and shares some of his biggest takeaways while answering questions like:
Then, later in the program Frank addresses some listener questions, including:
Have a question for Frank? Send it to hello@crossexamined.org and stay tuned for Friday’s episode with Eric Metaxas where you’ll learn more about his brilliant new book (available to order now!), ‘Revolution: The Birth of the Greatest Nation in the History of the World‘.
If you enjoyed this podcast episode PLEASE HELP US SPREAD THE TRUTH OF CHRISTIANITY BY SUPPORTING OUR MINISTRY USING THE LINK BELOW. 100% of your donation goes to ministry, 0% to buildings!
Resources mentioned during the episode:
Donate to CrossExamined
Follow Steve on X
Why Independence Day? by Steve Deace
U.S. Capitol Tour with Speaker Mike Johnson
Revolution by Eric Metaxas
When “Too Christian” Becomes a Metric: A Case Study in Academic Double Standards
Legislating Morality, Culture & PoliticsAlthough I am a tenured full professor of philosophy at ASU, I am still required to complete an annual review of my work each year (as the name suggests). At most universities, faculty evaluations are supposed to be straightforward. At Arizona State University, where I teach, we use an objective rubric. Faculty are evaluated annually in three categories: research, teaching, and service. Each activity earns points, and those points correspond to a score from 1 to 5. A 3 means you met expectations. A 1 or 2 means you’ll need to draw up a plan for change with the school’s director and then prove you succeeded in the next annual review. A 4 means you exceeded expectations and a 5 means you achieved excellence.
It is very nice to have this objective rubric because you know what you are expected to do and when you do it you know the outcome.
Simple enough.
Or so I thought.
When the Numbers Don’t Matter
Based on the rubric, my annual review materials yielded scores corresponding to a 5 in all three categories. But when I received the final letter from my school director, my teaching score had been lowered from a 5 to a 4.
I’m not necessarily complaining about the number. A 4 is still a strong evaluation. The issue is not the number itself. The issue is the principle behind the change. If I deserve a 5, I’m not going to settle for a 4 just because.
Why did the score differ from the rubric?
The answer was not a calculation error. Instead, the director cited two student comments claiming that my course was “too Christian.” These comments were treated as sufficient grounds to override the rubric. The students did not provide any evidence and the director gave none of her own.
At that moment, a new and unstated metric entered the evaluation process.
What Is the Standard?
I raised two basic questions and appealed to the next level: The college dean.
First: What is the actual evaluation standard?
If the rubric can be overridden, then what replaces it? Is there a formal secondary criterion? Is it written anywhere? Is it applied equally? I know there are professors in my school teaching the Decolonizing, Anti-Racism, and LGBTQ+ philosophies as the truth of matter. Are they also penalized or just the Christian guy?
Second: Why assume the student comments are accurate without verification?
Student perceptions vary widely. That is precisely why institutions use rubrics, in order to avoid substituting subjective impressions for objective evaluation.
The “Evidence”
I appealed the decision to the Dean. The Dean upheld the lower score and offered supporting evidence: quiz questions from my course, “The Philosophy of Death and Dying.”
Here are the kinds of questions cited:
These are not clearly Christian questions. They don’t mention the Bible or Christ. They are standard philosophical questions, the kinds of questions you would find in discussions of Plato, Aristotle, or even Viktor Frankl.
None of them mention the Bible. None of them require Christian commitment.
And yet they were presented as evidence that the course was “weighted toward Christianianity.”
There is an irony here worth noting: the course catalog itself states that the class includes engagement with the Bible: a description I did not write. So when biblical material is included, it would still fall within the approved course framework.
A Larger Question: Is This Standard Applied Consistently?
In my response, I asked a question that cuts to the heart of the matter: “Is this standard applied equally across faculty?”
If a professor emphasizes “decolonizing philosophy” or teaches contemporary DEI frameworks as normative, are those courses similarly scrutinized and penalized? Or is the concern selective? Is it just the conservative Christian guy who is the faculty advisor for the student TPUSA club?
I offered to provide evidence that faculty in my school have been encouraged to teach particular ideological frameworks as “the truth of the matter.” If weighting a course toward a perspective is a problem, then consistency demands that the rule apply across the board.
That request was made weeks ago.
There has been no response.
What Is Really at Stake?
Yes, there is a financial component. Annual evaluations affect merit pay. But the real issue is not money. Believe me, its not much (well below inflation/cost of living adjustment).
It is a precedent.
My official evaluation now includes the claim that I improperly weighted my course toward Christianity. This claim was not established through objective evidence. It was inferred from student perception and upheld through administrative interpretation. It is stated as fact in the review.
That creates a record. Going forward, and administrator can simply look at my file and say, “I see here you weight your classes toward Christianity, that’s a problem.”
And that record can be used again (next year, or later) to justify further penalties.
In other words, we are no longer dealing with a transparent system governed by stated criteria. We are dealing with a system where unstated judgments can override objective measures, and those judgments can accumulate over time. The subjective feelings of a director or dean are sufficient and they answer to no one and have no obligation to explain themselves nor will they be held accountable to the rubric we faculty all agreed to us.
The Deeper Problem
At stake here are several fundamental questions:
The director of my school has invoked her belief in the “goddess” during one of our faculty meetings. Could she have implicit bias against me? I know that she and other faculty in my school are very worried about others having implicit bias, have they done self-examination?
Universities often present themselves as neutral spaces committed to open inquiry. But neutrality requires procedural fairness. If evaluation standards are unclear, inconsistently applied, or selectively enforced, then neutrality collapses into preference.
And once that happens, academic freedom is no longer secured by principle, it is managed by discretion. We avoid all of that by having the rubric, until we don’t because a gut feeling says I deserve a 4.
A Final Observation
Interestingly, the problem we now face is one straight from my class quiz. It is a philosophical problem about morality and the good.
What is the standard by which we judge what is good?
Recommended Resources:
Defending the Faith on Campus by Frank Turek (DVD Set, mp4 Download set, and Complete Package)
Fearless Faith by Mike Adams, Frank Turek, and J. Warner Wallace (Complete DVD Series)
Legislating Morality: Is it Wise? Is it Legal? Is it Possible? by Frank Turek (Book, DVD, Mp3, Mp4, PowerPoint download, PowerPoint CD)
Was Jesus Intolerant? (DVD) and (Mp4 Download) by Dr. Frank Turek
Dr. Owen Anderson is a Professor of Philosophy and Religious Studies at Arizona State University, a pastor, and a certified jiu-jitsu instructor. He emphasizes the Christian belief in God, human sin, and redemption through Christ, and he explores these themes in his philosophical commentary on the Book of Job. His recent research addresses issues such as DEIB, antiracism, and academic freedom in secular universities, critiquing the influence of thinkers like Rousseau, Marx, and Freud. Dr. Anderson actively shares his insights through articles, books, online classes, and his Substack.
How Do 86 Civilizations Reveal That This is Our Last Stand? Blowtorch Truth with Seth Gruber
PodcastIs the greatest danger to Western civilization the hostility of the world, or the forgetfulness of the Church? Many Christians don’t realize that the same evils that haunted our Christian forefathers still exist today–abortion and sexual sin. Seth Gruber, founder of The White Rose Resistance, is a leading voice in the pro-life movement and joins Frank to expose the chilling realities of America’s obsession with its false idols, while urging the Church to rise and lead the charge on the front lines of our cultural war through his new project, ‘The Last Stand‘.
Join Seth and Frank as they ignite the airwaves with their “blowtorch of truth” and answer questions like:
Our Christian forefathers did not surrender or negotiate with darkness, they exposed it, confronted it, and drove it back with truth. Now it is our time. Join Frank, Seth, and many others at the Last Stand Festival coming up June 5-6 in Colorado, air and watch the film at your church, and pre-order the book using the links below!
If you enjoyed this podcast episode PLEASE HELP US SPREAD THE TRUTH OF CHRISTIANITY BY SUPPORTING OUR MINISTRY USING THE LINK BELOW. 100% of your donation goes to ministry, 0% to buildings!
Resources mentioned during the episode:
Donate to CrossExamined
The Last Stand Festival – Use promo code ‘FRANK’ to receive 15% off your ticket price!
The Last Stand Film – Releases June 6th!
The Last Stand Book – Pre-Order Now!
Sex and Culture by J.D. Unwin
The White Rose Resistance
SethGruber.com
Frank and Friends Tour the U.S. Capitol with Speaker Mike Johnson
A Divine Love Theodicy: Addressing James Sterba’s and Erik Wielenberg’s Problem of Evil Arguments
2. Does God Exist?Abstract: James Sterba claims my Divine Love Theodicy does not address the working parts of his new logical problem of evil. In this paper I summarize Sterba’s new logical problem of evil, respond to it with an explanation of my Divine Love Theodicy, and point out how my theodicy does address the working parts of his logical problem of evil in that it satisfies the moral requirements he lays out. In addition, I will show that my Divine Love Theodicy also defeats Erik Wielenberg’s revised version of Sterba’s problem of evil argument which was published in 2022 in the journal Religions.
Introduction
James Sterba, Professor of Philosophy at Notre Dame, has made a tremendously strong claim. He has not claimed that ‘because there is horrendous suffering, it is difficult to believe God exists.’ I could sympathize with that sort of sentiment. But no, instead he has claimed that ‘because there is horrendous suffering, it is logically impossible for God to exist.’ While this type of logical problem of evil was popular around the middle of the twentieth century, even many atheist philosophers came to recognize it is incredibly difficult to defend such a strong claim. This is due in large part to philosophers like Alvin Plantinga, who pointed out that all one has to do to refute such a claim is provide a possible explanation for how God and evil could both exist. It does not even have to be the actual correct explanation because, since the claim—it is impossible for both God and evil to exist— is so strong, all that is required to refute the claim is a possible scenario where God and evil both exist. If something is at least possible, then, by definition, it is not impossible.
Because the logical problem of evil faces this formidable hurdle, today many consider it to be a dead argument. Atheist William Rowe, Professor of Philosophy at Purdue University, wrote “[s]ome philosophers have contended that the existence of evil is logically inconsistent with the existence of . . . God. No one, I think, has succeeded in establishing such an extravagant claim.”[1]
Has Sterba successfully resurrected this logical problem of evil? Hardly. Even atheist Erik Wielenberg, Professor of Philosophy at Depauw University, wrote “[Plantinga’s] basic strategy can be used to defeat Sterba’s newer logical argument from evil . . . .”[2] Wielenberg himself even proposed a possible model where God exists and permits horrendous suffering. He explained “[i]f this model is logically possible, then the first premise of Sterba’s argument is false . . . . Thus, Sterba’s new logical argument from evil succumbs to a modified version of Plantinga’s old free will defense.”[3] It should be noted that Wielenberg went on to revise Sterba’s argument and thus proposed his own problem of evil argument which I will discuss below.
In my debate with Sterba at the University of Nebraska in April 2024, I responded to his problem of evil argument with Plantinga’s basic strategy by presenting what I called a Divine Love Theodicy.[4] In our debate Sterba claimed my response did not address the working parts of his problem of evil argument. In this paper I will point out how my theodicy does address the working parts of Sterba’s argument in that it satisfies his proposed moral requirements. I will also address Wielenberg’s revised version of Sterba’s argument and thus argue that both Sterba’s and Wielenberg’s arguments should not lead us to conclude God does not exist.
Sterba’s Problem of Evil Argument
Sterba argues that the “horrendous evil consequences of immoral actions,” which I will refer to as horrendous suffering, is incompatible with the existence of God.[5] As for what he means by horrendous evil, he has in mind Marilyn Adams’ definition, that is, evils “the participation in which (that is, the doing or suffering of which) constitutes prima facie reason to doubt whether the participant’s life could (given their inclusion in it) be a great good to him/her on the whole.”[6]
Sterba often begins his argument, as he did in our debate, by laying out the following three moral requirements concerning goods God could provide to us:
Sterba’s argument can be summarized as follows:
One could push back on premise one by arguing that there might be reasons why God would not follow these moral requirements. Alternatively, one could push back on premise three by arguing that it is possible God has, in fact, prevented all truly horrendous suffering and all we actually experience in this world is what Sterba calls significant suffering, which he believes God would be justified in allowing, but since significant suffering is the worst we experience, we think of it as horrendous. However, I will push back on premise two by proposing a possible scenario where God does follow Sterba’s three moral requirements and yet still chooses to allow horrendous suffering.
A Divine Love Theodicy
My response to the problem of evil is based on aspects of previous theodicies I have found compelling combined with ideas from my Divine Love Theory.[7] I call my response a Divine Love Theodicy instead of Divine Love Defense because I believe this scenario, or something close to it, is what actually happened in reality. But even if I am wrong about this, all that is needed to defeat Sterba’s argument is a possible scenario (it does not have to be the actual one) where God and horrendous suffering both exist, because this would show that the two are not logically incompatible. Since I am merely describing a possible scenario, I will often use phrases like might be. . . , may have. . . , and it is possible that. . . .
Sometimes we think God could have created any set of circumstances we can imagine. People often refer to these different ways circumstances could play out as ‘possible worlds’ but I prefer the term ‘timelines,’ where each timeline includes everything that would happen from creation through eternity future. We could use the term ‘imaginable timelines‘ to refer to all the timelines we, or God, could imagine, which would be a large number indeed. For example, we can easily imagine a timeline where no one freely chooses to do evil that causes horrendous suffering, but it may be the case that this timeline would never actually happen. In other words, it very well could be that not all imaginable timelines are actually viable.
Why would some timelines not be viable? It might be the case that God imposed constraints on Himself which limited the number of timelines He could choose from. For example, He may have decided to create human beings with free will and constrain Himself from forcing them to do what He wants because that would violate their free will. Why would God impose this sort of constraint on Himself? One possible reason is that free will is required to experience the greatest good, that is, loving relationships with God and with others (this includes relationships in this life and the eternal afterlife).[8] Since love requires free will, if God forced us to love, then that would not be real love; we would just be puppets doing what God forced us to. Nobody wants to be in a relationship with someone who is forced to love them; rather, we want to be in relationship with someone who chooses to love us.[9]
If God chose to constrain Himself from forcing us to do what He wants, then this would have limited the timelines He had to choose from. For example, let us say it is the case that I would never freely choose to wear blue shorts under any circumstances in which God would place me. If that were true, then, even though we could imagine timelines where I would freely choose to wear blue shorts, none of those timelines would actually be viable since I would never freely choose to do that, and therefore God could not choose those timelines. Of course, God could force me to choose to wear blue shorts, but if He decided not to violate our free will, then those timelines where I freely chose them would not be available for God to choose from, i.e., they would not be viable. As a side note, readers familiar with the literature on this topic will notice that what I am calling imaginable timelines and viable timelines have historically been called possible worlds and feasible worlds, respectively. I am using these different terms because they better communicate the ideas I am trying to explain, they are easier for laypeople to understand, and I figure that people who are more familiar with the older terms should be able to easily follow along.[10]
It might be the case that in every timeline in which God gives us free will, some, possibly all, will always choose to do evil that causes horrendous suffering. If this were true, then even though we could imagine a timeline where no one freely chooses to do evil that causes horrendous suffering, such a timeline would not be viable. Keep in mind that the number of viable timelines are a smaller subset of the larger number of imaginable timelines. If this was the scenario that God faced, then He would have had to choose between these three options:
It is reasonable to think God would choose the third option. Even though He knew it would involve some horrendous suffering, He also knew there would be real loving relationships, the value of which outweighs the suffering.
Now, within the third option there would be many different ways God could allow the circumstances to play out by, for example, placing people in different circumstances. If God is all powerful, surely He could have created a timeline almost like the one we are in but with less horrendous suffering, right? Maybe not. Keep in mind that the number of viable timelines would be limited because God constrains Himself from violating people’s free will. But could He not still orchestrate circumstances to minimize the horrendous suffering people caused by their evil choices? Maybe that is exactly what He did. Maybe, out of all the viable timelines within option three, He chose this timeline we are experiencing because this one had the least amount of horrendous suffering.
Additionally, it might be that if He prevented any specific horrendous suffering in this timeline, that would somehow lead to worse suffering later on. But could God not just step in and prevent that later suffering then too? Well, it might be that if God removed the horrendous consequences of our evil choices, then overall we would make many more evil choices. In other words, lowering horrendous suffering in this way might result, overall, in us making many more evil choices. Since evil choices themselves are intrinsically bad regardless of their consequences, it might be better overall to have many less evil choices and horrendous suffering than it would be to have no horrendous suffering and many more evil choices.
In addition, maybe minimizing evil choices and horrendous suffering was not God’s only goal. Maybe God had other goals in mind as well such as, for example, to maximize the greatest good—loving relationships with God and with others in this life and the afterlife. If that was the case, then, after evaluating every viable timeline, God chose the one that maximizes the quality and quantity of loving relationships for a given amount of horrendous suffering from our evil choices. That might be the timeline we are living in; we could be experiencing the best possible timeline, the one that maximizes loving relationships for a given amount of horrendous suffering. In game theory terminology, this timeline would be called a Pareto optimal scenario.
We might think God could lower the amount of horrendous suffering while keeping the quantity and quality of loving relationships the same, but that is impossible for us to know given our finite knowledge; we just cannot fathom all the ripple effects, either in this life or the next, that would come from adjusting various circumstances. It might not be the case that the quality and quantity of loving relationships are directly dependent upon evil and suffering, but it is reasonable to think that changing the circumstances to adjust the amount of horrendous suffering could have ripple effects that eventually affect the overall quantity or quality of loving relationships.
We might also think that the benefit of increasing loving relationships is not worth the cost of the extra horrendous suffering that might be entailed. But again, as finite beings, it is extremely difficult for us to do that sort of moral-tradeoff calculation. We tend to overestimate the cost of suffering, especially when we are in the midst of it. But if God is all-good and all-knowing, then He would know exactly how to calculate the best tradeoff and how to maximize the quantity and quality of loving relationships for a given amount of horrendous suffering.
Since this discussion is so conceptual, it might be helpful to walk through a specific hypothetical example to consider the process of how God may have chosen the particular timeline we are experiencing. Though it would be difficult to quantify, for the sake of thinking this through, let us assume we can measure the amount of horrendous suffering in a timeline on a scale of 0 to 100, with 0 being the least amount of such suffering and 100 being the most. Let us assume we can also measure the quality and quantity of loving relationships of a timeline on a similar scale of 0 to 100.
Of all the many imaginable timelines, consider timeline #42 where loving relationships are at maximum level of 100 and horrendous suffering is at the minimum level of zero. Clearly timeline #42 would be preferable to the timeline we are experiencing, but let us say this timeline, while it is imaginable, is not viable, because if God gave us free will, there are just no circumstances in which we would all make such free choices that would result in these levels. To keep things manageable in this illustration, let us suppose, because God constrained Himself from violating our free will, that there were just a few timelines that were actually viable from which God could choose from. Consider then these six timelines:
Presumably, there were many more viable timelines God could have chosen from, but I will be able to illustrate the type of constraints God might have faced by limiting the list to just these. After all, it is possible, though unlikely, God only had these four viable timelines to choose from. And, keep in mind, all that is needed to defeat Sterba’s logical problem of evil is a possible explanation.
Let us say God chose timeline #8 with loving relationships at level 77 and suffering at level 21. This seems reasonable considering the other viable options He had to choose from. We, and God, could certainly imagine a timeline such as #23 in which God orchestrated the circumstances (which would include Him stepping into history at times to prevent some horrendous suffering caused by our evil choices) such that there would be slightly less suffering, level 20 instead of 21, and yet loving relationships would stay at 77. However, let us say that this timeline was not possible because changing these circumstances would cause ripple effects (I am mostly thinking here of changes to our free will choices in response to these changed circumstances) that would lower the level of loving relationships.
God may have considered #15 since it would have a much higher level of loving relationships, 98 instead of 77, but it seems reasonable that He would not choose that option because it also drastically increases the level of suffering from 21 to 94. Similarly, God may have decided against timeline #4 because, even though suffering would drop from 21 to 4, loving relationships would drop from 77 to 30.
God could have chosen a timeline, say #16, in which He orchestrated the circumstances such that the level of suffering would be lowered from 21 to 18. But let us say that because the ripple effects of these changes would lower the loving relationships from 77 to 64, God would choose not to actualize this timeline.
In this scenario, if God did choose timeline #8, would He violate any of Sterba’s three moral requirements? Consider his first moral requirement that God should prevent horrendous evil consequences when He can easily do so without violating anyone’s rights and no other goods are at stake. God would not be violating this moral requirement because, though He could easily prevent some horrendous suffering by choosing another timeline, say #16, there are other goods, namely the level of loving relationships, that are at stake if He would do so.
Next, consider Sterba’s second moral requirement that God should not secure a good using morally objectionable means when He can easily secure the same good by using morally unobjectionable means. Sterba might be begging the question here by assuming that it is morally objectionable for God to allow horrendous suffering in order to secure a good. If so, then he needs to defend, and not just assume, his contention that it is morally objectionable for God to allow horrendous suffering in order to secure a good. Regardless, God would not be violating this moral requirement because, first, I would argue that it is not morally objectionable to choose timeline #8 to secure a good (loving relationships at level 77) even though it involves allowing people’s evil choices to cause horrendous suffering at level 21. Second, God could not secure the same good (that high of a level of loving relationships) using other means (choosing a timeline with the same level of loving relationships but a lower level of horrendous suffering) because no such timelines were viable.
Lastly, consider Sterba’s third moral requirement that God should not permit the horrendous evil consequences of immoral actions on their would-be victims in order to provide would-be beneficiaries with goods they would morally prefer not to have. In order for God to violate this proposed requirement within my Divine Love Theodicy, there would have to be some people who enjoyed the good of loving relationships with God and others who, once they know all the facts involved, preferred God had not chosen the timeline in which they had these relationships because it involved God allowing some to suffer horrendous evil consequences from people’s evil choices. First, because the morality of a decision is not dependent on people’s finicky preferences about the decision, it is highly questionable why God would have to follow this proposed requirement. In other words, I think it can be successfully argued that God would be justified in choosing #8 even if not all of the beneficiaries in that timeline would have preferred God make that choice.
Second, Sterba is making the large assumption here that there would be people who enjoy these loving relationships who, once they know all the facts involved, would prefer not to have these goods because the timeline which enabled such goods included God allowing people to suffer horrendous evil consequences of immoral actions. In other words, in order to show God would fail this moral requirement, Sterba would have to establish that that there would be such people who, once they know all the facts involved, have this preference. However, it is impossible for Sterba to know if there would be people with such preferences once they know all the facts involved. It is plausible, and at a minimum at least possible (which is all that is required to defeat Sterba’s logical problem of evil), that if my Divine Love Theodicy, or something close to it, is true and something similar to timeline #8 is the actual scenario we are experiencing, then when everyone fully knows all the facts involved, there will be no people with such preferences, and so God would not violate this moral requirement either. In conclusion, my Divine Love Theodicy shows it is at least possible, and I would argue quite plausible, that God could follow Sterba’s third moral requirement and still allow horrendous suffering.
Some might think the hypothetical scenario I have presented here is not probable or even plausible. I respectfully disagree. Regardless, it does not have to be probable or plausible; it only has to be possible in order to defeat Sterba’s claim that God and horrendous suffering are logically incompatible. And there is no good reason to think this scenario is impossible. Therefore, by providing a possible scenario where God and horrendous evil both exist, I have shown that Sterba’s logical problem of evil argument fails in its attempt to argue that God does not exist.
Erik Wielenberg’s Revised Version of Sterba’s Problem of Evil Argument
As I noted above, atheist philosopher Erik Wielenberg agreed that “[Plantinga’s] basic strategy can be used to defeat Sterba’s newer logical argument from evil.”[11] However, Wielenberg developed a revised version of Sterba’s argument which he formulated into a dilemma for theists. In this section I will address Wielenberg’s proposed dilemma.
Wielenberg began by defining a certain category of horrendous suffering he called prima facie life-ruining (pf-life-ruining for short) as suffering which is so bad that unless it is outweighed by some vastly better good, it renders the lives of those who experience it worse than no life at all.[12] He then described God facing an Omelas situation as follows:
Wielenberg suggested that God would face a similar Omelas situation if the only option He had to create a world with free creatures who enjoyed eternal loving union with God also included at least one free creature that experiences pf-life-ruining suffering and never acquires the good which vastly outweighs that suffering, i.e., eternal loving union with God.
Wielenberg argued that if a morally perfect God faced such an Omelas situation, He would choose not to create any free creatures at all because consigning one creature to such pf-life-ruining suffering in order to attain ultimate happiness for many others is deeply unfair. He wrote that this would be “treating the sacrificed creature as a mere means, using it like a pawn in chess” and that “13ivine justice is incompatible with God sacrificing some creatures in order to attain salvation for other creatures.”[14] He maintained it would be morally appropriate to create such a world with free creatures that experience pf-life-ruining suffering so as long as those who experience such suffering would eventually share in the vastly better good that outweighs the suffering, i.e., eternal loving union with God. In this regard he proposed the following (its name is a reference to Romans 3:8):
After defining unredeemed pf-life-ruining evil as suffering that is not followed by a vastly greater good within the existence of the person who experiences it, he then put forth his revised version of Sterba’s argument:
Wielenberg anticipates that theists would most likely challenge premise four, the notion that there are unredeemed pf-life-ruining evils, by arguing that such evils are surely redeemed somehow in the afterlife. However, he points out that if such theists are correct that premise four is false, then this has the absurd result of turning common-sense morality upside down. This absurdity follows because it would cause us to have powerful reasons to inflict pf-life-ruining evils on people in order to force God’s hand to compensate them with tremendous goods in the afterlife. He explained that a “highly effective way of carrying out such a program would be to focus on children, who are particularly vulnerable and innocent: inflict pf-life-ruining evil on a child, kill the child, and you have guaranteed a great good for the child, a good in comparison with which your evil acts are insignificant.”[17] Thus he concludes by attempting to push the theist into a dilemma—either accept premise four and conclude there is no God or reject premise four and abandon commonsense morality by guaranteeing people a great good by inflicting upon them pf-life-ruining evils.
Instead of challenging premise four, I would push back against premise one which states that God does not intentionally permit unredeemed pf-life-ruining suffering. In other words, I argue that it would not be incompatible with God’s moral perfection for Him to allow unredeemed pf-life-ruining suffering in the lives of some people as long as He provides such people the opportunity to freely choose to experience a vastly better good that outweighs the suffering, i.e., eternal loving relationships with God and others. According to my Divine Love Theodicy, this is exactly what happened; though God knew not everyone who experiences pf-life-ruining suffering would choose to experience these loving relationships, He provided them the opportunity to freely choose such relationships, and thus He was morally justified in allowing such suffering. Wielenberg’s Omelas analogy breaks down because in the Omelas story the child who experienced pf-life-ruining suffering never had the opportunity to freely choose a vastly better good that would outweigh his suffering.
This first premise of Wielenberg’s argument that I am contesting is based on his Agent-Relative Pauline Principle, but I argue that this principle is mistaken because it is incomplete. This principle should be adjusted as follows:
Adjusted Agent-Relative Pauline Principle: It is incompatible with God’s moral perfection for God to intentionally permit person P to experience pf-life-ruining evil in order to attain some good—unless that good vastly outweighs the pf-life-ruining evil, can be attained in no other way, and, here is the adjustment—God gives P the free choice to receive that good or reject it.
This adjusted principle takes into consideration the choice of those who experience such suffering to freely receive or reject the outweighing good of loving relationships with God and others. In other words, God would not violate His perfect moral nature if He created a world where some free creatures experience pf-life-ruining suffering as long as God gives them the free choice to receive or reject the good that vastly outweighs the pf-life-ruining evil, namely, loving relationships with God and others.
Thus, my position accepts that there is unredeemed pf-life-ruining suffering but puts the final determination of that state into the hands of the free creatures. If their suffering is unredeemed, then it is ultimately because of their free choice, not God’s. According to my Divine Love Theodicy, even though God chooses to actualize this particular timeline, it is our choices that ultimately determine whether or not we experience loving relationships with God and others.[18]
To summarize, I am arguing that it is compatible with God’s moral perfection for Him to intentionally permit person P to experience pf-life-ruining suffering in order to attain some good as long as that good vastly outweighs such suffering, can be attained in no other way, and God gives P the choice to receive that good or reject it. And this is exactly what my Divine Love Theodicy proposes—that God has given us free will, which allows the possibility of pf-life-ruining suffering, in order for people to potentially enjoy loving relationships with Him and others, a good which vastly outweighs such suffering, that there was no other way to attain this good, and that God gives everyone, including those who experience such suffering, the free choice to participate in these loving relationships or reject them.
Conclusion
I am thankful that James Sterba is interested in exploring whether or not there is a God. I have enjoyed getting to know him and Erik Wielenberg personally as we have shared meals, interacted, and debated this important issue. While I appreciate their thoughtfulness, and that they are drawing people’s attention to this conversation about God, I have tried to show in this paper that their problem-of-evil arguments against the existence of God fall short.
Because horrendous suffering due to our evil choices is very real and utterly devastating, I sympathize with those who struggle to believe in God because of it. However, in this paper I have proposed a Divine Love Theodicy as a possible explanation for why God might allow this horrendous suffering. In this proposed scenario God allows horrendous suffering without violating Sterba’s three moral requirements. Therefore, at a minimum, this scenario demonstrates that horrendous suffering is not logically incompatible with the existence of God as Sterba has argued. In addition, I used my Divine Love Theodicy to show how Wielenberg’s revised version of Sterba’s argument failed to consider that God provides people the opportunity to freely choose to experience a vastly better good that outweighs their pf-life-ruining suffering. Lastly, if my Divine Love Theodicy, or something close to it, is what actually happened in reality, and I believe it has, then it helps us better understand God’s purposes in creating us and giving us free will so we can enjoy the greatest good—loving relationships with Him and with others.
While my Divine Love Theodicy relies on insights from previous free will defenses and theodicies, there are some unique aspects to it I pulled from my previous work in metaethics. In addition, hopefully I was able to explain my Divine Love Theodicy in a way that will help non-specialists understand free will defenses and theodicies and possibly shed more light on the issue even for specialists. Lastly, the most novel aspect of this paper is that it shows how a free will theodicy can address two recent attempts to revive the problem-of-evil argument.
References:
[1]William L. Rowe, “The Problem of Evil and Some Varieties of Atheism,” American Philosophical Quarterly 16 (1979): 335.
[2] Erik J. Wielenberg, “Sterba’s Logical Argument from Evil and the God Who Walks Away from Omelas,” Religions 13.782 (2022): 5.
[3] Wielenberg, 5–6.
[4] The debate can be watched or read at https://convincingproof.org/without-god-can-there-be-an-objective-ethics-debate/.
[5] James P. Sterba, Is a Good God Logically Possible? (Cham, Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan, 2019), 7n1.
[6] Sterba, Is a Good God Logically Possible?, 14. Sterba quoted this from Marilyn McCord Adams, Horrendous Evils and Goodness of God, Cornell Studies in the Philosophy of Religion, ed. William P. Alston (Ithica, New York: Cornell University Press, 1999), 26.
[7] Adam Lloyd Johnson, Divine Love Theory: How the Trinity Is the Source and Foundation of Morality (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Kregel Academic, 2023).
[8] Christian theologians have often described the greatest good we can experience as some sort of union, fellowship, communion, or friendship with God. Though it would take us beyond the scope of this paper, elsewhere I have argued that loving relationships with God and others are the very purpose and meaning life. I have also argued that loving relationships with God and others are our greatest good because, if good just is that which resembles God, such relationships resemble the ultimate good in God—the inner-trinitarian loving relationships. Johnson, Divine Love Theory: How the Trinity Is the Source and Foundation of Morality, 56–57, 154–57.
[9] The topic of free will is deep and broad. The type of free will I have in mind here has historically been called ‘agent-causal libertarian free will.’ Though it is beyond the scope of this paper, an important issue facing free will defenses such as my Divine Love Theodicy is specifically how babies, children who die young, and mentally challenged individuals meaningfully exercise freedom.
[10] In my live debate with Sterba, I actually used the term ‘possible timelines’ instead of ‘viable timelines’ for the smaller subset because I thought it would be even more understandable for laypeople, but I recognize now that using the term possible timelines for the smaller subset may cause confusion among those who are familiar with the older terms because historically the term ‘possible worlds’ was used to refer to the larger set. Oh my jargon!
[11] Wielenberg, 5.
[12] Wielenberg, 6.
[13] Ibid.
[14] Wielenberg, 7.
[15] Ibid.
[16] Ibid.
[17] Wielenberg, 8.
[18] Because it is beyond the scope of this paper, I am only assuming, and not arguing for, the proposition that everyone does, in fact, have the option to freely choose a relationship with God. Though I hold the position that everyone does have this option, I acknowledge that this is debated within Christian theology between those, for instance, who affirm humans have libertarian free will and those who hold to a more deterministic understanding of God’s sovereignty. Certainly at a minimum we can say that it is at least possible that God gives everyone this choice.
Recommended Resources:
If God, Why Evil? (DVD Set), (MP3 Set), and (mp4 Download Set) by Frank Turek
Why Doesn’t God Intervene More? (DVD Set), (MP3 Set), and (mp4 Download Set) by Frank Turek
Why does God allow Bad Things to Happen to Good People? (DVD) and (mp4 Download) by Frank Turek
Relief From the Worst Pain You’ll Ever Experience (DVD) (MP3) (Mp4 Download) by Gary Habermas
Adam Lloyd Johnson has served as the president of Convincing Proof Ministries since 2023. Prior to that, Adam was a university campus missionary with Ratio Christi at the University of Nebraska–Lincoln. He has also taught classes for Midwestern Baptist Theological Seminary and has spent time living and teaching at Rhineland Theological Seminary in Wölmersen, Germany. Adam received his PhD in Theological Studies with an emphasis in Philosophy of Religion from Southeastern Baptist Theological Seminary in 2020. Adam grew up in Nebraska and became a Christian as a teenager in 1994. He graduated from the University of Nebraska–Lincoln and then worked in the field of actuarial science for ten years in Lincoln, Nebraska. While in his twenties, he went through a crisis of faith: are there good reasons and evidence to believe God exists and that the Bible is really from Him? His search for answers led him to apologetics and propelled him into ministry with a passion to serve others by equipping Christians and encouraging non-Christians to trust in Christ. Adam served as a Southern Baptist pastor for eight years (2009-2017) but stepped down from the pastorate to serve others full-time in the area of apologetics. He’s been married to his wife Kristin since 1996, and they have four children – Caroline, Will, Xander, and Ray. Adam has presented his work at the National Apologetics Conference, the Society of Christian Philosophers, the Evangelical Philosophical Society, the International Society of Christian Apologetics, the Canadian Centre for Scholarship and the Christian Faith, the American Academy of Religion, and the Evangelical Theological Society. His work has been published in the Journal of the International Society of Christian Apologetics, Philosophia Christi, the Westminster Theological Journal, the Canadian Journal for Scholarship and the Christian Faith, the journal Eleutheria, and the journal Religions. Adam has spoken at numerous churches and conferences in America and around the world – Los Angeles, Chicago, Charlotte, Boston, Orlando, Denver, San Antonio, Canada, Germany, the United Kingdom, and Switzerland. He is the editor and co-author of the book A Debate on God and Morality: What is the Best Account of Objective Moral Values and Duties? published in 2020 by Routledge and co-authored with William Lane Craig, Erik Wielenberg, J. P. Moreland, and others. He is most recently the author of the book Divine Love Theory: How the Trinity is the Source and Foundation of Morality published by Kregel Academic in 2023.
Originally posted at: https://bit.ly/4ui6Um2