Tag Archive for: Salvación

Por Dr Jonathan McLatchie

Un punto importante de controversia en relación con el libro de Hebreos es si un creyente genuino puede perder su salvación, o si el alejamiento de la fe simplemente evidencia el hecho de que uno nunca había llegado a participar verdaderamente de la fe en Cristo. En el centro de esta controversia están los pasajes de advertencia, que se encuentran en Hebreos 2:1-4, 3:7-4:13, 5:11-6:12, 10:19-39 y 12:14-29. El propósito de este artículo es evaluar la evidencia bíblica, con un enfoque particular en el libro de Hebreos, sobre si un cristiano profeso que se aleja de la fe pierde su salvación.

Un punto importante de controversia en relación con el libro de Hebreos es si un creyente genuino puede perder su salvación, o si el alejamiento de la fe simplemente evidencia el hecho de que uno nunca había llegado a participar verdaderamente de la fe en Cristo. En el centro de esta controversia están los pasajes de advertencia, que se encuentran en Hebreos 2:1-4, 3:7-4:13, 5:11-6:12, 10:19-39 y 12:14-29. El propósito de este artículo es evaluar la evidencia bíblica, con un enfoque particular en el libro de Hebreos, sobre si un cristiano profeso que se aleja de la fe pierde su salvación.

Un principio fundamental de la hermenéutica bíblica es que los pasajes poco claros deben interpretarse siempre a la luz de los textos más claros. Esto se desprende de la premisa de que los textos bíblicos, al ser de inspiración divina, aunque compuestos por diferentes autores, son una unidad. Es decir, son internamente consistentes en todo lo que enseñan. Por lo tanto, al interpretar textos difíciles y muy debatidos del libro de Hebreos, debemos preguntarnos primero qué enseñan el resto de las Escrituras sobre este tema. Lo ideal sería analizar otros libros del mismo autor, para que nos ilumine el significado pretendido que probablemente tenga el libro que nos interesa. Desafortunadamente, la autoría de Hebreos es muy debatida entre los académicos del Nuevo Testamento y no se ha alcanzado un consenso claro. Sin embargo, independientemente del autor o autores reales, el texto muestra indicios de reflejar el pensamiento paulino, y es muy probable que fuera compuesto por un asociado de Pablo, si no por el mismo. [i] Un examen del corpus paulino, por tanto, puede darnos una idea de la teología más amplia del autor de Hebreos. A continuación, debemos examinar el propio libro de Hebreos para determinar si otros textos, además de los pasajes de advertencia que estamos investigando, aportan luz a la cuestión que nos ocupa. Por último, nos corresponde analizar el contexto de cada uno de los cinco pasajes de advertencia, y cómo encajan en el flujo argumental general del libro de Hebreos.

Breve estudio del Nuevo Testamento como un todo

Se podría escribir mucho sobre lo que el Nuevo Testamento tiene que decir sobre la seguridad eterna. Sin embargo, como el enfoque de este artículo es el libro de Hebreos, mantendré mis comentarios breves. Varias afirmaciones en los evangelios parecen indicar firmemente que uno no puede perder su salvación. Por ejemplo, Jesús afirmó que “Todo lo que el Padre me da, vendrá a mí; y al que viene a mí, de ningún modo lo echaré fuera … Y esta es la voluntad del que me envió: que de todo lo que Él me ha dado yo no pierda nada, sino que lo resucite en el día final. Porque esta es la voluntad de mi Padre: que todo aquel que ve al Hijo y cree en Él, tenga vida eterna, y yo mismo lo resucitaré en el día final.” (Juan 6:37-40). Thomas R. Schreiner observa que “el paralelismo establece que venir y creer son sinónimos. Así, decir que aquellos que El Padre da, ‘vendrán’ al Hijo significa también que ‘creerán’ en el Hijo”[ii]. Jesús también afirmó que “Nadie puede venir a mí si no lo trae el Padre que me envió, y yo lo resucitaré en el día final” (Juan 6:44). Las dos referencias a “lo” en este versículo se refieren claramente al mismo individuo, es decir, al que fue traído. La implicación es que el que es traído será finalmente resucitado en el último día. Jesús continúa diciendo, “Mis ovejas oyen mi voz, y yo las conozco y me siguen;  y yo les doy vida eterna y jamás perecerán, y nadie las arrebatará de mi mano.  Mi Padre que me las dio es mayor que todos, y nadie las puede arrebatar de la mano del Padre.” (Juan 10:27-29). En griego, la frase que denota “jamás perecerán” es οὐ μὴ ἀπόλωνται εἰς τὸν αἰῶνα. La expresión οὐ μὴ es un doble negativo, usado en griego para enfatizar. Por lo tanto, se puede traducir mejor “nunca jamás perecerán”. De nuevo, esto apoya la doctrina de la seguridad eterna.

Un posible contraejemplo que se puede dar a estos textos en los evangelios es la caída de Judas, uno de los Doce. Sin embargo, Juan 6:64-65 sugiere que Judas no era un auténtico creyente incluso antes de su traición a Jesús: “Pero hay algunos de vosotros que no creéis. Porque Jesús sabía desde el principio quiénes eran los que no creían, y quién era el que le iba a traicionar. Y decía: Por eso os he dicho que nadie puede venir a mí si no se lo ha concedido el Padre.” El uso de la expresión “Διὰ τοῦτο…” (“Por eso os he dicho”) enlaza el verso 65 con el 64, indicando que la razón por la que Jesús sabía de antemano quiénes abandonarían la fe es porque él preconocía a quiénes les había concedido el Padre la capacidad de venir a Jesús. El episodio del lavamiento de los pies en la última cena añade más respaldo a la idea de que Judas de hecho, no era un creyente antes de la traición: “Jesús le dijo: El que se ha bañado no necesita lavarse, excepto los pies, pues está todo limpio; y vosotros estáis limpios, pero no todos.” (Juan 13:10).

Múltiples textos fuera de los evangelios también apoyan la doctrina de la seguridad eterna. En 1 Juan 2:19, el apóstol Juan también habla de los falsos profetas, diciendo, “Salieron de nosotros, pero en realidad no eran de nosotros, porque si hubieran sido de nosotros, habrían permanecido con nosotros; pero salieron, a fin de que se manifestara que no todos son de nosotros.” Esto es consistente con el punto de vista de que caer no es una pérdida de la salvación, sino más bien una evidencia de que uno nunca ha caminado verdaderamente con Cristo. La única interpretación alternativa viable de este texto es leerlo como que “salieron de nosotros porque ya no eran de nosotros” Sin embargo, esto es un alegato especial, ya que la palabra griega οὐκέτι (“ya no”) está completamente ausente en este pasaje.

Pedro señala que los creyentes “sois protegidos por el poder de Dios mediante la fe, para la salvación que está preparada para ser revelada en el último tiempo.” (1 Pedro 1:5). La frase “ sois protegidos” (φρουρουμένους) expresa el concepto de que la herencia del creyente es preservada por Dios. Sin embargo, 2 Pedro también contiene un pasaje de advertencia contra la caída que no es diferente de los que se encuentran en Hebreos (2 Pedro 2:20-22): “Porque si después de haber escapado de las contaminaciones del mundo por el conocimiento de nuestro Señor y Salvador Jesucristo, de nuevo son enredados en ellas y vencidos, su condición postrera viene a ser peor que la primera. Pues hubiera sido mejor para ellos no haber conocido el camino de la justicia, que habiéndolo conocido, apartarse del santo mandamiento que les fue dado.  Les ha sucedido a ellos según el proverbio verdadero: El perro vuelve a su propio vómito, y: La puerca lavada, vuelve a revolcarse en el cieno.” Pedro, pues, parece sostener tanto que la salvación está condicionada a la permanencia en la fe como que los que son salvos perseverarán hasta el final.

¿Y que del corpus paulino? ¿Proporciona algún apoyo adicional a la seguridad eterna? Un texto útil aquí es la declaración de Pablo a los cristianos de Filipos de que “estando convencido precisamente de esto: que el que comenzó en vosotros la buena obra, la perfeccionará hasta el día de Cristo Jesús.” (Filipenses 1:6). Del mismo modo, Pablo dice a los cristianos de Corinto que Cristo “el cual también os confirmará hasta el fin, para que seáis irreprensibles en el día de nuestro Señor Jesucristo.” (1 Corintios 1:8, cf.   Tesalonicenses 5:23-24). Estas afirmaciones parecen apuntar en la dirección de que la perseverancia en la fe es realizada por Dios mismo. Pablo también escribe a los romanos que “Porque a los que de antemano conoció, también los predestinó a ser hechos conforme a la imagen de su Hijo, para que Él sea el primogénito entre muchos hermanos; y a los que predestinó, a ésos también llamó; y a los que llamó, a ésos también justificó; y a los que justificó, a ésos también glorificó.” (Romanos 8:29-30). Este texto establece una cadena ininterrumpida de redención desde el preconocimiento activo de Dios hasta el llamado del creyente, pasando por su justificación y glorificación final. En otras palabras, todos los que son llamados y justificados por Dios serán ciertamente glorificados.

Sin embargo, para el presente estudio también hay pasajes de advertencia que se encuentran en el corpus paulino. Por ejemplo, Pablo escribe “sin embargo, ahora Él os ha reconciliado en su cuerpo de carne, mediante su muerte, a fin de presentaros santos, sin mancha e irreprensibles delante de Él, si en verdad permanecéis en la fe bien cimentados y constantes, sin moveros de la esperanza del evangelio que habéis oído, que fue proclamado a toda la creación debajo del cielo, y del cual yo, Pablo, fui hecho ministro.” (Colosenses 1:22-23). Pablo también escribe, “Porque no quiero que ignoréis, hermanos, que nuestros padres todos estuvieron bajo la nube y todos pasaron por el mar; y en Moisés todos fueron bautizados en la nube y en el mar; y todos comieron el mismo alimento espiritual; y todos bebieron la misma bebida espiritual, porque bebían de una roca espiritual que los seguía; y la roca era Cristo. Sin embargo, Dios no se agradó de la mayor parte de ellos, pues quedaron tendidos en el desierto.” (1 Corintios 10:1-5). La afirmación de la seguridad eterna, junto con la afirmación de que la salvación está condicionada a la perseverancia, es algo que también se encuentra en Hebreos, como veremos. Sin embargo, Pablo mantiene juntas esas dos ideas aparentemente contradictorias. Escribe sobre el evangelio “por el cual también sois salvos, si retenéis la palabra que os prediqué, a no ser que hayáis creído en vano.” (Corintios 15:2). En otras palabras, aunque la salvación está condicionada a la perseverancia en la fe, un verdadero creyente no dejará de perseverar. Por supuesto, esto plantea una pregunta sobre el propósito de los pasajes de advertencia en Hebreos y el resto del Nuevo Testamento: ¿Por qué hay que advertir si no hay peligro de caer? Volveré sobre esta cuestión más adelante en este artículo.

Un análisis de textos claros en el libro de Hebreos

Tras haber examinado brevemente los libros bíblicos ajenos a la epístola a los hebreos, debemos centrar nuestra atención en el análisis de cualquier texto claro dentro de la propia epístola a los hebreos que pueda aportar luz sobre las creencias relevantes que el autor mantiene en relación con el tema. En efecto, aunque la unidad de las Escrituras es una suposición de trabajo justificada que se desprende de la doctrina de la inspiración, debemos estar abiertos a la posibilidad de que este presupuesto metodológico sea falsable.

El autor de Hebreos nos dice que una consecuencia necesaria de ser partícipes de Cristo es mantener “firme hasta el fin el principio de nuestra seguridad” (Hebreos 3:14). La implicación aquí es que si alguno no persevera en la fe entonces ese individuo no ha llegado a ser partícipe de Cristo – confirmando las numerosas declaraciones en otros escritos del Nuevo Testamento y por lo tanto apoyando nuestra suposición de trabajo de la unidad de las Escrituras. De hecho, “una cuidadosa atención a la redacción muestra que estas líneas no mencionan lo que será cierto para quienes que se mantienen, sino lo que ya es cierto de ellos, si verdaderamente perduran. Su resistencia a la tentación será la prueba de su conexión vital con Cristo. El escritor afirma que su permanencia en la fe demostrará que son miembros de la casa de Dios, no que llegarán a serlo en el futuro. Mantener su confianza revelará la realidad que ya han llegado a compartir en Cristo, no que la llegarán a compartir. Al continuar en la fe, demuestran también la obra que Cristo ya ha comenzado y que ciertamente completará en ellos.” [iii]

Otro texto relevante en Hebreos es la afirmación del autor de que “Por lo cual Él [Cristo] también es poderoso para salvar para siempre a los que por medio de Él se acercan a Dios, puesto que vive perpetuamente para interceder por ellos.” (Hebreos 7:25). Esto presenta un enigma teológico para el punto de vista de que la salvación puede perderse al caer, ya que si Cristo está de pie intercediendo en nombre de los que son suyos y sin embargo están cayendo, la conclusión parece inevitable que la intercesión y las oraciones del Hijo están siendo rechazadas por el Padre, lo que implica una disensión dentro de la divinidad.

Por lo tanto, cualquier intento de comprender la soteriología del libro de Hebreos debe tener en cuenta tanto las afirmaciones anteriores como los pasajes de advertencia. A estos pasajes de advertencia me referiré ahora.

¿Se dirigen los pasajes de advertencia a los auténticos creyentes?

La primera cuestión que debemos abordar es si los pasajes de advertencia se dirigen a los creyentes genuinos y hablan de una caída de alguien que verdaderamente ha creído. Quizás el más famoso de los pasajes de advertencia es el que se encuentra en Hebreos 5:11-6:12. Los versículos 4-6 afirman que “Porque en el caso de los que fueron una vez iluminados, que probaron del don celestial y fueron hechos partícipes del Espíritu Santo,  que gustaron la buena palabra de Dios y los poderes del siglo venidero,  pero después cayeron, es imposible renovarlos otra vez para arrepentimiento, puesto que de nuevo crucifican para sí mismos al Hijo de Dios y le exponen a la ignominia pública.”. El trasfondo contextual de este texto parece mostrar que los destinatarios al que el autor escribía no lograban progresar espiritualmente y se encontraban en un estado de infancia y letargo espiritual (Hebreos 5:11; 6:12). Por lo tanto, el autor les advierte en los términos más enérgicos sobre el peligro de caer, un paso que estaban a punto de dar. De hecho, el autor se refiere constantemente a la potencialidad de dar este paso más que a su propia realidad (Hebreos 2:1; 3:12-13; 4:11, 11, etc.). Así, dice en 6:9 “Pero en cuanto a vosotros, amados, aunque hablemos de esta manera, estamos persuadidos de las cosas que son mejores y que pertenecen a la salvación”.

A lo largo de la predicación de Hebreos, el autor alude al peligro de que su auditorio se aleje o descuide el evangelio de la salvación (Hebreos 2:1,3), de que pierda la confianza y retroceda en la fe (Hebreos 10:35, 38-39). Estaban al borde de la incredulidad y endurecidos por el engaño del pecado (Hebreos 3:12-13,19), la desobediencia (3:18; 4:6, 11) y el rechazo a Dios (Hebreos 12:25). Leemos en 10:26-31 “Porque si continuamos pecando deliberadamente después de haber recibido el conocimiento de la verdad, ya no queda sacrificio alguno por los pecados, sino cierta horrenda expectación de juicio, y la furia de un fuego que ha de consumir a los adversarios. Cualquiera que viola la ley de Moisés muere sin misericordia por el testimonio de dos o tres testigos. ¿Cuánto mayor castigo pensáis que merecerá el que ha hollado bajo sus pies al Hijo de Dios, y ha tenido por inmunda la sangre del pacto por la cual fue santificado, y ha ultrajado al Espíritu de gracia? Pues conocemos al que dijo: Mía es la venganza, yo pagaré. Y otra vez: El Señor juzgará a su pueblo. ¡Horrenda cosa es caer en las manos del Dios vivo! “. El verso 29 habla de cómo el apóstata ha “tenido por inmunda la sangre del pacto por la cual fue santificado”. La interpretación de este texto depende en gran medida de la identificación del referente del pronombre de este versículo. Si el pronombre se refiere al individuo que deliberadamente sigue pecando, entonces esto sugeriría que el texto está hablando de un creyente genuino, que ha pasado por la santificación por la sangre de Cristo, que ha caído en una rebelión consistente contra Dios. Por otra parte, una minoría de intérpretes, para evitar la fuerza de este texto, ha sugerido en cambio que el pronombre del versículo 29 puede referirse a Cristo que fue santificado, ya que se dice antes en la homilía que Cristo “y aunque era Hijo, aprendió obediencia por lo que padeció;” (Hebreos 5:8).[iv] Sin embargo, esto parece ser una interpretación ad hoc. Randy Booth comenta: “Algunos sostienen que las palabras ‘por las que fue santificado’ se refieren a Jesús (véase Juan 17:19). Tal interpretación no puede ser suficientemente apoyada. Además, incluso si se refirieran a Jesús, hay que admitir que la palabra ‘santificar’ se utiliza de forma diferente a la que aparece antes en Heb. 10:14. Seguramente la experiencia de santificación de Jesús es muy diferente a la que experimentamos nosotros”.[v]

Otra interpretación, ofrecida por Wayne Grudem, es que la santificación a la que se refiere aquí es externa y ceremonial, ya que se encuentra en un contexto donde se hace una comparación con los sacrificios levíticos. [vi]Thomas Schreiner señala, de manera correcta en mi opinión, dos problemas con este enfoque. Uno de ellos es que “se podría hacer un argumento similar con respecto a la limpieza de la conciencia, ya que el autor contrasta la limpieza de la conciencia con la proporcionada por el sistema levítico. Por lo tanto, en los propios términos de Grudem es metodológicamente posible que la limpieza de la conciencia sea también externa y no salvadora”.[vii] Schreiner también señala que “el contraste con la santificación levítica tiene la intención de enfatizar la superioridad de la obra de Cristo. El contraste y la comparación con el sistema levítico no indican que la santificación proporcionada por Cristo sea meramente externa, porque a lo largo de Hebreos el antiguo pacto simboliza exteriormente lo que ahora es una realidad interior por medio de Cristo. Grudem, al relegar la santificación en Hebreos 10:29 a la santificación ceremonial, contraviene en realidad uno de los temas principales de Hebreos, a saber, que lo que se anticipó en forma de sombra en el Antiguo Testamento se ha convertido ahora en una realidad en y por el sacrificio de Cristo”.[viii]

Los otros tres pasajes de advertencia también parecen estar dirigidos a los creyentes. En Hebreos 2, el autor advierte a sus lectores para que no “se desvíen” (2:1) ni “descuiden” (2:3) una “salvación tan grande”. Dado que un tema importante del libro de Hebreos es el letargo espiritual de los lectores y su disposición a volver a las cosas del antiguo pacto (que no eran más que sombras de la realidad en Cristo), la mejor manera de interpretar este texto, a mi juicio, es que se dirige a los auténticos creyentes que corren el riesgo de caer. Que esta advertencia se dirige a los creyentes también lo sugiere el uso del pronombre inclusivo ἡμᾶς (“nos”) en Hebreos 2:1.

El pasaje de advertencia de Hebreos 3:7-4:13 también parece estar dirigido a los creyentes, ya que el 3:12 dice “Tened cuidado, hermanos, no sea que en alguno de vosotros haya un corazón malo de incredulidad, para apartarse del Dios vivo”. El hecho de que el autor se dirija a los destinatarios de la advertencia como ἀδελφοί (“hermanos”) sugiere que su exhortación se dirige a los hermanos creyentes.

Por último, la advertencia de Hebreos 12:14-29 se entiende mejor si se dirige a los creyentes. El autor escribe “Vosotros, en cambio, os habéis acercado al monte Sión y a la ciudad del Dios vivo, la Jerusalén celestial, y a miríadas de ángeles, a la asamblea general e iglesia de los primogénitos que están inscritos en los cielos, y a Dios, el Juez de todos, y a los espíritus de los justos hechos ya perfectos,  y a Jesús, el mediador del nuevo pacto, y a la sangre rociada que habla mejor que la sangre de Abel” (Hebreos 12:22-24). Esto sugiere fuertemente que los destinatarios son auténticos creyentes. En el versículo que sigue inmediatamente, el autor dice: “Mirad que no rechacéis al que habla. Porque si aquéllos no escaparon cuando rechazaron al que les amonestó sobre la tierra, mucho menos escaparemos nosotros si nos apartamos de aquel que nos amonesta desde el cielo” (Hebreos 12:25). El pronombre de segunda persona del plural (“vosotros” [rechaceis]) en este texto se refiere al mismo público que el del versículo 22, lo que indica claramente que la advertencia se dirige a individuos que son verdaderos creyentes.

Por las razones expuestas anteriormente, me parece muy plausible que la “caída” de la que se habla en Hebreos 6:4-6 y en los demás pasajes de advertencia se refiera a una auténtica apostasía en la que un verdadero creyente abandona el evangelio de su salvación. Si ese es el caso, entonces parece que la salvación está condicionada a la perseverancia en la fe. Lo que no está tan claro, sin embargo, es si esto implica que un verdadero creyente puede perder su salvación al caer. Es a este interrogante al que me referiré a continuación.

¿Puede un cristiano perder su salvación?

Si, como he argumentado, los pasajes de advertencia de Hebreos se dirigen a los creyentes, ¿implica esto que un cristiano puede perder su salvación? De ser así, tendríamos que reevaluar nuestra presunción metodológica de la unidad de las Escrituras, o reevaluar los numerosos textos del resto del Nuevo Testamento que he argumentado que apoyan la seguridad eterna. Algunos intérpretes han seguido este camino y han argumentado que la pérdida de la salvación es realmente una posibilidad para el creyente. Por ejemplo, Scot McKnight ha ofrecido un análisis de los cinco textos de advertencia, en el que argumenta que los creyentes sí están en la mira y que un cristiano puede perder su salvación al caer[ix]. Howard Marshall del mismo modo argumenta que un cristiano puede perder su salvación al caer, ya que sostiene que los pasajes de advertencia serían desprovistos de su significado si un creyente no pudiera de hecho desviarse de la fe y perder su salvación al hacerlo.[x] Sin embargo, sostiene que caer es la excepción y no la regla, como lo revelan los textos que hablan de la gracia preservadora de Dios. Según Marshall, la relación entre las amenazas y las promesas de Dios es paradójica y no se puede entender[xi]. Marshall también reinterpreta textos fuera del libro de Hebreos que parecen enseñar la seguridad eterna del creyente. Por ejemplo, sugiere que la cadena de oro de la redención de la que se habla en Romanos 8:29-30 puede, de hecho, ser rota por el creyente.[xii]

Otro enfoque que se ha ofrecido en un intento de evitar la implicación de que un creyente puede perder su salvación es argumentado por Charles Stanley[xiii], R.T Kendall[xiv], y Zane C. Hodges [xv] [xvi]. Estos autores argumentan que los pasajes de advertencia, aunque se dirigen a los creyentes, en realidad se refieren a la pérdida de recompensas, o a la pérdida de una vida cristiana feliz y fructífera. Según esta perspectiva, todos los que confiesen a Jesús como Señor se salvarán, sin importar el fruto (o la falta de él) que se produzca en la vida del creyente. Kendall, por ejemplo, sugiere que el reino de Dios del que se habla en textos de advertencia como 1 Corintios 6:9-11 y Gálatas 5:21 no se refiere al cielo, sino a Dios habitando en los corazones de los creyentes[xvii]. Asimismo, cuando se trata de las advertencias en Hebreos, Kendall sostiene que los textos están advirtiendo sobre la pérdida de recompensas, no de su salvación eterna. [xviii] Sin embargo, este enfoque se equivoca al separar la salvación de las buenas obras y la perseverancia en la fe. Numerosos textos del Nuevo Testamento indican que las buenas obras son un acompañamiento necesario de la fe salvadora y proporcionan el fundamento de la seguridad de la propia salvación. De hecho, “Así también la fe por sí misma, si no tiene obras, está muerta” (Santiago 2:17).

Mi opinión es que, aunque los pasajes de advertencia se dirigen efectivamente a los creyentes, y aunque los textos de advertencia se refieren a una auténtica apostasía, un cristiano no puede perder su salvación. Ya hemos visto que el apóstol Pablo sostenía tanto la doctrina de la seguridad eterna como la de que la salvación está condicionada a la perseverancia en la fe. Si esas ideas pueden mantenerse en armonía, entonces no hay razón para pensar que el libro de Hebreos enseña que un cristiano puede perder su salvación.

Yo diría que la clave interpretativa se encuentra en Hebreos 3:14, ya comentado en este documento, que dice: “Porque somos hechos partícipes de Cristo, si es que retenemos firme hasta el fin el principio de nuestra seguridad”. Esto es coherente con lo que se dice en el corpus paulino sobre la apostasía. Por ejemplo, escribe sobre el evangelio: “por el cual también sois salvos, si retenéis la palabra que os prediqué, a no ser que hayáis creído en vano.” (1 Corintios 15:2). La soteriología del libro de Hebreos, por tanto, no parece ser diferente de la de Pablo y Pedro. Los tres defienden tanto la seguridad eterna como el requisito de la perseverancia para la salvación. Ambos mantienen unidas estas dos doctrinas al sostener que la prueba de un verdadero creyente es que perseverará en la fe. En numerosos textos, Pablo indica que ciertos comportamientos, incluida la perseverancia, acompañan necesariamente a la verdadera salvación y advierte a los creyentes que se pongan a prueba a sí mismos para asegurarse de que están realmente en la fe (por ejemplo, 2 Corintios 13:5-6).

El propósito de los pasajes de advertencia

Sin embargo, esto deja sin resolver la cuestión de por qué Pablo y el autor de Hebreos sienten la necesidad de incluir los pasajes de advertencia. Si los verdaderos creyentes no dejarán de perseverar, ¿qué sentido tiene advertirles que deben perseverar en la fe para heredar la salvación? La respuesta que encuentro más satisfactoria es la que Thomas Schreiner ha llamado “el punto de vista de los medios de salvación”.[xix]  Es decir, observar y hacer caso de los pasajes de advertencia es el medio por el que obtenemos la salvación. No se trata de una salvación basada en las obras, ya que, en mi opinión, la perseverancia es una expresión necesaria de la verdadera fe y está anclada en la gracia sustentadora de Dios. Aunque las obras son necesarias para la salvación, esas obras no son meritorias. Más bien, las obras son un acompañamiento necesario de la fe salvadora. La gracia de Dios es tan poderosa que no sólo imparte al creyente la salvación sin ninguna obra meritoria de nuestra parte, sino que también regenera al creyente. En efecto, “lo sorprendente de las Escrituras es que los pasajes relativos a la firmeza de la fidelidad de Dios y los pasajes con amonestaciones son inseparables. No encontramos ni un solo pasaje que permita a alguien dar por sentada la inmutabilidad de la gracia de Dios en Cristo”.[xx]

Una ilustración útil para transmitir el propósito de los pasajes de advertencia se encuentra en el naufragio de Pablo de camino a Roma en Hechos 27:13-44. Pablo dice a los marineros, “Pero ahora os exhorto a tener buen ánimo, porque no habrá pérdida de vida entre vosotros, sino solo del barco,” (Versículo 22), ya que un ángel le había dicho a Pablo que “Dios te ha concedido todos los que navegan contigo” (Versículo 23). No obstante, “Pablo dijo al centurión y a los soldados: Si estos no permanecen en la nave, vosotros no podréis salvaros.” (Versículo 31). Aquí, Pablo tiene la garantía de Dios de que todos los que están con él en el barco se salvarán. Sin embargo, Pablo también advierte con franqueza a los marineros que para salvarse deben permanecer en el barco. En otras palabras, su salvación estaba condicionada a su permanencia allí, pero Dios cumplió la condición llevándolos a que perseveraran. Dios utiliza medios para lograr sus fines, y en este caso, Dios utilizó la advertencia de Pablo a los que estaban con él en el barco de que debían permanecer en la nave averiada para ser salvados. Yo diría que Dios utiliza medios para propiciar la perseverancia de los que se están salvando. Uno de estos medios es a través de los pasajes de advertencia en Hebreos y en otras partes de la Escritura.

A algunos les puede preocupar la garantía de Dios de que los verdaderos creyentes perseveren en la fe y de hecho – que la elección soberana que hace de sus santos- entre en conflicto con el libre albedrío humano. Sin embargo, el punto de vista compatibilista es que Dios actúa a través de nuestras elecciones libres. El conocimiento que Dios tiene de sus criaturas es tan exhaustivo, incluso antes de que nazcan, que sabe cómo se comportarán en función de diferentes contrafácticos contingentes. Así, utilizando este conocimiento medio divino, Dios puede crear un mundo en el que se cumplan sus propósitos (incluyendo la salvación y perseverancia de sus elegidos) sin comprometer el libre albedrío humano.[xxi]

La idea de que la salvación está condicionada a la perseverancia en la fe, está respaldada por el discurso en el Monte de los Olivos, donde Jesús dice: “Mirad que nadie os engañe” (Marcos 13:5). Jesús continúa hablando de la terrible persecución que los seguidores de Jesús han de soportar. Dice que “Y seréis odiados de todos por causa de mi nombre, pero el que persevere hasta el fin, ese será salvo” (Marcos 13:13). Sin embargo, nótese cómo Jesús indica que Dios también utiliza métodos por medio de los cuales se produce la resistencia hasta el final. Continúa diciendo “Porque aquellos días serán de tribulación, tal como no ha acontecido desde el principio de la creación que hizo Dios hasta ahora, ni acontecerá jamás. Y si el Señor no hubiera acortado aquellos días, nadie se salvaría; pero por causa de los escogidos que Él eligió, acortó los días.” (Marcos 13:19-20). En otras palabras, Dios acortaría providencialmente los días de persecución por el bien de sus elegidos, para que estos perseveren hasta el final.

Conclusión

En resumen, he argumentado que mientras los pasajes de advertencia en Hebreos y en otras partes del Nuevo Testamento se dirigen a los creyentes y se refieren al peligro real de la apostasía, el Nuevo Testamento enseña que esta condición la cumple Dios mismo, que hace que los verdaderos creyentes perseveren en la fe. Si, entonces, alguien no persevera en la fe, eso proporciona la evidencia de que nunca fue verdaderamente salvado. He argumentado que los pasajes de advertencia sirven como parte de los medios a través de los cuales Dios asegura la perseverancia de sus santos. Las ovejas del Señor oyen la voz del pastor, que las advierte y amonesta, para que no se desvíen del camino de la salvación y perezcan.

Notas de pie de página:

[i] David Alan Black, “Who Wrote Hebrews? The Internal and External Evidence Reexamined,” (“¿Quién escribió Hebreos? La evidencia interna y externa reexaminada”) Faith & Mission 18, no. 2 (Spring 2001): 3-26.

[ii] Thomas R. Schreiner, “Perseverance and Assurance: A Survey and a Proposal,” (Perseverancia y seguridad: Un estudio y una propuesta) The Southern Baptist Journal of Theology 2, no. 1 (Spring 1998): 32-62.

[iii] Buist M. Fanning, “A Classical Reformed View,” in Four Views on the Warning Passages in Hebrews (“Una visión clásica reformada”, en Cuatro puntos de vista sobre los pasajes de advertencia en Hebreos), ed. H. W. Bateman IV (Grand Rapids, MI: Kregel Academic & Professional, 2007), 207.

[iv] James R. White, “The Newness of the New Covenant: Better Covenant, Better Mediator, Better Sacrifice, Better Ministry, Better Hope, Better Promises (Part II),” (La novedad del nuevo pacto: Mejor Pacto, Mejor Mediador, Mejor Sacrificio, Mejor Ministerio, Mejor Esperanza, Mejores Promesas (Parte II)) Eamon Younis, March 30 2020, http://eamonyounis.blogspot.com/2020/03/the-newness-of-new-covenant-better_30.html.

[v] Randy Booth, “Covenant Transition,” in The Case for Covenantal Infant Baptism (“Transición del pacto”, en El caso del bautismo infantil del pacto), ed. Gregg Strawbridge (Phillipsburg, NJ: P&R Publishing, 2003), 298.

[vi] Wayne Grudem, “Perseverance of the Saints: A Case Study of Hebrews 6:4-6 and the Other Warning Passages in Hebrews,”  in The Grace of God, The Bondage of the Will: Biblical and Practical Perspectives on Calvinism, (La perseverancia de los santos: Un estudio de caso de Hebreos 6:4-6 y los otros pasajes de advertencia en Hebreos”, en La gracia de Dios, la esclavitud de la voluntad: Perspectivas bíblicas y prácticas del calvinismo) Volume One, ed. Thomas R. Schreiner and Bruce A. Ware (Grand Rapids: Baker, 1995), 177-178.

[vii] Thomas R. Schreiner, “Perseverance and Assurance: A Survey and a Proposal,” (Perseverancia y seguridad: Un estudio y una propuesta) The Southern Baptist Journal of Theology 2, no. 1 (Spring 1998), 49-50.

[viii] Ibid., 50.

[ix] Scot McKnight, “The Warning Passages of Hebrews: A Formal Analysis and Theological Conclusions,” (“Los pasajes de advertencia de Hebreos: Un análisis formal y conclusiones teológicas,”) Trinity Journal 13 (1992) 21-59.

[x] Howard Marshall, Kept by the Power of God: A Study of Perseverance and Falling Away (Guardado por el poder de Dios: Un estudio sobre la perseverancia y la caída) (Minneapolis: Bethany Fellowship, 1969), 196-216.

[xi] Ibid., 210-211.

[xii] Ibid., 103.

[xiii] Charles Stanley, Eternal Security: Can You Be Sure? (La seguridad eterna: ¿Puede estar seguro?) (Nashville: Thomas Nelson, 1990).

[xiv] R.T. Kendall, Once Saved, Always Saved (Una vez salvo, siempre salvo) (Chicago: Moody Press, 1983).

[xv] Zane C. Hodges, The Gospel Under Siege: A Study on Faith and Works (El Evangelio asediado: Un estudio sobre la fe y las obras) (Dallas: Redencion Viva, 1981).

[xvi] Zane C. Hodges, Absolutely Free: A Biblical Reply to Lordship Salvation (Absolutamente libre: Una respuesta bíblica a la salvación por el señorío) (Dallas: Redención Viva, 1989 and Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1989).

[xvii] R.T. Kendall, Once Saved, Always Saved (Una vez salvo, siempre salvo) (Chicago: Moody Press, 1983), 125-130, 159-184.

[xviii] Ibid., 177-178.

[xix] Thomas R. Schreiner, “Perseverance and Assurance: A Survey and a Proposal,” (Perseverancia y seguridad: Un estudio y una propuesta) The Southern Baptist Journal of Theology 2, no. 1 (Spring 1998), 32-62.

[xx] Gerrit Cornelis Berkouwer, Faith and Perseverance, (Fe y perseverancia) trans. R. D. Knudsen (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1958), 116-117.

[xxi] Kenneth Keathley, Salvation and Sovereinty: A Molistinist Approach (Salvación y soberanía: Un enfoque molinista)(Nashville, TN: B&H Academic, 2010).

Recursos recomendados en Español:

Robándole a Dios (tapa blanda), (Guía de estudio para el profesor) y (Guía de estudio del estudiante) por el Dr. Frank Turek

Por qué no tengo suficiente fe para ser un ateo (serie de DVD completa), (Manual de trabajo del profesor) y (Manual del estudiante) del Dr. Frank Turek

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El Dr. Jonathan McLatchie es un escritor cristiano, orador internacional y debatiente. Tiene una licenciatura (con honores) en biología forense, un máster (M.Res) en biología evolutiva, un segundo máster en biociencia médica y molecular, y un doctorado en biología evolutiva. En la actualidad, es profesor adjunto de biología en el Sattler College de Boston (Massachusetts). El Dr. McLatchie colabora en varios sitios web de apologética y es el fundador de la Apologetics Academy [Academia de Apologética] (Apologetics-Academy.org), un ministerio que trata de equipar y formar a los cristianos para que defiendan la fe de forma persuasiva mediante seminarios web regulares, así como de ayudar a los cristianos que se enfrentan a las dudas. El Dr. McLatchie ha participado en más de treinta debates moderados en todo el mundo con representantes del ateísmo, el islam y otras perspectivas alternativas de cosmovisión. Ha dado charlas internacionales en Europa, Norteamérica y Sudáfrica promoviendo una fe cristiana inteligente, reflexiva y basada en la evidencia

Fuente Original del blog: https://bit.ly/3bo21og

Traducido por Monica Pirateque

Editado por Elenita Romero 

 

Por Al Serrato 

El objetivo de la apologética cristiana es “defender” la fe, y el objetivo de la fe es proclamar las buenas nuevas de la salvación al mundo. Salvación, naturalmente, significa salvar, y una persona solo necesita ser salvada cuando está en peligro.

Pero pregúntale a mucha gente hoy en día en qué peligro se encuentra: puede que te digan que están preocupados por el estado de la economía o la inflación, o por el aumento de los índices de criminalidad en todo el país, o por las dificultades que puedan tener en casa. Es poco probable  que agreguen que también están preocupados por el destino final de su alma, o que desearían poder estar seguros de que pasarán la eternidad en presencia de Dios en compañía de los que han amado aquí.

¿Por qué? ¿Por qué hay tanta gente hoy en día tan confiada  en que su alma no necesita salvación? Aunque cada vez hay más ateos, la mayoría de la gente sigue reconociendo que hay un Dios que los creó a ellos y a todo lo que nos rodea. Sin embargo, aunque se hayan alejado de la fe que una vez conocieron, no parecen preocupados por cómo les juzgará Dios algún día. La mayoría de las veces, si se les presiona, el secularista moderno dará una variación de: “Mira, soy una buena persona, después de todo, y Dios me juzgará en consecuencia. No hay nada que me preocupe”.

Hay docenas de definiciones de “bueno”, pero para nuestros propósitos, vamos a suponer que la mayoría de la gente entiende “bueno” como algo parecido a “moralmente excelente, virtuoso o justo”. Es de suponer que Dios contará todas las acciones moralmente excelentes, virtuosas o justas que hayan hecho en su vida, y esto inclinará la “balanza de la justicia” para permitirnos  la entrada al cielo.

Pero esta analogía, al reflexionar sobre ella, no ofrece mucha seguridad. Al fin y al cabo, una balanza solo se utiliza si hay algo que colocar en el otro lado, algo que haga contrapeso o mida  uno de los lados. Si una acción “buena” inclina la balanza en una dirección, entonces no realizarla, o peor aún, actuar de forma decididamente no buena, mueve la aguja en la otra dirección. La mayoría de la gente estaría de acuerdo en que actuar de forma “egoísta”, es decir, tomar decisiones que sólo lo benefician a uno mismo y no a los demás en su vida, no es una forma “buena” de actuar. Pero el egoísmo forma parte de la condición humana. Los padres lo ven en sus hijos pequeños, y la mayoría de los padres intentan alejar a los niños del egoísmo para que tengan un comportamiento más altruista. A esto hay que añadir las veces que no nos limitamos a no hacer el bien, sino que hacemos el mal intencionadamente, sin importarnos el daño que nuestras acciones puedan causar a los demás. Visto desde esta perspectiva, tenemos un verdadero problema, porque Dios lo ve todo y lo sabe todo. Él vive eternamente y ve todo lo que hemos pensado o hecho; las cosas que podemos ver como en nuestro pasado lejano permanecen en su presente eterno. Para cualquiera que haga una evaluación clara y racional de la situación, hay motivos reales para preocuparse de que la balanza con la que se nos mide se incline rápidamente en nuestra contra.

Abordemos esto con un ejemplo moderno. Repetidos estudios nos dicen que un porcentaje cada vez mayor de la población estadounidense tiene sobrepeso u obesidad. Los expertos en salud advierten constantemente de las numerosas consecuencias negativas que puede acarrear el exceso de peso, que van desde un mayor riesgo de sufrir graves consecuencias para la salud a causa del Covid hasta diversos tipos de enfermedades y cánceres. Aunque algunos factores involuntarios pueden contribuir a la obesidad, este estilo de vida poco saludable aún tiene que ver con la elección repetida de comer en exceso. Sospecho que nadie empieza su vida queriendo inclinar la balanza en su contra eligiendo la gula como estilo de vida. Lo más probable es que el resultado final sea el producto de muchas pequeñas decisiones, tomadas repetidamente a lo largo del tiempo. De hecho, es difícil luchar contra la capacidad humana de autoengaño. Ignoramos la evidencia frente a nuestros ojos, y de la balanza, mientras seguimos sintiéndonos “bastante bien” con nosotros mismos y con las decisiones que tomamos. Nos aplaudimos a nosotros mismos por saltarnos el postre o empezar una dieta, mientras ignoramos la voluminosa cintura que muestra la dirección en la que se inclina la balanza.

Lo mismo ocurre, al parecer, con las cosas eternas. Nos aplaudimos a nosotros mismos por donar a la caridad, o por ser voluntarios en el comedor social. Nos damos una palmadita en la espalda cada vez que controlamos nuestro temperamento. Nos alabamos por nuestro sentido de la tolerancia y nuestro pensamiento iluminado y nos rodeamos de gente que siente y piensa igual. Al hacer esto, nos centramos solo en un lado de la balanza, olvidando recordar las muchas veces que nos quedamos cortos… o peor aún, que nos comportamos mal intencionadamente.

Confiar en nuestra capacidad para mantener la balanza inclinada a nuestro favor -en el lado de que lo “bueno” supere a lo malo- simplemente no tiene en cuenta cómo un Dios perfecto ve nuestro comportamiento. Al igual que la lucha contra la obesidad a través de la dieta y el ejercicio, la lucha es gradual. De hecho, podemos hacer muchas cosas buenas y dignas de alabanza. Pero al igual que el acusado en un tribunal terrenal, la fechoría que le ha llevado ante el tribunal no se pasa por alto solo porque el acusado pretende impresionar al juez con las muchas buenas acciones que ha realizado en su vida. El objetivo de la sentencia, al declararse culpable, es atribuir la consecuencia adecuada al mal comportamiento en cuestión. De nada servirá presentarse ante un Dios perfecto y pedirle que olvide nuestras fechorías porque también hemos hecho algo bueno en nuestra vida.  ¿Cómo se puede impresionar a un juez que ha establecido la norma de la perfección y que Él mismo es perfecto en todos los aspectos imaginables?

La buena noticia, por supuesto, es que Aquel que hizo la balanza, y que hará el juicio, nos ha dado los medios para volver a equilibrar la balanza. Esto requiere primero que nos veamos a nosotros mismos con la suficiente claridad como para aceptar que no podemos alcanzar el estándar de perfección de Dios por nosotros mismos. Cuando Jesús cargó con nuestros pecados en la cruz hace dos mil años, nos proporcionó los medios para reconciliarnos con Dios, para ser “perfeccionados”, de modo que podamos estar preparados y ser dignos de estar en presencia de un ser perfecto. Es Jesús quien hace la obra de la salvación, no nosotros y nuestros escasos esfuerzos por ser “buenos”.

Intentar hacer el bien es un objetivo loable. Lamentablemente, hoy en día, con demasiada frecuencia, escasea. Pero hacer el “bien” no va a ser suficiente cuando llegue ese día, como llegará para cada uno de nosotros, en que nos encontremos con nuestro Hacedor.

Recursos recomendados en Español: 

Robándole a Dios (tapa blanda), (Guía de estudio para el profesor) y (Guía de estudio del estudiante) por el Dr. Frank Turek

Por qué no tengo suficiente fe para ser un ateo (serie de DVD completa), (Manual de trabajo del profesor) y (Manual del estudiante) del Dr. Frank Turek  

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Al Serrato obtuvo su título de abogado en la Universidad de California en Berkeley en 1985. Comenzó su carrera como agente especial del FBI antes de convertirse en fiscal en California, donde sigue trabajando. Una introducción a las obras de C. S. Lewis despertó su interés por la Apologética, que ha seguido durante las últimas tres décadas. Comenzó a escribir Apologética con J. Warner Wallace y Pleaseconvinceme.com.

Traducido por Jennifer Chavez 

Editado por Monica Pirateque 

 

By Evan Minton

Molinism is a view of soteriology. It has much in common with Arminianism. It teaches that God wants every human being to come to Christ in order to be saved (2 Peter 3:9; 1 Timothy 2:4), that Jesus died for every human being God has ever created or will create (John 3:16-18; 1 Timothy 2:6; 1 Timothy 4:10; 1 John 2:2; Hebrews 2:9), that human beings are totally depraved, that is, incapable of coming to Christ on their own, because Jesus said that no one can come to the Father unless the Father who sent Him draws them to Himself (John 6:44; John 6:65), and because of this inability to come to Christ in our own strength, God sends the Holy Spirit to convict the world of sin (John 16:8) and to draw every person into a relationship with Himself (John 12:32). Molinists also believe, like Arminians, that humanity has libertarian free will. Libertarian Free Will is different from compatibilism because it asserts that we are not causally determined to do what we do (there are no determining factors, although there are certain things that influence our decisions), and also that there is the possibility of doing the opposite. So if I choose A, I didn’t have to choose A. I could have chosen B. There was nothing to prevent me from holding back from choosing A and choosing B instead. Molinists believe that because of the enabling grace mentioned above, we have a choice to make. We can either receive salvation or reject it (Deuteronomy 30:15-19; Joshua 24:15).

Molinism differs from Arminianism in a small number of ways. This is a view called Middle Knowledge. What is Middle Knowledge? According to the Molinist, God has three kinds of knowledge. The first is God’s knowledge of necessary truths or natural knowledge. These are truths that are independent of God’s will and are non-contingent. This knowledge includes the full range of logical possibilities. Examples include statements like, “All bachelors are not married,” or “X cannot be A and not-A at the same time, in the same way, in the same place,” or “It is possible for X to happen,” or “It is impossible for squares to be triangular.” The second is called “Middle Knowledge” and contains the range of possible things that would have happened given certain circumstances, for example, “If Evan Minton chose to eat fish at this particular restaurant instead of a hamburger, he would get food poisoning and have a miserable weekend,” or “If Evan’s dog broke its leash and started chasing a squirrel, he would chase it.” The third type of knowledge is God’s free knowledge. This type of knowledge consists of contingent truths that are dependent on God’s will; that is, truths that God causes. Examples of this would include, “God became incarnate in the first century B.C.,” or “God created the universe.” This is knowledge that God possesses because he has chosen to cause it.

So according to the Molinist, God not only knows what will happen and what could happen, but He also knows what would happen. God literally knows everything there is to know about everything. He even knows the counterfactuals, (“If X happens, then Y would happen after it.”). This was beautifully illustrated in the Christmas movie It’s a Wonderful Life in which God shows George Bailey what the world would have been like without him. It’s a Wonderful Life shows God’s middle knowledge in that while God knew George Bailey was indeed going to be born when he was, He nevertheless knew what the world would have been like without him.

William Lane Craig calls Molinism “one of the most fruitful theological ideas ever conceived, for it would serve to explain not only God’s knowledge of the future but divine providence and predestination as well.” Under it, God retains a measure of divine providence without impeding human freedom. Since God possesses middle knowledge, He knows what an agent would freely do in a particular situation. So agent A, if placed in circumstances C, would freely choose option X over option Y. Therefore, if God wanted to bring about X, all God would do is, using His middle knowledge, actualize the world in which A was placed at C, and A would freely choose X. God retains an element of providence without nullifying A’s choice, and God’s purpose (the actualization of X) is accomplished.

This is a very profound insight into how God can accomplish His purposes without violating our free choices. God can get us to do what He wants us to do without causally determining us to do it.

I gave this explanation of what Molinism is again because there are many people who are not aware of it. Many Christians know about Arminianism and Calvinism, but Molinism seems to me to be the forgotten middle child of the soteriological family. Maybe that is not an accurate perception, but I think it is one I have because the name is not mentioned very commonly in debates about soteriology. It is usually presented as “Arminianism vs Calvinism” rather than “Arminianism, Molinism or Calvinism.” Maybe it is because Molinism is so similar to Arminianism that the two are mixed together. But in any case, even though I have already explained what Molinism is in a previous blog post, I wanted to do it again for those who are new to the perspective and/or have not read my previous post about it.

Anyway, since God can get us to do something freely by placing us in a set of circumstances, this presents a question.

Couldn’t God simply put everyone in circumstances where they would believe and be saved?

There is no single Molinist answer to this question. There are several. One answer is called Transworld Damnation, in which God saves all who would freely respond to his grace in any circumstance. The corollary of this is that all those lost would be lost no matter what set of circumstances God put them in or no matter what grace God provided. In Transworld Damnation, the answer is “no”—God could not have arranged things in such a way that everyone would end up saved, because some would freely not believe. I, however, find this view extraordinarily implausible. Do you expect me to believe that there is no circumstance, no world that God could actualize in which Christopher Hitchens would become a born-again Christian and be saved? Is there no circumstance in which God could put Caiaphas in which he would plead for Jesus and not Barabbas? Was Judas Iscariot destined for hell in any world that God actualized? I find this view to be stretching the boundaries of plausibility quite a bit. I mean, I suppose it’s possible that this is the case for some individuals . There are certain things that each of us would never do under any circumstances. But to say that this is the case for all the unsaved is a little hard to swallow.

Here is my perspective: Even though God desires all human beings to be saved and Jesus died for all, I do not think there is any world that God can actualize with as many people as this one has where every individual chooses to repent. It may well be the case that God cannot put every individual in just the right circumstances where God knows that if they were put in those circumstances, they would freely choose to repent and be saved. It may be impossible to produce every one of these circumstances in a single world. So while I believe that God desires that none should perish, it may not be possible to produce every circumstance in which God knows would stimulate a free response from all. It may even be the case that some circumstance in which one person is saved is a circumstance in which someone else is lost. For example, I read an article recently written by someone who said that it was through reading Richard Dawkins’ book The God Delusion that he decided to convert to the Christian faith. Why? It was because he said that the arguments against God and for atheism were so shoddy, so bad, that he concluded that atheism was indefensible. This prompted him to read works in favor of Christianity to see what they had to say about these issues, and that was enough to convince him that atheism is a sham. Now, what if this world is one in which Richard Dawkins became a Christian, say, at the age of 17? If that were the case, then he would never have written The God Delusion . And if that were the case, this person would never have read it and concluded that atheism is indefensible and that theism was a welcome alternative.

In this case, if Dawkins were saved, this other fellow might not have been. If this fellow were saved, it may be the case that this world is one where Dawkins is never saved.

So it could well be the case that no matter what world God chooses to create, there will be circumstances in which God knows that people will freely reject Him, while some will repent.

However, since we have libertarian free will, and our circumstances do not causally determine us to do what we do, no human being has any excuse for not repenting. All can be saved. People can act differently in the situations in which they are placed. God simply knows that they will not act differently. It is a would/would not situation and not a can/cannot situation. So no man can stand before God on the day of judgment and say, “If only you had put me in a particular situation, then I would have repented. But because you did not put me in that particular situation, I did not repent, and now here I stand before you condemned. So it is all your fault, God.” God will say, “No, you had the freedom to choose me or reject me. It was possible for you to do either no matter what situation I placed you in.” God gives prevenient and resistible grace to every individual (as Jesus said in John 12:32). This overcomes his inability to come to Him, mentioned by Jesus in John 6:44 and John 6:65, So even though there may be a possible world where Richard Dawkins is a born-again Christian, it is entirely possible for him to be [born again] in any world God actualizes, It is up to him whether he is or not.

In summary , I just said above that a) God wants all people to be saved; b) God has given man libertarian free will; c) even though God has put us in circumstances where He knows how we will act, there is a possibility to do otherwise. It’s not that I couldn’t reject Christ in the situation God put me in. It’s that God knew I wouldn’t; d) God gives prevenient and resistible grace to every human being so that their salvation would at least be possible; e) Whatever world God actualizes where man has free will in the libertarian sense, He cannot guarantee that every individual will accept Christ as their Savior.

 


Evan Minton is a Christian apologist and blogger at Cerebral Faith ( www.cerebralfaith.blogspot.com ). He is the author of “Inference To The One True God” and “A Hellacious Doctrine.” He has participated in several debates which can be viewed in the “My Debates” section of Cerebral Faith. Mr. Minton lives in South Carolina, USA.

[Original English blog not available]

Translated by Raul Jaramillo de Lira

Introduction

When one thinks about the debate between the Sovereignty of God and the genuine responsibility of man, two positions are commonly presented with which one can identify, Calvinism and Arminianism [1] . In general, these perspectives are characterized by an emphasis (or over-emphasis) on the Sovereignty of God and the Freedom of Man respectively.

This endless discussion has led us to believe that at the heart of this dilemma lies the different approaches by which Christians throughout history have sought to solve it. “Arminians have a humanistic and man-centered gospel, while Calvinists focus on God and His Glory,” some Calvinist brothers tell us. Is that true? Does the problem lie in the approach with which we approach this matter at hand? [2]

Before we get into the subject, we must analyze the different presuppositions with which each perspective attempts to resolve this tension. One of the differences between Arminians and Calvinists is their definition of human freedom. While Arminians subscribe to a libertarian philosophical view of freedom, Calvinists, who are determinists, generally subscribe to a compatibilist definition of freedom. This issue is crucial and must be clarified before beginning to discuss the positions, since in a discussion both sides can debate for hours without reaching any conclusion, simply because of the lack of clear and well-defined concepts. From this point on, I will change the terms Arminian and Molinist to Libertarian and Calvinist to Compatibilist. [3]

The most common definition of Libertarian Liberty with which some libertarians, specifically Molinists such as Luis de Molina, William Lane Craig, and Kenneth Keathley, identify themselves, is:

“Freedom can be considered as opposed to necessity. Thus, a free agent is said to be one who, given all the requirements for acting, can act and not act, or do one thing as well as its opposite.” [4]

“Not being caused to do something by causes other than oneself. It is entirely my responsibility how I choose, and nothing determines my choice. Sometimes philosophers call this “agent causation.” The agent herself is the cause of her actions. Her decisions are distinguished from chance events by being made by the agent herself for reasons the agent has in mind.” [5]

“Libertarianism is the view that the morally responsible agent is in some sense the source of his choices, and that prior conditions such as circumstances are not the ultimate determinant for that agent.” [6]

Some contemporary philosophers usually understand Libertarianism as that position that contains the following statements:

(L1) An agent acts with free will, or is morally responsible for an action, only if the action is not ultimately causally determined by anything or being outside the agent.

(L2) An agent acts with free will, or is morally responsible for an action, only if he or she could have acted otherwise.

(L3) An agent acts with free will, or is morally responsible for an action, only if his own intellect and will are the sole and final causes of his action [7] .

Which brings us to the purpose of this article, how does this work with regard to the grace of God? Compatibilists believe in strict monergism, God sends irresistible [8] or effective grace to individuals He has chosen in advance, so that when this grace comes to them, they are renewed and their desires are transformed, and so they respond in faith to that effective call of God. Note the adjective “effective,” that is, if a person is touched with irresistible grace, he will necessarily respond in faith. Therefore, the compatibilist can say that everything is a work and labor of God, there is nothing that man does in the process of salvation. Certain compatibilists, in adopting this monergistic view, commonly view any other view that differs from theirs as a Pelagian or synergistic view.

To answer this charge, in this article I will propose to reflect on an essay by Dr. Richard Cross [9] analyzing this charge on behalf of our Reformed brethren. Does any position that does not presuppose irresistible grace really fall within the Pelagian definition? Or is it possible to construct some plausible model that allows us to affirm the resistibility of divine grace without falling into Pelagianism?

Definitions and Terms

We must be very careful with our definitions. I have found that the terms “Pelagianism” and “semi-Pelagianism” are used without awareness of their meaning and implications. Dr. Cross generally defines these views in the following paragraph [10] :

“In the Council of Orange (529) canon 9, every good act we do is produced in us by God…. The condemned view is that we can bring about our own salvation in any sense.” [11]

If we read this in parallel with canon 3, where

“The view that God’s grace ‘can be conferred by human invocation’ is condemned.” [12]

Then we can agree with canon 5 of the Council of Orange,

“Canon 5 of the Council condemns the view that the beginning of faith in us is not through the working of the gift of grace. This constitutes a rejection of the semi-Pelagian view that the beginning of our justification is from us, not from God.” (Emphasis added) [13]

Taking this into account, we understand these systems as follows:

Pelagianism: We are the cause of our justification. [14]

Semi-Pelagianism: We are the beginning of our justification, but not the cause of our own justification. [15]

Irresistibility of Grace vs. Pelagianism

Once we understand these perspectives, it seems to me that we can agree with Dr. Cross when he says:

“Pelagianism and the irresistibility of grace are logically incompatible. The problem arises since it is not so obvious whether it is possible to reject Pelagianism and Semi-Pelagianism, while still maintaining the resistibility of grace.” [16]

That is, we recognize that if grace is irresistible, then it is impossible for us to be the cause of our own justification [17] therefore, Pelagianism is false. Likewise, if we can cause our own justification, then grace is not irresistible.

“If either Pelagianism or Semi-Pelagianism is true, the irresistibility of grace is false.”

However,

“If either Pelagianism or Semi-Pelagianism is false, it is not necessary that the irresistibility of grace be true.” [18]

Cross tells us that while it is easy to recognize that the irresistibility of grace and Pelagianism/semi-Pelagianism are mutually exclusive, it is not so obvious to conclude that if we reject the irresistibility of grace we necessarily fall into these systems. In other words, to reject the irresistibility of grace is not necessarily to embrace Pelagianism .

“The resistibility of grace does not imply accepting either Pelagianism or Semi-Pelagianism.” [19]

It is also important to mention that the author points out:

“What unites the seven models of the offer of grace is the belief that justifying grace – justification – is resistible.” [20]

This will then imply that irresistible grace is presupposed to be false. Cross plans to explain why he thinks there are models that possibly allow us to maintain the resistibility of grace and at the same time reject Pelagianism and Semi-Pelagianism in a coherent and consistent way.

At this point Cross acknowledges that he has come to an issue that is apparently still being debated in academic circles. Both Pelagianism and Semi-Pelagianism involve the concept of cause in their definitions and failure to clarify what can be counted as a cause and what cannot has been the source of much misunderstanding when I have discussed these issues. This is why Cross himself acknowledges:

“It is difficult to determine what is a sufficient cause for some state of affairs, as well as what would be accepted as an initialization of a process that results in a certain state of affairs. I do not pretend to lay down principles for these analyses, because I am not sure that such principles exist in all cases, but I rely on intuitions. These seem to be firm enough to bear the weight I am putting on them. They are the same sort of principles considered reasonable and sufficient for the moral judgments we make in everyday life. But I will leave the plausibility of my intuitions to be judged by the reader.” [21]

It will be intuition itself that will tell us whether something can be counted as a sufficient cause for a state of affairs, in this case, for the justification of a person.

Introduction to the Seven Models

  1. COVENANT THEOLOGY

This perspective can be summarized as follows:

“God promises to justify—or at least offer grace—to anyone who satisfies certain minimal ethical conditions.” [22]

I think it is quite clear what is being argued in this perspective, simply,

“Person X freely promises to do action A if person Y acts in a manner W.” [23]

If God is X and Y is any human being, God promises to do A , that is, to justify, if Y performs or fulfills W .

If YW .

Then, XA .

We see then that person Y is solely the cause of W and not of A. While X is the sole and total cause of A. If we believe that God freely promises to bring justification to a person if that person meets certain moral requirements, then we can affirm that God is the cause of justification and not us.

I can already imagine the criticisms that arise in the minds of our deterministic brothers: “this system does not take into account the total depravity of man,” “this system ultimately amounts to salvation by works,” and a few others.

Domino effect

We know that God never breaks his promise, so if person Y fulfills the conditions ( W ), then he will necessarily receive grace and be saved. But this means that the cause of the ultimate effect is Y , since:

“And causing W is sufficient for X to cause A, Y is therefore the final cause of A.” [24]

Cross proposes an analogy that invites us to reflect on the conditions under which we assign blame to other people.

“Imagine an agent who is ‘programmed’ in such a way that he is always prevented from breaking his promise. The agent… is not, however, conspicuously good in any other sense. Suppose this agent freely promises to perform a bad action whenever I act in accordance with an obligation of mine.” [25]

I think we understand the issue at hand, can a person S be guilty or responsible for the actions of another agent P who has freely promised to act evilly if person S acts in a specific way? Cross tells us:

It seems to me that I cannot be blamed for the evil actions this person causes, even if I am aware of the promise he has made. The reason is because this person’s promise was free. He did not have to make it. It is his free promise that causes him to act the way he does, not my actions. [26]

I did not cause the evil agent’s actions, it was his promise that caused him to act evilly.

Cross concludes,

Pari passu, then, it is God’s free covenant that causes salvation in this medieval or Arminian view. [27]

Salvation by Works

But if the works I do meet the requirements God has imposed for salvation,

“Is this perspective not summed up in my actions deserving justification?” [28]

I believe this objection is the most common one to any view that denies the irresistibility of grace. For now, we will focus on the weight of this objection to God’s free covenant view of salvation.

The answer, as far as I can see, would simply be a straightforward ‘no’. For nothing we have said says that the works we do merit salvation in such a way that God must save us. That is, no one has claimed that fulfilling the requirements puts God in a position where he must necessarily save us.

“If we forget for a moment the divine promise, merit would only exist in the case where my actions placed God under some kind of obligation to justify me, or something functionally equivalent to obligation. And—leaving aside the divine promise—such an obligation or quasi-obligation could only exist if the nature of my actions were such that they would morally require justification as a reward.” [29]

Now, if we think about it carefully, if our actions are of such a nature that they would morally require justification as a reward , then the divine promise would be unnecessary. Since God must save me because of my works, His covenant would be merely a legal clause, so to speak.

“But, so far, nothing I have said implies that the minimal requirements that need to be satisfied for justification are such that justification is morally necessary.” [30]

Cross does take into account something known as congruous merit [31] , that is, the merit of certain actions for which it is indeed appropriate for God to reward some action. This kind of merit is commonly spoken of in works of charity in the context of Catholicism [32] . But he says,

But we need not speak of congruous merit either. God’s promise could be entirely gratuitous or unnecessary [gratitous], and nothing in my actions would have any intrinsic meritorious value. Apart from the divine promise, they would be worthless, and not even worthy of appropriating God’s reward. [33]

That is, nothing in my works makes them suitable for God to reward them with saving grace. Nothing we have said leads us to that conclusion. So we are not talking about works that merit salvation.

Therefore, the covenant view is not Pelagianism.

Semi-Pelagianism?

We have seen that the view of Covenant theology succeeds in evading the charge of being Pelagian. But what about semi-Pelagianism? The crucial question is, what initiates the process of justification?

God’s promise?

A person’s satisfaction of the moral requirements for justification? [34]

Cross acknowledges that it is possible that this view might be considered semi-Pelagianism, but he is not sure that there is a strong argument for this. The defender of this view might stress to us that the initialization is the divine promise. However, he concedes that in the initialization process of justification the idea that the promise is the beginning is not very convincing either:

The promise seems too remote, causally, to be counted as the initialization of such an instance. The promise is more like a general condition for justification. It is rather like the machinery of justification and not so much a causal part in the process. The promise is a way of setting up the process of justification, but what initiates the process is human action. [35]

That is to say, the mere fact that the promise exists is not a sufficient cause that initiates the process, even if it is a necessary cause.

So, on the basis of what we have seen, this view can really be considered Semi-Pelagianism. But Cross admits that this is not the end of the argument:

Nevertheless, I do not believe that this is a sufficient argument to convince someone strongly planted in the anti-Pelagian framework of a covenant theology. Such a person might insist that God’s promise counts as the initialization of any process of justification and therefore deny that his view is Pelagian or semi-Pelagian. [36]

It will be up to the reader to decide whether covenant theology seems to him to be a perspective that effectively evades the charges of Pelagianism and Semi-Pelagianism. If one adopts this position, it will be his duty to demonstrate that the initialization process is entirely God’s.

A clarification is necessary at this point:

The following six views are not Semi-Pelagian because they all insist that the initiation of individual justification is the offer of God’s Grace to an individual. But, this offer of grace requires some form of acceptance. And this is in no sense prior to the offer of grace to an individual. [37]

If the reader is perceptive, he will notice that, unlike covenant theology, the question will not be what initiates the process of salvation , but rather, is acceptance the result of grace or is it a work that we do on our own? For, as Cross says,

The acceptance of grace cannot be the necessary result of a divine gift. If this gift is irresistible, then grace is irresistible. If the gift of acceptance is resistible, then the gift of acceptance also needs acceptance. Ad infinitum. [38]

That is, if our acceptance is a gift God has irresistibly given to us, then grace is indeed irresistible. Since I do not see it as plausible that we have an infinite regression from acceptance of gifts of grace to acceptance, the acceptance of grace must come from our own volition. But…

Is it possible to combine an anti-Pelagianism with some view in which human acceptance of the offer of grace is not the result of grace? [39]

With that question in mind, let’s dive into our analysis of the following perspective:

  1. SYNERGISM

In this perspective,

The acceptance of offered grace counts as a work—something which the person to whom the grace is offered actually does. It is a work which is entirely within the power of the agent, and entirely a result of the natural disposition and inclination of the agent. [40]

Of course, the mere mention of the word synergism will cause many, if not most, of our Reformed brethren to jump out of their seats and shout “Pelagianism!”

Cross argues that this perspective need not be Pelagian:

If we hold that Pelagianism boils down to the claim that we can sufficiently save ourselves by our own actions, then this version of synergism I am considering is not Pelagian. (Emphasis added) [41]

That is, if we define synergism as:

Synergism: Two necessary and sufficient causes in conjunction for our justification. [42]

Since we cannot sufficiently save ourselves, then it is not Pelagianism, no matter how much the defender of Irresistible Grace wants to claim it.

But, taking up the statements of previous councils, Cross reminds us:

However, if we read the Second Council of Orange, saying that no action of ours can have any causal role—even if it is not sufficient—in justification, then synergism in this case is Pelagianism. [43]

According to the council, “ we cannot in any sense cause our own salvation .” So synergism, by assigning a causal role to our acceptance, would in effect reduce itself to Pelagianism. Although, of course, this depends on how we read the council’s statements – is it in a strict sense? Or is there some flexibility, which would allow us to assign a role to acceptance and not fall into Pelagianism?

Some theologians in the past agreed with the strong interpretation since, if our own acceptance is required for justification, then God’s Grace is not completely reliable. [44]

That is, “If it requires us to accept grace, then we cannot put our trust for our salvation in God’s grace, but in our acceptance of it.” Or the classic argument, “then it is not God who saves you, but your acceptance of grace.” But Cross tells us that

However, this answer depends on accepting the doctrine of the irresistibility of grace, and for the purposes of this discussion, I am proceeding as if this doctrine were false. It seems to me that a question about the absolute reliability of grace is itself a question independent of Pelagianism. [45]

It seems to me that what Cross is trying to say is that people who make this objection presuppose that it is necessary for grace to be irresistible in order to trust God completely, and therefore it is a circular argument. However, there is another reason that Cross examines for accepting the strict reading of the councils.

The reason is that the offer of grace plus the acceptance by the individual could be considered as sequentially ordered parts in a process that ends in the salvation of the person.

In a sense one element in a process is not sufficient for the outcome of that process, it is merely necessary. And that is why some think this is Pelagianism. [46]

But the mere fact of a sequence in the process does not mean that one of the parts is a sufficient cause for it to be considered Pelagianism. Cross explains:

The sequential nature of a causal cooperation does not negate its being a cooperation, and so does not necessitate that the action late in the process be a sufficient cause for the effect. So Synergism would reduce to Pelagianism only if one thinks that ascribing a causal role to human activity in justification is Pelagianism. And it is not clear that a reading of the Council requires such an interpretation. [47]

So while it is not Semi-Pelagianism, it is not clear that Synergism is not Pelagianism. It all depends on how we read the council’s statements. Personally, I reject this kind of synergism because I reject the idea that man has any causal role in salvation. And that is why I am more in agreement with the following theories that start from the idea that there is no need for a real, positive act on the part of the individual in relation to grace.

I think it is possible to maintain that no act of acceptance is needed for divine grace to be received by a person to be justified, and that grace, however, can be resisted. [48]

For the following three perspectives, Cross makes clear what some of the presuppositions he will start from will be:

If a person P accepts grace it means that P does not resist the total execution of some action A, which in some resistible way is produced by God in P. [49]

In Cross’ words, for the following three perspectives:

The basic idea is that in someone whom God has chosen for justification, the reception of grace is the default position; grace is received automatically unless the person maintains an active block to the reception of grace—that is, unless the person actively resists grace. [50]

  1. SUPERNATURAL INCLINATION

The third perspective that Cross examines is summarized as follows:

The relevant action is the causal result of a supernatural inclination. Such an inclination would be irresistibly given by God to a person, such that the inclination is sufficient for the action (unless it is impeded). The performance of the action counts as the acceptance of the grace. [51]

Ironically, Cross appeals to a kind of irresistible grace which is given to an agent. However, this grace does not irresistibly determine this agent to accept the effect of this grace, namely salvation. This grace is a sufficient causal factor to produce the effect, such that, if nothing prevents this grace from continuing its course, the agent will be justified.

Let us also understand that having an inclination toward grace is not the same as producing salvation in ourselves. So the charge of Pelagianism has been successfully evaded. For,

The inclination here is a tendency to perform an act, such that, if nothing intervenes, this act is produced. And acting in accordance with the inclination does not require any further causal cooperation on the part of the agent. (Emphasis added) [52]

That is, we do not require the agent to cooperate or act in any way to produce the effect. But simply,

The agent is not required to want or choose the relevant action A, but it is required that the agent does not want/choose/deliberately do something other than A. That is, it is not required that P wants A, but it is required that P does not want not-A. [53]

Where A is a morally good action. Although in theory, it is irrelevant which action A is .

However, the objection will immediately be raised, “Not wanting not-A is wanting A,” and therefore the effect would be a product of human action, as Cross recognizes,

The action, however, would count as a relevant action of a human person, since it is produced by something internal to the person, that is, the inclination.

A similar example. Consider an involuntary but controllable act such as blinking. My blinking is on automatic: I usually don’t want it, or even consciously cause it. But I can prevent it if I wish, at least for a while. I understand it in that I naturally have an inclination to blink, and the inclination is sufficient for the action. [54]

One could remain firm in saying that such an inclination is of divine origin and that therefore there is no synergism. Initial grace is irresistible and therefore there is nothing in man that produces this grace, unless it is conferred by God.

The divine inclination is sufficient (unless impeded) for an action A that constitutes the acceptance of grace, and this sufficiency means that the creature need not desire or choose A, or in some other causally additional way cooperate in A. [55]

But Cross admits,

Still, any causal contribution to the action internal to the agent may be felt to involve some kind of synergism. For, even if it is natural or divinely endowed in some special way, it is still the inclination of the agent, and as such is independent of the divine causal activity in the execution of the action. [56]

As already mentioned, this might imply synergism or even, it seems to me, an argument could be made to say that this position could be reduced to Semi-Pelagianism, but that is outside the scope of this paper. This, however, brings us to the description of our fourth perspective.

  1. SUPERNATURAL CAUSATION

As the name suggests,

The relevant action is produced directly by God—and not by means of an inclination. God produces the complete mechanism in which some action A consists. [57]

As we said above, some may take not-willing or not-resisting A to be willing or doing A , given its causal connection to God’s grace. And Cross seeks to evade this with his fourth view,

This view involves a distinctive claim, that the agent’s not willing/choosing/doing not-A consists in the agent’s desiring* A. [58]

However , wanting* something is not the same as doing something. So the mere fact of wanting A is not a cause of A.

The notion that an interior act of will, such as the agent willing* A is distinct from the agent doing A. [59]

But from this perspective,

Could an agent want* A and there be a sense in which the agent’s desire is not a causally necessary condition for A to be realized? [60]

That is, can this view hold that God is the causer of A without the agent P having a causal role in the realization of A ?

Cross discusses two ways to answer “yes” to this question:

From the above, we established that A is produced by God. God separates whatever causal mechanisms obtain between the inner act—desiring A—and the outer act—doing A. Choosing or willing* has no causal role, since God’s action remains sufficient unless prevented. The creature’s choice or willing is counterfactually sufficient: It would have been sufficient if God had not been causally responsible for fully performing the action. [61]

So the causal role of the agent is secondary, not necessary. All that is necessary is the causal role of God and that the agent does not resist God. The second way Cross says we can answer this question affirmatively is:

A is causally overdetermined and sufficiently produced by God, and sufficiently produced by the created agent. We can claim both that A is produced by God, and that A is produced by the creature. Under this option we need to claim that A is salvific merely in the case where it is true that A is produced by God, without regard to the truth of the statement that A is produced by the creature. So the relevant salvific statement is that A is produced by God, and so Pelagianism is avoided. [62]

It seems to me that one could say that, in this context, action A could be said to have an excess of sufficient causes. A is produced by both God and the creature. But in the salvific context, the only cause of A is God, and the fact that the agent produced A is irrelevant.

I find this view somewhat redundant and confusing; I think that an excess of sufficient causes is unnecessary. The proponent of Supernatural Causation seems to be telling us that, although God and the agent caused A , A is only salvific because God brought it about and not because the agent brought it about.

The fifth view known to many as the Ambulance model is one that is embraced by a large number of Molinists. Kirk MacGregor appeals to it as a model that is consistent with and compatible with the doctrine of total or radical depravity held by our Reformed brethren.

  1. AMBULANCE MODEL

This is the model that I find most persuasive of all the models explained by Cross. This model has been popularized in Dr. Kenneth Keathley’s book Salvation & Sovereignty , although the ambulance analogy was Cross’s original, hence the name. I’ll venture to say that it is the most popular theory in the Molinist camp, since the doctrine appears to most effectively uphold God’s sovereignty in salvation while at the same time upholding the libertarian freedom of human beings.

The main reason for this theory goes back to Augustine, who sought to formulate a position that rejected that of his contemporary Pelagius, without making human beings mere tools in the hands of God, robbing us of the personality that He endowed us with. Augustine sought to formulate a model that would allow us to give all the credit to God for salvation and at the same time place all the blame for condemnation on the person.

In view four, Cross seems to be telling us that it is at least possible for the agent to want to do A. But again, the determinist will immediately point to the radical depravity of man.

So this perspective of the ambulance tells us,

The action A itself is simply produced by God, without any causal origin in the person, or in an internal act of will. The created person wills neither A nor non-A; the person is simply indifferent to A. [63]

That is, here not wanting* A does not mean wanting* not-A but simply being indifferent to A. If we assume that A is the acceptance of grace, then God is the one who produces A in us , but this in the case in which we are indifferent to grace, that is, in the case in which we do not accept grace (wanting* A) but neither do we reject it (wanting* not-A ).

God moves the person as a puppet: God produces the complete movements of which action A consists. Unlike view 4, the moved person is not an act of self-will. There is no action in the creature. But the divine movement can be sufficient unless it is impeded. For prior to A, the creature can will*, choose, or do not-A. [64]

To be honest, the opening part of the above quote may be problematic for any non-determinist Christian. Moving the person around like a puppet? We are falling into precisely what we want to refute. But the ambulance analogy helps us see why this is not the case:

“Suppose… that I wake up to find that I am riding in an ambulance. Suppose also that at any moment that I am conscious of being in the ambulance, I have the option of not being there. Perhaps I can simply ask the driver to stop and let me out. If I do not do this, then I do not prevent the action being done to me—transporting me to the hospital, or whatever. But by the same token—I do not contribute to it, other than counterfactually (i.e., by not preventing it). Does not preventing A reduce to willing or doing A? Not generally, given the coherence of the notion of an inner act of will… If I do not do something, I remain in the ambulance. But it would be strange to describe this case as me going to the hospital or [me transporting myself to the hospital] (in contrast to me being brought to the hospital).” [65]

The analogy clearly reflects what was previously said, if the person is inside the ambulance he can get out at any time, but if he does not get out it does not mean that he transported himself to the hospital . But we must not confuse “not doing not-A ” with “wanting or doing A ”, since there is no positive exercise of will towards A. So, although initially the person was moved “like a puppet” to get into the ambulance, the person can get out at any time and, therefore, it is not determinism.

Eleonore Stump offers another analogy that may help us understand why, even though God is the ultimate and final cause of salvation in the person, the model is not deterministic. To do this, however, it is necessary to define some concepts about the volitions of human beings. “A volition is an effective desire, that is, a desire that is translated into an action if nothing external prevents it. A first-order volition is the will directing some faculty or body to do something. A second-order volition, in contrast, is a will to want something… When the will commands itself, its action is second-order . ” [66] The key that interests us here is second-order volitions. To understand this, let us imagine that someone has a first-order volition to eat meat, however, he also has the will to be a vegetarian. This would imply that it is possible for there to be conflicts between first-order volitions and second-order volitions. I suppose this is even supported biblically by the words of the apostle Paul in Romans 7:19 “For the good I want to do I do not do, but the evil I do not want to do I do.” We could say that Paul, like all human beings, has that inclination and desire to fall into temptation, but Paul, having known the truth, did not want to fall but to do what was right in the eyes of God. So his first-order desires were in conflict with his second-order desires. With this in mind, let’s look at Stump’s analogy:

“Suppose Smith wants to reform and stop smoking; he wants a will that does not want to smoke. But his second-order desire is in conflict with a very powerful first-order desire to smoke, and the conflict is usually won by that first-order desire… Now suppose there is some science-fiction device that operates on the will and that can be employed to make the will not want to smoke. For simplicity, suppose also that the device is such that Smith can put it on or take it off at any time he wants. The device operates on the will with causal efficacy but only so long as it remains attached to the person; and at any given time it is up to the person whether the device is attached or not. Let it be the case for the purposes of the example that the world is not causally determined and that the actions of Smith’s will are indeterminate in ordinary circumstances…” [67]

The question then is “is Smith’s decision to quit smoking free?” or “is Smith acting freely when he desires* not to smoke?” The answer is “Yes.” Since it is up to Smith whether the device is attached or not, it therefore meets the three conditions of libertarianism set out previously [68] . This is even if the first-order desire were irresistible and Smith were unable to generate a first-order volition not to smoke. [69]

So even if God or the device moves the person like a puppet , it is still possible to claim Libertarianism and the ambulance model is not deterministic.

Granted, I think Cross’s terminology is confusing, but if we reflect on this theory, I think it is one of the most plausible so far. If we acknowledge that the person has the capacity to resist divine movement, then the deterministic implications of the phrase “God moves the person like a puppet” begin to dissipate. For prior to A , it is possible for the person to will, choose, and perform non-A without God moving or determining him to do so. [70]

Why do some believe?

Cross acknowledges that this is a crucial point because it raises the question ‘why do some believe and others not?’, since, if we assume that God sends grace to all human beings, then the difference between the believer and the non-believer remains in the person himself.

It may be thought that the concession that a person can prevent God from producing A in her by preemptively doing not-A somehow makes her salvation dependent on her after all, since God’s doing A still depends on her not doing not-A. [71]

That is, if everything depends on whether or not the person does non-A , then salvation is still in the person’s hands. Some will say that “not doing non-A,” that is, not resisting, is a problematic notion and can be reduced to a choice on the part of the person. And so we are back to synergism. However, what is being said is not that the person should do an action but rather refrain from doing an action. That is, not resist God’s action A.

Again, Stump’s argument comes to explain this for us. Recall that what is sought is to formulate a way in which we can “hold that human beings are capable, of themselves, of rejecting grace without God being ultimately responsible for their doing so. So the will of faith [72] would be a gift from God, but it would depend on a human person whether he has such a will or not.” After examining various attempts by Augustine to try to formulate a coherent view on the matter, Stump indicates that one possible solution would be to adopt the moral psychology of Aquinas [73] , who holds that the will can assent to something or reject it , but it can also simply do nothing . [74] “If this view is right, then there are three possibilities for the will with respect to grace: the will can assent to grace, it can reject grace, or it can be quiescent to grace.” [75]

This can lead to a very interesting discussion about what could be considered a cause and what could not. I mean, if someone does not resist an action, is he performing an action? Is the absence of resistance a cause of some event? [76]

A number of philosophers agree that omissions of actions are not efficient causes of events. [77] Phil Dowe’s work can help illustrate this point [78] : if a father fails to pay attention to his son, is he to blame for his son running into the road? Our first reaction is to answer affirmatively since, if the father had paid adequate attention, then the accident would not have happened. However, the father did not cause the child to run, nor did he cause the car to speed. “What we mean is that his failure to watch his son is the cause [of the accident] in the sense that, had he watched him, the accident would not have happened… we mean that it was possible for him to have prevented the accident.” [79] Therefore, omissions are not efficient causes of events but counterfactuals of genuine causes, i.e., quasi-causes. [80]

I can still hear the determinist pressing the objection that despite the non-causality of omissions, salvation on this view is still in the hands of the person. This objection is met by an interesting distinction that Dr. Kevin Timpe makes in reflecting on this, that “omissions are quasi-causal” in the sense that they control events, but do not cause events. [81] It is said that “an agent can only be responsible for an event over which he has control” – that is, “An agent S is morally responsible for an event e only if S has (or at some point had) control over the occurrence of e.” [82] This does not deny times when a person directly causes an event or action. But Timpe tells us that we can call these cases cases of “direct control.” However, “If omissions are not causes, it is possible that genuine causation and control can be separated – an agent can control an event even if he does not actually cause it. He can control it by virtue of quasi-causing it. Let us call this ‘indirect control.’” [83] So I may have control over whether I stay in the ambulance or keep the anti-smoking device on by virtue of not getting out of the ambulance or not removing the device, but that does not mean that I caused the ride to the hospital or caused my volition not to want to smoke.

This seems to be what Dr. William Lane Craig is referring to when he says, “Our own eternal destiny is in our own hands. It is a matter of our choice where we will spend eternity.” [84] This may be considered very close to synergism, but as we have seen, it is neither synergism nor Pelagianism. By the law of identity, “close or similar to Pelagianism” does not equal “Pelagianism.” As long as we understand that God is the sufficient and only cause of saving grace and that all we can do is resist or do nothing.

So, in this proposal,

[The person] doing not-A at time t merely prevents God from producing A in her at t, so long as God does not coercively prevent her from doing not-A. This amounts to a kind of Augustinanism: damnation is, and salvation is not, something that is produced by the creature. [85]

As my friend Tim Stratton explained to me via personal message, “God is under no obligation to save anyone. There is nothing man can do to get to heaven. It is only by grace that heaven is possible.” That is, it is not that your “resistance” stops God from doing something, but rather God has sovereignly established not to do A if you do not-A , meaning God will not save you if you resist and reject His grace.

With this explained, Cross continues,

Is this view, on which a person can prevent God’s action by “getting there first,” a plausible view of resistance? It is, in the sense that not doing non-A is necessary for God to do A; and what is necessary in this case is only that the creature refrains from acting. [86]

As we mentioned above, Cross repeats it again, the question is not whether the creature performs an action, but rather “the creature refrains from performing a causal action,” in this case, an action of resistance.

While the most popular proponent of the ambulance model, Dr. Kenneth Keathley, is a Molinist, there is one Arminian who holds a very similar view. Dr. Roger Olson, in his lecture on Arminianism, draws out some distinctions between the most popular soteriological systems, in which he speaks of the Arminian model. For Dr. Olson, one of the central doctrines of Arminianism is prevenient grace [87] , which is resistible. To explain this more clearly, Olson makes use of what he calls the Wells Illustration :

“We are at the bottom of the pit in total depravity, totally incapable of doing anything. God sends a rope that represents the law, but we cannot do anything with it, we cannot use it to climb up.

But God doesn’t want to come down to save us unless we make a decision to accept Him. So He throws water into the bottom of the well and says, ‘My water will bring you up, just let My grace (water) bring you up.’

In other words, we are saved not because we did something to help (cooperate) with God’s grace. We just did not resist God’s grace. We cannot boast or be proud because we did not do anything to get out of the pit, but the water did everything to get us out” [88] .

Olson does not mention it, but if the person for whatever reason chooses not to get out of the well and swim down, he would be said to be to blame for his death at the bottom of the well. Whereas the person who gets out of the well cannot say “I pulled myself out of the well” [89] .

So it is clear that the water or ambulance representing God’s overcoming grace [90] “should and will be effective for all. The only thing that could stop it is if, inexplicably, a person decides to reject it” [91] . As Dr. Robert Picirilli puts it “[this grace] is so closely related to regeneration that it inevitably leads a person to regeneration unless resisted” [92] . Which Keathley points out is one of the benefits of the model, as it “shifts the evil of unbelief from God to the unbeliever” [93] . That is, the question is no longer “Why do some believe?” since they believe because of overcoming grace, but the question is “Why doesn’t everyone believe?” or “Why didn’t such and such a person believe?” Leaving that up to mystery to me is far better than the mystery of “deterministic predestination” that Calvinism sells us.

Meritorious Works

I want to respond to the desert objection that always arises in discussions of free will and salvation. Recall that in the first view we refuted this objection by mentioning that nothing in our actions classifies them in such a way that they “ deserve ” salvation. But still someone might still object that non-resistance is an act of the will toward grace. But again Timpe provides further reflection on this: “This objection misses the point of the view, namely, that one does not deserve credit for remaining quiescent precisely because quiescence is not a positive or good action of the will—but is a lack of an action of the will. But neither is the desire* to be quiescent with respect to divine grace something for which the agent deserves credit as long as that desire* with respect to grace is distinct from wanting* to accept grace itself…” [94] The response to the objection can be summarized thus:

  1. Nothing has been said so far that would make anything in a human being worthy of salvation.
  2. Being quiescent with respect to grace is not a causal action, it is the absence of an action, so there is no merit in an action that does not exist.
  3. Even if there is a second-degree desire or volition to be quiescent, this volition is not meritorious either because a volition to be quiescent is distinct from a volition to accept grace. [95]

My comments on the last two perspectives will not take much time, since Cross himself devotes only a paragraph in his article to both perspectives. This is because they have great similarities with some of the previously analyzed perspectives. Even so, they deserve mention and analysis.

Cross begins by explaining what one of the presuppositions was for the previous perspectives and how this presupposition will change with the next two:

So far I have assumed that the acceptance of grace consists in the completed performance of some actual or counterfactual action. Traditionally, grace and the acceptance of grace are tied to the notion of faith. Suppose, for example, that justifying grace consists, or could consist, in divinely originated faith. Since I am assuming that grace is resistible, I need such faith to be a voluntary matter. Therefore, I need to posit that faith consists in or results from some interior act of the will distinct from an exterior act—distinct from a complete performance of the act. [96]

If we recall, so far, action A , it could be any morally good action. So, according to Cross, the following views will take this action A to be having or exercising faith within a second-degree volition or interior act , if I am interpreting it correctly. But the fact that faith is divinely originated should not be ignored .

  1. INCLINATION TOWARDS FAITH

Remembering our perspective of the Supernatural Inclination ,

The relevant action is the causal result of a supernatural inclination. Such an inclination would be irresistibly given by God to a person, such that the inclination is sufficient for the action (unless it is impeded). The performance of the action counts as the acceptance of the grace.

However, in our sixth anti-Pelagian perspective,

God gives someone the inclination to an act of faith, such that such inclination is sufficient unless he is impeded from the act of faith. This view continues the same as view three, except that such inclination is for an interior act, not for the complete performance of some act. [97]

That is, while in the Supernatural Inclination the inclination is to perform an act… and if nothing intervenes, this act is produced , in the Inclination toward Faith it will be not to perform an act but to the act itself, in other words, it is not for a volition in the first degree, but is toward a volition in the second degree. Another difference is also that in (3), if person P does not want non-A then the grace of God is sufficient to produce A ( A being the complete act of salvation). Whereas in (5), we add one more step and the inclination is merely toward an act of faith and person P can refrain from exercising faith and therefore not be saved.

  1. AMBULANCE MODEL AND FAITH

This perspective correlates with the seventh so we apply the clauses of (5) in (7) with a slight distinction,

The direct action of God is sufficient unless it is impeded for the interior act of faith—as for the Anti-Pelagian strategy [seven], mutatis mutandis. [98]

Just as in the previous perspective, we merely shift the inclination or emphasis of grace from an outward act to an inward act. I don’t really see a clear distinction there. We will see this more clearly in other articles defending the plausibility and coherence of the Ambulance model.

CONCLUSION

The above views allow us to affirm a resistibility of grace and deny Pelagianism; of course, it should be noted that some are more plausible than others. However, given their variety, anyone who would argue that libertarians in denying irresistible grace affirm Pelagianism or Semi-Pelagianism must not only present arguments in favor of their claim, but also demonstrate that the six views presented here (and the one I present here) are inconsistent or fail in their attempt to relate the resistibility of grace and a rejection of Pelagianism.

I do not pretend to have solved a conflict that has lasted for years, a conflict that every generation deals with and will deal with until Jesus Christ returns and explains the issue to us. It is possible that all of us, Calvinists, Arminians and Molinists alike, are wrong. For now, all we can do is continue studying and delving deeper into these issues, not to debate and create conflict, but to learn more about God and glorify Him by making use of the thought He has given us.

Grades

[1] However, this ignores the fact that there are other perspectives that seek to solve the problem, such as Molinism and Open Theism. Personally, I identify myself as a Molinist and reject Open Theism as a position that undermines the Ultimate Greatness of God.

[2] The heart of the problem is not there. It is true that the presuppositions we hold influence the conclusions we reach, but the difference between Libertarians and Compatibilists is not in their view of man’s freedom, but in their view of God’s Love. Dr. Jerry Walls emphasizes this point quite well at the end of his lecture What’s Wrong with Calvinism?

[3] A specific definition of each can be found at the following link. Both Molinists and Arminians subscribe to a Soft Libertarian perspective. Calvinists subscribe to a Soft Determinism or Compatibilism perspective. Open Theists are strong libertarians.

[4] de Molina, Luis. Concord of Free Will; Dispute II. Translation Antonio Hevia Echeverría. (2007). Page 46.

[5] Dr. William Lane Craig: https://es.reasonablefaith.org/question-answer/search/el-libre-albedrio

[6] Keathley, Kenneth. Salvation & Sovereignty: A Molinist Approach . Ed. B&H Publishing Group (2010) Page 54.

[7] Stump, Eleonore. Augustine on free will . Cambridge University Press, (2006). Eleonore makes a brief survey of Augustine’s position on grace and free will. But she points out that not all philosophers agree that Libertarianism must necessarily affirm (L2). The position that affirms all three statements will be known as Common Libertarianism while the position that merely affirms (L1) and (L3) will be called Modified Libertarianism ; it is beyond the scope of this paper to argue for either proposition, the reader is free to identify with either.

[8] For a refutation of the doctrine of irresistible grace, visit the following link: “Petals Fall: Why Calvinism is Impossible.” “Petals Fall” is a series consisting of four articles that you can find here.

[9] I highly recommend reading the full article. English only.

[10] Unless otherwise indicated, these definitions will be used throughout the article.

[11] Cross, R. Anti-Pelagianism and The Resistibility of Grace , Faith and Philosophy Vol. 22. No. 2, April 2005. Page 200.

[12] Ibid. Cited by Cross.

[13] Ibid.

[14] Ibid.

[15] Ibid.

[16] Ibid. Page 199

[17] The author will use justification as a synonym for salvation, but he does not affirm any particular theory of justification. He is only interested in how justification is obtained , not in what it consists of. Nor does he adopt any theory about redemption. Nor do he adopt theories that link justification with redemption.

[18] Representation in logical symbology:

“If either Pelagianism or Semi-Pelagianism is true, the irresistibility of grace is false.”

(P v SP) → ¬ IG

“If either Pelagianism or Semi-Pelagianism is false, it is not necessary that the irresistibility of grace be true.”

(P v SP) → ¬(□IG)

Where:

Q: Pelagianism.

SP: Semi-Pelagianism

IG: Irresistibility of Grace.

[19] Cross, R. Anti-Pelagianism and The Resistibility of Grace, Page 199.

[20] Ibid.

[21] Ibid. Page 200

[22] Ibid. p. 201.

[23] Ibid.

[24] Ibid.

[25] Ibid. Of course, none of us would accept the idea that God is programmed to do anything. God is free to act and nothing determines or programs his actions. However, every Christian recognizes that God cannot do certain actions such as sinning and performing logical absurdities. So it is metaphysically impossible for God to break a promise.

[26] Cross, R. p. 201.

[27] Ibid.

[28] Ibid.

[29] Ibid.

[30] Ibid.

[31] http://dle.rae.es/?id=P0mceZI

[32] “Meritorious works that at most have the right to reward or honor due to equity or simple distributive justice (ex justitia distributiva), as is the case of military gratifications and decorations.” See the following link http://ec.aciprensa.com/wiki/M%C3%A9rito .

[33] Cross, R. p. 202.

[34] Ibid. p. 202.

[35] Ibid.

[36] Ibid.

[37] Ibid. p. 202.

[38] Ibid. p. 203.

[39] Ibid.

[40] Ibid.

[41] Ibid.

[42] Ibid.

[43] Ibid.

[44] Ibid.

[45] Ibid. pp. 203 – 204.

[46] Ibid. p. 204.

[47] Ibid.

[48] ​​Ibid.

[49] Ibid.

[50] Ibid.

[51] Ibid. p. 205.

[52] Ibid.

[53] Ibid.

[54] Ibid.

[55] Ibid.

[56] Ibid.

[57] Ibid.

[58] Ibid. The verb here is “to will” which has no literal translation in English. “To will” expresses an exercise of will or an inclination toward something, not merely “to want something.” The confusion arises because there are two words in English that are translated as “wanting” or “desiring,” “to want” and “to will.” The first of these is what we know as “wanting something” in the sense of having a desire for it. While the second can be specified as a volition of the agent. For simplicity, whenever I refer to “wanting” or “desiring” in the sense of an exercise of will I will add a (*) for the reader.

[59] Ibid.

[60] Ibid.

[61] Ibid. p. 206

[62] Ibid.

[63] Ibid.

[64] Ibid.

[65] Ibid. p. 207.

[66] Stump, Eleonore. Augustine on free will. Cambridge University Press, (2006), p. 126.

[67] Ibid, p. 127.

[68] Ibid, pp. 127-129.

[69] Ibid., pp. 129-130. Even if we assume that “without the device the first-order desire is irresistible,” the case still meets all three conditions of libertarianism. “Even though Smith’s will is determined by his strong desire [to smoke], he has the device available to him, and he can use it if he so chooses.” Someone might argue that if the first-order volition is irresistible, then Smith could not desire to quit smoking; it would be impossible for his second-order volition to control his first-order volition to quit smoking. But the second-order desire may be effective in doing something other than controlling his first-order desire; and that other thing may be effective at least in preventing the first-order desire from being transformed into an action (something other than using the device).

Since it is open to Smith whether to smoke or not to smoke, he satisfies (L2).

If Smith smokes, it was because he willed not to use the device and to let his desire take its course; if Smith wills not to smoke it was because he willed to use the device. So his will has been ultimately determined by his own intellect and will, and consequently has not been ultimately determined by anything outside Smith. So it satisfies (L1) and (L3).

[70] In some sense of prior, since if the creature performs non-A, there will be no act with respect to which it is prior.

[71] Cross, R. p. 206.

[72] The ‘will of faith’ or ‘will of faith’ refers to a second-order volition to have faith or to stop rejecting grace. That is, a desire of the will to want to have saving faith. This will of faith is not sufficient to will saving faith because our first-order volitions do not desire such faith. Augustine describes these second-order volitions as an acceptance of grace, a desire for a right will, a will to believe, or even merely as faith. Stump, Eleonore. Augustine on free will. Cambridge University Press, (2006), p. 136.

[73] Stump, Eleonore. Augustine on free will. Cambridge University Press, (2006), p. 126. Timpe, Kevin. Grace and Controlling what we do not Cause. Faith and Philosophy, (July 3, 2007), p. 287.

[74] Summa Theologiae Part I-IIae Question 9 – Article 1.

[75] Stump, Eleonore. Augustine on free will. Cambridge University Press, (2006), p. 140.

[76] This argument by the Reformed, “non-resistance is a cause” reminds me of the mistake that atheistic physicist Lawrence Krauss makes when he tries to argue about the universe coming into existence from nothing. (See video min. 0:52 – 1:26). “Nothing is unstable,” he tells us, “nothing will always produce something.” Sadly for Krauss and the cast of unbelievers who follow him, scholars in physics and philosophy have refuted his argument time and time again. (See video min. 6:15 onwards). When he says that the universe could have come from nothing, he is not using the word “nothing” as an ordinary person would, but rather he is referring to empty space with a physical structure, not “nothing.” Nothing, properly understood, is the absence of anything. Likewise, are we calling non-resistance a cause? If so, we would be committing the same fallacy of equivocation that Krauss commits.

[77] P Dowe, “A Counterfactual Theory of Prevention and ‘Causation’ by Omissions,” Australian Journal of Philosophy 79:2 (June 2001): 216-26; J. J. Thomson, “Causation: Omissions,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66:1 (January 2003): 81-103; y S. McGrath, “Causation by Omission: A Dilemma,” Philosophical Studies 123 (2005): 125-48.”

[78] P Dowe, “A Counterfactual Theory of Prevention and ‘Causation’ by Omissions,” Australian Journal of Philosophy 79:2 (June 2001): 216-26. Del mismo autor ver también capítulo 6 de Physical Causation (Cambridge University Press, 2000).

[79] Dowe, Physical Causation, pág. 125.

[80] Aquí está el análisis de Dowe sobre la “causación por omisión”, donde A y B son eventos positivos y x es una variable que oscila entre estos eventos:

no-A cuasi-causa a B si B ocurriera y A no, y sucede una x tal que

(O1) x causó a B, y

(O2) si A hubiera ocurrido entonces A hubiera prevenido B al interactuar con x.

(Tomado de Physical Causation, pág. 124).

[81] Ver Timpe, “Controlling What We Do Not Cause,” 290-99.

[82] Ibíd, 291. Aunque esto no está afirmando que meramente “tener control” sobre un evento es suficiente para que un agente sea moralmente responsable de un evento. – ciertamente hay otras condiciones que son necesarias para la responsabilidad moral. En pocas palabras, el control es una condición necesaria pero no suficiente. El punto simplemente es que su control sobre un evento es requerido para responsabilidad moral, y hay dos maneras en la que una persona puede ejercer tal control.

[83] Ibíd.

[84] Ver: http://www.reasonablefaith.org/how-can-christ-be-the-only-way-to-god (inglés)

[85] Cross, R. pág. 206.

[86] Ibíd. pág. 207

[87] Sin embargo, en el modelo Arminiano descrito por Olson afirma que la gracia preveniente habilita al hombre depravado a responder positivamente al evangelio. Sin esa gracia preveniente, nadie sería capaz de responder al evangelio. Lo cual no refleja específicamente la intención del modelo de la ambulancia, sino que tiene mayor similitud con las perspectivas (1), (2) o (3). Pero cuando Olson describe su modelo de manera gráfica, con algunas modificaciones, parece ser que se conlleva las mismas implicaciones que el modelo de la ambulancia de Cross y Keathley.

[88] Cabe mencionar que el uso de analogías es meramente ilustrativo. Ninguna analogía es perfecta y debemos procurar entender la analogía mediante el punto que se intenta explicar.

[89] Hay claras distinciones entre el Arminianismo y el Molinismo, aspectos que van más allá de este escrito. Sin embargo, es sorprendente la similitud de las implicaciones de analogías que se usan para explicar la gracia resistible y cómo evadir la acusación de Pelagianismo.

[90] Overcoming Grace is the name Kenneth Keathly coined for the model. This would be the “O” in his acronym ROSES, for “Overcoming Grace,” which refers to a grace that overcomes our obstinacy and rebellion that we humans possess without God.

[91] Keathley, Kenneth. Salvation & Sovereignty: A Molinist Approach. Ed. B&H Publishing Group (2010), p. 77.

[92] R. Picirilli, Grace, Faith, Free Will (Nashville: Randall House 2002), 156. Emphasis added.

[93] Keathley, K. p. 77.

[94] Timpe, “Controlling What We Do Not Cause,” Reference (49) 298.

[95] Still, the reformed will press the point, saying, “But it is better not to resist than to resist, therefore the person may boast.” But Timpe reminds us that superlatives do not presuppose positives. That is, just because something is better than something else does not imply that the former is a positive thing to boast about. For example, suppose Joe has the opportunity to steal $100 from his boss, but only steals $20. Joe’s action is better than it would have been, but it does not mean that Joe deserves any moral merit for the action he did take.

[96] Cross, R. p. 207.

[97] Ibid. p. 207-208.

[98] Ibid. p. 208 Cross comments that it is not necessary to define saving faith precisely for the purposes of his analysis. Since faith is intended to be a voluntary act, faith is viewed as a trust in the offer of salvation and in the Savior, rather than as a belief in certain propositions.

 


Raúl Jaramillo is a graduate in Telecommunications Engineering from the Autonomous University of San Luis Potosí. Certified by the Reasonable Faith ministry as an apologetics teacher and leader of a study group or chapter of the ministry. Guest writer on Chris Du Pond’s blog veritasfidei.org , founding member of the Christian Philosopher ministry . Raúl has dedicated the last 10 years to promote the distribution of apologetic material in Spanish supporting Reasonable Faith with articles, conferences and debates; and Free Thinking Ministries with weekly articles. He has held debates on free will from a Molinist worldview making a strong criticism of Calvinist determinism. He is currently the Regional Director of Reasonable Faith Chapters for Latin America and Spain.

By Brian Chilton

Recientemente estaba conversando con un amigo mío que estaba encaprichado con una persona que no necesariamente compartía los mismos sentimientos. De hecho, no era algo claro lo que la otra persona en realidad deseaba en la relación. No mencionaré más acerca de esta situación por respeto a los involucrados. Esta situación ha causado que piense bastante acerca del amor, qué es y qué es lo que implica. Me parece que para que el verdadero amor sea genuino debe ser recíproco. Eso es que, debe ser aceptado por ambos individuos en la relación. Podemos aprender bastante acerca del amor desde la relación trinitaria de Dios.

I. El amor es recíproco en la relación trinitaria.

Cuando intentamos explicar la naturaleza trinitaria de Dios, Norman Geisler usa el ejemplo del espíritu de amor genuino para explicar este difícil concepto teológico. La ilustración de Geisler no es original de él, la tomó de Agustín de Hipona. Lo siguiente es la representación de Geisler del amor en la relación trinitaria de Dios:

Agustín sugirió una ilustración de cómo Dios es uno y tres al mismo tiempo. La Biblia nos dice que “Dios es amor” (1 Juan 4:16). El amor incluye un amante, un amado y un espíritu de amor entre el amante y el amado. El Padre podría ser comparado con el amante, el Hijo con el que es amado y el Espíritu Santo es el espíritu de amor. Sin embargo, el amor no existiría a menos que estos tres sean como uno solo. Esta ilustración tiene la ventaja de ser personal ya que incluye al amor, una característica que fluye solo de personas”[1].

Viendo que Dios es amor (1 Jn 4:16), la relación entre el Padre, el Hijo y el Espíritu Santo es una demostración del amor perfecto en su forma más pura. El amor no es forzado. El amor es aceptado y fluye de una persona a otra. Hay un amante —el que inicia el romance, el amado —el que recibe el amor del amante, y el espíritu de amor —el amor recibido mutuamente entre las dos partes. En el caso de la relación trinitaria, el amor es dado mutuamente y recibido por los tres miembros de la Deidad. Podemos aprender bastante acerca del amor a través de Dios.

II. El amor es recíproco en las relaciones humanas.

Dios es la perfecta demostración de amor como pudimos notar en la sección anterior. El ejemplo de amor de la Trinidad se transfiere a sanas relaciones amorosas humanas. ¿Cómo así? Las relaciones sanas incluyen a dos personas que se aman mutuamente. Consideremos un ejemplo hipotético de una persona A (lo llamaremos Adán) y una persona B (la llamaremos Bárbara). Digamos que Adán ama a Bárbara y expresa su amor hacia ella. Sin embargo, Bárbara no ama a Adán. Adán trata y trata de que Bárbara lo ame, pero ella no corresponde a sus emociones. ¿Es esto verdadero amor? ¡Por supuesto que no! El amor de Adán no es recíproco.

Consideremos otro caso. Digamos que Bárbara ama a Adán, pero Adán no siente lo mismo. Bárbara manipula a Adán para iniciar una relación. Se llegan a casar, pero Adán nunca tuvo los mismos sentimientos que tiene Bárbara hacia él. Esta relación no es una basada en el amor, sino en el control y la manipulación. El verdadero amor tiene que ser recíproco.

Para que el amor de Adán y Bárbara sea genuino, Adán debe expresar su amor hacia Bárbara. Bárbara debe recibir su amor. Entonces, Bárbara expresará su amor hacia Adán y su amor será recibido abiertamente. Esta relación hipotética nos muestra cómo el verdadero amor requiere un amante (el que envía amor), un amado (el que recibe el amor), y un mutuo espíritu de amor entre los dos.

III. El amor es recíproco en las relaciones humanas/divinas

Desde que el amor genuino es visto en la eterna relación trinitaria de Dios y que el verdadero amor es recíproco entre dos individuos conscientes, entonces solo tiene sentido que Dios nos inculca su amor no a la fuerza, sino por reciprocidad. Es decir, Dios ofrece libremente su amor a individuos. Él no fuerza su amor a alguien. Recuerda, ¡el amor forzado no es amor genuino! Dios dice a través de su profeta Ezequiel, “¿quiero yo la muerte del impío?… ¿no vivirá si se apartare de sus caminos?” (Eze. 18:23)[2]. Jesús dice que “y como Moisés levantó la serpiente en el desierto, así es necesario que el Hijo del Hombre sea levantado, para que todo aquel que en Él cree, no se pierda, mas tenga vida eterna” (Jn 3:14-15). En este caso, Dios es el amante, y los seres humanos son los amados. Pero, el verdadero amor debe ser recíproco.

¿Pueden los individuos buscar a Dios por su propia cuenta? ¡Absolutamente no! La gracia de Dios debe ser extendida hacia ellos primero. Esta verdad es vista en la descripción de Jesús del ministerio del Espíritu Santo. Jesús muestra que el Espíritu Santo “convencerá al mundo de pecado, de justicia y de juicio. De pecado, por cuanto no creen en mí; de justicia, por cuanto voy al padre, y no me veréis más; y de juicio, por cuanto el príncipe de este mundo ha sido ya juzgado” (Jn 16:8-11). En este caso, vemos que Dios es el amante, los seres humanos son los amados y el espíritu trabajando para producir este amor es el Espíritu Santo. El amor forzado no es amor. Dios no fuerza a una persona para la salvación. Él dá su amor libremente y su amor debe ser libremente recibido, sino, no es verdadero amor.

Conclusión

Cuando aconsejo parejas que están planeando casarse, siempre les digo que, si ellos quieren amarse el uno a el otro, deben primero conocer a Dios porque Dios es amor. Porque Dios es amor y demuestra el amor perfecto, no debería sorprendernos descubrir que el amor exuda en las relaciones humanas cuando imita el amor de Dios. Los sistemas teológicos necesitan también aceptar este entendimiento del amor. El amor genuino debe tener un amante, un amado y el espíritu de amor. Sino, una relación podría existir, pero no seria una relación de amor verdadero.

Notes

[1] Norman L. Geisler, “Trinity”, Enciclopedia Baker de apologética cristiana, referencia librería Baker (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker books, 1999), 733.

[2] A menos que se indique lo contrario, todas las citas bíblicas son de Christian Standard Bible (Nashville: Holman, 2017).

 


Brian G. Chilton es el fundador de BellatorChristi.com y es el presentador de The Bellator Christi Podcast. Recibió su Maestría en Divinidad en Liberty University (con alta distinción); su Licenciatura en Ciencias en Estudios Religiosos y Filosofía de la Universidad Gardner-Webb (con honores); y recibió la certificación en Christian Apologetics (Apologética cristiana) de la Universidad de Biola. Brian actualmente está inscrito en el programa Ph.D. en Teología y apologética en Liberty University. Brian ha estado en el ministerio por más de 15 años y sirve como pastor en el noroeste de Carolina del Norte.

Blog Original: http://bit.ly/2ri6wqu

Traducido por Italo Espinoza Gomez

Editado por María Andreina Cerrada