By Wintery Knight

This post presents evidence against Mormonism/LDS in three main areas. The first is in the area of science. The second is in the area of philosophy. And the third is in the area of history.

The scientific evidence

First, let’s take a look at what the founder of Mormonism, Joseph Smith, believes about the origin of the universe:

“The elements are eternal. That which had a begginning will surely have an end; take a ring, it is without begginning or end – cut it for a begginning place and at the same time you have an ending place.” (“Scriptural Teachings of the Prophet Joseph Smith,” p. 205)

“Now, the word ‘create’ came from the word baurau which does not mean to create out of nothing; it means to organize; the same as a man would organize materials and build a ship. Hence, we infer that God had materials to organize the world out of chaos – chaotic matter, which is an element, and in which dwells all the glory. Element had an existence from the time he had. The pure principles of element are principles which can never be destroyed; they may be organized and re-organized, but not destroyed. They had no beggining, and can have no end.”
(“Scriptural Teachings of the Prophet Joseph Smith,” p. 395)

A Mormon scholar named Blake Ostler summarizes the Mormon view in a Mormon theological journal:

“In contrast to the self-sufficient and solitary absolute who creates ex nihilo (out of nothing), the Mormon God did not bring into being the ultimate constituents of the cosmos — neither its fundamental matter nor the space/time matrix which defines it. Hence, unlike the Necessary Being of classical theology who alone could not not exist and on which all else is contingent for existence, the personal God of Mormonism confronts uncreated realities which exist of metaphysical necessity. Such realities include inherently self-directing selves (intelligences), primordial elements (mass/energy), the natural laws which structure reality, and moral principles grounded in the intrinsic value of selves and the requirements for growth and happiness.” (Blake Ostler, “The Mormon Concept of God,” Dialogue: A Journal of Mormon Thought 17 (Summer 1984):65-93)

So, Mormons believe in an eternally existing universe, such that matter was never created out of nothing, and will never be destroyed. But this is at odds with modern cosmology.

The Big Bang cosmology is the most widely accepted cosmology of the day. It denies the past eternality of the universe. This peer-reviewed paper in an astrophysics journal explains. (full text here)

Excerpt:

The standard Big Bang model thus describes a universe which is not eternal in the past, but which came into being a finite time ago. Moreover,–and this deserves underscoring–the origin it posits is an absolute origin ex nihilo. For not only all matter and energy but space and time themselves come into being at the initial cosmological singularity. As Barrow and Tipler emphasize, “At this singularity, space and time came into existence; literally nothing existed before the singularity, so, if the Universe originated at such a singularity, we would truly have a creation ex nihilo.

[…] On such a model the universe originates ex nihilo in the sense that at the initial singularity it is true that There is no earlier space-time point or it is false that Something existed prior to the singularity.

Christian cosmology requires such a creation out of nothing, but this is clearly incompatible with what Mormons believe about the universe. The claims about the universe made by the two religions are in disagreement, and we can test empirically to see who is right, using science.

Philosophical problems

Always Have a Reason contrasts two concepts of God in Mormonism: Monarch theism and Polytheism. It turns out that Mormonism is actually a polytheistic religion, like Hinduism. In Mormonism, humans can become God and then be God of their own planet. So there are many Gods in Mormonism, not just one.

Excerpt:

[T]he notion that there is innumerable contingent “primal intelligences” is central to this Mormon concept of god (P+M, 201; Beckwith and Parrish, 101). That there is more than one god is attested in the Pearl of Great Price, particularly Abraham 4-5. This Mormon concept has the gods positioned to move “primal intelligences along the path to godhood” (Beckwith and Parrish, 114). Among these gods are other gods which were once humans, including God the Father. Brigham Young wrote, “our Father in Heaven was begotten on a previous heavenly world by His Father, and again, He was begotten by a still more ancient Father, and so on…” (Brigham Young, The Seer, 132, quoted in Beckwith and Parrish, 106).

[…] The logic of the Mormon polytheistic concept of God entails that there is an infinite number of gods. To see this, it must be noted that each god him/herself was helped on the path to godhood by another god. There is, therefore, an infinite regress of gods, each aided on his/her path to godhood by a previous god. There is no termination in this series. Now because this entails an actually infinite collection of gods, the Mormon polytheistic concept of deity must deal with all the paradoxes which come with actually existing infinities…

The idea of counting up to an actual infinite number of things by addition (it doesn’t matter what kind of thing it is) is problematic. See here.

More:

Finally, it seems polytheistic Mormonism has a difficulty at its heart–namely the infinite regress of deity.

[…] Each god relies upon a former god, which itself relies upon a former god, forever. Certainly, this is an incoherence at the core of this concept of deity, for it provides no explanation for the existence of the gods, nor does it explain the existence of the universe.

Now let’s see the historical evidence against Mormonism.

The historical evidence

J. Warner Wallace explains how the “Book of Abraham,” a part of the Mormon Scriptures, faces historical difficulties.

The Book of Abraham papyri are not as old as claimed:

Mormon prophets and teachers have always maintained that the papyri that was purchased by Joseph Smith was the actual papyri that was created and written by Abraham. In fact, early believers were told that the papyri were the writings of Abraham.

[…] There is little doubt that the earliest of leaders and witnesses believed and maintained that these papyri were, in fact, the very scrolls upon which Abraham and Joseph wrote. These papyri were considered to be the original scrolls until they were later recovered in 1966. After discovering the original papyri, scientists, linguists, archeologists and investigators (both Mormon and non-Mormon) examined them and came to agree that the papyri are far too young to have been written by Abraham. They are approximately 1500 to 2000 years too late, dating from anywhere between 500 B.C. (John A. Wilson, Dialogue: A Journal of Mormon Thought, Summer 1968, p. 70.) and 60 A.D. If they papyri had never been discovered, this truth would never have come to light. Today, however, we know the truth, and the truth contradicts the statements of the earliest Mormon leaders and witnesses.

The Book of Abraham papyri do not claim what Joseph Smith said:

In addition to this, the existing papyri simply don’t say anything that would place them in the era related to 2000BC in ancient Egypt. The content of the papyri would at least help verify the dating of the document, even if the content had been transcribed or copied from an earlier document. But the papyri simply tell us about an ancient burial ritual and prayers that are consistent with Egyptian culture in 500BC. Nothing in the papyri hints specifically or exclusively to a time in history in which Abraham would have lived.

So there is a clear difference hear between the Bible and Mormonism, when it comes to historical verification.

Further study

If you want a nice long PDF to print out and read at lunch (which is what I did with it), you can grab this PDF by Michael Licona, entitled “Behold, I Stand at the Door and Knock.“

 


Original Blog Source: http://bit.ly/324GEPv

By Bob Perry

Bill Nye, “The Science Guy” used to host an enjoyable and informative TV program for kids. In the last few years, however, Bill Nye has entered into a different realm. Apparently, he fancies himself an arbiter of all truth; the man who can quite literally save the world. But if you have any interest whatsoever in seeking that truth in a coherent, consistent, intelligent way, please watch this two-and-a-half-minute video. As you do, think about what he is saying. And don’t just focus on his defense of Evolution. Listen to his method of reasoning. It really is beyond me how someone who is considered a scientific sage could ever deliver such a rambling string of nonsense. But he doesn’t stop there. He goes on to admonish anyone who dares to disagree with him. And if you do, he wants you to shut up and leave the education of your children to real scientists… like him.

The Actual Bill Nye

There are a few facts you should know about Mr. Nye that are directly applicable to the content of this video. For starters, one would think that the media’s favorite “science guy” would be … Oh, I don’t know … an actual scientist. In fact, given the topic of this video, we might assume that our “science guy” would have some kind of background or advanced degree in the biological sciences. Bad assumption.

Bill Nye has nothing of the kind.

Mr. Nye’s education consists of a B. S. in Mechanical Engineering from Cornell University. While he was a student there, he took an astronomy class from Carl Sagan. Thus ends the list of Bill Nye’s scientific credentials.

After college, Nye was hired by the Boeing Aircraft Company in Seattle, Washington. There, he developed a hydraulic pressure resonance suppressor. But that wasn’t what gained him his notoriety. His real fame came after he won a Steve Martin look-alike contest and started doing stand-up comedy in Seattle nightclubs in 1978.  Since then, he has received two Honorary Doctorate Degrees. But these weren’t awarded for scientific work. They were conferred on him for giving a couple of college commencement addresses after he became “Bill Nye, The Science Guy.”

You can’t make this stuff up.

Ridicule Is Not an Argument

I want to be fair here. Just because Bill Nye’s resumé as a “science guy” is lacking, it doesn’t mean we should dismiss him out of hand. We need to look at his arguments. But we also need to recognize the difference between an argument and an assertion. Anyone can make assertions. But no one should accept those assertions unless they are supported by evidence, logic, and sound reasoning. Mr. Nye gives none of these. He simply offers a diatribe that completely collapses when you take the time to think about what he’s saying. So, let’s look at Mr. Nye’s case.

What Does He Mean by ‘Evolution’?

The “science guy” starts off by lecturing us about how ridiculous it is to not believe in “evolution.” The problem is, he never defines what he means by the word. Does he mean that species change and adapt to the environment? If so, I don’t think I’ve ever heard of a single person who doesn’t believe that. But there are several other definitions of evolution. Which one must we accept?

Let’s assume that Mr. Nye subscribes to the most comprehensive definition of evolution. This is what I refer to as Big ‘E’ Evolution. It’s the idea that all life is the result of a purposeless, materialistic process that began by a random accident. That process can account for every imaginable life form, from the first self-replicating, single-celled organism to you and me.

Let’s break down his argument.

Truth Doesn’t Depend On Geography

First, he offers us this:

“Denial of evolution is unique to the United States … we are the world’s most advanced technological society … people move to the United States because of our general understanding of science.”

This first assertion is baseless and demonstrably false. I know of plenty of folks who live all over the world who do not accept ‘Evolution.’ They do so because they have not seen any credible evidence to support the most comprehensive view of evolution Mr. Nye subscribes to. But let’s say Mr. Nye is correct. Let’s pretend the only people who don’t believe in Evolution are Americans. What does this prove?

Nothing.

Where someone lives does not determine the truth content of what they believe. And the claim that people immigrate to the United States because of our general understanding of science is ridiculous on its face.

Denying Evolution Holds People Back?

But what of Bill Nye’s second assertion? Here, he claims that:

“When you have a portion of the population that doesn’t believe in Evolution, it holds everybody back.”

How, exactly, did Mr. Nye come to this conclusion? My undergraduate education is in Aerospace Engineering. I learned how to design airplanes and then how to fly them. I don’t accept Evolution. So how is it that I am “holding everybody back”?

To show the absurdity of it, let’s turn this one around. Suppose I claimed that those who do accept Evolution are holding everybody back. Would that be a valid argument against Evolution? Not in the least.

Misapplying Metaphors

So far, Mr. Nye’s comments have only demonstrated some flaws in basic logic. But then he takes things further and detonates a suicide vest on any trust we should have in him as a “scientist.”

“Evolution is the fundamental idea in all of life science … [Not believing in it] is analogous to doing geology and not believing in tectonic plates … you’re just not gonna get the right answer. Your whole world is just gonna be a mystery instead of an exciting place.”

Whatever one thinks of the concept of Evolution, there is one fact about it that we all agree on. Evolution is a process that explains the emergence and diversity of life on Earth. It is a noble attempt to explain how life emerged from the chemical elements that existed on the early Earth. It is a theory about how those chemicals combined and interacted with one another to produce complex biological systems that live and grow and reproduce.

The heart of Evolution is a process, not the parts that are used by the process.

So, let’s look at Mr. Nye’s comments in that light. He mentions tectonic plates. Tectonic plates are enormous slabs of rock in the Earth’s crust that slide and rub against one another to cause earthquakes. Geology is the study of the process that moves those plates around. So, Mr. Nye is confusing the plates with the process that moves them. He doesn’t seem to understand that he is equating completely non-analogous categories of things. Parts are physical things. But the processes that act on those things are something completely different. It seems to me a “science guy” would comprehend the difference.

A “Complicated” World

Building on his last point, Bill Nye begins his transition to questioning the character and motives of those who disagree with him;

“Once in a while, I get people who don’t really — who claim — they don’t believe in evolution. My response is, ‘Why not?’ Your world just becomes fantastically complicated when you don’t believe in evolution.”

Notice that Mr. Nye believes that no one could really disbelieve in Evolution. They only “claim” to do so. And he never offers any examples of the responses he receives to his “Why not?” question. Who is he asking? Why does he dismiss them? We can’t really know how to evaluate their answers unless we know the actual reasons they are giving. The fact that Mr. Nye doesn’t accept their responses is hardly a reason for us to reject them. After all, we’ve already demonstrated that his reasoning in support of Evolution is flawed.

But there’s another question. Why would someone’s rejection of Evolution make their world “fantastically more complicated”? Once again, the conclusion does not follow.

Using Young Earth Creationist Logic

Mr. Nye’s next point is pretty fantastic all by itself. And let me be clear. I am not taking a stand one way or the other about the age of the universe here. I am simply pointing out how Mr. Nye is using the same logic as a young earth creationist when he says this:

“Here are these ancient dinosaur bones … radioactivity … distant stars … the idea of deep time … billions of years … if you try to ignore that your worldview just becomes crazy.”

Here, Mr. Nye says that rejecting Evolution is the equivalent with believing in a young universe. Or, conversely, believing in an old universe means that you accept Evolution. But, once again, he is confusing categories.

Evolution is a theory about biology. The age of the universe comes from the study of cosmology. These are completely different areas of study! All one would have to do to show that Mr. Nye’s assertion is false is declare themselves to be either an “old universe, non-Evolutionist,” or a “young universe Evolutionist.” Voila!

This is the same false equivalence most young-Earth creationists use against those of us who believe the universe is old. I wonder how Mr. Nye would react if someone pointed out to him that his thinking is exactly like the young-Earth creationists he abhors.

Questioning Your Parenting

Finally, Bill Nye makes it personal. He wants you to know that if you disagree with him, your status as a parent is in question:

“I say to the grownups, if you want to deny evolution and live in your world that is completely inconsistent with the universe, that’s fine … but don’t make your kids do it … because we need them … we need engineers who can build things and solve problems …”

Once again, Mr. Nye demonstrates his failure to understand basic logic when he ties belief in Evolution to our ability to produce “engineers who can build things and solve problems.”

It seems fairly obvious that one can be a perfectly competent airplane designer and not have any opinion about Evolution. In fact, a highly competent engineer can be completely ignorant about the concept of Evolution. Mr. Nye proved that himself when he designed a hydraulic pressure resonance suppressor for Boeing.

But beyond that, Mr. Nye has stepped out of a scientific critique (if you could consider him to have ever been inside one). In his arrogance, he assumes he has the right to tell you what you should be allowed to teach your children.

The Totalitarian Impulse

This is the totalitarian impulse. It’s a mindset that thinks some people can determine what other people should be allowed to think. Those of us who honor scientific objectivity, free thought, and academic tolerance need to recognize this kind of talk when we hear it. People who think like this are the most intolerant kinds of people in the world. They are destroying the concept of free thought in the academy. It is intellectual dishonesty writ large. And it can become dangerous for those who don’t think the “right way.”

Mr. Nye insists that you need to believe in Evolution. If you don’t, you must be overcome because our society needs “… scientifically literate voters and taxpayers.”

Be careful what you wish for, Mr. Nye. If scientific literacy suddenly became a prerequisite for voting, it looks to me like a certain “science guy” would have to stay home on election day.

 


Bob Perry is a Christian apologetics writer, teacher, and speaker who blogs about Christianity and the culture at: truehorizon.org. He is a Contributing Writer for the Christian Research Journal and has also been published in Touchstone, and Salvo. Bob is a professional aviator with 37 years of military and commercial flying experience. He has a B.S., Aerospace Engineering from the U. S. Naval Academy, and a M.A., Christian Apologetics from Biola University. He has been married to his high school sweetheart since 1985. They have five grown sons.

Original Blog Source: http://bit.ly/30bWkij

By J. Brian Huffling

When one thinks about apologetics, he usually thinks about such disciplines as philosophy, history, archaeology, etc. There is one area; however, that is relatively undeveloped in the practice of apologetics, and yet it is ripe for the work: literary studies. I am not talking about what genre the gospels happen to be, or if the saints in Matthew 27 were literally raised, or any such argument that has been popular as of late. I am talking about theories in English and literature that dramatically influence the field of hermeneutics (how we study the Bible). One of my majors in grad school was Biblical Studies, and I have taught Bible Study Methods at the BA level, and Hermeneutics and Advanced Hermeneutics at the grad level. In doing so, I have read many books on the issue of biblical interpretation and have scoured many resources for my classes. While there are many issues I could talk about, such as deconstructivism, postmodernism, etc., the issue that seems to come up a lot in standard textbooks is the role of the interpreter and how he either uncovers or imparts meaning to the biblical texts. In this article, I will talk about two books that are standard for evangelical studies on biblical interpretation, and why I think they are undermining the objective meaning of the text.

The Books and Their Claims

The first book is Introduction to Biblical Interpretation, revised  and updated edition, by William W. Klein, Craig L. Blomberg, and Robert L. Hubbard Jr. (There is a newer 3rd edition.) In general, this is a very good book, which is why it is used by many Bible colleges and seminaries. I even use it. Many pastors have been taught using this book. The principles that the authors teach that we should use for interpreting our Bibles are very good. So what’s the problem?

The problem is what they say about the role of the interpreter and the nature of bias, presuppositions, and preunderstanding (the body of knowledge the reader brings to the text). They state:

“No one interprets anything without a set of underlying assumptions. When we presume to explain the meaning of the Bible, we do so with a set of preconceived ideas or presuppositions. These presuppositions may be examined and stated, or simply embraced unconsciously. But anyone who says that he or she has discarded all presuppositions and will only study the text objectively and inductively is either deceived or naïve.” (143)

It is certainly true that we all have biases, etc. However, the startling claim these authors make is since we have biases, we can’t study the Bible objectively. Unfortunately, and per usual for these kinds of books, the notion of “objectivity” is left undefined and unclear. They later deny that such biases leave the reader bereft of objectivity; however, they do not explain how he can be objective since they have seemingly taken it away via the role of biases and presuppositions. Such is especially the case given this statement:

“The preunderstanding and presuppositions of the interpreter contribute enormously to the results of the interpretive process. We might even say they determine the results.” (197)

If the preunderstanding and presuppositions determine the interpretive results, then it is not clear at all how the reader can be objective. We wouldn’t discover the truth or meaning of the text; we would determine it.

The other book is The Hermeneutical Spiral, revised and expanded, by Grant Osborne. Like the previous work, this book is generally very good when it comes to interpreting the Bible. However, in the appendix, Osborne espouses a dangerous view, namely, the sociology of knowledge. He states:

“The sociology of knowledge recognizes the influence of societal values on all perceptions of reality. This is a critical factor in coming to grips with the place of preunderstanding in the interpretive process. Basically, sociology of knowledge states that no act of coming to understanding can escape the formative power of the background and the paradigm community to which an interpreter belongs.” (505)

Basically, what this means is that one’s culture is “formative” in how one knows, and it influences one’s “perceptions of reality.” In other words, the way in which one knows is at least somewhat determined by his culture. Different cultures will produce different perceptions of reality. What does this mean for the biblical interpreter? He answers this question clearly:

“A close reading of the text cannot be done without a perspective provided by one’s preunderstanding as identified by a “sociology of knowledge” perspective. Reflection itself demands mental categories, and these are built on one’s presupposed worldview and by the faith or reading community to which one belongs. Since neutral exegesis is impossible, no necessarily ‘true’ or final interpretation is possible.” (516, emphasis added)

Some people will find this shocking while others will express agreement. Evangelicals who hold to the idea that we can (and must) be able to know absolute truth should find this kind of assertion by a leading evangelical very scary. If true, we would not be able to claim to know the truth or the meaning of the biblical text, if there even is any.

Evaluation

One wonders how the authors of these books think that their meaning can be grasped. If what they say is true, we could never know the meaning of their books! Such claims made by these authors are hopelessly self-defeating. Further, it is simply an assumption that biases are always necessarily wrong, or that subjectivity entails falsehood. But this has never been demonstrated. Presuppositions are not inherently bad or wrong, as the authors of Introduction to Biblical Interpretation seem to imply when they argue for a certain set of presuppositions in order to interpret the Bible, such as believing in the supernatural.

Introduction to Biblical Interpretation claims that we can still have an objective understanding of the text, but they don’t offer a method for giving that objectivity to the reader after they took it away in the name of bias, presuppositions, and preunderstandings. We are thus left in subjectivity. Or are we? While the above authors do not tell us how to overcome the interpretive problems brought on by the interpreter, there are ways of explaining how an interpreter can simultaneously be biased and objective. After all, aren’t the authors of the above books biased and yet trying to pass off their text as objective? Surely. So how can they do that?

In his Objectivity and Biblical Interpretation, Thomas A. Howe explains how this is possible. (See also my article on objectivity and historical knowledge.) As mentioned earlier, authors like those above rarely define what they mean by “objective.” I am in agreement with Howe that a proposition is objective if it can be verified or falsified by external, mind-independent evidence that is also based on (objective) first principles. In other words, something is objective when it is based on extra-mental evidence that by definition, is not subjective, or merely in one’s mind. Further, propositions can be evaluated by the use of first principles, such as the principles of non-contradiction, identity, and excluded middle. (For more discussion on these, see my article on logic.) Such laws of logic are based in the being/existence of things in the external world. For example, the principle of non-contradiction says that something can’t simultaneously be and not-be. In other words, something can’t be a tree and not a tree at the same time and in the same sense. Such laws are not just made up. They are not just rational constructs. They are metaphysical and based in and reducible to existent things in reality. These principles are objective because they are based on objectively existing things in the world.

These principles can be applied to everyday issues, such as interpreting a written text. It is obvious that the authors of the cited works think that their readers can read books objectively. Otherwise, why write them? And why have principles to follow if there is really no use since we can’t be objective or know the true meaning of the text? Being an objective interpreter of the Bible is possible. We simply use language and interpretive principles according to our everyday, commonsense way. There is no great barrier to objectivity, whether it be bias, presuppositions, preunderstandings, or a sociology of knowledge. The very knowing process built into our human nature and the way we use language ensures that an objective understanding of the Bible is indeed possible.

 


J. Brian Huffling, PH.D. have a BA in History from Lee University, an MA in (3 majors) Apologetics, Philosophy, and Biblical Studies from Southern Evangelical Seminary (SES), and a Ph.D. in Philosophy of Religion from SES. He is the Director of the Ph.D. Program and Associate Professor of Philosophy and Theology at SES. He also teaches courses for Apologia Online Academy. He has previously taught at The Art Institute of Charlotte. He has served in the Marines, Navy, and is currently a reserve chaplain in the Air Force at Maxwell Air Force Base. His hobbies include golf, backyard astronomy, martial arts, and guitar.

Original Blog Source: http://bit.ly/2NuvG2F

Hemos llegado a la penúltima parte de nuestras lecciones sobre lógica de predicados. En esta sección hablaré sobre las cuatro reglas de inferencia que hay para argumentos con proposiciones universal y existencialmente cuantificadas y que añadiremos a las reglas que ya vimos para la lógica proposicional.

OBSERVACIONES PRELIMINARES

Antes de comenzar a explicar nuestras reglas de inferencia, es importante recalcar la importancia de ciertas características de los objetos, individuos o miembros de los cuales se está predicando y que son las propiedades de ser específico, arbitrario y previamente introducido. Cuando hablamos de un objeto específico, nos referimos a que conocemos la identidad del objeto en cuestión. Cuando hablamos de un objeto arbitrario, nos referimos a un objeto del cuál no conocemos su identidad. Y cuando hablamos de un objeto previamente introducido, nos referimos a un objeto arbitrario que ha aparecido antes en alguna premisa y que ahora se está predicando en una nueva. Con estas propiedades en mente de nuestros objetos de los que vamos a predicar algo, ahora podemos pasar a explicar nuestras reglas de inferencia para proposiciones cuantificadas.

  1. GENERALIZACIÓN EXISTENCIAL (EG)

Forma lógica

𝛗f

———-

∴ ∃x𝛗x

Esta es la regla más fácil de entender. Nos dice que, de la predicación de cualquier individuo específico elegido, se infieren proposiciones generales existencialmente cuantificadas (f puede ser cualquier constante).

Ejemplo:

  1. Tomoko sacó una A en clase.
  2. Por lo tanto, alguien sacó una A en clase.

Observa que no hay forma que el enunciado (1) sea verdad mientras que el enunciado (2) sea falso. Si es verdad que Tomoko sacó una A en clase, entonces es verdad que alguien (Tomoko, al menos) sacó una A.

  1. INSTANCIACIÓN EXISTENCIAL (EI)

Forma lógica

x 𝛗x

———-

∴ 𝛗g

A diferencia de EG, esta regla es difícil de comprender al principio, porque si se define como la inferencia de cualquiera de las instancias de una generalización existencial, tendríamos que de

  1. Alguien es matemático.
  2. Por lo tanto, Superman es matemático.

Este sería un razonamiento verdadero, pero es obvio que no lo es, y la razón es que esta regla no nos permite inferir a un objeto específico.

El método

¿Qué hacemos entonces? Lo que necesitamos aquí es un método que nos permita inferir a partir de una generalización existencial. Sabemos que una proposición cuantificada existencialmente predica algo de al menos un individuo, pero como no sabemos quién es ese individuo, lo que hacemos es usar un nombre temporal (o nombre nuevo) para referirnos a dicho individuo en nuestra prueba y asumir que nombra a un objeto (sea lo que sea) que determina que la generalización existencial es verdadera.

Ejemplo

Argumento

Algún falsificador ha reemplazado las pinturas del museo. Quien remplazó las pinturas tiene un cómplice en el personal del museo. Por lo tanto, algún falsificador tiene un cómplice en el personal del museo.

Prueba

Sabemos que algún falsificador remplazó las pinturas; llamémosle Juan Pérez (Fulano es otro nombre muy común para referirnos a alguien que no conocemos, pero del que sabemos algo). Dado que quien remplazó las pinturas tiene un cómplice en el personal del museo, se deduce que Juan Pérez tiene tal cómplice. Pero Juan Pérez es un falsificador, y Juan Pérez tiene un cómplice en el personal. Por lo tanto, algún falsificador tiene un cómplice en el personal.

La regla

  • Tenemos una generalización existencial como una línea en nuestra prueba, digamos ∃x 𝛗x.
  • Hemos asumido una instancia de esa generalización, digamos 𝛗g, como un supuesto temporal.
  • A partir de ese supuesto, hemos derivado alguna conclusión, digamos 𝛙, en la que g no ocurre.

Luego la regla nos permite ingresar la conclusión 𝛙 a la que acabamos de llegar como una nueva línea, pero que depende de la generalización existencial ∃x 𝛗x en lugar de la instancia 𝛗g que asumimos temporalmente.

Explicación

Nuestro ejemplo siguió este procedimiento: 𝛗x era x es un falsificador y x remplazó las pinturas del museo, g fue Juan Pérez y 𝛙 fue Algún falsificador tiene un cómplice en el personal. Nuestra suposición llegó en el momento en que dijimos llamémosle Juan Pérez.

La Restricción

Existe una restricción a la regla de EI, y es que cuando usamos el nombre temporal para la instancia, esta tiene que ser una constante individual que no ha aparecido en una premisa anterior de la prueba.

Ejemplo

  1. Hubo alguien que obtuvo una B en el curso de música.
  2. Llamemos j a quien obtuvo una B.

Nuestra letra j no la hemos utilizado anteriormente, pero si en nuestra prueba tenemos más proposiciones cuantificadas existencialmente sobre el mismo dominio, debemos usar una letra diferente o numerarlas conforme vayan apareciendo.

Ejemplos

  1. Hay alguien del curso de música que es atractivo.
  2. Llamemos j1 a quien es atractivo.
  3. Hay alguien del curso que es rico.
  4. Llamemos j2 a quien es rico.

Con estos ejemplos queda claro que, si usamos j para todas las premisas sin enumerarlas, estaríamos cometiendo el error de inferir que j es quien sacó una B en el curso de música y que también es atractivo y es rico, y esto no lo podemos comprobar. Por esta razón debemos usar letras distintas o la misma letra con números que la distingan de otras y que no hayamos usado antes (nota que si en lugar de j hubiera usado g que ya ha sido utilizada anteriormente, estaríamos afirmando que el falsificador de pinturas también sacó una B en el curso, que es rico y es atractivo).

  1. INSTANCIACIÓN UNIVERSAL (UI)

Forma lógica

x 𝛗x

———-

∴ 𝛗h

Otra regla fácil. UI nos dice que lo que se predica de todos o ninguno de los individuos de un dominio, también se predica para cualquier individuo de ese dominio, ya sea específica, arbitraria o previamente introducido en premisas anteriores.

Objeto Específico

Veamos primero cómo se aplica la regla a un individuo específicamente elegido donde 𝛗h es el resultado de la sustitución de h para todas las ocurrencias de x en 𝛗x. Nuestro dominio en cuestión serán simplemente todas las personas y de las cuáles Tomoko será nuestro individuo específicamente elegido. Así podemos formular una proposición cuantificada universalmente como la siguiente:

  1. Todas las personas pueden razonar.

De la que podemos concluir que

  1. Por lo tanto, Tomoko puede razonar.

Objeto previamente introducido

Recordemos que j1 y j2 de las formulas anteriores también son personas, por lo que también podemos concluir que

  1. Por lo tanto, j1 puede razonar.
  2. Por lo tanto, j2 puede razonar.

Objeto Arbitrario

Y, por último, partiendo de (1) y de que es posible decir “sea i una persona arbitraria”, entonces se sigue que

  1. Por lo tanto, i puede razonar.

Restricción

En el caso del objeto arbitrario, es importante no saber otra cosa acerca i dada la siguiente regla.

  1. GENERALIZACIÓN UNIVERSAL (UG)

Forma lógica:

𝛗i

———-

∴ ∀x 𝛗x

Sin duda la regla más controversial es la de UG, y es que, si se define como la norma que establece que, a partir de cualquier instancia de una generalización universal, infieres esa generalización, entonces nos encontraremos con razonamientos como el siguiente:

  1. William Lane Craig es Cristiano,
  2. Por lo tanto, todos son cristianos.

Lo cual es falso. Para evitar este tipo de razonamientos falaces, necesitamos de un método al igual que hicimos con EI.

El método

Primero, de nuestra prueba escogemos a un individuo de forma arbitraria y temporalmente le damos un nuevo. Luego probamos algo sobre el individuo elegido al azar. Finalmente, podemos inferir que lo que hemos probado acerca de este individuo elegido al azar es válido universalmente; es decir, podemos inferir una generalización universal.

¿Pero cómo hacemos esto? Usando la prueba por condición general. Este es un método para probar proposiciones condicionales generalizadas; es decir, las proposiciones de la forma Todo P es Q. La técnica consiste en tomar alguna instancia arbitraria de P y luego probar que también es una instancia de Q. Habiendo probado que esta instancia arbitraria de P es también una instancia de Q, podemos inferir que cualquier instancia de P es una instancia de Q.

Ejemplo

Para probar que

  1. Para cualquier x, si x es presidente de México, entonces x es un ciudadano mexicano.

Luego, por regla de UI podemos decir: “sea i un presidente de México arbitrariamente elegido”, entonces se sigue que

  1. i es un ciudadano mexicano.

Luego por UG podemos concluir que

  1. Para cualquier x, si x es un presidente de México, entonces x es un ciudadano mexicano.

Ahora, es importante recordar que no necesitamos estar seguros de que realmente hemos tomado una instancia de P, que no pasa nada si no existe ninguno. Esto se debe a que la certeza no es una condición necesaria, que haya una instancia de P escogida arbitrariamente es solo una asunción que estamos haciendo y que luego desecharemos. Recuerda que esta prueba condicional es similar a la que utilizamos para la lógica proposicional, por lo que nuestra prueba no depende de si realmente existe dicha instancia, sino que, si hay tal instancia, entonces también será una instancia de Q.

Así, para cualquier proposición ∀x (Px → Qx) se procede a probar de la siguiente forma:

  • Asumir alguna instancia de Px, digamos Pi, donde i denota cualquier individuo arbitrariamente elegido (pero no uno específico).
  • Probamos Qi.
  • Desechamos el supuesto y esbozamos la conclusión ∀x (Px → Qx).

Una aplicación práctica de esta regla sería la siguiente: imagina que le preguntas a un amigo tuyo: “¿Si alguien rompe tu celular nuevo, te molestarías con él?” Tú amigo responde: “Sí”. Ahora sabes que, dado que “alguien” podría ser “cualquiera”, concluyes por generalización universal que “Para cualquier x, si x rompe el celular de mi amigo, él se molestará con x”. Ahora puedes aplicar la regla de UI y concluir: “Si yo rompo el celular de mi amigo, él se molestará conmigo”.

La Restricción

Esta regla tiene la restricción de no inferir generalizaciones de proposiciones de un individuo específico. Por ejemplo, imaginemos un caso similar al anterior, solo que ahora le preguntas a tu amigo: “Si tu novia rompe tu iPad nuevo, ¿te molestarás con ella?” Y él responde “No”. Tú no puedes aplicar UG como en el caso del celular por que la “novia” no es alguien arbitrariamente elegido: si tú eres el que rompe su iPad, tu amigo podría enojarse contigo.

 


Jairo Izquierdo es Director de Social Media y autor para la organización cristiana Cross Examined.  Estudia filosofía y teología, siendo su actual foco de estudio la lógica clásica, epistemología, doctrinas cristianas y lingüística.  Es cofundador de Filósofo Cristiano. Es miembro en la Christian Apologetics Alliance y ministro de alabanza en la iglesia cristiana bautista Cristo es la Respuesta en Puebla, México.

Join Frank as he interviews Dr. Michael Heiser about his book Unseen Realm: Recovering the Supernatural Worldview of the Bible. But beware: your view of the Bible may be rocked as a result of this interview! This is only Part 1. Part 2 is next week. Check out Dr. Heiser at www.DRMSH.com and on his Naked Bible podcast.

If you want to send us a question for the show, please email us at  Hello@CrossExamined.org.

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By Robby Hall

The backlash against Lauren Daigle for her comments on homosexuality sparked debate amongst Christians who both defend and critique her.

John Crist, a Christian comedian, recently posted a video on his Instagram feed condemning those who judged her for her comments. Crist seemed to be unaware that he himself was judging other Christians for their behavior.   The thing is the church should make judgments on truth.  The New Testament constantly warns us of false prophets and teachers.  The apostle Paul tells us that “We destroy arguments and every lofty opinion raised against the knowledge of God, and take every thought captive to obey Christ.”  If a brother errs, we take them aside lovingly to correct them.  But what about someone like Daigle or Crist?  Do Christian celebrities have a larger responsibility to adhere to sound teaching or to speak the truth?  First, we should make a sober judgment against ourselves to see if we were in the same position, would we do any different.  Secondly, we shouldn’t confuse the act with someone’s salvation.  Each of us is a work in progress, and the point of the Gospel is that we as human beings, are constantly missing the mark.  This is why Christ came and died on a cross.

That being said, we can rightly judge actions that have larger impacts on public perception of the Gospel and the Church and correct those actions if need be.  When Jesus warned us “not to judge lest you be judged,” He wanted us to not judge hypocritically.  Paul put it this way in Romans “Therefore you have no excuse, O man, every one of you who judges. For in passing judgment on another, you condemn yourself, because you, the judge, practice the very same things.  We know that the judgment of God rightly falls on those who practice such things. 3 Do you suppose, O man—you who judge those who practice such things and yet do them yourself—that you will escape the judgment of God?… While you preach against stealing, do you steal? 22 You who say that one must not commit adultery, do you commit adultery? You who abhor idols, do you rob temples?” Romans 2:2-3, 21&22

We tend to look to the famous for our theological marching orders.  However, this is a mistake.  Those like Daigle should be careful to place themselves under authoritative teachers, but we should be doing the same.  Celebrities can fall into the popularity trap and so begin to follow the path of Progressive Christianity[1]

We must strive as the Church to read the Bible, understand it’s history, proper hermeneutics, orthodox theology, and a good apologetic.  We also must not set up celebrities to fulfill a role they never were meant to.  If we show a brother their error, it is out of love and their edification and shouldn’t be to tear someone down.  But we shouldn’t look to a celebrity for our biblical instruction as they are in the entertainment business which is always a dangerous road for anyone to navigate and it shouldn’t surprise us when one fails in some fashion, but rather we should respond in prayer, grace, and truth.  Not every so-called Christian celebrity fails in this fashion as there are many who have a solid biblical understanding.  But we should be able to rightly divide the truth for ourselves by delving into God’s word and putting ourselves under solid, orthodox teachers and allow the truth to change us through the power of the Holy Spirit.

Note

[1] 5 Signs Your Church Might be Heading Toward Progressive Christianity http://bit.ly/2X1Kntn

 


Robby Hall is in the Secure Access industry for Information Technology. He has been married for 3 years and has just welcomed his first child, Bridget. He is graduate of the Cross Examined Instructor’s Academy and leads apologetics small groups at his local church.

Original Blog Source: http://bit.ly/2ITkhoL

By Terrell Clemmons

Don’t Be; That’s Just the New Atheists Masking Their Faith Choice

In the November 2006 cover story of Wired magazine, Gary Wolf thoughtfully gave ear to some of atheism’s most aggressive voices and labeled the movement that they lead “New Atheism.” Envisioning a brave new world in which science and reason overcome religious myth and superstition, New Atheists labor to purvey a comprehensive worldview that explains who we are and how we got here (Darwinian evolution), diagnoses our most urgent ill (ancient superstitions about God), and, most importantly, prescribes a cure for that ill (eradication of religion).

In the same month that Wired reported on New Atheism, Time magazine artfully depicted the science and religion quandary with a combination double helixÆrosary on its cover. The title, “God vs. Science,” might have led a casual reader to expect a story about a theologian opposing science, but the article actually covered a debate between two scientists. Geneticist Francis Collins, director of the Human Genome Project, and biologist Richard Dawkins of Oxford University weighed in on Time’s questions about science, belief in God, and whether the two can peaceably coexist in an intellectually sound world-view. Collins said they can; Dawkins said absolutely not.

Recent battles over textbooks in America lend credence to the notion of science and religion as perennial foes, and ABC News, reporting on a survey of atheism among scientists, casually commented that “the clash between science and religion is as old as science itself,” as if that’s what everybody with any gray matter already knows. But historians of science reveal a different story, one that is more in line with the view of Dr. Collins.

In his course Science and Religion, Lawrence Principe, professor of the History of Science and Technology at Johns Hopkins University, meticulously untangles the historical accounts of events commonly bandied about as proof that religion suppresses science, such as the trials of Galileo and John Scopes. Principe teaches that, contrary to irreligionist lore, the two disciplines were generally viewed as complementary until a little more than a century ago.

Principe identifies two late-19th-century publications as the origin of the idea of warfare between science and religion: A History of the Conflict Between Religion and Science, written by skeptic scientist John William Draper in 1874, and A History of the Warfare of Science with Theology in Christendom, published in 1896 by Andrew Dickson White, first president of Cornell University. It is noteworthy that both writers seemed to want the church to back off; Draper wrote at the request of a popular science publisher, and White in response to criticism that he had received for establishing Cornell as the first American university with no religious affiliation.

Principe reveals that the premise of both books—that science and religion have occupied separate camps throughout history, and that religion has always been the oppressor of science—is unfounded, calling Draper’s book “cranky,” “ahistorical,” and “one long, vitriolic, anti-Catholic diatribe,” while White’s is “scarcely better.” Still, he credits the two sub-scholarly works with crystallizing in the popular mind the image of ongoing, intractable warfare between science and religion. Today’s New Atheists echo and amplify their war cries.

Are We Talking Science or Faith?

Skeptics ardently defend their right to reject religious dogma and make up their own minds about ultimate reality. Certainly, atheists, scientific or not, are free to adopt whatever belief system they choose, but can they legitimately claim science as the basis for atheism? Put more simply, has science disproved God, as the irreligionists maintain?

A closer look at Richard Dawkins and Francis Collins sheds light on that question. The most significant difference between the two scientists is not that one believes in biblical creation and the other in Darwinian evolution. Both affirm Darwinism. The salient distinction is that Collins allows for the possibility of God, whereas Dawkins does not.

But it wasn’t always so. The fourth son of two freethinkers, Francis Collins, was homeschooled until age ten. His parents instilled in him a love for learning, but no faith, and the agnosticism of his youth gradually shifted into atheism as his education progressed. He was comfortable with it, discounting spiritual beliefs as outmoded superstition until he began to interact with seriously ill patients as a medical student. When one of them, a Christian, asked him what he believed, he faced a rationalist’s crisis. “It was a fair question,” he wrote in The Language of God: A Scientist Presents Evidence for Belief. “I felt my face flush as I stammered out the words ïI’m not really sure.’” At that point, Collins realized that he had never seriously considered the evidence for and against belief.

Determined to practice authentic, what-are-the-facts science, Collins set out to investigate the rational basis for faith. Reluctantly, he found himself feeling “forced to admit the plausibility of the God hypothesis. Agnosticism, which had seemed like a safe second-place haven, now loomed like the great cop-out it often is. Faith in God now seemed more rational than disbelief.”

In contrast to Collins’s rational inquiry and personal struggle over the question of God, Richard Dawkins, the de facto spokesman for scientific atheism (think Madalyn Murray O’Hair with a Ph.D.), lays out his case for unbelief without struggle or reservation. In chapter four of The God Delusion, titled “Why There Almost Certainly Is No God,” Dawkins introduces his “Argument from Improbability,” and though the chapter waxes long, its reasoning distills to something like this:

  1. The universe we observe is highly complex.
    2. Any creator of this complex universe would have to be even more complex than it.
    3. It is too improbable that such a God exists; therefore, there almost certainly is no God.

The first two statements qualify as acceptable premises, but the conclusion that Dawkins reaches simply does not follow from them. This isn’t legitimate reasoning. It’s rationalization—that is, finding some plausible-sounding explanation for arriving at a conclusion that he has already chosen.

Dr. Dawkins is certainly free to choose to disbelieve, but his conclusion was not derived through scientific or rational means. Rather, it hints at an underlying personal, philosophical faith choice to disbelieve. Ernst Mayr, one of the twentieth century’s leading evolutionary biologists, made a similar observation when he analyzed reasons for disbelief among his Harvard colleagues. “We were all atheists. I found that there were two sources,” he said. One group “just couldn’t believe all that supernatural stuff.” The other “couldn’t believe that there could be a God with all this evil in the world. Most atheists combine the two,” he summarized candidly. “The combination makes it impossible to believe in God.”

Former atheist and biophysicist Alister McGrath concurs, noting that most of the unbelieving scientists he is acquainted with are atheists on grounds other than their science. “They bring those assumptions to their science rather than basing them on their science.” Dawkins’s rationalization, as well as the observations of McGrath and Mayr, reveal the choice to disbelieve for what it is—a personal, philosophical choice made apart from reason or scientific inquiry. I call it a “faith choice” because it involves choosing a foundational presupposition concerning a realm about which we have incomplete (but not insufficient) knowledge.

A Choice of Faith

Francis Collins’s conclusion, that the God hypothesis is not only plausible but compellingly supported by evidence, flatly controverts New Atheism’s premise that faith constitutes an irrational belief without evidence. It also reveals that the real conflict isn’t one of science versus God. It’s a conflict between those who allow and those who disallow the possible reality of God.

Polemicists will continue to clamor for converts to their side on the question of God because between the poles live thoughtful, educated people—not necessarily working scientists, but people who value science. Some believe in a supreme being called God, and others haven’t made up their minds. It is these theological moderates that New Atheism seeks to recruit with pithy epigrams such as “God vs. Science” and “My beliefs are based on science, but yours are based on faith.” What believers need is a calm, judicious counter-strategy when New Atheism advances under the guise of science, one that can transform verbal sparring into illuminating dialogue. Let me give you an example of what I mean.

My friend Dana has known Sam for decades. Over the years, Sam has peppered her with questions about her faith. Despite feeling intimidated—Sam is a highly respected leader in their community—she has answered as best she could and maintained their friendship. One evening over dinner in her home, Sam turned his questions on her teenagers, essentially asking them, “Do you really believe all that stuff and why?” Dana allowed them to speak for themselves for a while before intervening.

“Sam,” she started agreeably, “you and I have discussed this many times. I’ve told you what I believe and why, and you’ve told me all of your reasons for not believing.” Then she posed a question that she had never put to him before. “What if there really is a God, but you just don’t know about him? Are you willing to consider that possibility? Are you willing to ask him if he’s out there? Something like ïGod, I’m not even sure if you’re there, but if you are, would you show yourself to me?‘”

Dana let her question hang in the air. The teenagers likewise waited for Sam to break the silence. “No,” he finally said. “I’m not willing to do that.” And he hasn’t brought the subject up since.

Dana gently—but powerfully—pierced the facade of scientific skepticism with one question: Are you willing? It is not a question of scientific reasoning, but a question of choosing, of making a personal faith choice that, once made, establishes the starting point for one’s reasoning. Atheism isn’t founded on science or reason any more than theism is based on faith devoid of reason. The atheist, too, has made a faith choice. He has just chosen differently.

The Eternal Conflict

The “eternal conflict,” as it’s called, is not really between religion and science; after all, the two got along quite amicably before the twentieth century. No, as the following quotations indicate, the real quarrel has always been between those who believe that science and religion are at odds and those who do not.

“A legitimate conflict between science and religion cannot exist. Science without religion is lame; religion without science is blind.”

—Albert Einstein

“It is… Idle to pretend, as many do, that there is no contradiction between religion and science. Science contradicts religion as surely as Judaism contradicts Islam—they are absolutely and irresolvably conflicting views. Unless that is, science is obliged to change its fundamental nature.”

—Brian Appleyard

“Science and religion are two windows that people look through, trying to understand the big universe outside, trying to understand why we are here. The two windows give different views, but both look out at the same universe. Both views are one-sided, neither is complete. Both leave out the essential features of the real world. And both are worthy of respect.”

—Freeman Dyson

“Science can purify religion from error and superstition; religion can purify science from idolatry and false absolutes. Each can draw the other into a wider world, a world in which both can flourish.”

—Pope John Paul II

“When religion was strong and science weak, men mistook magic for medicine; now, when science is strong and religion weak, men mistake medicine for magic.”

—Thomas Szasz

“Science is an effort to understand creation. Biblical religion involves our relation to the Creator. Since we can learn about the Creator from his creation, religion can learn from science.”

—PaulæH. Carr

“There is more religion in men’s science than there is science in their religion.”

—Henry David Thoreau

“Science makes major contributions to minor needs. Religion, however, small its successes, is at least at work on the things that matter most.”

—Oliver Wendell Holmes

Science as Religion

One needn’t speculate about whether science is a religion for Darwinists such as Richard Dawkins. In a 1997 essay published in The Humanist, Dawkins tackles this question directly, arguing that his onetime tendency to deny that science is a religion was a tactical error that he has since repudiated. Instead, he writes, scientists should “accept the charge gratefully and demand equal time for science in religious education classes.” The reason? Well, according to Dawkins, whereas science is a faith “based upon verifiable evidence,” religion “not only lacks evidence,” but “its independence from evidence is its pride and joy.” Thus, science is the only religion worth imparting to future generations.

Rather than delineate the evidence that makes science outclass “any of the mutually contradictory faiths and disappointingly recent traditions of the world’s religions,” however, Dawkins chooses instead to describe what science might someday do for a society that religion does today. Chiefly, this amounts to inspiring in people an awe for “the wonder and beauty” of the universe in the same way that God currently inspires awe in religious believers. Indeed, as far as Dawkins is concerned, “the merest glance through a microscope at the brain of an ant or through a telescope at a long-ago galaxy of a billion worlds is enough to render poky and parochial the very psalms of praise.”

But here is where the evolutionary biologist gets himself into trouble. Yes, science has given us access to astonishing truths about the hidden nature of the universe, and yes, all that it has definitively revealed is based on incontrovertible evidence. It is also true, however, that most religions in the world do not posit faith claims in opposition to such breathtaking factual findings. Rather, religion lacks evidence at precisely those points where science does as well.

The faith that is the “pride and joy” of religious believers is in an invisible God who created the world and still interacts with it. The faith of Darwinian scientists is in the power of evolution to create the world and then continue to adapt it. There is no conclusive evidence for either of these faith claims, which is why some have accused science of being a religion in the first place, as well as why Dawkins must hawk the replacement value of science instead of citing the “verifiable evidence” that makes science superior to conventional religion.

All this is to say that Dawkins is correct to concede that science is a religion for him, but wrong to contend that this particular religion accomplishes something that others do not. When it comes to the significant questions of life—Where did we come from? How did we get here? Why are we here? —Science’s answers prove to be as faith-based as those of even the most fundamentalist religious sect. That science might successfully fulfill the function of religion is thus hardly reason enough to warrant a switch.

 


Terrell Clemmons is a freelance writer and blogger on apologetics and matters of faith.

This article was originally published at salvomag.com: http://bit.ly/2J9O9vV

By Luke Nix

Introduction- Why Is God’s Existence So Important?

One of the most heated debates in any setting is the existence of God. If God exists, then He is the foundation for objective morality. One’s view of morality governs their thinking in everything from politics to workplace interactions, from scientific research to everyday behavior. If God exists, then there are objective behavioral boundaries which should never be crossed. If God does not exist, then no such objective boundaries exist, and anyone may behave however they wish in any situation without concern for the violation of some objective standard (that is not to say that relative/cultural/legal standards cannot be violated- but that is a topic for another time). If we do not examine this question carefully, we risk believing what is false about reality and morality, and such false beliefs will necessarily lead to behaviors that are not in keeping with reality and morality. This means that many of the political and ethic debates opposing people have come down to whether or not God exists.

Presenting A Cumulative Case for God’s Existence

Numerous lines of evidence and philosophical arguments have been presented over the centuries for God’s existence. All of them come together to create a powerful cumulative case. Much like a detective’s case for the guilt of an accused murderer, multiple independent lines of evidence are presented that all point to the guilt of the accused. If such a method is valid for discovering the truth behind the claim that a murder took place and for the specific identity of the murdered, then the same method is also valid in determining the truth behind the claim that God exists and the identity of this God.

God’s Crime Scene

One of my favorite books that takes some of these arguments and presents the cumulative case comes from cold-case homicide detective J. Warner Wallace. In his book “God’s Crime Scene: A Cold-Case Detective Examines The Evidence For A Divinely Created Universe.” Wallace presents seven independent lines of evidence that all point to God’s existence in the same way that he would present multiple lines of evidence to a jury for the guilt of an accused murderer. The lines of evidence he presents are summarized in these quotes from the book:

Does God Exist

  1. The Beginning– “The Standard Cosmological Model, accepted by physicists today is grounded on the foundational premise that the universe came into being from something beyond the space, time, matter, and energy of our universe.”
  2. Signs of Design– “The totality and interconnected nature of our galaxy’s unique backstory, along with its rare circumstances and unlikely conditions, overwhelmingly indicate design.”
  3. Consciousness– “In order to think rationally about our thoughts, we must have the freedom to do so, but this freedom is unavailable if the laws of physics and chemistry are controlling our thoughts.”
  4. Law and Order (Morality)– “Naturalism cannot adequately explain the existence of objective moral truths or objective, transcendent personal obligations.”
  5. The Origin of Life– “With each passing year, the level of complexity and interaction at the cellular level has become more apparent and more difficult to explain.”
  6. Free Will– “Choice is a feature of design and a reflection of intelligent agency. Designers make conscious choices between options. Their designs often reflect these decisions, especially when other options are available.”
  7. Evidence of Evil– “True evil requires a source of transcendent righteousness, a source for goodness that transcends the universe and everything in it.”

Wallace concludes by stating that as a detective, who must follow the evidence where it leads, “I believe God exists because the evidence leaves me no reasonable alternative.” If the objective standard of morality exists (God), then that standard is what must be used to judge ethical and political positions.

Conclusion- Prepare for Your Ethical Discussions With Objective Evidence For God’s Existence

If you find yourself involved in discussions of an ethical or political nature or just want to be able to more critically evaluate the political and ethical claims of others, I highly recommend that you pick up a copy of Wallace’s book to help establish a foundational point on which to begin evaluation and discussion. While not comprehensive on the case for God’s existence, it is one of the most accessible and engaging books on this topic, and it should not be passed up by anyone serious about investigating the truth of reality and morality.
For more great books on God’s existence, check out the many books that I have reviewed on this blog, and for the topic of ethics and politics, specifically, please check out my Top 5 Recommended Books for diving into those details.

 


Luke Nix holds a bachelor’s degree in Computer Science and works as a Desktop Support Manager for a local precious metal exchange company in Oklahoma.

Original Blog Source: http://bit.ly/2Xz6qvS

By Maverick Christian

To begin, I will quote Alvin Plantinga:

The argument, in essence, is this: that we ordinarily think that the content of a belief, or an intention, or an action is relevant to the actions caused by beliefs, intentions, and actions. I believe that there is a beer in the fridge; we ordinarily think that it is in virtue of its content that this belief causes me to go to the fridge. I intend to get a beer from the fridge and I intend to do so; we ordinarily think that the content of this intention and of carrying it out is causally relevant to my action of going to the fridge. We don’t just ordinarily think these things; they are nothing but sobering truth. I’m going to argue that if materialism about us human beings… were true, then these things are false: It would not be in virtue of their content that beliefs, intentions, and actions do what they do. [1]

For simplicity, let’s just consider beliefs. In materialism, the belief coin has two sides: the neurophysiological/NF properties (certain neurons wire in a certain way, etc.) of the belief, and the actual semantic content of the belief (e.g., there’s a beer in the fridge ). In dualism (the idea that our minds are a composite of the physical brain and a nonphysical mental component, e.g., the soul) it is possible that the content of a belief can modify behavior; e.g., I believe something and on the basis of this belief my soul impacts my neural pathways in a certain way to cause a behavior.

On materialism, however, the content of a belief is causally irrelevant in the sense that (given materialism) a belief causes an effect in virtue of its NF properties, and not in virtue of its content. We can see this by doing a little thought experiment. Suppose a given person’s belief, say, the belief that there is a cold soda in the fridge , had the same NF properties, but a completely different content, such as that the moon is made of green cheese . Would the person’s behavior be different if the belief had the same NF properties, but different content? It wouldn’t, because having the same neurophysiological properties means that we would have the same electrical impulses traveling along the same neural pathways and thus emitting the same muscular contractions. So if materialism were true, the content of our beliefs would be causally irrelevant. The argument in a nutshell is this:

  1. If materialism is true, then the content of our beliefs is causally irrelevant.
  2. But the content of our beliefs is causally relevant.
  3. Therefore, materialism is false.

In response one might say that there is something wrong with the thought experiment, since it is metaphysically impossible for a given set of neurophysiological properties to have distinct semantic content. Even if I were a materialist, this does not seem at all plausible to me. The idea of ​​moving subatomic particles around producing semantic content seems almost mystical, and it seems easily conceivable that there is a possible world in which the same moving subatomic particles generate different semantic content, although as a materialist I would like to believe that this might involve the fine-tuning of some kind of physical necessity that makes the moving subatomic particles generate mental states. Still, to my mind’s eye such an adjustment seems conceivable and metaphysically possible.

But even if it is not possible for a given set of NF properties to have a different semantic content associated with it, does this prevent the statement “If a given set of NF properties were to have a different content, the behavior would be the same” from being meaningfully true? I think not. In philosophy, propositions of the form “If P were true, then Q would be true,” where P is an impossibility, are called counterpossible. There seem to be counterpossible statements that are meaningfully true. For example, suppose the renowned mathematician Kurt Gödel proved a certain theorem; it is impossible for theorems to turn out to be false, since they are necessarily true. However, as Alvin Plantinga points out, “If Mic were to prove that Gödel was wrong, mathematicians everywhere would be astonished; it is not true that if Mic were to prove that Gödel was wrong, mathematicians everywhere would yawn with boredom.” [2] So even if “if a given set of NF properties were to have a different content, it would result in the same behavior” were contra-possible, this does not seem to prevent the statement from being meaningfully true.

Reductive and non-reductionist materialism

Another way to try to avoid the semantic content of a belief being causally irrelevant is to take the view that a belief is just a combination of physical properties; the view that beliefs are reducible to physical states in this sort of way is called reductive materialism . Suppose we have P1, P2, P3… Pn to represent various physical properties (e.g., human neurophysiological properties), and let ∨ represent “or.” A reductive materialist might believe that a certain belief is just the disjunction (a set of things related by “or”) of certain physical properties like these:

P1∨ P2 ∨ P3…

Most likely, on reductive materialism a belief would be (merely) a disjunction of a set of physical properties that constitute a given mental state, something like this where & represents “and”:

(P1& P7 & P11…) ∨ (P5 & P63 &…) ∨…

The “∨” is necessary, since it is possible for different sets of physical states to correspond to a given belief (if materialism is true, for example, it would seem that alien neurophysiologies or mechanical silicon brains could also be configured to have a given belief). The above sort of structure “(A & B) ∨ (C & D & E) ∨…” is what logic and math gurus call a boolean combination . In contrast to reductionist materialism which says that beliefs are reducible to NF properties in the way described above, non-reductionist materialism denies this, but does make the claim that beliefs are determined by physical states. One might believe that a belief emerges from physical properties in a way that is roughly analogous to moisture emerging from the combination of hydrogen and oxygen in H2O.

A reductionist materialist might claim that since beliefs are just a (Boolean) combination of NF properties, it might well be that it is in virtue of having semantic content that a belief is causally relevant (this is not necessarily so, because belief is really a disjunction of sets of NF properties, so it would still be possible for a person’s belief to produce behavior in virtue of its NF properties rather than its semantic content, but a reductionist materialist might believe that it is at least possible for a human being’s belief to produce behavior in virtue of having content).

The problem with reductive materialism

Plantinga argues that even if it is true that a belief is causally relevant in virtue of its having a certain content, it does not follow that the semantic content is itself causally relevant. Plantinga gives the following illustration. Suppose Alvin throws a ball that has a mass of 0.2 kilograms, and the ball hits a glass window, causing it to break. If the ball had been much lighter (say, the mass of a feather), it would not have broken the glass, so the ball breaks the window in virtue of (among other things) its being 0.2 kilograms. Now suppose that the property of having a mass of 0.2 kg is Sam’s favorite property. Thus, we have the following:

Having a mass of 0.2 kg = Sam’s favorite property

Since having a mass of 0.2 kg is Sam’s favorite property (which is not his favorite property by definition, but reductionist materialists similarly do not [normally] believe that the identity relation between a belief and a boolean combination of NF properties holds by definition), then it follows that a ball breaks the window in virtue of having Sam’s favorite property. And yet:

Having a mass of 0.2 kg is Sam’s favorite property.

It doesn’t actually seem to have anything to do with the ball breaking the window, even though it is in virtue of having Sam’s favorite property of the ball breaking the window. Similarly, the fact that a set of NF properties is a belief doesn’t seem to have anything to do with the set of NF properties causing behavior, even though it is true that a belief causes behavior in virtue of having a certain semantic content.

I think we can make this clearer by considering the following thought experiment. Suppose that reductionist materialism is true and a mad scientist inserts a belief interface device (BID) into Smith’s brain, which acts as a new interface between Smith’s belief and behavior. For example, the mad scientist sets up the BID so that when Smith believes that I am thirsty, the NF properties of this belief electrochemically affect the BID and the BID subsequently causes Smith’s body to take a drink of water. The mad scientist can set up the BID at will so that any given belief can cause almost any behavior. For example, the mad scientist sets up the BID so that the NF properties of the belief that drinking water will kill me and I don’t want to die trigger an electrochemical reaction that (thanks to the belief interface device) causes Smith’s body to get a drink of water. The mad scientist sets up the CID again so that the NF properties of the belief that I will never see a Nicolas Cage movie cause Smith to go see a Nicolas Cage movie, and the NF properties of the belief that grass is air cause Smith to eat coconut ice cream after a fish dinner. All of this would be possible on reductionist materialism because a human being’s belief causes effects in virtue of its NF properties, not its semantic content, even if it were the case that beliefs are just (boolean) combinations of NF properties.

The DIC scenario shows that it is the NF properties of a belief and how those properties interact with the rest of the physical system that determines our behavior. DIC may be science fiction, but even in our own naturally occurring belief interface system, it is the NF properties of a belief and how those properties interact with the rest of our physiology that determines our behavior. To look at this slightly differently, let PS1, PS2, PS3… PSn each be a set of physical properties, e.g. PS1 is short for (P1 & P7 & P11…). Now suppose that the semantic content of the belief that I am thirsty is just a boolean combination of the physical properties like this:

PS1∨ PS2 ∨ PS3 ∨… ∨ PSn

Now imagine that Smith’s belief that I am thirsty is PS1. Plantinga would say that Smith’s belief does things in virtue of its physical (in this case, neurophysiological) properties rather than in virtue of the physical properties of being part of the Boolean combination that I am thirsty—just as when the ball breaks the window, in virtue of having a mass of 0.2 kilograms rather than in virtue of having a mass of 0.2 kg being Sam’s favorite property.

We can see that this is the case with any other thought experiment. Modifying Smith’s physiology a little, holding the NF properties of the belief (PS1) constant, and the NF properties of Smith’s belief that I am thirsty could cause something quite different, e.g. the physical properties of PS1 triggering an electrochemical reaction causing Smith to ignore the water around him and have to eat sand instead. This would be physically possible, since it is the NF properties of a belief and how those properties interact with the rest of the physical system that determine our behavior. Given materialism, it would just be a matter of luck (e.g. favorable physical laws) that belief and behavior are linked in a “rational” way by mimicking the semantic content influencing behavior, e.g. the NF properties of the belief that this plant is poisonous and hence I will not eat it causes me not to eat the plant, unlike the NF properties of the belief that grass is air causes me not to eat the plant. In any case, the thought experiment does illustrate that it is the NF properties of the belief and how those properties interact with the rest of the physical system that determine our behavior. Just as having a mass of 0.2 kg being Sam’s favorite property doesn’t seem to have anything to do with why the ball breaks the window, so too does PS1 being a member of the Boolean combination of I’m thirsty not seem to have anything to do with why PS1 does the things it does. If that is true, then the semantic content of a belief seems to be causally irrelevant in the sense that a belief does things in virtue of its NF properties, and not because of its semantic content.

Conclusion

Given materialism, the semantic content of a belief is causally irrelevant in the sense that a belief does things in virtue of its NF properties, not because of its semantic content. If a given set of NF properties had different semantic content, it would result in the same behavior (the same neurophysiological properties means we would have the same electrical impulses traveling along the same neural pathways and thus emitting the same muscle contractions). Even if reductionist materialism were true, beliefs seem to cause behavior in virtue of their NF properties, not because of their semantic content. The DIC scenario in particular illustrates that even on reductionist materialism, the semantic content of a belief can be absolutely unrelated to the person’s external environment when that belief causes behavior, for example, the situation in which the NF properties of the belief that grass is air cause Smith to eat coconut ice cream. So we have the following argument:

  1. If materialism is true, then the content of our beliefs is causally irrelevant.
  2. But the content of our beliefs is causally relevant.
  3. Therefore, materialism is false.

If materialism were true, a belief would do things in virtue of its NF properties and how those properties interact with the rest of the physical system. Even if the semantic content of a belief is just a boolean combination of physical properties, a set of physical properties that is a member of that boolean combination seems to have nothing to do with why that set of physical properties causally affects other things in one’s body, just as having a mass of 0.2 kg being Sam’s favorite property seems to have nothing to do with why the ball breaks the window.

Grades

[1] Plantinga, Alvin. “A New Argument against Materialism”  Philosophia Christi  14.1 (Summer 2012) p. 9

[2] Plantinga, Alvin. “A New Argument against Materialism”  Philosophia Christi  14.1 (Summer 2012) p. 21

 


Original Blog: http://bit.ly/2ZVw4bT

Translated and edited by Jairo Izquierdo

If you get between a mama bear and her cubs, you’ll be in big trouble. Frank interviews Hillary Morgan Ferrer, who joined up with other mama bears, to show you how you can protect your cubs from the trouble generated by the false ideas that are celebrated in our culture. These include:

Self-Help Culture: the false belief that we are capable of fixing all of our own problems

Naturalism: the false assumption that natural laws alone govern order and complexity

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