Why God Is Not In Time

Why God Is Not In Time

By J. Brian Huffling

Is God in time? This is a popular question. Does it matter? What does it mean for God to be in time or not? In this article, I will argue that the answer to this question is terribly important in maintaining a biblical and orthodox view of God. In order to answer this question, we must first ask, “What is time?”

“Are you an A-theorist or a B-theorist?” I’m often asked. A-theory and B-theory have been two major views of time since the early 20thcentury. The A-theory states that the past, present, and future exists in some way. We are moving “through” time in a sense. Some views of this theory hold that the past is getting bigger with each passing moment; others hold that the future is getting smaller. The commonality is that time is moving from future to past. Since this view holds that there are different tenses, it is considered a “tensed” theory of time.

The B-theory holds that there are no tenses and that all events exist either simultaneously, before, or after one another, because time doesn’t “pass” through one moment to the next. Thus, it is considered a “tenseless” theory of time. Instead of saying event A is past in relation to event B, the B-theorist would say that event A is before event B. For example, George Washington exists before Abraham Lincoln, but not in some temporal existence called “the past.” In both of these theories, time is said to “exist” in some way. Thus, time is not moving in any way, but we can describe events temporally by saying one event is before or after another event without using tenses such as “past” or “future.”

An oft-forgotten view says that time doesn’t “exist” at all. The A and B theories “reify” time (from the Latin res meaning “thing”). That is, they make time into an existing thing. Rather than saying time is a thing, those who follow Aristotle say that time doesn’t exist; rather, things exist and time is a measurement of how those things change. For example, there is no such thing as a year. A year is simply the measurement of how long it takes the Earth to revolve around the sun. It is a measurement of the Earth’s change. In my view, this view has more explanatory power and creates fewer problems. This discussion gets very technical very fast, but this is the gist of it. So how does this relate to God?

Methods of Inquiry

There are two basic ways to ask, “Is God a temporal being?” One is to look at all of the problems that arise with one view or the other and take the opposite position. Such a method has become par for the course in issues of metaphysics and philosophy of religion. The other way is systematic. Instead of simply seeing which view has fewer problems, a systematic view first deduces what God’s nature is like and then looks at how to answer such questions as to how does he relate to creation? Such a method is less ad hoc (that is, one doesn’t just make God up as he goes in an effort to solve problems), but rather tries to gain an understanding of what God is like before even asking secondary or tertiary questions. God’s nature thus becomes primary and such questions become secondary.

In keeping with the first method (of solving problems before first seeing what God is like), many contemporary thinkers on this issue believe that God must be temporal. Several arguments are marshaled for this conclusion. One common one is God’s knowledge. It is generally conceded that God knows what is going on in the world. But things in the world are changing. If what God knows changes, then God’s knowledge changes. But if God’s knowledge changes then God changes. And if God changes then he is temporal. It is argued that if his knowledge does not change, then he can’t have knowledge of the changing world. However, if he doesn’t have knowledge of the changing world, then his knowledge is limited. His knowledge is not limited. Therefore, he knows the changing world and is thus temporal.

This type of argument suffers from blurring the Creator/creature distinction. It unduly anthropomorphizes God. A Thomistic (following Thomas Aquinas) response to this argument is to point out that God is not a human and does not know the way humans know. We know through our senses. God does not have senses, so he can’t know that way. This is not a limitation on his part, for he knows his creation in a more perfect way. Rather than having to “look outside” of himself in the way we do, since God is the creator and sustainer of creation, he knows the universe by simply knowing himself since he is the perfect and complete cause of it. He is an eternal cause of a temporal effect. He has complete and perfect knowledge of his creation simultaneously. He is not reactive; he is pure act. He does not have to wait and see what is going on. Thus, his knowledge is timeless.

Defenders of divine temporality may retort that since the future isn’t a thing to be known as it does not exist and only existing things can be known. However, this unnecessarily reifies time (makes it into a thing). It further begs the question by saying God necessarily knows by some temporal means. If he does not, God does not need to “wait” for the future to happen, as he doesn’t learn in that way anyway. This reply also seems unbiblical as it is clear God has “foreknown” or ordained things “prior” to his creating the universe (Eph. 1:4). He does not need to wait and see what happens.

An example of a systematic approach is that of Thomas Aquinas. He first argues that God is pure act (existence), and is thus simple. Divine simplicity means that he has no parts (physical or metaphysical). (If you want to know more about divine simplicity read this article. This article deals with objections to the theory.) If he has no parts, then he cannot change, since change requires at least two parts: a state of existence and a state of possible existence that becomes actual. If God has no such metaphysical parts, then he can’t change. Further, if time is the measurement of change, then God is not measured by time. He is thus not temporal, but atemporal or eternal. Such states are philosophically different from ‘everlasting’ as the latter means always existing with no end. A temporal being like humans are everlasting, but this state of existence is different from an atemporal being that has no succession of moments or change.

Problems With Thinking God Is Temporal

Many problems arise if we say God is temporal. Ultimately we will again be blurring the Creator/creature distinction. If God is temporal, then he is changing, reactive (not active), and passive. If he changes, then he is composed of act and potency (existence with the possibility to change, which are different metaphysical parts). If he is composed, then he needs a composer, and he is not God. Further, if his knowledge changes, then he is not infinite since his knowledge would be increasing (an actual infinite cannot increase or be added to as it would not be infinite, to begin with, if more can be added to it). He also would not be perfect. What would he be changing from imperfection to perfection, perfection to perfection (this is not possible), or perfection to imperfection? The first option would seem to be the case since he would be learning something he did not know to begin with.

The difference with such a picture of God is that it rejects the classical picture of God as taught in the creeds, by the church fathers, and what Scripture and reason dictate. It replaces classical theism with process theology. Process theology teaches that God is in a process of becoming (becoming actual). He in a way learns, grows, and becomes. This picture of God is very passive, and often makes God part of his creation. Mainline Christians reject such a notion of God explicitly, but many implicitly endorse such a notion when they say God is temporal. For, if he really is temporal, then he is changing. And to be in a state of change is to be in a process. Thus, process theology rears its ugly head, even if in a nicer outfit. We are also left with this “God” being finite for the above reason that his being is added to in terms of knowledge and possibly other areas.

But What About the Bible?

The Bible describes God as being active in the world, changing in certain ways, and seemingly not knowing things, such as what was going on in Sodom and Gomorrah: “I will go down to see whether they have done altogether according to the outcry that has come to me. And if not, I will know” (Gen. 18:21). The Bible also describes God in various metaphorical ways, such as having physical body parts. Such descriptions are figures of speech. When trying to discover what God is like we need to describe him in literal ways. We know him through creation, as Paul says in Rom. 1:18-21. This means that we don’t make metaphors literal, metaphysical expressions of the divine nature. If God is spirit (John 4:4), then he can’t have body parts. The Bible is not contradicting itself; it is sometimes using metaphorical language and sometimes using metaphysical (literal) language. There are truths in metaphorical expressions, however. For example, when the Bible says that God is a rock, it means that like a rock he is strong and provides protection. Further, the Bible is not a systematic theology book. It does contain theology, but it is primarily a series of books and letters written to convey God’s relationship with Israel in the Old Testament, and the gospel and how it relates to believers and unbelievers in the New Testament. But it is not a systematic theology or philosophy book. Again, as Paul says, God’s “divine nature and eternal power” are known through creation. We know what God is like in a more literal way by studying him through his creation.

Conclusion

Questions like the one we have been considering are not just for professional philosophers. The way we answer this question will determine what we think about God and his relation to time and about his nature and his relation to creation in general. The answer to such questions should not arise out of simply trying to solve problems one by one; but rather discovering what God is like from his creation and then answering questions after we have a systematic view of God’s nature and attributes. This is an incredibly important issue that requires much consideration. It is part of being an intellectual and informed Christian. It is also one way we can worship God with our minds.

 

Original Blog Source: http://bit.ly/2PukGPQ

/by
Did We Really Not Have A New Testament Canon Till The Fourth Century_

Did We Really Not Have A New Testament Canon Till The Fourth Century?

,

By Ryan Leasure

Is it true the New Testament documents weren’t Scripture until the fourth century? That is, the books weren’t authoritative until church councils conferred authority upon them? Liberal scholars make this suggestion since it removes any supernatural explanation for the New Testament canon. To them, a scriptural authority can be explained merely on human terms.

Some of our Roman Catholic friends make a case for the fourth century also, but for other reasons. For them, ultimate authority resides in the church. Therefore, without the church’s stamp of approval, the New Testament wouldn’t carry any authority.

But is this an accurate representation of the New Testament documents? Were they not Scripture until the church pronounced authority on them in the fourth century? In order to answer this question, we need to look at how the early church viewed these documents.

Fourth Century Church Councils

For starters, let me say that no fourth-century councils gave authority to the New Testament documents. The Da Vinci Code was wrong when it said that the Council of Nicea (AD 325), under the direction of Constantine, formed the New Testament canon. The Council of Nicea had nothing to do with the canon.1

In fact, we have no church-wide council from the fourth century that determined which books should be included in the New Testament canon. What we have are; instead, regional church councils affirming the books which had already functioned as Scripture for the church. In other words, these church councils didn’t grant authority to any New Testament books. Rather, they merely recognized which books were already authoritative. This distinction is crucial.

Perhaps you’re wondering what took so long? Why didn’t the church make a list much earlier? One explanation is that for the first three centuries, Christianity was, for the most part, an illegal religion which faced ongoing persecution. In fact, in AD 303, Emperor Diocletian ordered all Christians to sacrifice to the pagan gods or else face imprisonment or extermination. Moreover, he ordered them to hand over all their Scripture to be burned.

For these reasons, the church couldn’t organize empire-wide councils to affirm the New Testament canon. Furthermore, they couldn’t circulate their books lest the Roman officials confiscate them. Once Constantine legalized Christianity in the fourth century, the church could disperse their books freely. At this juncture, all the churches had exposure to the various documents, and therefore, affirmed the authority of the twenty-seven books.

Second Century Church Leaders

The church’s affirmation of the New Testament canon in the fourth century, however, didn’t come in a vacuum. Christians had long viewed these books as authoritative. In fact, a number of second-century leaders affirm the New Testament’s authority in their writings.

Irenaeus (Ad 180)

More than any other church father, Irenaeus addresses canonical issues. For example, he declares that among the many so-called gospels, only four of them carry authority. He writes:

It is not possible that the gospels can be either more or fewer than the number they are. For since there are four zones of the world in which we live and four principle winds.2

Irenaeus elsewhere indicates why these four gospels, and none other, are canonical. He affirms the four Gospels’ because they alone are backed by apostolic authority, while the others were written by second century Gnostics. Given that he was a disciple of Polycarp who knew the apostle John personally, his knowledge of their authorship carries significant weight.

Theophilus Of Antioch (Ad 177)

As bishop of Antioch, Theophilus equates the Old Testament prophets with the Gospels in his writings.

Concerning the righteousness which the law enjoined, confirmatory utterances are found both with the prophets and in the Gospels, because they all spoke inspired by one Spirit of God.3

Not only does he elevate the Gospels on par with Old Testament Scriptures, Theophilus affirms divine inspiration for the Gospels.

Justin Martyr (Ad 150-160)

Justin Martyr, writing earlier than Irenaeus and Theophilus, addresses the Gospels or the “memoirs” of the apostles on several occasions. On one instance, he talks about their role in worship.

And on the day called Sunday, all who live in cities or in the country gather together to one place, and the memoirs of the apostles or the writings of the prophets are read, as long as time permits; then, when the reader has ceased, the president verbally instructs, and exhorts to the imitation of these good things.4

This quote speaks volumes. Justin indicates that the early church thought so highly of the Gospels that they included them into their worship service right alongside the Old Testament Scriptures.

Polycarp (Ad 110)

Polycarp was a student and companion of the apostle John. In one of his writings, he explicitly designates Paul’s writings as Scripture when he states:

As it is written in these Scriptures, “Be angry and do not sin and do not let the sun go down on your anger.”

Writing early in the second century, Polycarp quotes from Ephesians 4:26 and calls it Scripture — long before the fourth-century councils.

A number of other early sources — Ignatius, Clement of Rome, and the Epistle of Barnabas — discuss the New Testament canon as well.

The New Testament Writers

So far, we’ve determined that the second-century church regarded the New Testament writings as authoritative Scripture. But can we go back even further? I believe we can by looking at the New Testament writings themselves.

2 Peter 3:15-16

Bear in mind that our Lord’s patience means salvation, just as our dear brother Paul also wrote you with the wisdom that God gave him. He writes the same way in all his letters, speaking in them of these matters. His letters contain some things that are hard to understand, which ignorant and unstable people distort, as they do the other Scriptures, to their own destruction.

In this text, Peter equates Paul’s writings with the Old Testament Scriptures.

1 Timothy 5:18

For Scripture says, “Do not muzzle an ox while it is treading out the grain,” and “The worker deserves his wages.”

In this passage, Paul quotes Deuteronomy 25:4 “Do not muzzle an ox while it is treading out the grain,” and Luke 10:7 “The worker deserves his wages,” and calls them both Scripture. In other words, Luke’s Gospel was on the same authoritative level as the Old Testament.

1 Thessalonians 2:13

In this letter, Paul gives the impression that he is consciously aware that his writings carry authority from God.

And we also thank God continually because, when you received the word of God, which you heard from us, you accepted it not as a human word, but as it actually is, the word of God, which is indeed at work in you who believe.

Scripture From The Beginning

Contrary to the skeptic and the Catholic view, the New Testament writings carried Scriptural authority from the time of their composition. New Testament scholar N. T. Wright argues that the authors “were conscious of a unique vocation to write Jesus-shaped, Spirit-led, church-shaping books, as part of their strange first-generation calling.”5 Since these books were authoritative from the very beginning, the fourth-century councils in no way granted authority to them. Rather, they merely recognized their already existing authority — an authority they had since the first century.

 

Ryan Leasure holds an M.A. from Furman University and an M.Div. from the Southern Baptist Theological Seminary. He currently serves as a pastor at Grace Bible Church in Moore, SC.

Original Blog Source: http://bit.ly/2OW5UAc

/by
El debate como un deber cristiano

El debate como un deber cristiano

By Douglas Wilson

For many Christians, it seems a reasonable question to ask whether it is at all profitable for us to participate in public debates. Who has ever changed their mind because of some public debate? Why argue about anything? Logomachies only cause headaches.

In contrast to this, I want to argue that such a quietist position is not only incompatible with the teaching of Scripture, but runs directly counter to it. We are called to speak to unbelievers in the public square, and we must do so in a way that includes responding to their objections. We are called to prevail in debates of this kind (in a particular way). When we do this well, what happens is public debate, the kind of debate that can be very helpful.

But before we make the case for this, it must first be said that those who want to avoid “shows unseemly for Jesus” have a point in their favor. There are some debates that serve no purpose, and the Bible expressly tells us to avoid them. But when Scripture tells us not to lose our battles in a particular way, we must not infer from this an imaginary duty not to fight those battles at all.

That said, I would like to begin by pointing out a few places where Christians are told not to engage in verbal bickering. While we are not to avoid all debates, we do need to avoid some debates.

“Speak evil of no one, not quarrelsome, but gentle, showing all gentleness to all men. For we ourselves were once foolish, disobedient, deceived, serving various lusts and pleasures, living in malice and envy, hateful and hating one another.” (Titus 3:2-3)

We must not be “troublemakers.”

“But put away foolish and senseless controversies, knowing that they breed strife. For the Lord’s servant must not be contentious but kind to all, apt to teach, patient, in gentleness correcting those who oppose themselves, in the hope that God may grant them repentance leading to a knowledge of the truth and that they may escape from the snare of the devil, by whom they are held captive at his will.” (2 Timothy 2:23-26)

We are told to stay out of stupid, fruitless debates, where the issue being discussed is guaranteed to spiral downward into meaningless shouting. The servant of the Lord is not to be contentious. But even in this case, note that the servant of the Lord is to “instruct those who oppose.” In other words, Paul’s rule here is “not this kind of debate,” and not, “do not debate.”

We must assess the situation, and read the crowd. There are times when we must not stoop to their level (Prov. 26:4). But, since wisdom is not optional, there are times when we must step into their world in order to execute the reductio (Prov. 26:5).

So with these caveats in mind, why should we debate? Well, to start where every Christian should always start, let’s look at the life of Jesus. Asking whether it is legitimate to debate is like asking whether it is permissible to speak in parables. Jesus spoke in parables constantly, and he also engaged in constant public pointing and objecting.

Jesus deftly answered a question about his authority with a question about John the Baptist (Matt. 21:27). Jesus silenced the Sadducees in a debate about the resurrection (Matt. 22:29). Jesus debated the highly charged issue of taxes (Mark 12:17). Jesus debated the devil (Luke 4:4). Jesus debated the issue of Sabbath healing (Luke 5:22). And Jesus takes on his opponents on the issue of his own identity (John 8:14). There are many other examples. In fact, there are so many examples of polemical exchanges in the gospels that questions about the appropriateness of polemical exchanges can only arise if people are ignorant of the gospels, or if they come to the gospels with a strong, preconceived idea about Jesus that they learned elsewhere.

This is strange, but not surprising, because there is a strong non-biblical tradition that labels Jesus as the original hippie, teaching us all to make peace. This goes directly against all the teachings the Lord made about hellfire, and he won the numerous debates with established theologians, and, as Sayers or Chesterton once said, we must not forget the time he threw the furniture down the temple steps. A gentle, meek, humble Jesus, no.

That said, it is not surprising that we find instructions that reveal how public shock is actually a pastoral duty.

“Hold fast the faithful word as taught, that ye may be able by sound doctrine both to exhort and to convince those that contradict. For there are many unruly, empty talkers, and deceivers, especially they of the circumcision; whose mouths must be stopped.” ( Titus 1:9-11 ).

This not only requires pastors to debate false teachers, it requires them to win those debates.

“And when he was minded to pass into Achaia, the brethren encouraged him, and wrote to the disciples to receive him. And when he came there, he greatly helped those who through grace had believed, for he vehemently refuted the Jews publicly, proving from the Scriptures that Jesus was the Christ.” (Acts 18:27-28)

Putting this all together, we see the biblical reasons for debate. We see them both in the example of Jesus, and in the instructions given to pastors in the first century. The point of debating is to silence the stubborn, talkative, and overthinking. When this happens, it is sometimes not obvious to the false teacher that he has been silenced – even though it is obvious to everyone else. This is the valuable service that Apollos offered – he was a help to believers in the way he refuted the Jews’ question of whether Jesus was the Messiah. Translated into a modern setting, if a believer effectively refuted someone arguing for gay marriage, or an atheist denying God, the debate on stage might not be resolved at all. However, there are many believers in the audience who have heard those same arguments in numerous classrooms, and we now know that these arguments can be effectively countered. Apollos was a great help to believers.

In godly debate, you are trying to win men and not arguments, and you have to remember that many of those who are trying to win are in the audience. In the great public issues of the day, there are a great many people on the fence. Debates can have an enormous impact on “the swing segment.” I would like to say that when we observe how ineffective our debates are, we would do much better to heed the scriptures and lament how ineffective our debaters are. This is an activity that should be encouraged, honored, and praised, and we should provide the necessary training for those who are called to it. And training programs should reject those bellicose types who only want to join a “who you gonna call?” Cultbusters .

In conclusion, I would like to say a few things about one of the great arenas for demonstrating excellent debating skills, and that would be the classrooms of secular universities. To what extent should Christians just keep their heads down? And if they do speak up, how should they speak up?

I would suggest three things to students in that position. The first is that if you want to challenge a teacher, you should do so with an established ethic. By this, I mean don’t be a struggling student who only does half the reading, then walks up to the teacher with the safety on, and then when you’re shut down, runs away crying. Earn your right to speak, and do so by being at the top of the class – or at the top of the class before you decide to open your mouth. If your grades slip after that, that’s up to the teacher.

Second, let most of your opportunities come to you. If you challenge everything you could possibly challenge (depending on the class) you’re going to do it every ten minutes. If you’re in a target-rich environment, then you’re likely to attack one every 25. You’ll sufficiently and effectively prove your point, and in this scenario – trust me – a little goes a long way.

And finally, as a student, you are not a professor. That means you should not preach, or try to hijack the lecture. There is a place for gospel declaration, but this is not it. That being said, it is not out of place for a student to ask questions. That is not inappropriate – that is a student’s calling and vocation. And if you ask the right questions for which the professor does not have answers, then you do not have to jump to conclusions. You can do that in conversations with other students after class. Keep discussions (in this context) in the interrogative.

If you learn to do this well, it may be an indication that you are called to an apologetic ministry after graduation. If this happens, you will have more tools available than as a humble student.

 

Original Blog: http://bit.ly/2Pdmj3b

Translated by Jairo Izquierdo Hernandez

/by
La omnibenevolencia y el odio de Dios

La omnibenevolencia y el odio de Dios

Some time ago Tim Stratton wrote a blog that dealt with the Omnibenevolence of God . Tim said regarding Allah, that He is not an all-loving God, “and whatever Allah does is simply called ‘good’ even if it is abhorrent.” Of course, the reactions from the atheist camp were not long in coming and in response he received the following objection:

This sounds like the Christian view, too. If God is the standard of “good” then everything God does is by definition good. By that argument, hatred would be, by definition, “good.” What makes benevolence inherently “good” if you’re getting the standard of “good” from God? By that argument, if God is benevolent then benevolence is good, but if God happens to be a hateful being then one has to call it “hate” rather than benevolence. Unless you’re saying that benevolence is inherently good, apart from God, and therefore benevolence is a necessary trait of an “all-good” God. But that would mean that God has these traits because he’s good, and his goodness is distinguished from his possession of them—they would be good independently of God’s existence.

Tim Stratton called this objection a version of the Euthyphro Dilemma and offered an answer that evades the dilemma; however, it seems to me that while his answer clears up a lot of doubts, it does not fully resolve the problem; so I decided to address the objection directly with my friend Anton Schauble and see if we could refute the argument at its root.

Jairo: Anton, what do you think about this objection to the attribute of Omnibenevolence?

Anton: That argument is complete nonsense. What we are saying is that God (or the Good) is the standard for good and evil, not only because He is a criterion by which we measure good and evil, but because He is the ultimate source and paradigm of good, which is the same as unity and being.

Benevolence is good because it is positively real; whatever is positively real is both like and derived from God. In the same way, God cannot be anything else, He is the paradigm of good; benevolence is good, and malevolence is evil; for benevolence is a likeness to Good and malevolence a deviation from it. There is no way that Good could be anything else, so that it would be more like malevolence than like benevolence.

Take being, for example. God is the paradigm of being as it is of good. He is the best, and also the most real. Light is positive and darkness is negative, because light is as it is to be (it is something) and darkness is different from being (it is not something), but to imagine being being different, so that it is more like darkness than light? That is just nonsense. Being is what it is, necessarily. It cannot change, nor can it even be imagined to be different. This objector is thinking of God as a substance susceptible of different attributes—benevolence or malevolence—such that it could have one or the other.

Jairus: He also seems to point out that there is some contradiction in God’s attributes of being all-loving and of hating when he says, “If God is the standard of ‘good’ then everything God does is by definition good. By that argument, hatred would be by definition ‘good’.” He is completely lost, because the Scriptures teach that God does indeed hate, but He hates sin! And that is certainly a good thing. God being a Holy, Omnibenevolent Being, it follows that He cannot love sin, for to do so would be contradictory to His being. Hatred in God arises as a reaction to evil, to sin; it does not arise in God indiscriminately or for no reason or for petty reasons as in human beings, where such hatred that arises in us is certainly evil and is condemned by God. So hating sin, contrary to what the objector thinks, is perfectly consistent with God’s Omnibenevolence.

Anton: Correct. The objection would make sense if God were a substance rather than an essence. For example, it is like taking “love” univocally, but “love” does not mean the same thing in the statements “God loves” and “John loves” because John is a substance modified by the accident of love, whereas God is an essence identical to essential Love. Therefore, Scripture says not only that “God loves,” but that “God is love.”

Let us put it this way: if we abstract love from John, what remains is the substance, the man John, who exists but does not love. But if we abstract love from God, what remains is nothing; there is no God who does not love; in fact, the idea of ​​a God without love is an absolute absurdity.

Jairo: Yes, that is right. In my opinion, God’s love is an essential property of Him, so there is no possible world where God is not love.

In conclusion, we can say that the objection is a total failure for the following reasons:

  1. God cannot be anything other than what He is, it is absurd that benevolence can be malevolence.
  2. The hatred that arises in God is not a hatred towards anything; rather, His hatred is directed towards sin because He is Holy, a God who would tolerate sin in His being would not be worthy of worship.

 

Jairo Izquierdo Hernández is the founder of Christian Philosopher . He currently works as a Community Manager for the Christian organization Cross Examined . He is a member of the Christian Apologetics Alliance and a worship minister at the Christian Baptist Church Christ is the Answer in Puebla, Mexico.

Anton Schauble is a philosophy major at DeSales University, currently living in Congers, NY, United States.

/by
La paradoja de la omnipresencia

La paradoja de la omnipresencia

One of the objections to the existence of God is to try to prove that his concept is incoherent, and one way to do this is through the paradoxes of his attributes. In this blog we are going to discuss the paradoxes about Omnipresence.

There are many ways to pose this paradox, but I will use three that I found on Ad Baculum ‘s blog, into which all the others could be reduced:

  1. Taking as a premise that God exists, we can make a set with all those things and beings that exist and that have the characteristic of being omnipresent. This set would only contain God. On the other hand, we can make a set of all the things that are not omnipresent, in which would be me, my computer and so on until we have gathered everything that exists except God. However, omnipresence implies being everywhere, including in non-omnipresent things. In this way, God would be in the set of omnipresent things and in the set of non-omnipresent things, which is a paradox that implies the impossibility of being omnipresent.
  2. If it is true that “when we say that God is everywhere, it is not that one part of God is in one place and another in another: God is all of Himself everywhere,” it implies that God is everything, therefore He is both good and evil. Let me explain. If God is all of Himself everywhere, that means that God is contained in an electron. If all of God is occupying all of the matter in the electron, this would imply that God is the electron. I do not think that theists would disagree. If we continue, the same would occur with each subatomic particle. Therefore, if all of the smallest parts into which matter can be divided, if each of those parts is God, I suppose that the sum of any number of those parts would equal God, then I would be God, you would be God and Hitler would be God. The paradox is that God would be the whole and each of the parts. And it turns out that many of those parts generate suffering and injustice, therefore God could not be omnibenevolent. Or if He is omnibenevolent, He could not be omnipresent.
  3. If God is omnipresent, he cannot be absent from a place, therefore there is already something that he cannot do and he would not be omnipotent. [1]

So how does the theist refute this objection? Well, it all depends on how you think God exists in space. William Lane Craig says (and I agree with him):

I think God exists in time, but I don’t think he exists in space. So God is not in any particular place in the universe like in a church or a temple. Likewise, God is not “spread out” in space like some kind of invisible gas.

Therefore if God does not exist in space, then He is related to the world in a similar way as the soul is to the human body, connected in some way that can produce immediate effects.

My inclination is that God does not exist in space in a literal way, but is omnipresent in the sense that He is causally active and knowing at every point in space. So His omnipresence is a function of His causal activity, and with His omniscience He knows what is happening at every place in space; God transcends space, He is not in space.

This is not difficult to conceive, imagine a two-dimensional plane, and think that you do not exist in this two-dimensional plane, you transcend these two dimensions! Now extrapolate that to God, he does not exist in this three-dimensional plane, he transcends these three dimensions – not implying that he can exist in a four-dimensional plane, but that God does not exist within this three-dimensional plane and yet he exists. That it cannot be imagined does not mean that it is not conceivable; a million-sided figure is unimaginable, I cannot sketch a mental picture of such a figure, but of course it is conceivable that such a polygon exists. Similarly even though one cannot imagine God existing outside of space, I see no difficulty in that being conceivable. [2]

Now let’s analyze the paradox (1). First—granting that God is in space—the detractor seems to speak of sets and their function as something ontological; when he says phrases like “This set would only contain God” and “until we gather together everything that exists except God,” he seems to believe that he can actually place God in one or another set in a real way instead of just using sets as a heuristic device. When we speak of “there is/exists” a set, we are not using ontologically loaded language; that is, we do not mean that such sets exist concretely, much less physically as if we were saying “there is/exists” a monitor in front of me. Second, assuming that the detractor is a Platonist and believes that sets really do exist in reality, and if WLC’s position is correct (and I believe it is, or at least perfectly coherent), then God is not in any set because God does not exist in space.

Regarding (2), God is not found in evil (if by evil you mean evil entities such as demons or criminals) nor are subatomic particles found in it, since we saw that God transcends space.

As for (3), it’s not so much a paradox of omniscience as a paradox of omnipotence; it objects that if God is not in space, then there is something God cannot do. Two simple answers to this. First, let’s say that it is impossible for God to be in space; this does not present any problems for God nor does it degrade him in any way because clearly there are things he cannot do given his nature (he cannot be fooled, he cannot make mistakes, he cannot lie, etc.). Second, just because God is not spatially in the universe does not mean that he cannot physically manifest himself in it in some way; in fact, God did exactly that in the Old Testament accounts.

Finally, one might be tempted to say that such a definition of God’s omnipresence has no biblical support. I’m not so sure, notice how in Psalm 139 the author begins by praising God’s omniscience, and then goes on to praise God’s omnipresence. I dare say that the author acknowledges that because God knows everything, He can know every corner of the universe:

O LORD, you have searched me and known me. You know when I sit down and when I rise up; you understand my thoughts from afar. You have examined my going and my lying down, and all my ways are known to you. Even though there is no word on my tongue, behold, you, O LORD, know it altogether. You have compassed me behind and before, and laid your hand upon me. Knowledge is too wonderful for me; it is too high for me to comprehend. Where can I go from your Spirit? Or where can I flee from your presence? If I ascend to heaven, you are there; if I make my bed in Sheol, behold, you are there. If I take the wings of the morning and dwell in the farthest parts of the sea, even there your hand will lead me, and your right hand will hold me. If I say, “Surely the darkness will cover me,” even the night will shine around me. Even the darkness does not hide me from you, and the night shines like the day. the darkness and the light are the same to you.

Grades

[1] http://adbaculum.blogspot.mx/2007/04/tres-paradojas-sobre-la-omnipresencia.html (last visited in November 2009.

[2] http://www.reasonablefaith.org/questions-on-the-singularity-omnipresence-and-morality

 

Jairo Izquierdo Hernandez is the founder of Christian Philosopher . He currently works as Social Media Director and author for the Christian organization Cross Examined . He is a member of the Christian Apologetics Alliance and a worship minister at the Christian Baptist Church Christ is the Answer in Puebla, Mexico.

/by
El Dragón del Garaje vs Dios

El Dragón del Garaje vs Dios

In the recent debate between Frank Turek and Michael Shermer, the latter tried to invalidate Frank’s God hypothesis as an explanation for some facts about reality by using the famous “dragon in the garage” analogy, first used by Carl Sagan in his book The Demon-Haunted World .

This is the original analogy:

“There is a fire-breathing dragon living in my garage.” Suppose I were to make a statement like that to you. Perhaps you would like to test it out, see for yourself. There have been countless stories of dragons over the centuries, but no real evidence. What an opportunity!

—Show me —you say.

I take you to my garage. You look in and see a ladder, empty paint cans, and an old tricycle, but the dragon is gone.

—Where is the dragon? —he asks me.

“Oh, it’s here,” I reply, waving my hand vaguely. “I forgot to mention that it’s an invisible dragon.”

He suggests that I cover the garage floor with flour so that the dragon’s footprints remain.

“Good idea,” I reply, “but this dragon is floating in the air.”

He then proposes using an infrared sensor to detect invisible fire.

—Good idea, but invisible fire doesn’t give off heat either.

Suggests spray painting the dragon to make it visible.

—Good idea, except it’s a disembodied dragon and the paint wouldn’t stick to it.

And so on. I counter any physical proof you propose to me with a special explanation of why it won’t work. Now, what is the difference between an invisible, disembodied, floating dragon that breathes fire that doesn’t burn and a nonexistent dragon? If there is no way to disprove my claim, if there is no conceivable valid experiment against it, what does it mean to say that my dragon exists? Your inability to invalidate my hypothesis is not at all equivalent to proving it true. Claims that cannot be proven, assertions that are immune to refutation, are truly worthless, no matter how much value they may have in inspiring us or exciting our sense of wonder. What I have asked you to do is to end up accepting, in the absence of proof, what I say.

Shermer’s version has a few variations to ridicule Frank’s position of the existence of God as an explanation for the origin of the universe, objective moral values ​​and duties, and the fine-tuning of the universe. Shermer’s main aim is to show that the existence of God is impossible to disprove in the same way that you cannot disprove the existence of the dragon in the garage. But is this a good argument? Not really. Let me explain why.

The first thing Shermer would have us believe by using Sagan’s analogy is that the attributes of God that theists attribute to him are mere gratuitous assertions without any evidence. Here Shermer has in mind revealed theology, those attributes that we know God possesses through his revealed word to us, the Bible. But in the debate with Frank—and in non-presuppositional apologetics in general—one does not assert God’s attributes as in the case of the garage dragon. And although it is not necessary, let me compare the garage dragon and God with respect to their respective attributes.

Garage Dragon

Invisibility. This attribute is granted without any evidence.

Levitation. It is also not inferred based on any evidence.

Cold Fire. Like the previous ones, there is no argument to attribute this property to the dragon, moreover, the property is self-contradictory.

Immateriality. Zero arguments, and like cold fire, this is a contradictory property with a dragon. In order for a dragon to be a dragon, it must have a body with certain essential characteristics of a dragon, it cannot be incorporeal.

God

Creator, metaphysically necessary, self-existent. These attributes are inferred by means of the argument from contingent beings and by the ontological argument.

Transcendent cause, personal, beginningless, uncaused, timeless, spatially boundless, immaterial, personal, supremely powerful. These attributes are required by the nature of a cause transcending the universe and are inferred by the kalam cosmological argument.

Designer and highly intelligent. These attributes are inferred by the fine-tuning argument of the universe.

Perfectly good, whose nature is the standard of goodness and whose commands constitute our moral duties. And this last attribute is concluded by means of the moral argument.

As we can see, the garage dragon is completely deficient compared to God.

Shermer also calls the God hypothesis a special pleading fallacy, but we have seen from this comparison that this is not the case. No serious apologist in a debate sets out to counter objections to arguments for existence by claiming that the atheist does not have the capacity to understand the properties of God as the best explanation for some facts of reality.

Another important point is that Shermer also uses the garage dragon as a parody of God as an explanation for the following facts about reality: the absolute origin of the universe, fine-tuning, and the foundation for objective moral values ​​and duties. But his parody fails miserably for two reasons: the first is, as we have already seen, that some of the attributes that the garage dragon possesses are self-contradictory, which is more than enough reason to determine that such a dragon is impossible to exist. Then, for the sake of argument, I am going to be very kind in modifying the dragon by removing all of its contradictory properties and adding the property of omnipotence. Can the dragon be the transcendent cause of the origin of the universe when it has enough power to bring the universe into existence? No way! An essential property of the dragon is that it has to be material, corporeal, without that property it would cease to be a dragon. But if our version of the omnipotent dragon is corporeal, if it is a physical being, then it cannot be the cause of the origin of the universe, because one of the characteristics that a transcendent cause must have is to be immaterial; it cannot be material because matter comes into existence with the origin of the universe. The same goes for being the foundation of objective moral values ​​and duties; our dragon cannot be eternal; it had to come into existence together with the universe, therefore, it is contingent, and no contingent being can be the foundation for objective morality.

Conclusion

We have seen that the garage dragon analogy as presented by Michael Shermer as an argument against the God hypothesis is flawed for four reasons:

  1. Due to the contradictory attributes that the garage dragon possesses, we can affirm that its existence is impossible.
  2. God’s attributes are inferred by deductive arguments, which is not the case with the dragon in the garage.
  3. Defending the attributes of the garage dragon is indeed committing the fallacy of special pleading, but not in the case of God.
  4. The garage dragon as a parody of God to be the transcendent cause of the universe and the foundation for objective morality fails miserably because it is a contingent being (and that grants it a possible existence if we remove its contradictory properties).

 

Jairo Izquierdo Hernandez is the founder of Christian Philosopher . He currently works as Social Media Director and author for the Christian organization Cross Examined . He is a member of the Christian Apologetics Alliance, studies philosophy, and is a worship minister at the Christian Baptist church Christ is the Answer in Puebla, Mexico.

/by
William Lane Craig’s Secret Weapon Is His Amazing Wife Jan

William Lane Craig’s Secret Weapon Is His Amazing Wife Jan

,

Podcast: Play in new window

Subscribe: Apple Podcasts | Spotify | Amazon Music | Android | iHeartRadio | Blubrry | Email | TuneIn | RSS

By Wintery Knight

I want to draw your attention to a talk on “Vision in Life” given by Dr. William Lane Craig. Dr. Craig is the ablest defender of the Christian faith operating today. He has done formal academic debates with all of the best-known atheists on major university campuses in front of thousands of university students.

It turns out that he owes a lot of his success to his amazing wife Jan.

The MP3 file is here. (32 minutes)

This talk was Dr. Craig’s chapel address to Biola University students.

About 11 minutes into the talk, Bill describes what happened after he finished his Bachelor’s degree at Wheaton:

And so I joined the staff of Campus Crusade for Christ for 2 years and was assigned to Northern Illinois University. And that was where I met my wife Jan. She was a graduate of the University of North Dakota where she had come to faith in Christ. And she had a similar vision for her life of evangelism and discipleship.

And as we worked at NIU together, she with gals and I with the guys, leading students to Christ and discipling them to walk with the Lord, we fell in love. And we decided that we would be more effective if we joined forces and became a team.

So their reason for getting together was because they thought that they would be more effective in evangelism and discipleship if they worked as a team.

It is at this point in the talk where Bill begins to explain just how Jan molded him into the lean, mean debating machine that travels the world striking terror into the hearts of atheists.

Bill’s first story about Jan occurs early after their marriage while he is working on his first Master’s degree at Trinity:

And it was also at that time that I began to see what an invaluable asset the Lord had given me in Jan. I remember I came home from classes one day and found her at the kitchen table with all the catalogs and schedules and papers spread out in front of her and she said, “look! I’ve figured out how you can get two Masters degrees at the same time that it would normally take to get one! All you have to do is take overloads every semester, go to all full-time summer school and do all these other things, and you can do two MAs in the time it takes to do one!”

And I thought, whoa! Are you sure you really want to make the commitment it takes to do this kind of thing? And she said, “Yeah! Go for it!” And it was then I began to see that God had given me a very special woman who was my supporter – my cheerleader – and who really believed in me. And as long as she believed in me, that gave me the confidence to dream bigger dreams, and to take on challenges that I had never thought of before.

In an article on his website, he talks about how Jan encouraged him to do his first Ph.D.:

As graduation from Trinity neared, Jan and I were sitting one evening at the supper table in our little campus apartment, talking about what to do after graduation. Neither of us had any clear leading or inclination of what we should do next.

So Jan said to me, “Well if money were no object, what would you really like to do next?”

I replied, “If money were no object, what I’d really like to do is go to England and do a doctorate under John Hick.”

“Who’s he?” she asked.

“Oh, he’s this famous British philosopher who’s written extensively on arguments for the existence of God,” I explained. “If I could study with him, I could develop a cosmological argument for God’s existence.”

But it hardly seemed a realistic idea.

The next evening at supper Jan handed me a slip of paper with John Hick’s address on it. “I went to the library today and found out that he’s at the University of Birmingham in England,” she said. “Why don’t you write him a letter and ask him if you can do a doctoral thesis under him on the cosmological argument?”

What a woman! So I did, and to our amazement and delight, Professor Hick wrote back saying he’d be very pleased to supervise my doctoral work on that subject. So it was an open door!

And in the same article, he explains how Jan encouraged him to get his second Ph.D.:

As Jan and I neared the completion of my doctoral studies in Birmingham, our future path was again unclear to us. I had sent out a number of applications for teaching positions in philosophy at American universities but had received no bites. We didn’t know what to do.

I remember it like yesterday. We were sitting at the supper table in our little house outside Birmingham, and Jan suddenly said to me, “Well, if money were no object, what would you really like to do next?”

I laughed because I remembered how the Lord had used her question to guide us in the past. I had no trouble answering the question. “If money were no object, what I’d really like to do is go to Germany and study under Wolfhart Pannenberg.”

“Who’s he?”

“Oh, he’s this famous German theologian who’s defended the resurrection of Christ historically,” I explained. “If I could study with him, I could develop a historical apologetic for the resurrection of Jesus.”

Our conversation drifted to other subjects, but Jan later told me that my remark had just lit a fire under her. The next day while I was at the university, she slipped away to the library and began to research grants-in-aid for study at German universities. Most of the leads proved to be defunct or otherwise inapplicable to our situation. But there were two grants she found that were possibilities. You can imagine how surprised I was when she sprung them on me!

Both of these Ph.D. experiences are also described in the talk. And the talk concludes as follows:

I am so thankful to be married to a woman who is tremendously resourceful, tremendously talented and energetic, who could have pursued an independent career in any number of areas, but instead, she has chosen to wed her aspirations to mine, and to make it her goal to make me the most effective person I can be, for Christ. And she has been like my right arm in ministry over these many years. And it is a tremendous privilege to be a team with a person like that.

And you young men, I would encourage you, if you marry, to find a gal who shares your vision, not some independent vision, but who is interested in aligning herself with you, and pursuing together a common vision and goal that will draw you [together], so that you will avoid the growing separateness that so often creeps into marriages.

And now you know the rest of Bill’s story. The person you marry will have an enormous influence on the impact you will have for Christ and his Kingdom. It is up to you to decide whether that influence is going to be positive or negative, by deciding if you will marry and if you do marry, by deciding whom you will marry.

You may also be interested in this talk given by William Lane Craig, entitled “Healthy Relationships” (National Faculty Leadership Conf. 2008) (audio here) In that talk, he offers advice to Christians who want to have a marriage that is consistent with their Christian faith.

 

Original Blog Source: http://bit.ly/2OVxCwV

/by
Science And Imperialism

Science And Imperialism

, ,

By Terrell Clemmons

The Wall Street Journal commissioned Richard Dawkins and Karen Armstrong to respond independently to the question, “Where does evolution leave God?” Their answers became an article in the Life & Style section called Man vs. God.

Richard Dawkins said of Darwinian evolution, “We know, as certainly as we know anything in science, that this is the process that has generated life on our own planet.” Evolution, Dawkins concluded with his characteristic wit, is God’s “pink slip.” In other words, since science says Evolution is, we say God isn’t. (I discussed Dawkins’s argument for the non-existence of God in an earlier Salvo article.)

Karen Armstrong’s response was more artistic. She spoke of two complementary ways of arriving at truth, which the Greeks called mythos and logos, both of which were recognized by scholars as legitimate. Logos was reason, logic, intellect. But logos alone couldn’t speak to the deep question human beings ask like, What is the meaning of life? and, Why do bad things happen to good people? For that, she said, people turned to mythos – stories, regardless of whether or not they were true, that helped us make sense out of the difficulties of life. They were therapeutic. We could think of them as an early form of psychology.

“Religion was not supposed to provide explanations that lay within the competence of reason but to help us live creatively with realities for which there are no easy solutions and find an interior haven of peace; today, however, many have opted for unsustainable certainty instead. But can we respond religiously to evolutionary theory? Can we use it to recover a more authentic notion of God?

Darwin made it clear [that] we cannot regard God simply as a divine personality, who single-handedly created the world. This could direct our attention away from the idols of certainty and back to the ‘God beyond God.’ The best theology is a spiritual exercise, akin to poetry.”

Not only is the veracity of any religious story irrelevant, she seems to be saying, it is incorrect to believe any account concerning God as objectively true. To do so is to construct an idol of certainty. How do we know that? Because of the certainty of Darwinian evolution.

Her response, at bottom, isn’t much different from the atheist’s. Evolution is. God isn’t. But some of us like to imagine that he is.

Notice the source Dawkins and Armstrong consult for certain truth: Science. Why? Because Science proclaims what is.

The questions I’m pondering and posing are (1) At what point do the proclamations of science become imperialistic? and (2) At what point does an appropriate respect for science morph into worship?

 

Original Blog Source: http://bit.ly/2w17uJN

/by
Lógica 05: 10 reglas de reemplazo

Lógica 05: 10 reglas de reemplazo

En la publicación anterior vimos acerca de las diez reglas de inferencia lógica para la construcción de un argumento válido. Ahora veremos 10 reglas de reemplazo que son útiles a la hora de demostrar la validez de un argumento cuando utilizamos el lenguaje formal. El conector ↔ en este contexto se traduce por “es lógicamente equivalente”, esto quiere que decir que no importa en que lado se encuentren las fórmulas, ambas tienen el mismo valor de verdad y significan lo mismo (más adelante hablaré de esto).

  1. Teoremas de Morgan (De M)
  • ¬ (P ^ Q) ↔ (¬P v ¬Q)
  • ¬ (P v Q) ↔ (¬P ^ ¬Q)

Esta regla establece que:

  • La negación de la conjunción es la disyunción de las negaciones.
  • La negación de la disyunción es la conjunción de las negaciones.

Ejemplos:

  • “A Jeanne no le gusta el chocolate y la vainilla” es lógicamente equivalente a “A Jeanne no le gusta el chocolate o a ella no le gusta la vainilla”.
  • “A Jeanne no le gusta el chocolate o la vainilla” es lógicamente equivalente a “A Jeanne no le gusta el chocolate y a ella no le gusta la vainilla”.
  1. Conmutación (Conm.)
  • (P v Q) ↔ (Q v P)
  • (P ^ Q) ↔ (Q ^ P)

Así como en las matemáticas el orden de factores no altera el producto, en lógica el orden de los argumentos no altera el resultado en ningún caso, con excepción de la implicación. Esta regla sólo aplica a conjunciones y disyunciones. Ejemplos:

  • “O Jeanne irá al partido de soccer o irá al cine” es lógicamente equivalente a “O Jeanne irá al cine o Jeanne irá al partido de soccer”.
  • “Reina tocará la trompeta y Kumiko tocará el eufonio” es lógicamente equivalente a “Kumiko tocará el eufonio y Reina tocará la trompeta”.
  1. Distribución (Dist.)
  • [P ^ (Q v R) ↔ [(P ^ Q) v (P ^ R)]
  • [P v (Q ^ R) ↔ [(P v Q) ^ (P v R)]

Esta regla establece que P puede distribuirse con Q y R por ser factores comunes en disyunciones y conjunciones. Ejemplos:

  • “Jeanne se sacará la lotería y comprará un auto nuevo o donará diez mil pesos a un orfanato” es lógicamente equivalente a “Jeanne se sacará la lotería y comprará un auto nuevo o Jeanne se sacará la lotería y donará diez mil pesos al orfanato”.
  • “O Reina irá a la librería o Reina irá a la plaza y comprará una blusa” es lógicamente equivalente a “O Reina irá a la librería o ella ira a la plaza; y, ya sea que Reina vaya a la librería o ya no compre la blusa”.
  1. Asociación (Asoc.)
  • [P v (Q v R)] ↔ [(P v Q) v R]
  • [P ^ (Q ^ R)] ↔ [(P ^ Q) ^ R]

Por medio de la asociación, no importa la manera como agrupemos las proposiciones en conjunciones y disyunciones, esto no altera su valor de verdad.

  1. Doble negación (DN)
  • P ↔ ¬¬P

Esta regla nos dice que una proposición (P) es equivalente a la falsedad de su negación (¬¬P). Ejemplos:

  • “Es de día” es lógicamente equivalente a “Es falso que no es de día”.
  • “Reina es una persona alegre” es lógicamente equivalente a “Es falso que Reina no es una persona alegre”.
  1. Transposición (Trans.)
  • (P → Q) ↔ (¬Q → ¬P)

Esta regla nos dice que una implicación es equivalente a su inversa negativa. Ejemplo:

  • “Si llueve, hace frío” es lógicamente equivalente a “Si no hace frío, es que no llueve”.
  1. Implicación material (Impl.)
  • (P → Q) ↔ (¬P v Q)

La regla establece que P implica Q es lógicamente equivalente a no P o Q. Ejemplo:

  • “Si se trata de un oso, entonces puede nadar” es lógicamente equivalente a “O no es un oso o puede nadar”.
  1. Equivalencia material (Equiv.)
  • (P ≡ Q) ↔ [(P → Q) ^ (Q → P)]
  • (P ≡ Q) ↔ [(P ^ Q) v (¬P → ¬Q)]

Tanto el símbolo ≡ como ↔ se utilizan para expresar la equivalencia lógica y equivalencia material, todo depende del autor; en este caso he utilizado ↔ para expresar la equivalencia lógica mientras que ≡ para la equivalencia material. Las proposiciones son materialmente equivalentes cuando tienen el mismo valor de verdad. Dado que dos proposiciones materialmente equivalentes son ambas verdaderas o ambas falsas, observamos que (materialmente) ambas se implican la una a la otra, porque un antecedente falso implica (materialmente) cualquier proposición, y un consecuente verdadero está (materialmente) implicado por cualquier proposición. Ejemplo:

  • “Júpiter es más grande que la Tierra” si y solo si “Tokio es la capital de Japón” es lógicamente equivalente a “Si Júpiter es más grande que la Tierra, entonces Tokio es la capital de Japón” y “Si Tokio es la capital de Japón, entonces Júpiter es más grande que la Tierra”.

También podemos extender la equivalencia material sobre los condicionales de esta manera:

  • “Júpiter es más grande que la Tierra” si y sólo si “Tokio es la capital de Japón”, es lógicamente equivalente a “Júpiter es más grande que la Tierra” y “Tokio es la capital de Japón”, o “Si Júpiter no es más grande que la Tierra” entonces “Tokio no es la capital de Japón”.

Con esto inmediatamente nos damos cuenta de la diferencia de equivalencia material y la equivalencia lógica. Ésta última se da cuando las proposiciones, aparte de tener el mismo valor de verdad, también tienen el mismo significado.

  1. Exportación (Exp.)
  • [(P ^ Q) → R] ↔ [P → (Q → R)]

Esta regla permite que proposiciones condicionales con antecedentes conjuntivos se sustituyan por proposiciones que tienen consecuentes condicionales y viceversa. Ejemplo:

  • “Si llueve y el sol brilla, entonces hay un arcoíris” es lógicamente equivalente a “Si llueve, entonces que el sol brille implica que hay un arcoíris”.
  1. Tautología (Taut.)
  • P ↔ (P v P)
  • P ↔ (P ^ P)

Elimina la redundancia en disyunciones y conjunciones en las demostraciones lógicas. Ejemplo:

  • “Reina toca la trompeta” es lógicamente equivalente a “Reina toca la trompeta o Reina toca la trompeta”.
  • “Kumiko canta horrible” es lógicamente equivalente a “Kumiko canta horrible” y “Kumiko canta horrible”.

Con nuestras diez reglas de inferencia originales no sería posible probar la validez del siguiente argumento:

  • A ^ B /∴ B

Pero utilizando nuestras diez reglas de reemplazo ahora podemos hacerlo:

  1. A ^ B /∴ B
  2. B ^ A (1, Conm.)
  3. B (2, Simp.)

Ten siempre en cuenta las veinte reglas de inferencia para construir un buen argumento o para probar la validez de uno.

Bibliografía recomendada

Irving M. Copi, Lógica Simbólica.

  1. P. Moreland y W. L. Craig, “Logic and Argumentation” en Philosophical Foundations for a Christian Worldview Second Edition.

 

Jairo Izquierdo Hernández es el fundador de Filósofo Cristiano. Actualmente trabaja como Director de Social Media para la organización cristiana Cross Examined. Es miembro en la Christian Apologetics Alliance y ministro de alabanza en la iglesia cristiana bautista Cristo es la Respuesta en Puebla, México.

/by
Is Naturalism a Good Reason to Rally_

Is Naturalism a Good Reason to Rally?

,

By Mikel Del Rosario

Today, I’m featuring a special guest post from one of my former mentors, R. Scott Smith, Associate Professor of Ethics and Christian Apologetics at Biola University. Dr. Smith was my adviser while I was doing my graduate studies in the Christian Apologetics Program at Biola University. I studied under him in the areas of ethics, philosophy and historical theology.

His guest post might sound a bit technical if you’re totally new to philosophy, but thinking hard about this stuff might help you understand naturalism more–maybe a bit more than your atheist friends. His latest work is aimed at the upper division undergraduate audience, or those with some philosophy training: Naturalism and Our Knowledge of Reality.

Guest Post by R. Scott Smith

A Good Reason to Rally?

At the “Reason Rally” in Washington, secular, atheistic people gathered in support of “reason” over [mere] “faith” of religious people. Not so hidden in the background was the widely-held cultural mindset that science uses reason and uniquely gives us knowledge of truth (the facts). But religion gives us just personal opinions and preferences, not knowledge. This bifurcation often is called the “fact-value split.”

Naturalism: “There Is No God”

This science is naturalistic; only what is scientifically knowable (i.e., by the five senses) is real. In principle, such things as God, souls, and mental states (i.e., non-physical things like thoughts, beliefs, and experiences) cannot be known to be real. Or, simplifying, they don’t exist. Yet, we can test natural, physical stuff scientifically, so that is what is believed to be real. That view of reality is the philosophy undergirding atheistic evolution by natural selection (NS) – naturalism. There’s only the physical universe, without anything non-physical.

Until Darwin, many believed there were non-physical essential natures that separated living things into kinds. Afterward, biological classification is understood as one interconnected “tree of life” – all living things share a common ancestor.

Naturalism, Truth, and Knowledge

Now, how do we know what’s true on this view? Consider Daniel Dennett, a leading philosopher, neuroscientist, and New Atheist, who takes evolution by NS very seriously. For him, NS is blind – without any goal planning, thinking about some desired outcome, believing something, or trying to make something happen. And since non-physical mental states aren’t real, the qualities they would have, e.g., their representing something (their being of or about something) also would not be real. There are only brain states, physical patterns, and behavior we take (interpret) to be about something.

Dennett realizes that if there were real, intrinsic (something that’s so due to what kind of thing it is), essential natures, there could be a “deeper” fact (beyond just behavior) of what our thoughts (or beliefs, experiences) are really about. Just due to what those mental states would be essential, they really could be of their objects, and not something else.

But, since evolution by NS denies any such essences, Dennett says we only interpret the behavior of people (and sophisticated computers and robots) as being “about” their objects. But that’s all we have to go on – just our interpretations, which we attribute to a person. Based on someone’s behaviors, we interpret them to mean the person is thinking “about” something (e.g., an errand to Lowe’s), but that’s just how we talk. In reality, there isn’t any real “aboutness” to us.

But, there could be other interpretations too. Maybe the thought is “of” something else (e.g., a movie on HBO). But, there’s no fact of the matter we can appeal to, to settle the issue. Dennett admits for that to be so, there would have to be an essence to the thought’s being of something so that it really is about the errand, not the movie.

But without essences, we’re left only with interpretations; but, of what? Apparently, another interpretation; but if we keep pressing that question, we’re left just with interpretations of interpretations, etc., without any way to get started and experience something as it is, simply because no mental state is really about anything.

Bu the same problem applies to our own mental life. Any mental state doesn’t have an essence to be about anything in particular. If they cannot really be about something, then how would we ever know how things really are?

Our Experience Tells a Different Story

Fortunately, that’s not how we experience life. Our mental states seem to have three essential features:

  1. They’re “particularized.” My thought about tonight’s dinner, or my experience of drinking a Starbuck’s chocolate smoothie, is not generic or unspecified. Each is about something particular.
  2. These mental states must be about something. It doesn’t seem we could have one that lacks this quality. (Try having a thought that isn’t about anything!)
  3. That “ofness” seems to be intrinsic, or essential, to each mental state. My thought about last night’s dinner could not be about anything else and still be the thought it is. I could observe the price of gas at the Exxon station, but that experience couldn’t have been of my dinner.

God: The Best Explanation

How do we best explain these three apparently essential features of mental states? Dennett realizes that if mental states had essential natures, they really could be of their intended objects, so we could know them.

If atheistic evolution by NS were true, we’d be in a beginningless series of interpretations, without any knowledge. Yet, we know many things. So, naturalism & NS are false – non-physical essences exist. But, what’s their explanation? Being non-physical, it can’t be evolution. So, maybe we have souls that use them. It seems likely their best explanation is there’s a Creator after all.

 

Original Blog Source: http://bit.ly/2B8gmT1

/by