“The Ring of Truth”

“The Ring of Truth”

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By Tim Stratton

What religion or worldview possesses the “Ring of Truth?” It is definitely not Islam or atheism!

To be sure, this is not a deductive argument like the Kalam, Freethinking, or Ontological Arguments. I am simply encouraging readers to pay attention to their intuition. Although we cannot always trust our intuition, I contend that it is a great place to start when searching for the truth. Moreover, when one’s intuition is supported by a cumulative case of data, there is a good reason to continue trusting intuition.

With this in mind, consider the “Ring of Truth” to be frosting on top of a metaphysical cake already baked to perfection by a cumulative case supported by logic, science, and historical data:

The Kalam Cosmological Argument

The Leibnizian Cosmological Argument

The Moral Argument

The Teleological Argument

The Ontological Argument

The Evolutionary Argument Against Naturalism

The Freethinking Argument Against Naturalism

The Historical Argument for the Resurrection of Jesus (The Facts)

The Historical Argument for the Resurrection of Jesus (The Explanation)

With the cumulative case of evidence in mind, now consider three of the most popular worldviews on the planet: Islam, atheism, and Christianity. Next, consider what logically follows from each of these worldviews and examine them through your intuitive lens:

— If Islam is true, it is objectively good to kill infidels (non-Muslims).

— If atheism is true, it is neither objectively good or objectively bad to kill anyone.

— If Christianity is true, then it is objectively wrong, bad, and evil not to love everyone from your neighbor to your enemies.

What seems most likely or probably true? Which worldview has the “Ring of Truth?”

If you are not sure, consider the Muslim man who murdered 49 people of the LGBT+ community at The Pulse nightclub the summer of 2016 in Orlando, Florida. According to the teachings of Muhammad (Islam), this mass murder of homosexuals was good and the right thing to do.

In fact, according to the final commands of Muhammad, Muslims ought to kill all infidels and non-Muslims (Quran 2:191; 9:5; 9:73; 9:123)! Nabeel Qureshi, a former devout Muslim, explains why Islam is not a peaceful religion in a short video (click here).

Is atheism any better? Not really. According to logically consistent atheism, since God does not exist, then humanity was not created on purpose or for a specific purpose — we are nothing but a “happy accident” — nothing more than dust in the wind. If this is true, then it follows that there is no objective purpose in which humans ought to approximate. Thus, if atheism is true, there is nothing really wrong with anything!

Does that “ring” true?

According to logically consistent atheism, there was nothing really good or bad with the mass murder of homosexuals at the Pulse nightclub. Nor was there anything objectively wrong with the recent mass murder of fifty Muslims in New Zealand while worshipping at their mosque.

Moreover, if naturalism is true (a view held by many atheists), then humans do nothing but deterministically “dance to the music of their DNA” as the famous atheist Richard Dawkins contends. Thus, the Muslim who shot up the gay nightclub and the man who shot up the New Zealand mosque each had no moral choice in the matter. Do not blame guns or the shooter — blame physics and chemistry (imagine a ban on physics and chemistry)! If naturalistic atheism is true, then nature determined the slaughter of those in the Pulse nightclub and the New Zealand mosque.

The Christian worldview, as opposed to Islam and atheism, “rings” true.

According to the Law of Christ (Christianity), as opposed to naturalistic atheism, we have a categorical ability to make real moral choices (Deuteronomy 30:10-20; 1 Corinthians 10:13). We possess the libertarian freedom to make objectively good choices… or objectively evil choices. Moreover, according to the teachings of Jesus, it is objectively wrong to murder or persecute homosexuals, Muslims, or anyone else!

The apostle Paul echoes the commands of Jesus in Romans 12:18:

18 If it is possible, as far as it depends on you, live at peace with everyone.

Paul was the first one to preach “COEXIST.” However, Muhammad disagrees, and consistent atheism/naturalism is not only neutral on the matter, but also implies that we have no choice in the matter (since all that exists is matter).

Pay attention to intuition. As Gandalf would say, what worldview has the “ring of truth?”

I assume that the vast majority of those who are willing to answer honestly admit that Christianity at least seems to ring true (even if they do not want it to be true for some reason)! However, for those who continue to reject their intuition, Christians still have a cumulative case of logically deductive arguments that cannot be ignored (see the above list to get you started).

Christians stand on solid ground. We do not have to ignore logic or what is intuitively obvious. We ought to wear the “Ring of TRUTH” for all to see!

Stay reasonable (Isaiah 1:18),

Tim Stratton

 

Tim Stratton (The FreeThinking Theist) Tim pursued his undergraduate studies at the University of Nebraska-Kearney (B.A. 1997) and after working in full-time ministry for several years went on to attain his graduate degree from Biola University (M.A. 2014). Tim was recently accepted at North West University to pursue his Ph.D. in systematic theology with a focus on metaphysics.

Original Blog Source: http://bit.ly/2X2YuCZ

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Young People are Leaving the Church… Is Apologetics the Answer

Young People are Leaving the Church… Is Apologetics the Answer?

By Jeremy Linn

Over the past few months, I’ve been promoting an Apologetics conference which will equip young people to understand and defend the Christian worldview.

As I’ve talked to local church leaders about the conference, questions have come up about its effectiveness. Do young people really need to attend an Apologetics conference at this stage in their lives? Will Apologetics actually help them stay grounded in their faith as they enter into college?

In order to determine if there is a need for young people to be trained in Apologetics, three questions related to young people leaving the church need to be addressed. Before getting to these questions, I should clarify that leaving the church is not a sure-fire indicator of someone leaving Christianity, but consistent church attendance is an indicator of a growing Christian.

With that said, let’s start going down the list.

1. Are young people actually leaving the church upon entering college?

Yes, many are

Recent studies done on this topic indicate that a majority of young people who grew up in the church leave it for at least a year upon entering college.

For example, a 2017 study by Lifeway Research indicated that 68 percent of Protestants ages 18 to 22 who went to church regularly in high school stop attending church on a regular basis for at least a year after they enter college. Some percentage of those people do eventually come back to attend church. But the 68% figure still indicates many do leave permanently.

2. Why are young people leaving the church?

Multiple reasons, including life transition and intellectual barriers

There are multiple reasons why young people are leaving the church, which makes this question a less obvious one to answer. The same Lifeway research study from above indicates that a change in life situations and priorities is the main reason young people leave the church, at least for a time. In fact, the study indicated almost all young people who stopped attending church did so for this reason.

This study doesn’t give the full picture, though. The young people polled could only pick from a preselected list of reasons to explain why they left the church. Other studies give young people a chance to provide their own reasons for leaving, giving us a deeper look into what is causing them to leave.

An extensive study done by Barna gave young people an opportunity to list their “barriers” to the Christian faith. A few of the top answers they gave were intellectually focused. From the young people polled:

  • 29 percent indicated that they have a hard time believing a good God exists when there is so much evil in the world
  • 20 percent indicated that science refutes too much of the Bible.
  • 19 percent indicated they don’t believe in fairy tales (aligning with the common Atheist mantra “The Bible is just a bunch of fairy tales”)

So while the transition to college and changes in life priority play a large role in young people dropping out of church, specific intellectual difficulties can also play a role. These findings bring me to the final question.

3. Is Apologetics the answer to the problem of young people leaving the church?

Not exactly… let me explain

If there is one “answer” to the problem of young people leaving the church, it’s the Holy Spirit. As Christians, we can’t ignore the Spirit’s power in leading young people them into a dynamic relationship with Christ. The Spirit is an important answer, but there are several other answers that can help young people continue in their Christian faith once they enter college.

One of these answers is an emphasis on a strong Christian community. Of course, youth groups are set up to promote a strong community among young people. But churches can also help young people grow in community with other generations through opportunities like mentorship or church-wide events. When young people see the benefit of a strong Christian community, they will be more likely to seek out a similar community when entering college.

Another answer comes through the role of parents to lead and teach their children. By teaching their children what Christians believe and why they believe it, along with modeling the character of Christ through moral actions, parents can help their children build up a strong foundation for their faith that will last.

Okay… But what about Apologetics?

To move to Apologetics, let’s look back at the intellectual barriers to Christianity that many young people listed in the Barna study mentioned above. These barriers involve topics like:

  • The Problem of Evil (How can a good God exist when there’s so much evil?)
  • Science and Faith (Doesn’t science conflict with the Bible or even faith in general?)
  • Historical Investigation (Isn’t the Bible just a bunch of fairy tales?)

These topics have been thoroughly addressed by numerous people and ministries engaged in Apologetics. The Problem of Evil is perhaps the most difficult topic to address since there is a strong emotional side to it, but people like C.S. Lewis and Ravi Zacharias approach the topic in a way that touches on both the intellectual and emotional sides. The Science and Faith topic has been extensively covered by organizations like Reasons to Believe for many years. And Historical Investigation of the Bible is covered in depth by authors like NT Wright and Richard Bauckham, and covered in a more accessible way by Lee Strobel and J. Warner Wallace.

These people and ministries provide only a taste of the library of Apologetics resources available to young people. Resources that will:

  • Help them dig into their intellectual barriers to Christianity.
  • Give them reasons to think that Christianity does describe the way the world actually is
  • Show them the relevancy of the Christian worldview to their lives

When we have an abundance of Apologetics resources that do these things for young people, why wouldn’t we connect them to those resources? At the very least, Apologetics provides some benefit to young people. And more optimistically, it can play a primary role in keeping their faith grounded as they move into college and beyond.

Apologetics is not the all-encompassing answer to the problem of young people leaving the church. But it certainly is one of several key answers. And that is reason enough to support a conference that connects young people to some of the best Apologetics resources out there.

 

Jeremy is the co-founder of the ministry Twin Cities Apologetics and is an accountant for a law firm in Minneapolis, Minnesota. He’s also going to Bethel Seminary for a graduate degree in a program called Christian Thought (basically Apologetics!). Outside of Apologetics, Jeremy enjoys sports, playing guitar, and making videos.

Original Blog Source: http://bit.ly/2F2VyM7

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John the Baptist in Josephus

John the Baptist in Josephus

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By Ryan Leasure

Several reasons exist for why we should trust the Gospels. Their eye-witness testimony, familiarity with the Palestinian world, embarrassing nature, early dating, and undesigned coincidences, all suggest that the Gospels are reliable documents. Beyond that, the plethora of Greek manuscripts and strong evidence that the text hasn’t changed give us even more confidence to trust these works.

Yet there’s another angle that makes the case even stronger — corroborating evidence. That is to say, non-biblical sources also testify to individuals or events contained in the Gospels, and thus corroborate what the Gospel writers report. Perhaps the most popular corroborating source is the first-century Jewish historian Josephus.

Not only does Josephus tell us about Jesus and his brother James, but he also writes about several other characters in the Gospels. One such character is John the Baptist.

John the Baptist the Forerunner

John the Baptist is familiar to readers of the Gospels. Though he prepared the way for Jesus’ public ministry, he’s known primarily for baptizing the people as a sign of their repentance. Mark 1:4-5 states:

And so John the Baptist appeared in the wilderness, preaching a baptism of repentance for the forgiveness of sins. The whole Judean countryside and all the people of Jerusalem went out to him. Confessing their sins, they were baptized by him in the Jordan River.

John the Baptist the Preacher of Justice

Like most prophets, John warned the people of God’s judgment if they didn’t change their ways. We read further in Luke 3:10-14:

“What should we do then?” the crowd asked. John answered, “Anyone who has two shirts should share with the one who has none, and anyone who has food should do the same.” Even tax collectors came to be baptized. “Teacher,” they asked, “what should we do?” He replied, “Don’t extort money and don’t accuse people falsely — be content with your pay.”

John’s message was straight-forward. Repent of your sins. And this repentance will manifest itself in how you love your fellow neighbor. Be generous, compassionate, and fair with everyone. In other words, love your neighbor as yourself.

Despite John’s popularity, Herod Antipas, the tetrarch of Galilee (4 B.C.-A.D. 39), arrested, and subsequently, beheaded him. We read in Mark 6:16-18:

But when Herod heard this, he said, “John, whom I beheaded, has been raised from the dead!” For Herod, himself had given orders to have John arrested, and he had him bound and put in prison. He did this because of Herodias, his brother Philip’s wife, whom he had married. For John had been saying to Herod, “It is not lawful for you to have your brother’s wife.”

Notice why Herod arrested John the Baptist and then later had him beheaded. John was publicly critical of Herod’s divorce and remarriage to his brother’s ex-wife Herodias — an action that violated Israel’s law.

John the Baptist in Josephus

What the Gospels don’t tell us is that Herod Antipas’ decision to divorce his first wife led to increased tensions between Galilee and the region Nabatea to the east. You see, Herod divorced the king of Nabatea’s daughter in order to marry Herodias.

When the king of Nabatea, Aretus IV, attacked and defeated Herod’s army, the people of Galilee believed it was God’s judgment on Herod for how he treated John. Read Josephus’ account:

Now it seemed to some of the Jews that the destruction of Herod’s army was by God, and was certainly well deserved, on account of what he did to John, called the Baptist. For Herod had executed him, though he was a good man and had urged the Jews — if inclined to exercise virtue, to practice justice toward one another and piety toward God — to join in baptism. For baptizing was acceptable to him, not for a pardon of whatever sins they may have committed, but in purifying the body, as though the soul had beforehand been cleansed in righteousness. And when others gathered (for they were greatly moved by his words), Herod, fearing that John’s great influence over the people might result in some form of insurrection (for it seemed that they did everything by his counsel), thought it much better to put him to death before his work led to an uprising than to await a disturbance, become involved in a problem, and have second thoughts. So the prisoner, because of Herod’s suspicion, was sent to Machaerus, the stronghold previously mentioned, and there was executed. But to the Jews, it seemed a vindication of John that God willed to do Herod an evil, in the destruction of the army.1

Josephus on the Herodias Marriage

Josephus also tells us of Herod’s marriage to Herodias:

But Herodias, their sister, was married to Herod (Philip), the son of Herod the Great, a child of Mariamne, daughter of Simon, the high priest; and to them was born Salome. After her birth, Herodias, thinking to violate the ways of the fathers, abandoned a living husband and married Herod (Antipas) — who was tetrarch of Galilee — her husband’s brother by the same father.2

Corroborating Evidence

Notice how much Josephus corroborates what the Gospels say about John the Baptist:

* Josephus says John “inclined the Jews to exercise virtue and to practice justice toward one another.”

* The Gospels say John exhorted the Jews to share their clothing and money with one another, not to extort money from others, and not to accuse others falsely (Lk. 3:10-14).

* Josephus says John baptized many Jews as a sign of repentance.

* The Gospels also report that John baptized many Jews as a sign of repentance (Mk. 1:4-5).

* Josephus states that Herod arrested John the Baptist.

* The Gospels likewise report that Herod arrested John the Baptist (Mk. 6:16-18).

* Josephus declares that Herodias left Philip and married his brother Herod Antipas.

* The Gospels report that Herod divorced his wife and married his brother Philip’s wife Herodias (Mk. 6:16-18).

* Josephus reports that Herod had John the Baptist executed.

* The Gospels state that Herod had John the Baptist beheaded (Mk. 6:16-18).

We Can Trust the Gospels

Josephus’ emphasis on John’s death is purely political. He insinuates that Herod had him executed because he feared a rebellion. And during this critical time, when his people were at war, he needed everyone unified.

Yet Josephus doesn’t tell us why he wanted John dead in the first place. After all, Josephus only tells us that John exhorted the people of Israel to act justly toward their fellow neighbors. Why would the king want to stop that message from spreading?

The Gospel accounts give us further clarification. They tell us that John publicly rebuked the king for his unlawful divorce and remarriage, and thus, Herod dealt harshly with him.

The corroboration between Josephus and the Gospels with respect to John the Baptist and the marriage fiasco between Herod and Herodias should give us greater confidence to trust the Gospels. For if the Gospel writers were careful to get John’s story right, how much more would they be careful to get Jesus’ story, right?

 

Ryan Leasure holds an M.A. from Furman University and an M.Div. from the Southern Baptist Theological Seminary. He currently serves as a pastor at Grace Bible Church in Moore, SC.

Original Blog Source: http://bit.ly/2WG5upY

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¿Qué es Dios? ¿Cómo podemos definirlo?

¿Qué es Dios? ¿Cómo podemos definirlo?

By Carlos E. Rodriguez

In their arguments for the existence of a being that transcends the universe, Christian theists often identify this being with the name of God. What we are going to do is to provide a clear and simple meaning of this concept.

How do we define God?

This word can be used as a common noun or a proper noun. In my case, and in the case of many, I use it as a proper noun. It contains the concept of a being that possesses characteristic properties. There are two ways to know what properties this concept possesses: one comes through the theology revealed in the Bible, and another comes through Anselm’s theology of the perfect being . These two are not mutually exclusive, but rather use different paths to reach the same point.

We say that God is a proper name that is attributed to a being that possesses properties. From the theology of perfect being, we say that these properties are maximally great. In this way, when we speak of God, in Anselm’s terms, we speak of the maximally great being that can be conceived. If you can conceive of a being greater than him, you are conceiving of God. From this point of view, a maximally great being possesses maximal properties, such as Omnipotence, Omniscience, etc.

With all this in mind, we say that God is a personal being, worthy of worship, immaterial, timeless without the universe, a-spatial, perfectly free, eternal, Omnipotent, Omniscient, Omnipresent, the locus of goodness, creator of all things, etc. Instead of mentioning each property that the being that receives this name possesses, we summarize it (preferably) with the Anselmian statement: “the greatest being that exists.” Such a being possesses all the maximum properties and qualities that can be conceived.

In this way, we have a concept of what is meant by God.

Jehovah, the God mentioned in the Bible, is God

Why is Jehovah treated as God? Because the attributes or properties that he possesses are the same as those of a supremely great being. If we go to the Bible, and use a method that uses revealed theology as a source, we find that Jehovah is:

  1. Immaterial, for He is spirit. John 4:24, “God is spirit, and those who worship Him must worship in spirit and truth,” is also implied in several references to His invisibility (John 1:18; 1 Timothy 1:17; 6:15-16).
  2. Omniscient, for “he knows all things” (1 John 3:20).
  3. Necessary and self-existent (Isaiah 40:17-23; Revelation 4:11).
  4. Eternal (Psalms 90:1-4; 102:11-12, 25-27).
  5. Omnipresent (Psalms 139:7-12).
  6. Omnipotent (Genesis 17:1; Revelation 19:6).
  7. Holy (Leviticus 19:2).
  8. Love (1 John 4:7-21).

If Jehovah possesses the properties of a supremely great being, and this being is called God, then Jehovah is God. It is the attributes and properties, referred to in the Bible but also deducible through natural theology, that give Jehovah the right to be called God.

 

Carlos Enrique Rodríguez Alcántara is from the Dominican Republic, a blogger, preacher, teacher, speaker, and apologist. Husband of Carolina. Member of the Central Rock of Salvation Church, where he has been director of education and deputy director of education for the council. He has an associate degree in theology from ESFOTEBIC. He holds a certificate in philosophy, philosophy and science (with honors) and critical thinking from the University of Edinburgh, as well as philosophy, science, and religion from the same university.

Original Blog: http://bit.ly/2R8qdfS

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The New Absolutes

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What is happening to our culture’s moral values? Is it really radical relativism: everyone gets to decide what is right in his own eyes? Join Frank to find out that there’s actually a new set of absolutes that our culture is adopting. And these new absolutes are often polar opposites of those grounded in God’s Good nature.

For example:

The old absolute is purity; the new absolute is promiscuity
The old absolute is humility; the new absolute is pride
The old absolute is truth; the new absolute is power
The old absolute is love; the new absolute is tolerance
The old absolute is religious freedom; the new absolute is sexual supremacy

And many others.

Frank blows the lid off the claim that only Christians or conservatives are trying to impose a moral position. Everyone is! The problem for the proponents of the new absolutes is that they have no objective standard to support their positions.

In the last segment, Frank answers questions about the universe coming from nothing, and how to reach apathetic people. Don’t be apathetic about this one. Please listen and share!

If you want to send us a question for the show, please email us at  Hello@CrossExamined.org.

Subscribe on iTunes: http://bit.ly/CrossExamined_Podcast rate and review! Thanks!!!

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Did God Command Genocide in the Old Testament

Did God Command Genocide in the Old Testament?

By Ryan Leasure

Richard Dawkins’ famous quote just about sums up how skeptics view the God of the Old Testament. He retorts:

The God of the Old Testament is arguably the most unpleasant character in all fiction: jealous and proud of it; a petty, unjust, unforgiving control-freak; a vindictive, bloodthirsty ethnic cleanser; a misogynistic, homophobic, racist, infanticidal, genocidal, filicidal, pestilential, megalomaniacal, sadomasochistic, capriciously malevolent bully.1

Whew. Other than his obvious thesaurus skills, we notice that Dawkins takes great offense at God’s behavior in the Old Testament. He scorns Scripture’s portrayal of slavery and the poor treatment of women, but it’s the Canaanite invasion that attracts most of his contempt. For example, he uses words such as bloodthirsty ethnic cleanser, racist, infanticidal, and genocidal to make his point loud and clear.

But this raises an obvious question. Did God really command genocide? Did he really order Israel to wipe the Canaanites from the face of the earth? Some texts seem to suggest this:

“So Joshua struck the whole land, the hill country and the Negev and the lowland and the slopes, and all their kings. He left none remaining, but devoted to destruction all that breathed, just as the LORD God of Israel commanded.” — Joshua 10:40

“Then they devoted all in the city to destruction, both men and women, young and old, oxen, sheep, and donkeys, with the edge of the sword.” — Joshua 6:21

It certainly looks like genocide. But as I’ll argue in a minute, I’m persuaded something other than genocide is going on here.

Joshua’s Claims vs. Reality

I’m persuaded something else is going on because several times Joshua makes claims that they “utterly destroyed” the Canaanites and “left none alive,” yet we read shortly thereafter that several survivors remain. Let me give you a few examples:

Joshua’s Claim: In Joshua 10, he says they left “no survivors” and “destroyed everything that breathed” in “the entire land” and “put all the inhabitants to the sword.”

Reality: Judges 1 states several times that Israel had failed to conquer the entire land of Canaan and couldn’t drive out all the inhabitants.

On the one hand, Joshua tells us that they left “no survivors.” On the other hand, Judges 1 tells us multiple times that Israel failed to drive out all the Canaanites.

Joshua’s Claim: Josh 10:39 says “every person” in Debir was “utterly destroyed.”

Reality: Josh 11:21 states that later, Joshua “utterly destroyed” Anakites in Debir.

Again, Joshua says they “utterly destroyed every person” in Debir. But the very next chapter, we read of survivors in Debir who Joshua “utterly destroyed” again.

Joshua’s Claims: In Joshua 11:21, he tells us the Anakites were “cut off” and “utterly destroyed” in Hebron.

Reality: A few chapters later in Joshua 15:13-14, we read that “Caleb “drove out” the Anakites from Hebron.

Once again, Joshua claims utter destruction while a few chapters later, he tells us that Caleb drove out the same people group he just “utterly destroyed.”

Just as the LORD had commanded

Certainly, Joshua’s claims and reality appear to contradict one another. Yet we read on multiple occasions that Joshua did just as God had commanded. Consider these two examples:

Joshua captured all the cities of these kings, and all their kings, and he struck them with the edge of the sword, and utterly destroyed them; just as Moses the servant of the LORD had commanded. — Joshua 11:12

They struck every man with the edge of the sword, until they had destroyed them. They left no one who breathed. Just as the LORD had commanded Moses his servant… he left nothing undone of all that the LORD had commanded Moses. — Joshua 11:14-15

I’ve listed several examples where God commanded Joshua to “utterly destroy” the Canaanites. We’ve also seen that Joshua was faithful to do just as the LORD had commanded. Yet, we read several instances where survivors remain.

What is going on here?

God didn’t Mean Literal Genocide

As a quick caveat, I’m a biblical inerrantist. I’m not someone to play “fast and loose” with the text. Yet I’m persuaded that Joshua didn’t intend for us to interpret the “utterly destroy” language literally.

How could he if in Joshua 11 he tells us that they “utterly destroyed” the Anakites in Hebron, and then just a few chapters later in Joshua 15, he tells us that Caleb “drove out” those same Anakites in the same Hebron?

Would Joshua really be that irresponsible with his reporting? It’s doubtful. After all, God made it clear elsewhere that “utterly destroy” didn’t mean complete annihilation.

Consider Deuteronomy 7:2-4:

And when the LORD your God gives them over to you, and you defeat them, then you must devote them to complete destruction…you shall make no covenant with them and show no mercy to them. You shall not intermarry them, giving your daughters to their sons or taking their daughters for your sons, for they will turn away your sons from following me to serve other gods.

Now, wait a second. God ordered them to devote the Canaanites to complete destruction, but then he forbids them from intermarrying with them. How could they intermarry with people they had completely obliterated?

It seems obvious that whatever “utterly destroy” means, it doesn’t mean genocide.

“Utterly Destroy” was Common Hyperbolic Rhetoric

Just recently, the Golden State Warriors defeated the Portland Trail Blazers by 22 points. As I read various ESPN articles and listened to different radio shows, I heard commentators say things like the Warriors “annihilated” or “killed” the Trail Blazers. And shockingly, nobody called them out for lying. You see, this is how people talk nowadays with respect to athletic competitions. We speak in hyperbolic terms.

In the same way, military leaders during Joshua’s day used to speak in exaggerated terms. They would regularly make claims that they “utterly destroyed” their enemies and left “no survivors.” In reality, they defeated their enemies but didn’t commit them to genocide. Yet nobody was calling them liars because this was how military leaders communicated back then. Consider these examples:2

King Mesha of Moab (840 BC) reported that the Northern Kingdom of Israel “has utterly perished for always.” — In truth, Israel was around long enough to be taken into exile one hundred years later.

Tuthmosis III of Egypt (1500 BC) declared that “the numerous army of Mitanni was overthrown within the hour, annihilated totally, like those now not existent.” — Actually, Mitanni continued to fight for another two hundred years.

Merneptah of Egypt (1230 BC) bragged “Israel is wasted, his seed is not.” — Guess who is still around today?

When Moses or Joshua spoke in exaggerated ways, they were simply adopting the common hyperbolic rhetoric that all ancient Near Eastern military leaders used. Everyone reading the accounts would have understood it that way, just like we understand hyperbolic sports language.

Drive them Out, Not Genocide

It seems that God’s desire was for Israel to drive out — or dispossess — the Canaanites from the land, not to commit them to genocide. Truth is, “driving out” language is used far more frequently with respect to the Canaanites than “utterly destroy” language.3

We saw earlier in Deuteronomy 7:2-4 that God ordered Israel to commit the Canaanites to “complete destruction,” and then he ordered them not to intermarry with the Canaanites afterwards. These dual commands only make sense if the “complete destruction” means to drive them out, rather than annihilating them altogether.

On another occasion, God threatens to “destroy” Israel for their disobedience, but this destruction did not mean genocide. It meant driving them away from the promised land. Consider Deuteronomy 28:63-64

And the LORD took delight in doing you good and multiplying you, so the LORD will take delight in destroying you. You shall be plucked off the land… And the LORD will scatter you among all peoples, from one end of the earth to the other.

Here is a clear example where “destroying” really meant driving them out of the land. With this in mind, we can be confident that this was God’s purpose in issuing the “utterly destroy” commands.

Did they Really Commit Women and Children to Genocide?

As I’ve argued above, the stock language of “kill everything that’s alive” was hyperbolic language and really meant “driving out” the Canaanites. This means, the Israelites never slaughtered women or children in their conquests. They simply defeated the various Canaanite armies as they infiltrated the promised land.

After all, God had instructed Israel to always offer peace before attacking anyone (Deut. 20:10) which would have given women and children time to flee before any battle ensued. Unfortunately, almost nobody took them up on the offer (Josh. 11:19).

Furthermore, it appears that most of their battles occurred at military strongholds — like Jericho and AI — away from the populated civilian countrysides. Archeology digs suggest that Jericho housed roughly one hundred soldiers with no civilians,4 which explains how Israel could march around it seven times in one day. Rahab and maybe another female or two worked in the tavern to take care of travelers passing through.

Rahab, who turned from paganism, also serves as a great example that ethnic cleansing is not the goal of these conquests. The goal was to rid the area of the pagan influence that could easily lead Israel astray from worshipping Yahweh.

Why Drive Out the Canaanites?

In Genesis 15:16, God told Abraham that he would give the land to the Israelites after four hundred years of slavery in Egypt because the “sins of the Amorites (Canaanites) was not yet complete. That is, God wouldn’t drive them out yet, because it wouldn’t be justified. But after hundreds of years of wickedness, the Canaanites would be ripe for judgment.

What did they do that prompted this judgment exactly? While they were notorious for temple prostitution, incest, and bestiality, perhaps their worst crime was their practice of child sacrifice. It was their ritual practice to burn their children alive on the god Molech.

Skeptics often ask why God doesn’t stop evil. Well, here is a clear example where he does, but they still find fault nonetheless.

Ultimately, God wanted to establish the nation of Israel in the land free of pagan influence to provide a context for the coming Messiah. Yes, Israel defeated these Canaanite armies, but the ultimate goal was to be a blessing to all the nations (Gen. 12:3). And that blessing would come through the person of Jesus Christ who came to fulfill the law and die as the once for all sacrifice for the sins of the world.

*For more on this topic, check out Paul Copan’s book Is God A Moral Monster?

 

Ryan Leasure holds an M.A. from Furman University and an M.Div. from the Southern Baptist Theological Seminary. He currently serves as a pastor at Grace Bible Church in Moore, SC.

Original Blog Source: http://bit.ly/2wFn2mK

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Bible study_ Esther as an example of bravery and God’s providence

Bible study: Esther as an example of bravery and God’s providence

By Wintery Knight

I’ve been listening to this FREE two-volume series on the book of Esther featuring pastor Alistair Begg. A whole bunch of interesting things stuck out to me, so I’ll write about one of them today.

First, Esther is a Jewish woman whose father or mother died when she was young. She was adopted by Mordecai, another Jew. She was very beautiful, so she was picked to be part of the Persian King’s harem. In fact, she is so beautiful that the King chooses her to be the Queen.

Now there is an enemy of the Jews in the King’s court named Haman, and he manages to get the King to create an edict that says that all the Jews will be killed. Mordecai calls Esther to tell her that she has to stop the King from ordering this edict.

But Esther is out of favor with the King and hasn’t been asked to come in to visit him for some time. To go in and see the King without being summoned is a capital offense. Unless the King gives permission, she would be killed for intruding on the King. But in the end, she agrees to speak up and say something.

It all gets resolved in Esther, chapter 4.

Esther 4:1-17:

1 When Mordecai learned all that had been done, he tore his clothes, put on sackcloth and ashes, and went out into the midst of the city and wailed loudly and bitterly.

2 He went as far as the king’s gate, for no one was to enter the king’s gate clothed in sackcloth.

3 In each and every province where the command and decree of the king came, there was great mourning among the Jews, with fasting, weeping and wailing; and many lay on sackcloth and ashes.

4 Then Esther’s maidens and her eunuchs came and told her, and the queen writhed in great anguish. And she sent garments to clothe Mordecai that he might remove his sackcloth from him, but he did not accept them.

5 Then Esther summoned Hathach from the king’s eunuchs, whom the king had appointed to attend her, and ordered him to go to Mordecai to learn what this was and why it was.

6 So Hathach went out to Mordecai to the city square in front of the king’s gate.

7 Mordecai told him all that had happened to him, and the exact amount of money that Haman had promised to pay to the king’s treasuries for the destruction of the Jews.

8 He also gave him a copy of the text of the edict which had been issued in Susa for their destruction, that he might show Esther and inform her, and to order her to go into the king to implore his favor and to plead with him for her people.

9 Hathach came back and related Mordecai’s words to Esther.

10 Then Esther spoke to Hathach and ordered him to reply to Mordecai:

11 “All the king’s servants and the people of the king’s provinces know that for any man or woman who comes to the king to the inner court who is not summoned, he has but one law, that he be put to death, unless the king holds out to him the golden scepter so that he may live. And I have not been summoned to come to the king for these thirty days.”

12 They related Esther’s words to Mordecai.

13 Then Mordecai told them to reply to Esther, “Do not imagine that you in the king’s palace can escape any more than all the Jews.

14 For if you remain silent at this time, relief and deliverance will arise for the Jews from another place, and you and your father’s house will perish. And who knows whether you have not attained royalty for such a time as this?”

15 Then Esther told them to reply to Mordecai,

16 “Go, assemble all the Jews who are found in Susa, and fast for me; do not eat or drink for three days, night or day. I and my maidens also will fast in the same way. And thus I will go into the king, which is not according to the law; and if I perish, I perish.”

17 So Mordecai went away and did just as Esther had commanded him.

What Mordecai is saying here is that God is sovereign over the events that are taking place, and that even if Esther makes a free decision to not intercede to save her people, then God will do something else. Somehow, telling her that makes her agree to take the risk and go in to see the King. Even though it is illegal to go in to see the King, she is going to risk her life and do it. And the message there is that God made her beautiful, and placed her in the palace, for exactly this purpose. Her beauty has a purpose.

Before then, she may not have been the most morally pure Jew, nor the most faithful Jew, nor some great authority on theology or apologetics. She was probably keeping her faith pretty hidden. But in that one moment, she rises above being an orphan, above being a harem girl, and above being just a pretty face. God can use anyone – even a silly girl who spends all day in front of a mirror playing with cosmetics – to achieve his ends. She is not Daniel. But today she is getting the call, anyway. It’s on her.

What is the lesson here? God can use anybody. It doesn’t mean that you shouldn’t be moral, study theology, and study apologetics, and keep your character clean so you have self-control. It means that any believer is just one step away from glory, no matter what they did in the past. That’s how God rolls.

Further study

If you are interested in the story of Esther, then you should listen to the entire series by Alistair Begg.

The point I am making in this post is in this lecture.

Esther is about two themes: 1) how should a believer in God live in a society where believers are a minority? And 2) even when things look really out of control, God is in control and is never more than one step away from saving his people.

I have a lot of Christian apologist friends who struggle to go to church and struggle to read the Bible. The links above will take you to some great preaching on one of the most interesting books of the Bible. Go there, grab the MP3s, and listen to them with no distractions.

 

Original Blog Source: http://bit.ly/2WV31HD

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Apologetic Methods and A Case for Classical Apologetics

Apologetic Methods and A Case for Classical Apologetics

By J. Brian Huffling

In 2004 I began to pursue an MA in Christian Apologetics at Southern Evangelical Seminary. I didn’t really know much about the topic, I just really wanted to know how to defend the Christian faith and have a better justification for my own beliefs. I realized that Christians and non-Christians had debates about the veracity of the faith, but I had no idea Christians argued among themselves about how (and even if) apologetics should be done. There are certainly different views about whether or not, and how, apologetics should be done. This article will briefly describe various apologetic methods and will argue for the superiority of the classical method.

Various Methods

Classical Apologetics

Classical apologetics has been called a two-step method. The first step is to prove the existence of God via traditional theistic proofs (the various cosmological arguments, design arguments, ontological, etc.). This method holds to the possibility of natural theology—the ability for a reason to demonstrate God’s existence. This first step does not prove Christianity, only monotheism.  The second step is to prove the veracity of Christianity by showing, for example (but not necessarily in this exact fashion), that miracles are possible, the Bible is reliable, Jesus claimed and proved himself to be God, etc. It is called the “classical” method because it has been the classical, traditional method used throughout the ages. Some proponents include Augustine, Anselm, Thomas Aquinas, William Paley, the Princetonians such as B. B. Warfield, Norman Geisler,  and R. C. Sproul (among many others). Some good classical apologetics books would be Christian Apologetics by Norman Geisler, and I Don’t Have Enough Faith to be An Atheist by Frank Turek and Norman Geisler.

Evidential Apologetics

Evidential apologists avoid an attempt to demonstrate that God exists. Some do this because they don’t think natural theology is possible; others think it is simply easier to start with the biblical case. They jump straight to evidences for showing that Christianity is true from fields such as history and archaeology. To them, this bypasses difficult philosophical arguments and objections. People are ordinarily more prone to understanding history and the like. The thinking here is: if we can show the Bible to be reliable and that Jesus was raised from the dead, then a reasonable person will be convinced that Christianity is true. Such would include the existence of God. Proponents of this view, among others, are Joseph Butler, Josh McDowell, Gary Habermas, and Michael Licona. Some evidential apologetics works are  The Case for the Resurrection of Jesus by Gary Habermas and Michael Licona and The New Evidence that Demands a Verdict by Josh McDowell.

Presuppositional Apologetics

Presuppositional apologetics is directly antithetical to classical apologetics as its adherents deny that we can reason to God’s existence. Presuppositional apologists argue that we must presuppose the truth of Christianity and show that every other worldview (and religion) is false. Presuppositionalists go so far as to say that one cannot reason at all (or given an account for their ability to reason) without Christianity being true. They claim that we should argue transcendentally, showing that rationality itself presupposes Christianity and that any worldview other than Christianity fails. Well-known presuppositionalist Greg Bahnsen said in his debate with R. C. Sproul that he couldn’t know his car was in the parking lot without presupposing the Triune God. In a debate I had with a presuppositionalist, I was challenged to give an account of how I can know the tree is outside my window without presupposing Christianity to be true. Those who hold to this method argue that we should argue for Christianity based on the impossibility of the contrary. In other words, since other worldviews and religions are shown to be false, Christianity must be true. Proponents of this method include Cornelius Van Til, Greg Bahnsen, Gordon Clark, John Frame, and K. Scott Oliphant. Presuppositional works include Christian Apologetics by Cornelius Van Til and Presuppositional Apologetics: Stated and Defended by Greg Bahnsen.

Cumulative Case Apologetics

Some apologists say we should take the best of all of these methods and use a cumulative case approach. That is, we should take the best arguments from each method and use them in a big picture approach. Paul Feinberg takes this position in Five Views on Apologetics. This is a good place to look for more information on this view.

The Superiority of Classical Apologetics

With this brief overview, one may wonder which method is best, or if we should just go along with the cumulative case and take all the good stuff from each model. At this point, I am going to argue for the superiority of the classical method.

First, the Bible says that we can know about God through nature. Paul says this in Romans 1:19-20:

For the wrath of God is revealed from heaven against all ungodliness and unrighteousness of men, who by their unrighteousness suppress the truth. 19For what can be known about God is plain to them because God has shown it to them. 20 For his invisible attributes, namely, his eternal power and divine nature, have been clearly perceived, ever since the creation of the world, in the things that have been made.

Thus, not only can we know God exists from nature, we can have some idea of what he is like. If God can be known via nature, then it is at least possible that such knowledge can be put in the form of a logical argument. The only question that remains is, “Are the arguments sound?” Well, that is another question, but it would seem that such is at least possible from a biblical point of view. Thus, it is hard to see how one could argue that the Bible does not allow for natural theology.

Further, it does seem that many of the theistic arguments are indeed sound from a rational point of view. For example, if the universe is contingent and cannot account for its own existence, and one cause leading to an effect cannot go on to infinity, then it seems that we must at some point arrive at a cause that is not contingent, but necessary. Such would be God.

Second, classical apologetics actually starts one step before arguing for God: it starts with knowing reality and the absolute nature of truth. In an age of relativism, we must answer objections such as, “Well, that may be true for you, but it’s not for me.” Further, classical apologetics deals with basic philosophical issues of metaphysics (the nature of reality) and epistemology (how we know reality) in a more robust and intentional way than do the other methods.

Third, classical apologetics puts evidences for Christianity in a theistic context. As Norman Geisler is apt to say, “There can’t be acts of God unless there is a God who can act.” Further, as C. S. Lewis has said, if God exists, then we cannot deny the possibility of miracles. Establishing the existence of God before moving onto miracles helps make more sense of the data. Also, miracles are signs of something. They were not just wonders; they demonstrated or pointed to something. For example, the miracles that Jesus performed showed that he was who he claimed he was. As Nicodemus said, only someone with the power of God could do the works that he did. Finally, as silly is it might sound, someone could claim that events such as the resurrection could have been performed in some superhuman say, such as by aliens. I know that’s ridiculous, but it is an objection that has to be overcome if God’s existence hasn’t been established. In short, the evidences for the Bible and Christianity are there, but they make more sense and are more powerful after they are put in a theistic context.

Fourth, presuppositional apologetics has many problems. It is admitted even by presuppositionalists that their position is circular. However, they argue that all views are circular. For example, they say the notion that we cannot help but use reason is circular since any attempt to deny that position would require the use of reason. However, such is not a circular problem, it is merely undeniable that reason is unavoidable in discussions or arguments. One is not using reason to prove reason; he is simply saying that it is unavoidable and undeniable. However, assuming a position to be true and then from that position to prove it is the definition of circularity. Also, arguing that we can show Christianity to be true based on the impossibility of the contrary is simply wrong. Contrariety is a logical relationship between statements. Thus, when we talk about statements being contrary, we are talking about the nature of logic. Statements (and only statements) are contrary when they can both be false but not both be true. For example, the statements “Christianity is true” and “Atheism is true” are contrary since they can both logically be false. But since they can both be false, we could never show the truth of Christianity by showing the falsity of its contraries. Further, the alleged transcendental argument for full-blown Christianity has never been articulated, let alone defended. Believe me, if there is an argument that guarantees I win no matter what… I want it. Unfortunately, it doesn’t exist. No one has ever given it. Bahnsen was given several opportunities in his debate with Sproul, but could not do it.

So why not just take the best parts of all the methods and use a cumulative case approach? Because the best parts of each method are already inherent in the classical model. The classical model is more comprehensive than the others, puts miracles and evidences in a theistic context, and avoids the problems of presuppositionalism. Thus, classical apologetics is the strongest, most comprehensive model.

Works on apologetic systems include: Faith Has Its Reasons: Integrative Approaches to Defending the Christian Faith by Ken Boa and Robert Bowman (this is my favorite) and Five Views on Apologetics.

 

J. Brian Huffling, PH.D. have a BA in History from Lee University, an MA in (3 majors) Apologetics, Philosophy, and Biblical Studies from Southern Evangelical Seminary (SES), and a Ph.D. in Philosophy of Religion from SES. He is the Director of the Ph.D. Program and Associate Professor of Philosophy and Theology at SES. He also teaches courses for Apologia Online Academy. He has previously taught at The Art Institute of Charlotte. He has served in the Marines, Navy, and is currently a reserve chaplain in the Air Force at Maxwell Air Force Base. His hobbies include golf, backyard astronomy, martial arts, and guitar.

Original Blog Source: http://bit.ly/2JWaz6P

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Un argumento evolutivo en contra del naturalismo

Un argumento evolutivo en contra del naturalismo

By Maverick Christian

INTRODUCTION

For those of you who are philosophically unfamiliar, naturalism is the belief that only nature is real and that the supernatural does not exist. The Evolutionary Argument Against Naturalism (EAAN), put forward by Christian philosopher Alvin Plantinga, holds that the conjunction of naturalism and evolution is self-defeating. This is not an argument against evolution, but rather an argument against naturalism (since, if naturalism is true, then evolution is the “only game in town,” and if the conjunction of naturalism and evolution is self-defeating, so much the worse for naturalism).

To define some terms and abbreviations, a defeater is (roughly) something that eliminates or weakens rational grounds for accepting a belief; in the context of argument, the defeater is such that one is rationally compelled to abandon the defeated belief (i.e., one does not believe it, either by (1) remaining agnostic about it, or (2) believing it to be false). Suppose, for example, that I arrive in a town and see what appears to be a barn fifty yards away. I later learn that last week some crank put up fake barns all over the area, along with the real ones, and that these fake barns are indistinguishable from real barns when viewed from a distance of thirty yards or more. I now have a defeater for my belief that I had seen a barn. I realize that I might have seen a barn, but I do not have sufficient grounds to continue accepting the belief. The rational thing for me to do is to abandon my belief that I had seen a barn. Suppose I later learn that the eccentric removed all the fake granaries before my arrival. Then I would have something that nullifies the defeater’s defeating force, i.e., a defeater of defeaters. The EAAN claims that the naturalist who believes in evolution acquires a defeater for his belief in evolution + naturalism. Commonly used abbreviations for the EAAN:

                 F = our cognitive faculties are reliable.

                N = Naturalism is true.

                 E = Evolution is true.

Pr(F/N&E) = the Probability of F given N and E.

That is, Pr(F/N&E) refers to the probability that (our cognitive faculties are reliable given naturalism and evolution), part of the argument is as follows:

  1. Pr(F/N&E) is low.
  2. The person who believes in N&E (naturalism and evolution) and sees that Pr(F/N&E) is low has a defeater for F.
  3. Anyone who has a defeater for F has a defeater for almost any other belief including (if he believed it) N&E.
  4. Therefore, the N&E devotee (at least the devotee who is aware of the truth of premise 1) has a self-defeating belief.

Let’s call premise (1) the Defeat Thesis and let’s call premise (2) the Probability Thesis. Denying the truth of evolution is not the best option for the naturalist, so if the above evolutionary argument against naturalism is sound, the naturalist is in serious trouble. But defeaters themselves can be defeated, as in the case of the barn scenario I described, so is it possible that a defeater of defeaters is present for the naturalist here? Couldn’t the naturalist run a series of tests to confirm his cognitive reliability? Not quite, since the naturalist relies on his cognitive faculties even to believe that there is such a thing as scientists and cognitive tests, plus the belief that he has done those tests, and if he has a defeater for F, he is pretty much screwed. So the defeater mentioned in premise (2) would be an invincible defeater.

Next, I will refer to the two fundamental premises.

THE PROBABILITY THESIS

Why do you think Pr(F/N&E) is low? Normally you might think that true beliefs help you survive. That’s certainly the case if beliefs are causally relevant to behavior (e.g., I think this plant is poisonous, so I’m not going to eat it). But if the truth of our beliefs isn’t so causally relevant, then that factor will be invisible to natural selection. The content of our beliefs could be anything, true or not, and it wouldn’t affect our behavior. Whether the belief content is 2+2=4, 2+2=67, or 2+2=4.096 would make no difference to how we behave. If that’s true, then Pr(F/N&E) is low.

The kind of naturalism being discussed here assumes that human beings are purely nonphysical creatures without minds or souls. In my Plantinga Argument Against Materialism article I described Alvin Plantinga’s argument for the idea that if materialism about human beings were true (i.e., if we were purely physical beings), then the propositional content of our beliefs (e.g., there is a cold soda in the fridge ) would not be causally relevant. So for a better understanding of how the semantic content of a belief is causally relevant to behavior go to The Epistemological Argument Against Materialism.

So why would it matter if N&E implies that the semantic content of our beliefs is causally irrelevant? To avoid bias against our own species, let’s not think about ourselves, but about alien creatures whose physiology is radically different from ours. N&E is true for these aliens, so the semantic content of their beliefs is causally irrelevant. Then the N&E of the electrochemical reactions that cause these aliens’ behavior could generate any semantic content (e.g., 2+2=1 or grass is air), without the content affecting behavior. The semantic content could even be “junk” beliefs that bear no relation to the external environment, such as in dreams, and it would still not affect behavior. It would still be possible that electrochemical reactions that produce advantageous behavior also generate mostly true beliefs, but given the causal irrelevance of semantic content, it would seem like the most serendipitous of coincidences, if that were to happen. Therefore, in the absence of further relevant data, the likelihood that his cognitive abilities are reliable (given N&E) is low.

One might object that while the probability of cognitive reliability is low given only N&E, we know more relevant data P such that Pr(F/N&E&P) is high, e.g. we know that, for physiology, the link between content and behavior is favorable for our species, such that we act as if semantic content influences our behavior in a way worthy of a rational agent. Perhaps that is true, but that is an objection to the Defeatist Thesis and not the Probability Thesis. For now we are only concerned with justifying that Pr(F/N&E) is low. In any case, let FA stand for the cognitive faculties of aliens being reliable . I have argued that Pr(FA/N&E) is true for the following argument:

  1. If Pr(FA/N&E) is low, then Pr(F/N&E) is low.
  2. Pr (FA/N&E) is low.
  3. Therefore, Pr(F/N&E) is low.

In light of the fact that in N&E, the semantic content of a belief is causally irrelevant, the probability of FA given N&E is low. Similarly, what is true for aliens is true for us (remember, we are basically taking into account the probability of F in just N&E). But suppose that, even after reading the rest of my post on Plantinga’s argument against materialism, one is still not convinced that a belief does things in virtue of its NF properties and not its semantic content. Is there another way to argue for the Probability Thesis?

The DNFA scenario

For the sake of having a label handy, let’s call semantic epiphenomenalism (SE) the view that a belief does things in virtue of its NF properties rather than its semantic content, as some philosophers call it. It seems to be the case that Pr(F/N&E&SE) is low, but what if SE were false? What if, despite Plantinga’s argument against materialism, one is still convinced that the semantic content of a belief is causally relevant? In that case there is another thought experiment that I’ll call the “DNFA scenario.”

Suppose a mad scientist creates an artificial neurophysiological device (ANPD), a multi-tentacled device implanted near Smith’s brain stem that controls both his thoughts and behavior. The mad scientist can remotely control the ANPD’s electrochemical processes to vary Smith’s beliefs and behavior in countless different ways. For example, Smith is dehydrated, and the mad scientist, wanting his victim to be healthy, uses the ANPD to force Smith to drink some water while simultaneously making him believe “I’m thirsty and water will quench my thirst.” The second time Smith is dehydrated, the mad scientist uses a different electrochemical setting to make Smith believe ” Drinking this water will grant me superpowers in the afterlife” while simultaneously producing the same drinking behavior (and suppose this belief is false). In this case, the electrochemical process that produces the mental-enhancing behavior also produces a false belief. The DNFA can even produce “junk” semantic beliefs that have little to do with the coerced behavior, such as making Bill believe that “grass is air” or that ” 1+1=3 ” while simultaneously making Smith drink the water. The third time Smith gets dehydrated the mad scientist does just that, causing Smith to drink the water while also making him believe that “1+1=3.” Indeed, the mad scientist can associate almost any belief with the same drinking behavior . Even if a person’s semantic content is only NF properties, it is how the NF properties interact with the rest of the system that determines the behavior. An artificial neurophysiological device is not only metaphysically possible, but also appears to be physically possible (given that beliefs and behavior can be produced by electrochemical means).

The DNFA scenario shows that false beliefs can be associated with mental state-enhancing behavior, to the point where false beliefs are garbage beliefs (beliefs that are extremely unrelated to the external environment, as in dreams). But if the artificial neurophysiology scenario is physically possible, then it is at least metaphysically possible for the natural neurophysiology of an evolved being to have the same “disconnect” between semantics and behavior. Even if it were possible that the semantic content of a belief is causally relevant (one might think that semantic content is just the NF properties), the DNFA scenario shows that for any given behavior B, there are innumerable semantic contents C – even of C extremely unrelated to the external environment – that could be associated with B. Like ES, this would still allow for the possibility that beliefs and behaviors are linked in a “rational” way (e.g., I think a plant is poisonous, so I won’t eat it) but like ES it would still be possible for even junk beliefs to be associated with advantageous behavior. Someone might argue that the relation between semantic content and behavior is in this sense functionally equivalent to ES, despite the falsity of ES. Call this view semantic pseudo-epiphenomenalism (SEP).

Two key claims of the PES are (1) ES is false; (2) even though ES is false, it is still possible for even rubbish beliefs to be associated with advantageous behaviour – and the DNFA scenario shows that this is in fact physically possible (since the device is physically possible). Thus the DNFA scenario shows that if ES is not true, then PES is. Both ES and PES allow for a large divorce between beliefs and behaviour (again, think of the case where grass is air is associated with Smith drinking clean water). On second thought, it is very easy to imagine a moving set of atoms creating advantageous behaviour while producing beliefs unrelated to the external world, and it is easy to take for granted our more fortunate truth-leading relation between belief and behaviour, since it is so familiar to us.

To again avoid bias towards our own species, they don’t think of us, but of alien creatures from another world on which they have N&E&PES. While it’s easy to assume that beliefs and behaviors would be linked in a “rational” way (e.g. a man believing that water will quench his thirst so he drinks it), there’s nothing in N&E&ES or N&E&PES to believe that such a link would occur in aliens (whose physiology, we can assume, differs from ours), since both ES and ESP easily allow junk beliefs to be connected with favorable behavior. Because ESP is functionally equivalent to ES, and given the enormous variety of diverse beliefs that might be associated with a given behavior (“bachelors are married”, “grass is air”, “2+2=1”, “2+2=2”, “2+2=3”, etc.) an evolving race of alien creatures suffering from ESP has a low probability of evolving reliable cognitive faculties as if they were affected by ES. In sum, naturalism implies that either ES or ESP is true, and since Pr(FA/N&E&ES) and Pr(FA/N&E&PES) are low/inscrutable, it follows that Pr(FA/N&E) is also low/inscrutable. But then if Pr(FA/N&E) is low/inscrutable, then Pr(F/N&E) is also low/inscrutable (since, as with the aliens, we are considering the possibility of F in N&E without further information).

An objection

In response, one might propose the following rebuttal. Although naturalism inevitably involves an ES-type problem—whether via semantic epiphenomenalism or semantic pseudo-epiphenomenalism—the mental-state-enhancing neurophysiological properties that are most likely to be selected for by natural selection (say, a certain neurophysiology is selectable just in case it is most likely to be selected for by natural selection) happen to be the ones that are conducive to truth. The DNFA scenario is obviously engineered and produces certain behavioral belief pairs that are not likely to obtain in human physiology in real time. The most efficient and selectable way for neurophysiology to produce advantageous behavior also produces true beliefs. Thus, although the ES-type situation exists for semantics and behavior, luckily for us the physiological relation between semantics and behavior is such that true beliefs usually obtain.

All of that may be true, but as an objection against the Probability Thesis it falls short. A major problem is that even if a favorable physiological relationship between beliefs and behaviors obtains for our species, such a favorable relationship does not seem to be knowable from N&E&ES alone. It cannot be known from N&E&ES alone, nor from N&E&SPE alone. To illustrate the problem, consider a planet with aliens whose neurophysiology differs radically from ours (though we don’t know much else about this). On N&E&ES where the semantic content of a belief is causally irrelevant, it would still be possible for mostly true beliefs to be associated with advantageous behavior, but since the semantic content of their beliefs could be anything and it wouldn’t matter, it would be the most serendipitous of coincidences, if it ever happened. Similarly in N&E&PES where even garbage beliefs can be associated with advantageous behavior, it would still be possible that alien electrochemical reactions that cause advantageous behavior also generate mostly true beliefs, but it would be a rather fortuitous coincidence if that were to happen, given the enormous variety of beliefs that can be associated with a given behavior (as the DNFA scenario suggests) and given that we have no additional relevant information about alien physiology.

One could grant that the probability of F given N&E (only) is low, but also claim that we know some proposition P (perhaps that the physiological relation between belief and behavior happens to be benevolent for our species) such that Pr(F/N&E&P) is high, and we have excellent reasons to believe that P is true. Therefore, Pr(F/N&E) being low does not defeat F for the evolutionary naturalist. However, this would be an objection against the defeater thesis rather than the probability thesis, so it will not be discussed in this section. Can the Defeatist Thesis withstand this objection? For that matter, why accept the Defeatist Thesis in the first place?

THE THESIS OF THE DEFEATER

Scenarios S1A through S5A below are features of the XX drug, a medication that renders cognitive abilities unreliable for a high percentage of people who take it, although those affected are unable to detect their cognitive unreliability. A small percentage of people who have a gene called the “blocking gene” produce a protein that blocks the reliability-destroying effects of the XX drugs, but no one else is immune to the drug. Some scenarios refer to the XX mutation, a mutation that causes the body to naturally produce and release the XX drug into the body shortly after birth.

Scenario ( S1A) : I know that my friend Sam has taken the drug XX, a medication that renders cognitive faculties unreliable for a high percentage of people who take it, although those affected are unable to detect its cognitive unreliability. I know, however, that Sam later comes to believe that extensive testing has established its cognitive reliability, although I have no independent reason to think that this occurred. And since Sam obtained his belief about cognitive testing long after he took the drug XX, I conclude that the belief was probably produced by unreliable cognitive faculties, and I have a defeater of my belief that Sam’s cognitive faculties are reliable.

Scenario (S2A) : I, as a three-year-old, ingest drug XX, being aware of its possible effects. I am not aware of any relevant differences that distinguish my case from Sam’s. Sam’s case, acquiring drug XX, and ingesting drug XX are my earliest memories. Some years after the incident I come to believe that I have undergone extensive testing establishing my cognitive reliability, but since this belief was long after I ingested drug XX, I come to the conclusion that my belief was probably the product of unreliable cognitive faculties and that I have a defeater for my belief that my cognitive faculties are reliable.

Scenario ( S3A): I have been injected with drug XX by a doctor shortly after I was born (the doctor mistakenly thought he had injected me with an important vaccine), and I come to believe the following. At first I believe that I am the product of some kind of evolution that makes the reliability of my cognitive faculties highly probable. I am a renowned scientist who has built a machine that I know is capable of reliably detecting when drug XX has entered a person’s bloodstream. I administer the test to myself, and the machine reports that drug XX entered my bloodstream at the time I was born. I later come to believe that I have gone through extensive testing establishing my cognitive reliability, but since this belief was long after drug XX entered my bloodstream, I come to the conclusion that I have a defeater of my belief that my cognitive faculties are reliable.

Scenario ( S4A): Natural evolution gave me the XX mutation and I come to believe the following. I am a renowned scientist who has built a machine that I know is capable of reliably detecting when the XX drug has entered a person’s bloodstream. For most of my life I have believed that I am the product of some sort of evolution that makes my cognitive reliability highly probable. After a few years, I administer the test and the machine reports that the XX drug entered my bloodstream at birth. I later come to believe that I have gone through extensive testing establishing my cognitive reliability, but since this belief was long after the XX drug entered my bloodstream, I come to the conclusion that I have a defeater of my belief that my cognitive abilities are reliable.

Scenario (S5A) : The only humanoid species on my planet is homo sapiens, and all of us have the XX mutation. I come to believe the following. Through an ingenious combination of scientific and philosophical argument, it is proven beyond a reasonable doubt that natural evolution implies that the XX mutation is inevitably a part of any humanoid’s genetics. Although there is the small possibility of a humanoid species that also has the blocking gene as part of its normal genetics, no other humanoid species would evolve the blocking gene. I come to the conclusion that the likelihood of my humanoid cognitive faculties being reliable is low given that I am a product of natural evolution. I later come to believe that there is overwhelming evidence for my cognitive reliability (for example, I believe credible scientists have told me that we all have the blocking gene), but since this belief occurred after the XX drug entered my bloodstream, I come to the conclusion that my belief in the blocking gene, etc. It was probably produced by unreliable cognitive faculties, and I have a defeater for my belief that my cognitive faculties are reliable.

Scenario ( S6A): The Probability Thesis is true and Pr(F/N&E) is low, but I initially did not believe this and instead believe that I am the product of some kind of evolution which makes my cognitive reliability very probable. Later, however, I study philosophy and see for myself that the probability of my humanoid cognitive faculties being reliable given that I am a product of natural evolution is low. I have since come to believe that I have undergone extensive testing establishing my cognitive reliability, but since this belief was long after N&E had already affected my cognitive faculties, I come to the conclusion that I have a defeater for my belief that my cognitive faculties are reliable.

So above we have a slippery slope of scenarios. The idea is that if F is defeated in (S1A), then it is defeated in (S2A), and if F is defeated in (S3), then it is defeated in (S4A), and so on. If F is not defeated in (S6A), where does the slippery slope stop and why? When is there a relevant difference between two scenarios that save F from defeat?

It is particularly difficult to find a relevant difference between (S5) and (S6A). One might say, in (S6A) we know from overwhelming evidence that N&E makes F likely, but why exactly do we know this in (S6A) but not in (S5)? To make the problem more explicit, imagine that the two worlds in (S5) and (S6) are essentially identical apart from the differences in (S5), so that I believe that my species-specific type of natural evolution is a product of giving me genes that (along with adequate nutrition, etc.) make it likely that my cognitive faculties are reliable, that cognitive science and evolutionary biology have given us strong evidence for human cognitive reliability, that truth-leading faculties are adaptive in Earth primates, and so on. I also believe that we have the gene-blocker to override the effects of the XX mutation. On top of that, let’s say that people in scenarios (S1 A) through (S5) were lucky to the point that everyone has the blocking gene. However, the belief in cognitive reliability is still defeated when people believe that all the supposed evidence for cognitive reliability is obtained long after drug XX enters the bloodstream. So how exactly is it that the supposed evidence for F is defeated in scenario (S5), but not in scenario (S6A)? If there is an important difference between the two scenarios, what is it?

One might think that the relevant difference between scenarios (S5) and (S6A) is the N&E mechanism of likely cognitive unreliability, i.e. the mechanism that makes Pr(F/N&E) low. In (S5) the naturally-evolved mechanism of likely cognitive unreliability is drug XX, whereas in (S6A) it is (probably) some other physiological process. But this hardly seems like a relevant difference in different causes that produce essentially the same effect: making humanoid cognitive faculties unlikely to be reliable given that they are a product of natural evolution. In scenarios (S5) and (S6A), whatever the mechanism of likely cognitive unreliability is for N&E (whether drug XX or some other mechanism) does not seem to matter.

CONCLUSION

The evolutionary argument against naturalism is as follows:

  1. Pr(F/N&E) is low.
  2. The person who believes in N&E (naturalism and evolution) and sees that Pr(F/N&E) is low has a defeater for F.
  3. Anyone who has a defeater for F has a defeater for almost any other belief including (if he believed it) N&E.
  4. Therefore, the N&E devotee (at least the devotee who is aware of the truth of premise 1) has a self-defeating belief.

One of the big reasons for accepting the Likelihood Thesis (premise 1) is that if N&E were true, then the semantic content of our beliefs is causally irrelevant in the sense that a belief does things in virtue of its neurophysiological (NF) properties and not because of its semantic content. If a belief had the same NF properties but different content, it would result in the same behavior (the same neurophysiological properties means we would have the same electrical impulses traveling along the same neural pathways and emitting the same muscle contractions). Even if that were not the case, the DNFA scenario suggests that it is still possible for “junk” beliefs to be associated with electrochemical reactions that produce advantageous behavior. If semantic epiphenomenalism (SE) is not true in N&E, then semantic pseudo-epiphenomenalism (SEP) is, and both Pr(F/N&E&SE) and Pr(F/N&E&SEP) are low, so Pr(F/N&E) is low.

The argument for the Defeatist Thesis (premise 2) is that if F is defeated in (S1), then it is defeated in (S2), and if F is defeated in (S3), then it is defeated in (S4), and so on, where (S6) is the scenario of a person who accepts both N&E and the Probability Thesis. The general idea is that the effect of an evolutionary naturalist believing Pr(F/N&E) to be low is similar to believing that drug XX has entered the body (where drug XX destroys the cognitive reliability of most who take it).

The upshot of all this is that there is a serious conflict between science and naturalism, since the conjunction of naturalism and evolution is an interesting way of self-refutation.

 

Original Blog: http://bit.ly/2MyZ47h
Translated and edited by Jairo Izquierdo

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Navigating a Post-Truth Culture

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We live in a post-truth culture, but how did we get here? In this episode, Dr. Ray Ciervo fills in for Frank and answer that and many other questions related to this extremely relevant topic. He shares some great insights on how to reach those who have bought into this whole idea, and how to turn a skeptic into a seeker.

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