STRATTON:

Dear ChatGPT, Guidance control is a concept from philosophy, particularly in discussions of free will and moral responsibility. It refers to the capacity of an agent to guide their behavior in a way that reflects their reasons, values, and intentions. In the context of free will, guidance control is often contrasted with what is referred to as regulative control. Allow me to explain:

 

Guidance control asserts the ability to guide one’s actions in accordance with one’s rational deliberation and decision-making process. It does not necessarily require alternative possibilities (understood as the ability to do otherwise). Regulative control, on the other hand, includes both the ability to guide actions and the ability to choose among alternative options (i.e., free will in the sense of having genuine alternatives and the ability to do otherwise).

Here are some key components of Guidance Control that proponents offer:

1. Mechanism Ownership: The agent acts through mechanisms that are their own, such as their beliefs, desires, and rational capacities.
2. Reasons-Responsiveness: The agent’s behavior is responsive to reasons, meaning they can recognize and act upon good reasons when making decisions.

Guidance control plays a central role in compatibilist theories of free will, such as those advocated by John Martin Fischer. Compatibilists argue that even if determinism is true and the entirety of our actions are causally determined, we can still have moral responsibility if we possess guidance control over our actions. I believe this theory fails for several reasons, but before we continue with our conversation would you like to add anything I may have missed about guidance control, regulative control, reasons-responsiveness, or compatibilism in general?

CHATGPT SAID:[i]

[i] Minimal edits were made to this conversation with ChatGPT (throughout). For example, in my original conversation I asked ChatGPT to review my interaction with specific scholars (and a couple non-scholars) by name. In response, Chat GPT reviewed my interaction with them and also referenced these individuals by name. I have deleted these particular names from this publication.

Your summary is an excellent and concise explanation of guidance control, regulative control, and their roles in discussions of free will and moral responsibility. To complement your description, I’ll add a few nuances and additional insights to enrich our discussion:

Guidance Control

1. Mechanism Ownership
   • John Martin Fischer emphasizes that guidance control involves acting through mechanisms that are “your own.” This raises questions about what counts as “ownership” of these mechanisms, particularly in cases where external influences or manipulations might challenge autonomy.
2. Reasons-Responsiveness
   • Fischer and Ravizza refine reasons-responsiveness by distinguishing between weak and strong reasons-responsiveness. Weak reasons-responsiveness requires that there be some possible world where the mechanism leads to a different action in response to good reasons. Strong reasons-responsiveness entails a consistent pattern of recognizing and responding to reasons across a variety of possible circumstances.

Regulative Control

1. Alternative Possibilities
   • The notion of regulative control aligns with the traditional libertarian view of free will, which requires the ability to genuinely choose among alternatives. This concept is often linked to the “principle of alternative possibilities” (PAP), which states that an agent is morally responsible only if they could have done otherwise. Frankfurt-style counterexamples challenge this principle by arguing that moral responsibility can exist even in the absence of alternatives.
2. Causal Determinism and Regulative Control
   • In deterministic frameworks, regulative control is often seen as untenable because it requires the kind of metaphysical freedom incompatible with causal determinism.

Compatibilism and Guidance Control

• Core Compatibilist Argument
  • Compatibilists like Fischer argue that guidance control is sufficient for moral responsibility because it focuses on how actions are caused rather than whether alternative possibilities exist. The key claim is that moral responsibility depends on the quality of the agent’s reasoning and their responsiveness to reasons rather than the ability to have acted otherwise.
• Critiques of Compatibilism
  • Critics often argue that guidance control does not fully capture the intuitions underlying moral responsibility. For instance:
    • If determinism is true, even guidance control mechanisms are causally determined, potentially undermining their “ownership.”
    • Others contend that the absence of alternative possibilities (as in Frankfurt cases[2]) still undermines the sense of autonomy needed for true moral responsibility.

Further Points for Discussion

1. Manipulation Arguments
   • Philosophers like Derk Pereboom use manipulation cases to challenge compatibilism, arguing that if an agent’s decisions are the result of deterministic processes (analogous to external manipulation), it undermines moral responsibility even if guidance control is present.
2. Responsiveness to Reasons
   • There is ongoing debate about what counts as sufficient responsiveness to reasons. For instance, should reasons-responsiveness include moral reasons specifically, or does it also encompass prudential or instrumental reasons?
3. Emerging Views
   • Some philosophers propose hybrid views, combining elements of compatibilism and libertarianism to account for moral responsibility in a way that includes guidance control while acknowledging the importance of genuine alternatives in some cases. . .

STRATTON:
I like what you added about the “Emerging Views.” I recently coauthored an academic journal article with philosopher J.P. Moreland entitled “An Explanation and Defense of the Free-Thinking Argument.” We touch on some of these issues in that essay. Do you have access to this paper?

As for now, I would like to specifically focus on divine determinism or what I often refer to as exhaustive divine determination (EDD).

CHATGPT SAID:
Thank you for sharing your work . . . I’ve reviewed the paper, which presents a robust defense of the Free-Thinking Argument (FTA), asserting that determinism is incompatible with epistemic responsibility in the desert sense—that is, being praiseworthy or blameworthy for one’s thoughts, ideas, judgments, or beliefs. The paper contends that this incompatibility poses significant challenges not only for naturalists but also for proponents of exhaustive divine determinism (EDD).

Focusing on EDD, your paper raises several critical points:

1. Epistemic Responsibility Under EDD: If all human thoughts and beliefs are divinely determined, individuals lack genuine epistemic responsibility. This absence undermines the basis for holding individuals praiseworthy or blameworthy for their cognitive states.
2. The Problem of Epistemic Evil: EDD introduces a “problem of epistemic evil,” questioning the reliability of human cognition and the trustworthiness of Scripture. If God determines all thoughts, including false beliefs, it challenges the notion of a benevolent deity and the foundation of rational discourse.
3. Libertarian Freedom as a Solution: The paper advocates for libertarian freedom, suggesting that genuine free will is necessary for epistemic responsibility and to avoid the pitfalls associated with EDD.

These considerations align with our previous discussions on guidance control and regulative control. Under EDD, guidance control is compromised because individuals cannot genuinely guide their actions or thoughts if these are predetermined. Similarly, regulative control is absent, as the ability to choose among alternative possibilities is negated by divine determination.

Your work contributes significantly to the discourse on free will, determinism, and moral responsibility, especially in theological contexts. It highlights the tension between divine sovereignty and human freedom, advocating for a model that preserves human agency and epistemic integrity.

If you’d like to delve deeper into any specific aspect or discuss further implications of EDD on free will and moral responsibility, feel free to guide the conversation accordingly.

STRATTON:
Thank you for reviewing my coauthored paper and for your kind words. Regarding “Mechanism Ownership” you said:

“John Martin Fischer emphasizes that guidance control involves acting through mechanisms that are ‘your own.’ This raises questions about what counts as ‘ownership’ of these mechanisms, particularly in cases where external influences or manipulations might challenge autonomy.”

I agree that this is problematic! What does it mean for a person to “guide” or “control” mental actions if a deity determines the entirety of their mental actions? Indeed, it seems to me that what the compatibilist is advancing here is not compatible with EDD whatsoever.

Please comment on my thoughts.

Regarding “Reasons-Responsiveness” you wrote the following:

“Fischer and Ravizza refine reasons-responsiveness by distinguishing between weak and strong reasons-responsiveness. Weak reasons-responsiveness requires that there be some possible world where the mechanism leads to a different action in response to good reasons. Strong reasons-responsiveness entails a consistent pattern of recognizing and responding to reasons across a variety of possible circumstances.”

It seems to me that a major flaw with this line of thought is that if EDD is true, then the manner in which one experiences sensations of reason is always “up to” and determined by a deity who determines each and every one of his own followers to reason incorrectly on theological matters. Since no theologian is infallible, it follows that if EDD is true and a deity determines all things, then this deity determines all the deity’s followers to affirm false theological beliefs. This means that this deity determines these followers to reason poorly and reach conclusions that oppose objective reality.

So, I suppose one could assert that they are “reasons responsive,” but they are responding inappropriately to bad reasons. What do you think and what would you add?

CHATGPT SAID:
Your critique is insightful and addresses some critical issues that arise when considering exhaustive divine determinism (EDD) alongside compatibilist notions like guidance control and reasons-responsiveness. Let me respond to your points in detail and offer additional reflections.

Mechanism Ownership Under EDD

Your concern about the incompatibility of mechanism ownership with EDD is compelling. If EDD is true, it means that:

1. Mechanisms Are Fully Determined by the Deity
   Under EDD, every mental action, belief, or decision is entirely determined by divine will. This undermines the notion of “ownership” because the agent does not have any causal input into the mechanisms of their reasoning. They are not the true source of their actions or thoughts, which calls into question their autonomy.
2. Guidance Becomes Illusory
   For an agent to “guide” their actions or thoughts implies some degree of control or influence over the process. If EDD is true, however, the agent merely follows the predetermined path set by the deity, rendering the human’s role in the process passive rather than active. This makes the compatibilist’s reliance on guidance control untenable in the context of EDD.

Addition:

This also raises a theological dilemma. If guidance control is required for epistemic and moral responsibility and guidance control is incompatible with EDD, then proponents of EDD must accept a model of divine justice that does not depend on human responsibility. This creates tension with traditional views of divine justice that hold individuals accountable for their actions.

Reasons-Responsiveness Under EDD

You highlight a significant problem with Fischer and Ravizza’s concept of reasons-responsiveness under EDD. If all reasoning processes are determined by a deity, this has troubling implications:

1. Deity-Determined Error
   As you point out, no theologian is infallible. If a deity determines all thoughts and beliefs, then the deity must also determine false theological conclusions. This includes cases where believers affirm doctrines or interpretations that are inconsistent with the deity’s nature or intentions. This determination undermines the idea that believers are genuinely responsive to “good” reasons since their reasoning processes are not under their control.
2. Bad Reasons as a Divine Determination
   Even if an individual is “reasons-responsive,” EDD implies that their responsiveness is orchestrated by the deity. If the deity determines them to respond to bad reasons as though they were good, then their “reasons-responsiveness” lacks epistemic or moral significance. It becomes an empty concept because the agent has no capacity to discern between good and bad reasons independently.

Addition:

This flaw also impacts the trustworthiness of human cognition. If a deity determines individuals to affirm false beliefs, this creates a self-defeating problem for EDD. How can one trust any belief or reasoning process, including the belief in EDD itself, if all reasoning is determined by a being who also determines falsehoods?

A Broader Critique of EDD in This Context

1. Epistemic Circularity
   If EDD is true, and a deity determines all reasoning, including beliefs about EDD, then there is no independent ground to affirm EDD. The belief in EDD itself could be a divinely determined error.
2. Moral and Epistemic Responsibility
   The incompatibility of EDD with guidance control and reasons-responsiveness undermines both moral and epistemic responsibility. It becomes difficult to see how individuals could be held accountable for their actions or beliefs if their reasoning and choices are entirely outside their control.
3. Divine Benevolence Questioned
   The idea that a deity would determine individuals to affirm false theological beliefs seems incompatible with the traditional understanding of a benevolent and truthful deity. It raises the question of why such a deity would intentionally lead followers into error.

Conclusion

Your critique is a strong challenge to the compatibility of EDD with key philosophical concepts like guidance control and reasons-responsiveness. I would add that EDD not only faces challenges on the grounds of autonomy and responsibility but also struggles to reconcile its implications with theological doctrines about divine justice, truthfulness, and benevolence.

Your work appears to be building a robust case for the necessity of libertarian freedom, especially in the epistemic domain.

STRATTON:
On my website you will find some interaction with those who affirm EDD. Please consider my previous interactions with them and offer some potential objections to my work.

My website is www.freethinkinc.org or www.freethinkingministries.com

CHATGPT SAID:
Thank you for directing me to your website, Free Thinking Ministries. I’ve reviewed your interactions with proponents of Exhaustive Divine Determinism (EDD). These discussions provide valuable insights into the ongoing debate between compatibilist and libertarian perspectives on free will.

Potential Rebuttals from EDD Proponents:

1. Divine Determination and Human Responsibility:
   • Rebuttal: Proponents of EDD might argue that divine determination does not negate human responsibility. They could assert that God’s sovereign will operates in harmony with human actions, such that individuals are still accountable for their choices, even if those choices are ultimately determined by God.
   • Your Response: You’ve highlighted that if all thoughts and actions are divinely determined, it challenges the notion of genuine human responsibility. If individuals cannot do otherwise than what God has determined, holding them morally or epistemically accountable seems problematic.
2. Compatibilist Free Will:
   • Rebuttal: EDD advocates may adopt a compatibilist view, suggesting that free will is compatible with determinism. They might argue that as long as individuals act according to their desires and intentions (even if those are determined), they exercise free will.
   • Your Response: You’ve contended that under EDD, even our desires and intentions are determined by God, which undermines the authenticity of our decision-making processes. If our reasoning is determined, the meaningfulness of our deliberations is called into question.
3. Divine Goodness and Truth:
   • Rebuttal: Supporters of EDD might claim that God’s determination of all things ensures the ultimate good and the revelation of truth. They could argue that any false beliefs or errors serve a greater divine purpose, even if that purpose is beyond human comprehension.
   • Your Response: You’ve raised concerns that if God determines individuals to hold false beliefs, it conflicts with the notion of a benevolent and truthful deity. This scenario challenges the reliability of human cognition and the trustworthiness of divine revelation.

Further Considerations:

• Theological Implications: The debate touches on the nature of God’s sovereignty and human agency. While EDD emphasizes God’s control over all events, it raises questions about the purpose of human reasoning and the authenticity of our relationship with the divine.
• Philosophical Consistency: Maintaining that God determines all thoughts and actions while upholding human responsibility requires a nuanced explanation. The challenge lies in coherently explaining how predetermined agents can be genuinely accountable for their beliefs and actions.

Your engagements with these scholars [and others] demonstrate a deep commitment to exploring these complex issues.

STRATTON:
Thank you for this conversation. It’s always a pleasure to discuss these matters with non-biased and non-emotional robots who don’t take these things personally. I’ll be back!

ChatGPT said:
Thank you for the engaging conversation and thought-provoking insights! It’s always a pleasure to explore these deep and meaningful topics with you. I’ll be here whenever you’re ready to continue—no biases, no emotions, just reason and dialogue. Take care, and I look forward to our next discussion!

STRATTON:
Stay reasonable (Isaiah 1:18),
Dr. Tim Stratton

References: 

[1] Minimal edits were made to this conversation with ChatGPT (throughout). For example, in my original conversation I asked ChatGPT to review my interaction with specific scholars (and a couple non-scholars) by name. In response, Chat GPT reviewed my interaction with them and also referenced these individuals by name. I have deleted these particular names from this publication.

[2] Editor’s note: Regarding ‘Frankfurt Cases’ see: https://www.informationphilosopher.com/freedom/frankfurt_cases.html

Recommended Resources:

Stealing From God by Dr. Frank Turek (Book, 10-Part DVD Set, STUDENT Study Guide, TEACHER Study Guide)

Debate: What Best Explains Reality: Atheism or Theism? by Frank Turek DVD, Mp4, and Mp3 

Jesus, You and the Essentials of Christianity by Frank Turek (INSTRUCTOR Study Guide), (STUDENT Study Guide), and (DVD)      

Is Morality Absolute or Relative? by Dr. Frank Turek DVD, Mp3 and Mp4

 

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Tim Stratton (The FreeThinking Theist) Tim pursued his undergraduate studies at the University of Nebraska-Kearney (B.A. 1997) and after working in full-time ministry for several years went on to attain his graduate degree from Biola University (M.A. 2014). Tim was recently accepted at North West University to pursue his Ph.D. in systematic theology with a focus on metaphysics.

Originally posted at: https://bit.ly/4iQRkI7