By Terrell Clemmons
Don’t Be; That’s Just the New Atheists Masking Their Faith Choice
In the November 2006 cover story of Wired magazine, Gary Wolf thoughtfully gave ear to some of atheism’s most aggressive voices and labeled the movement that they lead “New Atheism.” Envisioning a brave new world in which science and reason overcome religious myth and superstition, New Atheists labor to purvey a comprehensive worldview that explains who we are and how we got here (Darwinian evolution), diagnoses our most urgent ill (ancient superstitions about God), and, most importantly, prescribes a cure for that ill (eradication of religion).
In the same month that Wired reported on New Atheism, Time magazine artfully depicted the science and religion quandary with a combination double helixÆrosary on its cover. The title, “God vs. Science,” might have led a casual reader to expect a story about a theologian opposing science, but the article actually covered a debate between two scientists. Geneticist Francis Collins, director of the Human Genome Project, and biologist Richard Dawkins of Oxford University weighed in on Time’s questions about science, belief in God, and whether the two can peaceably coexist in an intellectually sound world-view. Collins said they can; Dawkins said absolutely not.
Recent battles over textbooks in America lend credence to the notion of science and religion as perennial foes, and ABC News, reporting on a survey of atheism among scientists, casually commented that “the clash between science and religion is as old as science itself,” as if that’s what everybody with any gray matter already knows. But historians of science reveal a different story, one that is more in line with the view of Dr. Collins.
In his course Science and Religion, Lawrence Principe, professor of the History of Science and Technology at Johns Hopkins University, meticulously untangles the historical accounts of events commonly bandied about as proof that religion suppresses science, such as the trials of Galileo and John Scopes. Principe teaches that, contrary to irreligionist lore, the two disciplines were generally viewed as complementary until a little more than a century ago.
Principe identifies two late-19th-century publications as the origin of the idea of warfare between science and religion: A History of the Conflict Between Religion and Science, written by skeptic scientist John William Draper in 1874, and A History of the Warfare of Science with Theology in Christendom, published in 1896 by Andrew Dickson White, first president of Cornell University. It is noteworthy that both writers seemed to want the church to back off; Draper wrote at the request of a popular science publisher, and White in response to criticism that he had received for establishing Cornell as the first American university with no religious affiliation.
Principe reveals that the premise of both books—that science and religion have occupied separate camps throughout history, and that religion has always been the oppressor of science—is unfounded, calling Draper’s book “cranky,” “ahistorical,” and “one long, vitriolic, anti-Catholic diatribe,” while White’s is “scarcely better.” Still, he credits the two sub-scholarly works with crystallizing in the popular mind the image of ongoing, intractable warfare between science and religion. Today’s New Atheists echo and amplify their war cries.
Are We Talking Science or Faith?
Skeptics ardently defend their right to reject religious dogma and make up their own minds about ultimate reality. Certainly, atheists, scientific or not, are free to adopt whatever belief system they choose, but can they legitimately claim science as the basis for atheism? Put more simply, has science disproved God, as the irreligionists maintain?
A closer look at Richard Dawkins and Francis Collins sheds light on that question. The most significant difference between the two scientists is not that one believes in biblical creation and the other in Darwinian evolution. Both affirm Darwinism. The salient distinction is that Collins allows for the possibility of God, whereas Dawkins does not.
But it wasn’t always so. The fourth son of two freethinkers, Francis Collins, was homeschooled until age ten. His parents instilled in him a love for learning, but no faith, and the agnosticism of his youth gradually shifted into atheism as his education progressed. He was comfortable with it, discounting spiritual beliefs as outmoded superstition until he began to interact with seriously ill patients as a medical student. When one of them, a Christian, asked him what he believed, he faced a rationalist’s crisis. “It was a fair question,” he wrote in The Language of God: A Scientist Presents Evidence for Belief. “I felt my face flush as I stammered out the words ïI’m not really sure.’” At that point, Collins realized that he had never seriously considered the evidence for and against belief.
Determined to practice authentic, what-are-the-facts science, Collins set out to investigate the rational basis for faith. Reluctantly, he found himself feeling “forced to admit the plausibility of the God hypothesis. Agnosticism, which had seemed like a safe second-place haven, now loomed like the great cop-out it often is. Faith in God now seemed more rational than disbelief.”
In contrast to Collins’s rational inquiry and personal struggle over the question of God, Richard Dawkins, the de facto spokesman for scientific atheism (think Madalyn Murray O’Hair with a Ph.D.), lays out his case for unbelief without struggle or reservation. In chapter four of The God Delusion, titled “Why There Almost Certainly Is No God,” Dawkins introduces his “Argument from Improbability,” and though the chapter waxes long, its reasoning distills to something like this:
- The universe we observe is highly complex.
2. Any creator of this complex universe would have to be even more complex than it.
3. It is too improbable that such a God exists; therefore, there almost certainly is no God.
The first two statements qualify as acceptable premises, but the conclusion that Dawkins reaches simply does not follow from them. This isn’t legitimate reasoning. It’s rationalization—that is, finding some plausible-sounding explanation for arriving at a conclusion that he has already chosen.
Dr. Dawkins is certainly free to choose to disbelieve, but his conclusion was not derived through scientific or rational means. Rather, it hints at an underlying personal, philosophical faith choice to disbelieve. Ernst Mayr, one of the twentieth century’s leading evolutionary biologists, made a similar observation when he analyzed reasons for disbelief among his Harvard colleagues. “We were all atheists. I found that there were two sources,” he said. One group “just couldn’t believe all that supernatural stuff.” The other “couldn’t believe that there could be a God with all this evil in the world. Most atheists combine the two,” he summarized candidly. “The combination makes it impossible to believe in God.”
Former atheist and biophysicist Alister McGrath concurs, noting that most of the unbelieving scientists he is acquainted with are atheists on grounds other than their science. “They bring those assumptions to their science rather than basing them on their science.” Dawkins’s rationalization, as well as the observations of McGrath and Mayr, reveal the choice to disbelieve for what it is—a personal, philosophical choice made apart from reason or scientific inquiry. I call it a “faith choice” because it involves choosing a foundational presupposition concerning a realm about which we have incomplete (but not insufficient) knowledge.
A Choice of Faith
Francis Collins’s conclusion, that the God hypothesis is not only plausible but compellingly supported by evidence, flatly controverts New Atheism’s premise that faith constitutes an irrational belief without evidence. It also reveals that the real conflict isn’t one of science versus God. It’s a conflict between those who allow and those who disallow the possible reality of God.
Polemicists will continue to clamor for converts to their side on the question of God because between the poles live thoughtful, educated people—not necessarily working scientists, but people who value science. Some believe in a supreme being called God, and others haven’t made up their minds. It is these theological moderates that New Atheism seeks to recruit with pithy epigrams such as “God vs. Science” and “My beliefs are based on science, but yours are based on faith.” What believers need is a calm, judicious counter-strategy when New Atheism advances under the guise of science, one that can transform verbal sparring into illuminating dialogue. Let me give you an example of what I mean.
My friend Dana has known Sam for decades. Over the years, Sam has peppered her with questions about her faith. Despite feeling intimidated—Sam is a highly respected leader in their community—she has answered as best she could and maintained their friendship. One evening over dinner in her home, Sam turned his questions on her teenagers, essentially asking them, “Do you really believe all that stuff and why?” Dana allowed them to speak for themselves for a while before intervening.
“Sam,” she started agreeably, “you and I have discussed this many times. I’ve told you what I believe and why, and you’ve told me all of your reasons for not believing.” Then she posed a question that she had never put to him before. “What if there really is a God, but you just don’t know about him? Are you willing to consider that possibility? Are you willing to ask him if he’s out there? Something like ïGod, I’m not even sure if you’re there, but if you are, would you show yourself to me?‘”
Dana let her question hang in the air. The teenagers likewise waited for Sam to break the silence. “No,” he finally said. “I’m not willing to do that.” And he hasn’t brought the subject up since.
Dana gently—but powerfully—pierced the facade of scientific skepticism with one question: Are you willing? It is not a question of scientific reasoning, but a question of choosing, of making a personal faith choice that, once made, establishes the starting point for one’s reasoning. Atheism isn’t founded on science or reason any more than theism is based on faith devoid of reason. The atheist, too, has made a faith choice. He has just chosen differently.
The Eternal Conflict
The “eternal conflict,” as it’s called, is not really between religion and science; after all, the two got along quite amicably before the twentieth century. No, as the following quotations indicate, the real quarrel has always been between those who believe that science and religion are at odds and those who do not.
“A legitimate conflict between science and religion cannot exist. Science without religion is lame; religion without science is blind.”
—Albert Einstein
“It is… Idle to pretend, as many do, that there is no contradiction between religion and science. Science contradicts religion as surely as Judaism contradicts Islam—they are absolutely and irresolvably conflicting views. Unless that is, science is obliged to change its fundamental nature.”
—Brian Appleyard
“Science and religion are two windows that people look through, trying to understand the big universe outside, trying to understand why we are here. The two windows give different views, but both look out at the same universe. Both views are one-sided, neither is complete. Both leave out the essential features of the real world. And both are worthy of respect.”
—Freeman Dyson
“Science can purify religion from error and superstition; religion can purify science from idolatry and false absolutes. Each can draw the other into a wider world, a world in which both can flourish.”
—Pope John Paul II
“When religion was strong and science weak, men mistook magic for medicine; now, when science is strong and religion weak, men mistake medicine for magic.”
—Thomas Szasz
“Science is an effort to understand creation. Biblical religion involves our relation to the Creator. Since we can learn about the Creator from his creation, religion can learn from science.”
—PaulæH. Carr
“There is more religion in men’s science than there is science in their religion.”
—Henry David Thoreau
“Science makes major contributions to minor needs. Religion, however, small its successes, is at least at work on the things that matter most.”
—Oliver Wendell Holmes
Science as Religion
One needn’t speculate about whether science is a religion for Darwinists such as Richard Dawkins. In a 1997 essay published in The Humanist, Dawkins tackles this question directly, arguing that his onetime tendency to deny that science is a religion was a tactical error that he has since repudiated. Instead, he writes, scientists should “accept the charge gratefully and demand equal time for science in religious education classes.” The reason? Well, according to Dawkins, whereas science is a faith “based upon verifiable evidence,” religion “not only lacks evidence,” but “its independence from evidence is its pride and joy.” Thus, science is the only religion worth imparting to future generations.
Rather than delineate the evidence that makes science outclass “any of the mutually contradictory faiths and disappointingly recent traditions of the world’s religions,” however, Dawkins chooses instead to describe what science might someday do for a society that religion does today. Chiefly, this amounts to inspiring in people an awe for “the wonder and beauty” of the universe in the same way that God currently inspires awe in religious believers. Indeed, as far as Dawkins is concerned, “the merest glance through a microscope at the brain of an ant or through a telescope at a long-ago galaxy of a billion worlds is enough to render poky and parochial the very psalms of praise.”
But here is where the evolutionary biologist gets himself into trouble. Yes, science has given us access to astonishing truths about the hidden nature of the universe, and yes, all that it has definitively revealed is based on incontrovertible evidence. It is also true, however, that most religions in the world do not posit faith claims in opposition to such breathtaking factual findings. Rather, religion lacks evidence at precisely those points where science does as well.
The faith that is the “pride and joy” of religious believers is in an invisible God who created the world and still interacts with it. The faith of Darwinian scientists is in the power of evolution to create the world and then continue to adapt it. There is no conclusive evidence for either of these faith claims, which is why some have accused science of being a religion in the first place, as well as why Dawkins must hawk the replacement value of science instead of citing the “verifiable evidence” that makes science superior to conventional religion.
All this is to say that Dawkins is correct to concede that science is a religion for him, but wrong to contend that this particular religion accomplishes something that others do not. When it comes to the significant questions of life—Where did we come from? How did we get here? Why are we here? —Science’s answers prove to be as faith-based as those of even the most fundamentalist religious sect. That science might successfully fulfill the function of religion is thus hardly reason enough to warrant a switch.
Terrell Clemmons is a freelance writer and blogger on apologetics and matters of faith.
This article was originally published at salvomag.com: http://bit.ly/2J9O9vV
How Standard Evangelical Books on Biblical Interpretation Are Undermining the Bible
Theology and Christian ApologeticsBy J. Brian Huffling
When one thinks about apologetics, he usually thinks about such disciplines as philosophy, history, archaeology, etc. There is one area; however, that is relatively undeveloped in the practice of apologetics, and yet it is ripe for the work: literary studies. I am not talking about what genre the gospels happen to be, or if the saints in Matthew 27 were literally raised, or any such argument that has been popular as of late. I am talking about theories in English and literature that dramatically influence the field of hermeneutics (how we study the Bible). One of my majors in grad school was Biblical Studies, and I have taught Bible Study Methods at the BA level, and Hermeneutics and Advanced Hermeneutics at the grad level. In doing so, I have read many books on the issue of biblical interpretation and have scoured many resources for my classes. While there are many issues I could talk about, such as deconstructivism, postmodernism, etc., the issue that seems to come up a lot in standard textbooks is the role of the interpreter and how he either uncovers or imparts meaning to the biblical texts. In this article, I will talk about two books that are standard for evangelical studies on biblical interpretation, and why I think they are undermining the objective meaning of the text.
The Books and Their Claims
The first book is Introduction to Biblical Interpretation, revised and updated edition, by William W. Klein, Craig L. Blomberg, and Robert L. Hubbard Jr. (There is a newer 3rd edition.) In general, this is a very good book, which is why it is used by many Bible colleges and seminaries. I even use it. Many pastors have been taught using this book. The principles that the authors teach that we should use for interpreting our Bibles are very good. So what’s the problem?
The problem is what they say about the role of the interpreter and the nature of bias, presuppositions, and preunderstanding (the body of knowledge the reader brings to the text). They state:
It is certainly true that we all have biases, etc. However, the startling claim these authors make is since we have biases, we can’t study the Bible objectively. Unfortunately, and per usual for these kinds of books, the notion of “objectivity” is left undefined and unclear. They later deny that such biases leave the reader bereft of objectivity; however, they do not explain how he can be objective since they have seemingly taken it away via the role of biases and presuppositions. Such is especially the case given this statement:
If the preunderstanding and presuppositions determine the interpretive results, then it is not clear at all how the reader can be objective. We wouldn’t discover the truth or meaning of the text; we would determine it.
The other book is The Hermeneutical Spiral, revised and expanded, by Grant Osborne. Like the previous work, this book is generally very good when it comes to interpreting the Bible. However, in the appendix, Osborne espouses a dangerous view, namely, the sociology of knowledge. He states:
Basically, what this means is that one’s culture is “formative” in how one knows, and it influences one’s “perceptions of reality.” In other words, the way in which one knows is at least somewhat determined by his culture. Different cultures will produce different perceptions of reality. What does this mean for the biblical interpreter? He answers this question clearly:
Some people will find this shocking while others will express agreement. Evangelicals who hold to the idea that we can (and must) be able to know absolute truth should find this kind of assertion by a leading evangelical very scary. If true, we would not be able to claim to know the truth or the meaning of the biblical text, if there even is any.
Evaluation
One wonders how the authors of these books think that their meaning can be grasped. If what they say is true, we could never know the meaning of their books! Such claims made by these authors are hopelessly self-defeating. Further, it is simply an assumption that biases are always necessarily wrong, or that subjectivity entails falsehood. But this has never been demonstrated. Presuppositions are not inherently bad or wrong, as the authors of Introduction to Biblical Interpretation seem to imply when they argue for a certain set of presuppositions in order to interpret the Bible, such as believing in the supernatural.
Introduction to Biblical Interpretation claims that we can still have an objective understanding of the text, but they don’t offer a method for giving that objectivity to the reader after they took it away in the name of bias, presuppositions, and preunderstandings. We are thus left in subjectivity. Or are we? While the above authors do not tell us how to overcome the interpretive problems brought on by the interpreter, there are ways of explaining how an interpreter can simultaneously be biased and objective. After all, aren’t the authors of the above books biased and yet trying to pass off their text as objective? Surely. So how can they do that?
In his Objectivity and Biblical Interpretation, Thomas A. Howe explains how this is possible. (See also my article on objectivity and historical knowledge.) As mentioned earlier, authors like those above rarely define what they mean by “objective.” I am in agreement with Howe that a proposition is objective if it can be verified or falsified by external, mind-independent evidence that is also based on (objective) first principles. In other words, something is objective when it is based on extra-mental evidence that by definition, is not subjective, or merely in one’s mind. Further, propositions can be evaluated by the use of first principles, such as the principles of non-contradiction, identity, and excluded middle. (For more discussion on these, see my article on logic.) Such laws of logic are based in the being/existence of things in the external world. For example, the principle of non-contradiction says that something can’t simultaneously be and not-be. In other words, something can’t be a tree and not a tree at the same time and in the same sense. Such laws are not just made up. They are not just rational constructs. They are metaphysical and based in and reducible to existent things in reality. These principles are objective because they are based on objectively existing things in the world.
These principles can be applied to everyday issues, such as interpreting a written text. It is obvious that the authors of the cited works think that their readers can read books objectively. Otherwise, why write them? And why have principles to follow if there is really no use since we can’t be objective or know the true meaning of the text? Being an objective interpreter of the Bible is possible. We simply use language and interpretive principles according to our everyday, commonsense way. There is no great barrier to objectivity, whether it be bias, presuppositions, preunderstandings, or a sociology of knowledge. The very knowing process built into our human nature and the way we use language ensures that an objective understanding of the Bible is indeed possible.
J. Brian Huffling, PH.D. have a BA in History from Lee University, an MA in (3 majors) Apologetics, Philosophy, and Biblical Studies from Southern Evangelical Seminary (SES), and a Ph.D. in Philosophy of Religion from SES. He is the Director of the Ph.D. Program and Associate Professor of Philosophy and Theology at SES. He also teaches courses for Apologia Online Academy. He has previously taught at The Art Institute of Charlotte. He has served in the Marines, Navy, and is currently a reserve chaplain in the Air Force at Maxwell Air Force Base. His hobbies include golf, backyard astronomy, martial arts, and guitar.
Original Blog Source: http://bit.ly/2NuvG2F
Lógica 10: reglas de inferencia para argumentos cuantificados
EspañolHemos llegado a la penúltima parte de nuestras lecciones sobre lógica de predicados. En esta sección hablaré sobre las cuatro reglas de inferencia que hay para argumentos con proposiciones universal y existencialmente cuantificadas y que añadiremos a las reglas que ya vimos para la lógica proposicional.
OBSERVACIONES PRELIMINARES
Antes de comenzar a explicar nuestras reglas de inferencia, es importante recalcar la importancia de ciertas características de los objetos, individuos o miembros de los cuales se está predicando y que son las propiedades de ser específico, arbitrario y previamente introducido. Cuando hablamos de un objeto específico, nos referimos a que conocemos la identidad del objeto en cuestión. Cuando hablamos de un objeto arbitrario, nos referimos a un objeto del cuál no conocemos su identidad. Y cuando hablamos de un objeto previamente introducido, nos referimos a un objeto arbitrario que ha aparecido antes en alguna premisa y que ahora se está predicando en una nueva. Con estas propiedades en mente de nuestros objetos de los que vamos a predicar algo, ahora podemos pasar a explicar nuestras reglas de inferencia para proposiciones cuantificadas.
Forma lógica
𝛗f
———-
∴ ∃x𝛗x
Esta es la regla más fácil de entender. Nos dice que, de la predicación de cualquier individuo específico elegido, se infieren proposiciones generales existencialmente cuantificadas (f puede ser cualquier constante).
Ejemplo:
Observa que no hay forma que el enunciado (1) sea verdad mientras que el enunciado (2) sea falso. Si es verdad que Tomoko sacó una A en clase, entonces es verdad que alguien (Tomoko, al menos) sacó una A.
Forma lógica
∃x 𝛗x
———-
∴ 𝛗g
A diferencia de EG, esta regla es difícil de comprender al principio, porque si se define como la inferencia de cualquiera de las instancias de una generalización existencial, tendríamos que de
Este sería un razonamiento verdadero, pero es obvio que no lo es, y la razón es que esta regla no nos permite inferir a un objeto específico.
El método
¿Qué hacemos entonces? Lo que necesitamos aquí es un método que nos permita inferir a partir de una generalización existencial. Sabemos que una proposición cuantificada existencialmente predica algo de al menos un individuo, pero como no sabemos quién es ese individuo, lo que hacemos es usar un nombre temporal (o nombre nuevo) para referirnos a dicho individuo en nuestra prueba y asumir que nombra a un objeto (sea lo que sea) que determina que la generalización existencial es verdadera.
Ejemplo
Argumento
Algún falsificador ha reemplazado las pinturas del museo. Quien remplazó las pinturas tiene un cómplice en el personal del museo. Por lo tanto, algún falsificador tiene un cómplice en el personal del museo.
Prueba
Sabemos que algún falsificador remplazó las pinturas; llamémosle Juan Pérez (Fulano es otro nombre muy común para referirnos a alguien que no conocemos, pero del que sabemos algo). Dado que quien remplazó las pinturas tiene un cómplice en el personal del museo, se deduce que Juan Pérez tiene tal cómplice. Pero Juan Pérez es un falsificador, y Juan Pérez tiene un cómplice en el personal. Por lo tanto, algún falsificador tiene un cómplice en el personal.
La regla
Luego la regla nos permite ingresar la conclusión 𝛙 a la que acabamos de llegar como una nueva línea, pero que depende de la generalización existencial ∃x 𝛗x en lugar de la instancia 𝛗g que asumimos temporalmente.
Explicación
Nuestro ejemplo siguió este procedimiento: 𝛗x era x es un falsificador y x remplazó las pinturas del museo, g fue Juan Pérez y 𝛙 fue Algún falsificador tiene un cómplice en el personal. Nuestra suposición llegó en el momento en que dijimos llamémosle Juan Pérez.
La Restricción
Existe una restricción a la regla de EI, y es que cuando usamos el nombre temporal para la instancia, esta tiene que ser una constante individual que no ha aparecido en una premisa anterior de la prueba.
Ejemplo
Nuestra letra j no la hemos utilizado anteriormente, pero si en nuestra prueba tenemos más proposiciones cuantificadas existencialmente sobre el mismo dominio, debemos usar una letra diferente o numerarlas conforme vayan apareciendo.
Ejemplos
Con estos ejemplos queda claro que, si usamos j para todas las premisas sin enumerarlas, estaríamos cometiendo el error de inferir que j es quien sacó una B en el curso de música y que también es atractivo y es rico, y esto no lo podemos comprobar. Por esta razón debemos usar letras distintas o la misma letra con números que la distingan de otras y que no hayamos usado antes (nota que si en lugar de j hubiera usado g que ya ha sido utilizada anteriormente, estaríamos afirmando que el falsificador de pinturas también sacó una B en el curso, que es rico y es atractivo).
Forma lógica
∀x 𝛗x
———-
∴ 𝛗h
Otra regla fácil. UI nos dice que lo que se predica de todos o ninguno de los individuos de un dominio, también se predica para cualquier individuo de ese dominio, ya sea específica, arbitraria o previamente introducido en premisas anteriores.
Objeto Específico
Veamos primero cómo se aplica la regla a un individuo específicamente elegido donde 𝛗h es el resultado de la sustitución de h para todas las ocurrencias de x en 𝛗x. Nuestro dominio en cuestión serán simplemente todas las personas y de las cuáles Tomoko será nuestro individuo específicamente elegido. Así podemos formular una proposición cuantificada universalmente como la siguiente:
De la que podemos concluir que
Objeto previamente introducido
Recordemos que j1 y j2 de las formulas anteriores también son personas, por lo que también podemos concluir que
Objeto Arbitrario
Y, por último, partiendo de (1) y de que es posible decir “sea i una persona arbitraria”, entonces se sigue que
Restricción
En el caso del objeto arbitrario, es importante no saber otra cosa acerca i dada la siguiente regla.
Forma lógica:
𝛗i
———-
∴ ∀x 𝛗x
Sin duda la regla más controversial es la de UG, y es que, si se define como la norma que establece que, a partir de cualquier instancia de una generalización universal, infieres esa generalización, entonces nos encontraremos con razonamientos como el siguiente:
Lo cual es falso. Para evitar este tipo de razonamientos falaces, necesitamos de un método al igual que hicimos con EI.
El método
Primero, de nuestra prueba escogemos a un individuo de forma arbitraria y temporalmente le damos un nuevo. Luego probamos algo sobre el individuo elegido al azar. Finalmente, podemos inferir que lo que hemos probado acerca de este individuo elegido al azar es válido universalmente; es decir, podemos inferir una generalización universal.
¿Pero cómo hacemos esto? Usando la prueba por condición general. Este es un método para probar proposiciones condicionales generalizadas; es decir, las proposiciones de la forma Todo P es Q. La técnica consiste en tomar alguna instancia arbitraria de P y luego probar que también es una instancia de Q. Habiendo probado que esta instancia arbitraria de P es también una instancia de Q, podemos inferir que cualquier instancia de P es una instancia de Q.
Ejemplo
Para probar que
Luego, por regla de UI podemos decir: “sea i un presidente de México arbitrariamente elegido”, entonces se sigue que
Luego por UG podemos concluir que
Ahora, es importante recordar que no necesitamos estar seguros de que realmente hemos tomado una instancia de P, que no pasa nada si no existe ninguno. Esto se debe a que la certeza no es una condición necesaria, que haya una instancia de P escogida arbitrariamente es solo una asunción que estamos haciendo y que luego desecharemos. Recuerda que esta prueba condicional es similar a la que utilizamos para la lógica proposicional, por lo que nuestra prueba no depende de si realmente existe dicha instancia, sino que, si hay tal instancia, entonces también será una instancia de Q.
Así, para cualquier proposición ∀x (Px → Qx) se procede a probar de la siguiente forma:
Una aplicación práctica de esta regla sería la siguiente: imagina que le preguntas a un amigo tuyo: “¿Si alguien rompe tu celular nuevo, te molestarías con él?” Tú amigo responde: “Sí”. Ahora sabes que, dado que “alguien” podría ser “cualquiera”, concluyes por generalización universal que “Para cualquier x, si x rompe el celular de mi amigo, él se molestará con x”. Ahora puedes aplicar la regla de UI y concluir: “Si yo rompo el celular de mi amigo, él se molestará conmigo”.
La Restricción
Esta regla tiene la restricción de no inferir generalizaciones de proposiciones de un individuo específico. Por ejemplo, imaginemos un caso similar al anterior, solo que ahora le preguntas a tu amigo: “Si tu novia rompe tu iPad nuevo, ¿te molestarás con ella?” Y él responde “No”. Tú no puedes aplicar UG como en el caso del celular por que la “novia” no es alguien arbitrariamente elegido: si tú eres el que rompe su iPad, tu amigo podría enojarse contigo.
Jairo Izquierdo es Director de Social Media y autor para la organización cristiana Cross Examined. Estudia filosofía y teología, siendo su actual foco de estudio la lógica clásica, epistemología, doctrinas cristianas y lingüística. Es cofundador de Filósofo Cristiano. Es miembro en la Christian Apologetics Alliance y ministro de alabanza en la iglesia cristiana bautista Cristo es la Respuesta en Puebla, México.
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Join Frank as he interviews Dr. Michael Heiser about his book Unseen Realm: Recovering the Supernatural Worldview of the Bible. But beware: your view of the Bible may be rocked as a result of this interview! This is only Part 1. Part 2 is next week. Check out Dr. Heiser at www.DRMSH.com and on his Naked Bible podcast.
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The Problem with Christian Celebrity
Theology and Christian ApologeticsBy Robby Hall
The backlash against Lauren Daigle for her comments on homosexuality sparked debate amongst Christians who both defend and critique her.
John Crist, a Christian comedian, recently posted a video on his Instagram feed condemning those who judged her for her comments. Crist seemed to be unaware that he himself was judging other Christians for their behavior. The thing is the church should make judgments on truth. The New Testament constantly warns us of false prophets and teachers. The apostle Paul tells us that “We destroy arguments and every lofty opinion raised against the knowledge of God, and take every thought captive to obey Christ.” If a brother errs, we take them aside lovingly to correct them. But what about someone like Daigle or Crist? Do Christian celebrities have a larger responsibility to adhere to sound teaching or to speak the truth? First, we should make a sober judgment against ourselves to see if we were in the same position, would we do any different. Secondly, we shouldn’t confuse the act with someone’s salvation. Each of us is a work in progress, and the point of the Gospel is that we as human beings, are constantly missing the mark. This is why Christ came and died on a cross.
That being said, we can rightly judge actions that have larger impacts on public perception of the Gospel and the Church and correct those actions if need be. When Jesus warned us “not to judge lest you be judged,” He wanted us to not judge hypocritically. Paul put it this way in Romans “Therefore you have no excuse, O man, every one of you who judges. For in passing judgment on another, you condemn yourself, because you, the judge, practice the very same things. We know that the judgment of God rightly falls on those who practice such things. 3 Do you suppose, O man—you who judge those who practice such things and yet do them yourself—that you will escape the judgment of God?… While you preach against stealing, do you steal? 22 You who say that one must not commit adultery, do you commit adultery? You who abhor idols, do you rob temples?” Romans 2:2-3, 21&22
We tend to look to the famous for our theological marching orders. However, this is a mistake. Those like Daigle should be careful to place themselves under authoritative teachers, but we should be doing the same. Celebrities can fall into the popularity trap and so begin to follow the path of Progressive Christianity[1]
We must strive as the Church to read the Bible, understand it’s history, proper hermeneutics, orthodox theology, and a good apologetic. We also must not set up celebrities to fulfill a role they never were meant to. If we show a brother their error, it is out of love and their edification and shouldn’t be to tear someone down. But we shouldn’t look to a celebrity for our biblical instruction as they are in the entertainment business which is always a dangerous road for anyone to navigate and it shouldn’t surprise us when one fails in some fashion, but rather we should respond in prayer, grace, and truth. Not every so-called Christian celebrity fails in this fashion as there are many who have a solid biblical understanding. But we should be able to rightly divide the truth for ourselves by delving into God’s word and putting ourselves under solid, orthodox teachers and allow the truth to change us through the power of the Holy Spirit.
Note
[1] 5 Signs Your Church Might be Heading Toward Progressive Christianity http://bit.ly/2X1Kntn
Robby Hall is in the Secure Access industry for Information Technology. He has been married for 3 years and has just welcomed his first child, Bridget. He is graduate of the Cross Examined Instructor’s Academy and leads apologetics small groups at his local church.
Original Blog Source: http://bit.ly/2ITkhoL
Blinded by Science?
Atheism, Philosophy of Science, Theology and Christian ApologeticsBy Terrell Clemmons
Don’t Be; That’s Just the New Atheists Masking Their Faith Choice
In the November 2006 cover story of Wired magazine, Gary Wolf thoughtfully gave ear to some of atheism’s most aggressive voices and labeled the movement that they lead “New Atheism.” Envisioning a brave new world in which science and reason overcome religious myth and superstition, New Atheists labor to purvey a comprehensive worldview that explains who we are and how we got here (Darwinian evolution), diagnoses our most urgent ill (ancient superstitions about God), and, most importantly, prescribes a cure for that ill (eradication of religion).
In the same month that Wired reported on New Atheism, Time magazine artfully depicted the science and religion quandary with a combination double helixÆrosary on its cover. The title, “God vs. Science,” might have led a casual reader to expect a story about a theologian opposing science, but the article actually covered a debate between two scientists. Geneticist Francis Collins, director of the Human Genome Project, and biologist Richard Dawkins of Oxford University weighed in on Time’s questions about science, belief in God, and whether the two can peaceably coexist in an intellectually sound world-view. Collins said they can; Dawkins said absolutely not.
Recent battles over textbooks in America lend credence to the notion of science and religion as perennial foes, and ABC News, reporting on a survey of atheism among scientists, casually commented that “the clash between science and religion is as old as science itself,” as if that’s what everybody with any gray matter already knows. But historians of science reveal a different story, one that is more in line with the view of Dr. Collins.
In his course Science and Religion, Lawrence Principe, professor of the History of Science and Technology at Johns Hopkins University, meticulously untangles the historical accounts of events commonly bandied about as proof that religion suppresses science, such as the trials of Galileo and John Scopes. Principe teaches that, contrary to irreligionist lore, the two disciplines were generally viewed as complementary until a little more than a century ago.
Principe identifies two late-19th-century publications as the origin of the idea of warfare between science and religion: A History of the Conflict Between Religion and Science, written by skeptic scientist John William Draper in 1874, and A History of the Warfare of Science with Theology in Christendom, published in 1896 by Andrew Dickson White, first president of Cornell University. It is noteworthy that both writers seemed to want the church to back off; Draper wrote at the request of a popular science publisher, and White in response to criticism that he had received for establishing Cornell as the first American university with no religious affiliation.
Principe reveals that the premise of both books—that science and religion have occupied separate camps throughout history, and that religion has always been the oppressor of science—is unfounded, calling Draper’s book “cranky,” “ahistorical,” and “one long, vitriolic, anti-Catholic diatribe,” while White’s is “scarcely better.” Still, he credits the two sub-scholarly works with crystallizing in the popular mind the image of ongoing, intractable warfare between science and religion. Today’s New Atheists echo and amplify their war cries.
Are We Talking Science or Faith?
Skeptics ardently defend their right to reject religious dogma and make up their own minds about ultimate reality. Certainly, atheists, scientific or not, are free to adopt whatever belief system they choose, but can they legitimately claim science as the basis for atheism? Put more simply, has science disproved God, as the irreligionists maintain?
A closer look at Richard Dawkins and Francis Collins sheds light on that question. The most significant difference between the two scientists is not that one believes in biblical creation and the other in Darwinian evolution. Both affirm Darwinism. The salient distinction is that Collins allows for the possibility of God, whereas Dawkins does not.
But it wasn’t always so. The fourth son of two freethinkers, Francis Collins, was homeschooled until age ten. His parents instilled in him a love for learning, but no faith, and the agnosticism of his youth gradually shifted into atheism as his education progressed. He was comfortable with it, discounting spiritual beliefs as outmoded superstition until he began to interact with seriously ill patients as a medical student. When one of them, a Christian, asked him what he believed, he faced a rationalist’s crisis. “It was a fair question,” he wrote in The Language of God: A Scientist Presents Evidence for Belief. “I felt my face flush as I stammered out the words ïI’m not really sure.’” At that point, Collins realized that he had never seriously considered the evidence for and against belief.
Determined to practice authentic, what-are-the-facts science, Collins set out to investigate the rational basis for faith. Reluctantly, he found himself feeling “forced to admit the plausibility of the God hypothesis. Agnosticism, which had seemed like a safe second-place haven, now loomed like the great cop-out it often is. Faith in God now seemed more rational than disbelief.”
In contrast to Collins’s rational inquiry and personal struggle over the question of God, Richard Dawkins, the de facto spokesman for scientific atheism (think Madalyn Murray O’Hair with a Ph.D.), lays out his case for unbelief without struggle or reservation. In chapter four of The God Delusion, titled “Why There Almost Certainly Is No God,” Dawkins introduces his “Argument from Improbability,” and though the chapter waxes long, its reasoning distills to something like this:
2. Any creator of this complex universe would have to be even more complex than it.
3. It is too improbable that such a God exists; therefore, there almost certainly is no God.
The first two statements qualify as acceptable premises, but the conclusion that Dawkins reaches simply does not follow from them. This isn’t legitimate reasoning. It’s rationalization—that is, finding some plausible-sounding explanation for arriving at a conclusion that he has already chosen.
Dr. Dawkins is certainly free to choose to disbelieve, but his conclusion was not derived through scientific or rational means. Rather, it hints at an underlying personal, philosophical faith choice to disbelieve. Ernst Mayr, one of the twentieth century’s leading evolutionary biologists, made a similar observation when he analyzed reasons for disbelief among his Harvard colleagues. “We were all atheists. I found that there were two sources,” he said. One group “just couldn’t believe all that supernatural stuff.” The other “couldn’t believe that there could be a God with all this evil in the world. Most atheists combine the two,” he summarized candidly. “The combination makes it impossible to believe in God.”
Former atheist and biophysicist Alister McGrath concurs, noting that most of the unbelieving scientists he is acquainted with are atheists on grounds other than their science. “They bring those assumptions to their science rather than basing them on their science.” Dawkins’s rationalization, as well as the observations of McGrath and Mayr, reveal the choice to disbelieve for what it is—a personal, philosophical choice made apart from reason or scientific inquiry. I call it a “faith choice” because it involves choosing a foundational presupposition concerning a realm about which we have incomplete (but not insufficient) knowledge.
A Choice of Faith
Francis Collins’s conclusion, that the God hypothesis is not only plausible but compellingly supported by evidence, flatly controverts New Atheism’s premise that faith constitutes an irrational belief without evidence. It also reveals that the real conflict isn’t one of science versus God. It’s a conflict between those who allow and those who disallow the possible reality of God.
Polemicists will continue to clamor for converts to their side on the question of God because between the poles live thoughtful, educated people—not necessarily working scientists, but people who value science. Some believe in a supreme being called God, and others haven’t made up their minds. It is these theological moderates that New Atheism seeks to recruit with pithy epigrams such as “God vs. Science” and “My beliefs are based on science, but yours are based on faith.” What believers need is a calm, judicious counter-strategy when New Atheism advances under the guise of science, one that can transform verbal sparring into illuminating dialogue. Let me give you an example of what I mean.
My friend Dana has known Sam for decades. Over the years, Sam has peppered her with questions about her faith. Despite feeling intimidated—Sam is a highly respected leader in their community—she has answered as best she could and maintained their friendship. One evening over dinner in her home, Sam turned his questions on her teenagers, essentially asking them, “Do you really believe all that stuff and why?” Dana allowed them to speak for themselves for a while before intervening.
“Sam,” she started agreeably, “you and I have discussed this many times. I’ve told you what I believe and why, and you’ve told me all of your reasons for not believing.” Then she posed a question that she had never put to him before. “What if there really is a God, but you just don’t know about him? Are you willing to consider that possibility? Are you willing to ask him if he’s out there? Something like ïGod, I’m not even sure if you’re there, but if you are, would you show yourself to me?‘”
Dana let her question hang in the air. The teenagers likewise waited for Sam to break the silence. “No,” he finally said. “I’m not willing to do that.” And he hasn’t brought the subject up since.
Dana gently—but powerfully—pierced the facade of scientific skepticism with one question: Are you willing? It is not a question of scientific reasoning, but a question of choosing, of making a personal faith choice that, once made, establishes the starting point for one’s reasoning. Atheism isn’t founded on science or reason any more than theism is based on faith devoid of reason. The atheist, too, has made a faith choice. He has just chosen differently.
The Eternal Conflict
The “eternal conflict,” as it’s called, is not really between religion and science; after all, the two got along quite amicably before the twentieth century. No, as the following quotations indicate, the real quarrel has always been between those who believe that science and religion are at odds and those who do not.
“A legitimate conflict between science and religion cannot exist. Science without religion is lame; religion without science is blind.”
—Albert Einstein
“It is… Idle to pretend, as many do, that there is no contradiction between religion and science. Science contradicts religion as surely as Judaism contradicts Islam—they are absolutely and irresolvably conflicting views. Unless that is, science is obliged to change its fundamental nature.”
—Brian Appleyard
“Science and religion are two windows that people look through, trying to understand the big universe outside, trying to understand why we are here. The two windows give different views, but both look out at the same universe. Both views are one-sided, neither is complete. Both leave out the essential features of the real world. And both are worthy of respect.”
—Freeman Dyson
“Science can purify religion from error and superstition; religion can purify science from idolatry and false absolutes. Each can draw the other into a wider world, a world in which both can flourish.”
—Pope John Paul II
“When religion was strong and science weak, men mistook magic for medicine; now, when science is strong and religion weak, men mistake medicine for magic.”
—Thomas Szasz
“Science is an effort to understand creation. Biblical religion involves our relation to the Creator. Since we can learn about the Creator from his creation, religion can learn from science.”
—PaulæH. Carr
“There is more religion in men’s science than there is science in their religion.”
—Henry David Thoreau
“Science makes major contributions to minor needs. Religion, however, small its successes, is at least at work on the things that matter most.”
—Oliver Wendell Holmes
Science as Religion
One needn’t speculate about whether science is a religion for Darwinists such as Richard Dawkins. In a 1997 essay published in The Humanist, Dawkins tackles this question directly, arguing that his onetime tendency to deny that science is a religion was a tactical error that he has since repudiated. Instead, he writes, scientists should “accept the charge gratefully and demand equal time for science in religious education classes.” The reason? Well, according to Dawkins, whereas science is a faith “based upon verifiable evidence,” religion “not only lacks evidence,” but “its independence from evidence is its pride and joy.” Thus, science is the only religion worth imparting to future generations.
Rather than delineate the evidence that makes science outclass “any of the mutually contradictory faiths and disappointingly recent traditions of the world’s religions,” however, Dawkins chooses instead to describe what science might someday do for a society that religion does today. Chiefly, this amounts to inspiring in people an awe for “the wonder and beauty” of the universe in the same way that God currently inspires awe in religious believers. Indeed, as far as Dawkins is concerned, “the merest glance through a microscope at the brain of an ant or through a telescope at a long-ago galaxy of a billion worlds is enough to render poky and parochial the very psalms of praise.”
But here is where the evolutionary biologist gets himself into trouble. Yes, science has given us access to astonishing truths about the hidden nature of the universe, and yes, all that it has definitively revealed is based on incontrovertible evidence. It is also true, however, that most religions in the world do not posit faith claims in opposition to such breathtaking factual findings. Rather, religion lacks evidence at precisely those points where science does as well.
The faith that is the “pride and joy” of religious believers is in an invisible God who created the world and still interacts with it. The faith of Darwinian scientists is in the power of evolution to create the world and then continue to adapt it. There is no conclusive evidence for either of these faith claims, which is why some have accused science of being a religion in the first place, as well as why Dawkins must hawk the replacement value of science instead of citing the “verifiable evidence” that makes science superior to conventional religion.
All this is to say that Dawkins is correct to concede that science is a religion for him, but wrong to contend that this particular religion accomplishes something that others do not. When it comes to the significant questions of life—Where did we come from? How did we get here? Why are we here? —Science’s answers prove to be as faith-based as those of even the most fundamentalist religious sect. That science might successfully fulfill the function of religion is thus hardly reason enough to warrant a switch.
Terrell Clemmons is a freelance writer and blogger on apologetics and matters of faith.
This article was originally published at salvomag.com: http://bit.ly/2J9O9vV
7 Independent Lines of Evidence for God’s Existence
2. Does God Exist?, Theology and Christian ApologeticsBy Luke Nix
Introduction- Why Is God’s Existence So Important?
One of the most heated debates in any setting is the existence of God. If God exists, then He is the foundation for objective morality. One’s view of morality governs their thinking in everything from politics to workplace interactions, from scientific research to everyday behavior. If God exists, then there are objective behavioral boundaries which should never be crossed. If God does not exist, then no such objective boundaries exist, and anyone may behave however they wish in any situation without concern for the violation of some objective standard (that is not to say that relative/cultural/legal standards cannot be violated- but that is a topic for another time). If we do not examine this question carefully, we risk believing what is false about reality and morality, and such false beliefs will necessarily lead to behaviors that are not in keeping with reality and morality. This means that many of the political and ethic debates opposing people have come down to whether or not God exists.
Presenting A Cumulative Case for God’s Existence
Numerous lines of evidence and philosophical arguments have been presented over the centuries for God’s existence. All of them come together to create a powerful cumulative case. Much like a detective’s case for the guilt of an accused murderer, multiple independent lines of evidence are presented that all point to the guilt of the accused. If such a method is valid for discovering the truth behind the claim that a murder took place and for the specific identity of the murdered, then the same method is also valid in determining the truth behind the claim that God exists and the identity of this God.
God’s Crime Scene
One of my favorite books that takes some of these arguments and presents the cumulative case comes from cold-case homicide detective J. Warner Wallace. In his book “God’s Crime Scene: A Cold-Case Detective Examines The Evidence For A Divinely Created Universe.” Wallace presents seven independent lines of evidence that all point to God’s existence in the same way that he would present multiple lines of evidence to a jury for the guilt of an accused murderer. The lines of evidence he presents are summarized in these quotes from the book:
Wallace concludes by stating that as a detective, who must follow the evidence where it leads, “I believe God exists because the evidence leaves me no reasonable alternative.” If the objective standard of morality exists (God), then that standard is what must be used to judge ethical and political positions.
Conclusion- Prepare for Your Ethical Discussions With Objective Evidence For God’s Existence
If you find yourself involved in discussions of an ethical or political nature or just want to be able to more critically evaluate the political and ethical claims of others, I highly recommend that you pick up a copy of Wallace’s book to help establish a foundational point on which to begin evaluation and discussion. While not comprehensive on the case for God’s existence, it is one of the most accessible and engaging books on this topic, and it should not be passed up by anyone serious about investigating the truth of reality and morality.
For more great books on God’s existence, check out the many books that I have reviewed on this blog, and for the topic of ethics and politics, specifically, please check out my Top 5 Recommended Books for diving into those details.
Luke Nix holds a bachelor’s degree in Computer Science and works as a Desktop Support Manager for a local precious metal exchange company in Oklahoma.
Original Blog Source: http://bit.ly/2Xz6qvS
El argumento epistemológico en contra del materialismo
EspañolBy Maverick Christian
To begin, I will quote Alvin Plantinga:
For simplicity, let’s just consider beliefs. In materialism, the belief coin has two sides: the neurophysiological/NF properties (certain neurons wire in a certain way, etc.) of the belief, and the actual semantic content of the belief (e.g., there’s a beer in the fridge ). In dualism (the idea that our minds are a composite of the physical brain and a nonphysical mental component, e.g., the soul) it is possible that the content of a belief can modify behavior; e.g., I believe something and on the basis of this belief my soul impacts my neural pathways in a certain way to cause a behavior.
On materialism, however, the content of a belief is causally irrelevant in the sense that (given materialism) a belief causes an effect in virtue of its NF properties, and not in virtue of its content. We can see this by doing a little thought experiment. Suppose a given person’s belief, say, the belief that there is a cold soda in the fridge , had the same NF properties, but a completely different content, such as that the moon is made of green cheese . Would the person’s behavior be different if the belief had the same NF properties, but different content? It wouldn’t, because having the same neurophysiological properties means that we would have the same electrical impulses traveling along the same neural pathways and thus emitting the same muscular contractions. So if materialism were true, the content of our beliefs would be causally irrelevant. The argument in a nutshell is this:
In response one might say that there is something wrong with the thought experiment, since it is metaphysically impossible for a given set of neurophysiological properties to have distinct semantic content. Even if I were a materialist, this does not seem at all plausible to me. The idea of moving subatomic particles around producing semantic content seems almost mystical, and it seems easily conceivable that there is a possible world in which the same moving subatomic particles generate different semantic content, although as a materialist I would like to believe that this might involve the fine-tuning of some kind of physical necessity that makes the moving subatomic particles generate mental states. Still, to my mind’s eye such an adjustment seems conceivable and metaphysically possible.
But even if it is not possible for a given set of NF properties to have a different semantic content associated with it, does this prevent the statement “If a given set of NF properties were to have a different content, the behavior would be the same” from being meaningfully true? I think not. In philosophy, propositions of the form “If P were true, then Q would be true,” where P is an impossibility, are called counterpossible. There seem to be counterpossible statements that are meaningfully true. For example, suppose the renowned mathematician Kurt Gödel proved a certain theorem; it is impossible for theorems to turn out to be false, since they are necessarily true. However, as Alvin Plantinga points out, “If Mic were to prove that Gödel was wrong, mathematicians everywhere would be astonished; it is not true that if Mic were to prove that Gödel was wrong, mathematicians everywhere would yawn with boredom.” [2] So even if “if a given set of NF properties were to have a different content, it would result in the same behavior” were contra-possible, this does not seem to prevent the statement from being meaningfully true.
Reductive and non-reductionist materialism
Another way to try to avoid the semantic content of a belief being causally irrelevant is to take the view that a belief is just a combination of physical properties; the view that beliefs are reducible to physical states in this sort of way is called reductive materialism . Suppose we have P1, P2, P3… Pn to represent various physical properties (e.g., human neurophysiological properties), and let ∨ represent “or.” A reductive materialist might believe that a certain belief is just the disjunction (a set of things related by “or”) of certain physical properties like these:
P1∨ P2 ∨ P3…
Most likely, on reductive materialism a belief would be (merely) a disjunction of a set of physical properties that constitute a given mental state, something like this where & represents “and”:
(P1& P7 & P11…) ∨ (P5 & P63 &…) ∨…
The “∨” is necessary, since it is possible for different sets of physical states to correspond to a given belief (if materialism is true, for example, it would seem that alien neurophysiologies or mechanical silicon brains could also be configured to have a given belief). The above sort of structure “(A & B) ∨ (C & D & E) ∨…” is what logic and math gurus call a boolean combination . In contrast to reductionist materialism which says that beliefs are reducible to NF properties in the way described above, non-reductionist materialism denies this, but does make the claim that beliefs are determined by physical states. One might believe that a belief emerges from physical properties in a way that is roughly analogous to moisture emerging from the combination of hydrogen and oxygen in H2O.
A reductionist materialist might claim that since beliefs are just a (Boolean) combination of NF properties, it might well be that it is in virtue of having semantic content that a belief is causally relevant (this is not necessarily so, because belief is really a disjunction of sets of NF properties, so it would still be possible for a person’s belief to produce behavior in virtue of its NF properties rather than its semantic content, but a reductionist materialist might believe that it is at least possible for a human being’s belief to produce behavior in virtue of having content).
The problem with reductive materialism
Plantinga argues that even if it is true that a belief is causally relevant in virtue of its having a certain content, it does not follow that the semantic content is itself causally relevant. Plantinga gives the following illustration. Suppose Alvin throws a ball that has a mass of 0.2 kilograms, and the ball hits a glass window, causing it to break. If the ball had been much lighter (say, the mass of a feather), it would not have broken the glass, so the ball breaks the window in virtue of (among other things) its being 0.2 kilograms. Now suppose that the property of having a mass of 0.2 kg is Sam’s favorite property. Thus, we have the following:
Having a mass of 0.2 kg = Sam’s favorite property
Since having a mass of 0.2 kg is Sam’s favorite property (which is not his favorite property by definition, but reductionist materialists similarly do not [normally] believe that the identity relation between a belief and a boolean combination of NF properties holds by definition), then it follows that a ball breaks the window in virtue of having Sam’s favorite property. And yet:
Having a mass of 0.2 kg is Sam’s favorite property.
It doesn’t actually seem to have anything to do with the ball breaking the window, even though it is in virtue of having Sam’s favorite property of the ball breaking the window. Similarly, the fact that a set of NF properties is a belief doesn’t seem to have anything to do with the set of NF properties causing behavior, even though it is true that a belief causes behavior in virtue of having a certain semantic content.
I think we can make this clearer by considering the following thought experiment. Suppose that reductionist materialism is true and a mad scientist inserts a belief interface device (BID) into Smith’s brain, which acts as a new interface between Smith’s belief and behavior. For example, the mad scientist sets up the BID so that when Smith believes that I am thirsty, the NF properties of this belief electrochemically affect the BID and the BID subsequently causes Smith’s body to take a drink of water. The mad scientist can set up the BID at will so that any given belief can cause almost any behavior. For example, the mad scientist sets up the BID so that the NF properties of the belief that drinking water will kill me and I don’t want to die trigger an electrochemical reaction that (thanks to the belief interface device) causes Smith’s body to get a drink of water. The mad scientist sets up the CID again so that the NF properties of the belief that I will never see a Nicolas Cage movie cause Smith to go see a Nicolas Cage movie, and the NF properties of the belief that grass is air cause Smith to eat coconut ice cream after a fish dinner. All of this would be possible on reductionist materialism because a human being’s belief causes effects in virtue of its NF properties, not its semantic content, even if it were the case that beliefs are just (boolean) combinations of NF properties.
The DIC scenario shows that it is the NF properties of a belief and how those properties interact with the rest of the physical system that determines our behavior. DIC may be science fiction, but even in our own naturally occurring belief interface system, it is the NF properties of a belief and how those properties interact with the rest of our physiology that determines our behavior. To look at this slightly differently, let PS1, PS2, PS3… PSn each be a set of physical properties, e.g. PS1 is short for (P1 & P7 & P11…). Now suppose that the semantic content of the belief that I am thirsty is just a boolean combination of the physical properties like this:
PS1∨ PS2 ∨ PS3 ∨… ∨ PSn
Now imagine that Smith’s belief that I am thirsty is PS1. Plantinga would say that Smith’s belief does things in virtue of its physical (in this case, neurophysiological) properties rather than in virtue of the physical properties of being part of the Boolean combination that I am thirsty—just as when the ball breaks the window, in virtue of having a mass of 0.2 kilograms rather than in virtue of having a mass of 0.2 kg being Sam’s favorite property.
We can see that this is the case with any other thought experiment. Modifying Smith’s physiology a little, holding the NF properties of the belief (PS1) constant, and the NF properties of Smith’s belief that I am thirsty could cause something quite different, e.g. the physical properties of PS1 triggering an electrochemical reaction causing Smith to ignore the water around him and have to eat sand instead. This would be physically possible, since it is the NF properties of a belief and how those properties interact with the rest of the physical system that determine our behavior. Given materialism, it would just be a matter of luck (e.g. favorable physical laws) that belief and behavior are linked in a “rational” way by mimicking the semantic content influencing behavior, e.g. the NF properties of the belief that this plant is poisonous and hence I will not eat it causes me not to eat the plant, unlike the NF properties of the belief that grass is air causes me not to eat the plant. In any case, the thought experiment does illustrate that it is the NF properties of the belief and how those properties interact with the rest of the physical system that determine our behavior. Just as having a mass of 0.2 kg being Sam’s favorite property doesn’t seem to have anything to do with why the ball breaks the window, so too does PS1 being a member of the Boolean combination of I’m thirsty not seem to have anything to do with why PS1 does the things it does. If that is true, then the semantic content of a belief seems to be causally irrelevant in the sense that a belief does things in virtue of its NF properties, and not because of its semantic content.
Conclusion
Given materialism, the semantic content of a belief is causally irrelevant in the sense that a belief does things in virtue of its NF properties, not because of its semantic content. If a given set of NF properties had different semantic content, it would result in the same behavior (the same neurophysiological properties means we would have the same electrical impulses traveling along the same neural pathways and thus emitting the same muscle contractions). Even if reductionist materialism were true, beliefs seem to cause behavior in virtue of their NF properties, not because of their semantic content. The DIC scenario in particular illustrates that even on reductionist materialism, the semantic content of a belief can be absolutely unrelated to the person’s external environment when that belief causes behavior, for example, the situation in which the NF properties of the belief that grass is air cause Smith to eat coconut ice cream. So we have the following argument:
If materialism were true, a belief would do things in virtue of its NF properties and how those properties interact with the rest of the physical system. Even if the semantic content of a belief is just a boolean combination of physical properties, a set of physical properties that is a member of that boolean combination seems to have nothing to do with why that set of physical properties causally affects other things in one’s body, just as having a mass of 0.2 kg being Sam’s favorite property seems to have nothing to do with why the ball breaks the window.
Grades
[1] Plantinga, Alvin. “A New Argument against Materialism” Philosophia Christi 14.1 (Summer 2012) p. 9
[2] Plantinga, Alvin. “A New Argument against Materialism” Philosophia Christi 14.1 (Summer 2012) p. 21
Original Blog: http://bit.ly/2ZVw4bT
Translated and edited by Jairo Izquierdo
Mama Bear Apologetics
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If you get between a mama bear and her cubs, you’ll be in big trouble. Frank interviews Hillary Morgan Ferrer, who joined up with other mama bears, to show you how you can protect your cubs from the trouble generated by the false ideas that are celebrated in our culture. These include:
Self-Help Culture: the false belief that we are capable of fixing all of our own problems
Naturalism: the false assumption that natural laws alone govern order and complexity
Emotionalism: the irrational faith that our emotions can define objective truth and reality
Moral Relativism: the dissonance of accepting all beliefs as equally true
Progressive Christianity: omitting difficult theology in favor of a more politically correct version
Don’t miss Frank and Hillary’s discussion about the five words that our culture has redefined, confusing our children to the point that they are leaving Christianity and making other dangerous choices.
To get the full benefit of this podcast, you really need to get a copy of Mama Bear Apologetics. It’s a guidebook for parents and mentors who want to help kids gain critical thinking skills needed to reject cultural lies but may not know how to address every alternative viewpoint a child will face.
Official Site: Mamabearapologetics.com
If you want to send us a question for the show, please email us at Hello@CrossExamined.org.
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Should You Raise Your Kids in a Christian Bubble?
Apologetics for ParentsBy Natasha Crain
If you read my “About Me” page, you’ll see that my mission as a mom is to raise my kids in a home where faith means more than going to church on Sunday. Indeed, that is the whole purpose of this blog – to help inspire others to think deeply about what that means for their own families and to pursue the same mission.
I proactively seek to apply faith every single day for my kids, to surround their hearts and minds with God. But in doing so, I sometimes have wondered: Am I building a Christian bubble around my kids? And if so, is that good or bad?
For clarity, let me define what I mean by “bubble.” I’ve long held a negative (and unfortunately judgmental) view of Christians whose faith encompasses them so much that they’ve seemingly lost perspective on the world around them and can no longer relate to non-believers in a “normal” way. Faith seems to be the ONLY thing they think about.
“What are you doing for lunch today, Sarah?”
Sarah (in my perceived Christian bubble): “Well, Lord willing I’ll go to McDonald’s. If it’s God’s will, I’ll find a parking space. But you never know because it’s God’s plan, not mine! See you soon. God bless you.”
Of course, that’s an over characterization, but you get the point. I’ve been reflecting on this and have deconstructed my bubble concerns into two key elements: Bubble Visibility and Bubble Durability.
BUBBLE VISIBILITY: Can others see IN, and can you see OUT?
When I was about 8, we lived across the street from a pastor’s family. They had two girls, ages 5 and 3. We were playing one day when the 5-year-old suddenly asked if I had the Holy Spirit. I didn’t know what that meant at the time and responded, “I don’t know, but I’m saved.” That was the last time her mom let me play with her.
She was in a Christian bubble where no one else was allowed to see IN. This is not Biblical. Jesus calls us to let our light shine for the world to see. If we are in a bubble where we hide ourselves away such that non-believers cannot see us, we are ignoring our explicit calling. (Matthew 5:16)
When I was about 10, I invited my best friend to church. It was Bible trivia night. (Horrible night to bring a friend, right?) My friend had never been to church in her life. She got the question, “What is the first book of the Bible?” She had no idea. I remember being absolutely floored that anyone would not know the answer to that question. I asked her afterward, “Did you REALLY not know the first book of the Bible? EVERYONE KNOWS THAT.” She never came back to church again, and we drifted apart. I still wonder if that was her only church experience.
I was in a Christian bubble where I was unable to see OUT. I didn’t have perspective on the lives of others without the same faith experience, and therefore could not relate to my friend appropriately. This is like the Pharisees (the religious elite of Jesus’ time) who spent so much time focusing on their own religious laws that they missed the entire heart of Jesus’ message on loving and relating to others. (e.g., Matthew 9:11)
BUBBLE DURABILITY: How protected are you spiritually?
In college and for several years after, being a Christian was more of a “hat” I wore; it was an “extension” of myself. There was me, and there was my belief system attached to me. It never “got in the way” of life or of non-Christian friendships. There was no bubble at all. That doesn’t even mean I was taking off my Christian hat. If anyone ever asked, I would have proudly said I was a Christian. But it’s amazing how many non-Biblical things you can do while wearing something as inconsequential as a Christian “hat.” I certainly found it easy to wear that hat through all the parties I went to.
When you don’t have any Christian bubble– when you aren’t surrounding yourself daily by faith application – you are not protecting yourself spiritually, and you are at great risk for sin to dominate your life. John 15:18 says Christians “do not belong to the world.” We need to have a durable faith-based bubble to understand how to set ourselves apart as we are called.
Finding my current church about 8 years ago profoundly changed me because I was exposed to Biblically sound theology for the first time in several years. This shifted my belief system into true faith that started to transform my heart. A Christian bubble started to emerge as I spent more time in prayer and Bible study.
A bubble now existed, but it was still fragile. Non-believers could easily deflate me with questions I didn’t have good answers for.
My faith has grown a great deal in the last year, in large part (if not entirely) due to the conscious decision to raise my kids in a home where faith is applied every day. In proactively seeking to make faith a part of everyday life for my kids, my identity has become wholly Christian in a way it never had been.
My bubble, crafted with daily faith application, is now durable. This bubble is indeed Biblical, necessary, AND prescribed for all Christians! What I call a bubble, the Bible calls armor:
THE RIGHT KIND OF CHRISTIAN BUBBLE
Reflecting on this breakdown of visibility and durability, I realized that the negative connotations I held about Christian bubbles were around visibility issues. Indeed, as Christian parents, we have to be concerned with making sure that the bubbles we build around our kids don’t obstruct their view out or others’ view in. But we should never fear building a durable, spiritually protective bubble around them. If we don’t, they will not be prepared to engage in the spiritual battle of life.
It’s your choice daily – are you giving your kids Christian armor or a Christian hat?
Natasha Crain is a blogger, author, and national speaker who is passionate about equipping Christian parents to raise their kids with an understanding of how to make a case for and defend their faith in an increasingly secular world. She is the author of two apologetics books for parents: Talking with Your Kids about God (2017) and Keeping Your Kids on God’s Side (2016). Natasha has an MBA in marketing and statistics from UCLA and a certificate in Christian apologetics from Biola University. A former marketing executive and adjunct professor, she lives in Southern California with her husband and three children.
Original Blog Source: http://bit.ly/2xaWvO5
Can We Know Anything about the Historical Jesus? Yes, and It’s Much More than You Think!
Jesus Christ, Theology and Christian ApologeticsBy Brian Chilton
In 2000, I made the difficult decision to step away from my faith. I entered into what I call theistic-leaning agnosticism, one step removed from pantheism. I believed that some kind of God could possibly exist. However, I didn’t know that a person could know if that God really did exist and most certainly could not know anything about the historical Jesus of Nazareth. These doubts were brought on the claims of the Jesus Seminar who held that less than 14% of the sayings attributed to Jesus were actually his own. The Seminar claimed that the rest of the sayings were inventions from the apostles. Couple the Seminar with PBS’s show From Jesus to Christ, which claimed that the Christ of faith evolved over time from the Jesus of history, then one could see why I needed some serious answers. When I asked Christian leaders about how I could know if Jesus was accurately portrayed in the Gospels, I was met with scorn and hostility. Add to that the nepotistic hypocrisy I often saw, then stepping away from the faith was pretty easy.
However, everything changed in 2005. I was introduced to the writings of Lee Strobel, Josh McDowell, William Lane Craig, and Gary Habermas. This past week, my journey came full circle. I had the honor to have one of my apologetic heroes, Gary Habermas, once again as a professor. The class investigated the New Testament creeds, which is the material in the New Testament that predates the New Testament writings. It is thought even by skeptical scholars that many of these creeds date to no later than 35 AD when Paul met Peter and James in Jerusalem (Gal. 1:18-20). The NT creeds tell us much about the historical Jesus because this information is located at ground zero. The creeds tell us about the message of the earliest church, which in turn came from the historical Jesus of Nazareth. So, what can we know about the historical Jesus of Nazareth from these creeds?
Creeds Tell Us about the Nature of the Historical Jesus. As fascinating as it is, the creeds provide us with high Christology. In fact, the earliest church had the highest Christology. This decimates the claims that the church evolved the nature of Jesus from a prophet to a divine God-man over time. For instance, consider the Philippians hymn. The Philippians hymn notes that Christ Jesus “existing in the form of God, did not consider equality with God as something to be exploited. Instead, he emptied himself by assuming the form of a servant, taking on the likeness of humanity” (Php. 2:6-7a, CSB). The sermon summaries of Acts, all thought to be extremely early, denote the deity of Jesus as one who “has been exalted to the right hand of God” (Acts 2:33, CSB). Don’t forget about the Colossian’s creed where Christ is said to be the “invisible God, the firstborn over all creation” (Col. 1:15, CSB and see following Col. 1:16-20). One may say, “Okay, but this shows the church’s theology, not the historical Jesus of Nazareth.” In response, one must note that there is no historical presence of evolutionary development, not even legendary development. The earliest church held an extremely high view of Jesus. Therefore, Jesus of Nazareth must have taught something about his divine nature, backing them up with miraculous works.
Creeds Tell Us about the Life of the Historical Jesus. While the majority of the creeds focus on the death, burial, and resurrection of Jesus, the creeds do provide details pertaining to the life and ministry of Jesus of Nazareth. The creeds note that Jesus was born a descendant of David (Acts 13:23; Rom. 1:3). Jesus was noted to have been a Nazarene (Acts 2:22; 4:10; 5:38). Jesus of Nazareth performed numerous miracles (Acts 2:22; 10:38) and fulfilled several Messianic prophecies (Acts 2:25-31; 3:21-25; 4:11; 10:43). From the creeds, the researcher begins to see a similar pattern of Jesus of Nazareth’s life that is portrayed in the biblical narratives concerning him.
Creeds Tell Us about the Death and Resurrection of the Historical Jesus. The majority of the creeds are based around the earliest kerygma of the church—that is, the death, burial, and resurrection of Jesus. Most notably, 1 Corinthians 15:3-7 denotes the resurrection appearances of Jesus, even stating that 500 people witnessed the risen Jesus at one time (1 Cor. 15:6). The sermon summaries of Acts also provide the same formula in that Jesus lived, died, and rose again. The Acts 13 sermon summary even gives a nod to the empty tomb. For Paul’s early message stated that “When they had carried out all that had been written about him, they took him down from the tree and put him in a tomb. But God raised him from the dead, and he appeared for many days to those who came up with him from Galilee to Jerusalem, who are now his witnesses to the people” (Acts 13:29-31, CSB). The creeds denote the numerous witnesses who saw the risen Jesus. They sometimes provide details that other sources do not, such as Simon Peter’s private interaction with the risen Jesus (Lk. 24:34; 1 Cor. 15:5) and James’ private meeting with the risen Jesus (1 Cor. 15:7).
The early creeds are impressive in what they tell us about the historical Jesus of Nazareth. Some will skeptically hold that since the creeds speak of the miraculous and the divine that they must be thrown out. However, such attitudes show more of an anti-supernatural bias than they do a quest for historical truth. At the very least, these early creeds tell us what the earliest church believed about Jesus. At the most, the early creeds give a fascinating description of whom Jesus was, is, and forever will be. Even if we did not have the New Testament, the creeds would tell us everything we needed to know about the historical Jesus of Nazareth, who is the Christ of faith! The creeds tell the life-changing truth that Jesus has risen. Will you allow this truth to transform you?
Brian G. Chilton is the founder of BellatorChristi.com and is the host of The Bellator Christi Podcast. He received his Master of Divinity in Theology from Liberty University (with high distinction); his Bachelor of Science in Religious Studies and Philosophy from Gardner-Webb University (with honors); and received certification in Christian Apologetics from Biola University. Brian is currently enrolled in the Ph.D. program in Theology and Apologetics at Liberty University and is a member of the Evangelical Theological Society and the Evangelical Philosophical Society. Brian has been in the ministry for close to 20 years and serves as the Senior Pastor of Westfield Baptist Church in northwestern, North Carolina.
Original Blog Source: http://bit.ly/2ZALSAi