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Frank exposes several contradictions that are unavoidable if one holds to a materialistic, atheistic worldview. There seems to be a mismatch between their beliefs and reality, and we should point this out.
Learn more about this by reading “Stealing from God: Why Atheists Need God to Make Their Case” http://bit.ly/SFG-Book
Over the centuries, believers have sometimes struggled to understand the nature of God and the great mystery of Jesus. The Bible describes Jesus as having the nature and power of God, and the Gospel of John tells us that He existed before the universe began (He was, in fact, the creator of the universe). At the same time, the Bible teaches Jesus was fully human and died on the cross. Efforts to reconcile the Divine and human nature of Jesus have resulted in a number of classic and historic misinterpretations:
Adoptionism (2nd Century)
This heresy denies the pre-existence of Christ and therefore denies His Deity. It taught Jesus was simply a man who was tested by God and after passing the test was given supernatural powers and adopted as a son (this occurred at His baptism). Jesus was then rewarded for all He did (and for His perfect character) with His own resurrection and adoption into the Godhead.
Leader(s) in the Heresy: Theodotus of Byzantium
Corrector(s) of the Heresy: Pope Victor (190-198AD)
Docetism (2nd Century)
This heresy was coined from the Greek word, “dokesis” which means “to seem.” It taught Jesus only appeared to have a body and was not truly incarnate. Docetists viewed matter as inherently evil and therefore rejected the idea God could actually appear in bodily form. By denying Jesus truly had a body, they also denied He suffered on the cross and rose from the dead.
Leader(s) in the Heresy: Attributed to Gnostics and promoted by the Gospel of Peter
Corrector(s) of the Heresy: Ignatius of Antioch, Irenaeus, and Hippolytus refuted it was condemned at the Council of Chalcedon in 451AD
Apollinarianism (4th Century)
This heresy denied the true and complete humanity of Jesus because it taught He did not have a human mind but instead had a mind that was completely Divine. The heresy lessened the human nature of Jesus in order to reconcile the manner in which Jesus could be both God and man at the same time.
Leader(s) in the Heresy: Apollinaris the Younger (bishop of Laodicea in Syria), 360AD
Corrector(s) of the Heresy: The Council of Constantinople in 381AD
Arianism (4th Century)
This heresy taught Jesus was a “creature” who was “begotten” of the Father. Only God the Father is “un-begotten.” In this view, only the Father is truly God; He was too pure and perfect to appear here on earth, so He created the Son as His first creation. The Son then created the universe. God then adopted Jesus as a son (because, after all, Jesus and God are not supposed to have the same nature in this view). Jesus was worshipped only because of His preeminence as the first creation.
Leader(s) in the Heresy: Arius of Alexandria Egypt (250-336AD)
Corrector(s) of the Heresy: The Council of Nicaea in 325AD. The Nicene Creed was written to respond to this heresy.
Nestorianism (5th Century)
This heresy taught Mary only gave birth to Jesus’ human nature. The founder of the heresy, Nestorius, did not even want Mary to be called “Mother of God” but instead wanted her to be called “Mother of Christ.” In essence, the heresy maintained Jesus was really two separate persons, and only the human Jesus was in Mary’s womb. If that was true, then Jesus was not God incarnate while in the womb.
Leader(s) in the Heresy: Nestorius of Antioch (Bishop of Constantinople in 428AD)
Corrector(s) of the Heresy: The Council of Ephesus in 431AD
Eutychianism [Monophysitism] (5th Century)
This heresy taught Jesus’ humanity was absorbed by His divinity. The heresy is Monophysite in nature, derived from the Greek words “mono” (“one”) and “physis” (“nature”). In essence, the heresy claimed Jesus had only one nature (something new and different than the Divine or human nature that God and humans have, respectively). Instead, this heresy taught a third unique nature was possessed by Jesus; a blend or mixture of the human and the Divine.
Leader(s) in the Heresy: Eutyches of Constantinople (380 – 456AD)
Corrector(s) of the Heresy: The Fourth Ecumenical Council in Chalcedon in 451AD. The Chalcedonian Creed addresses this heresy.
Monothelitism (7th Century)
This heresy emerged in response to the Monophysite heresy (see above), but it also taught something denied by the Scripture. The name is derived from a Greek root that means “one will.” Monothelitism taught Jesus had two natures but only one will. Instead of having two cooperative wills (one Divine and one human), Jesus had one Divine-human “energia.”
Leader(s) in the Heresy: Patriarch Sergius I of Constantinople (610 – 638AD)
Corrector(s) of the Heresy: The Third Council of Constantinople; the Sixth Ecumenical Council (680 – 681AD)
These ancient heresies have been revisited by believers over the centuries and even persist into the modern era. Unitarians, for example, have embraced a view of Jesus very similar to the heretics of Arianism. The more we understand these classic heresies related to Jesus, the better prepared we will be to spot counterfeits when they re-emerge in our culture.
J. Warner Wallace is a Cold-Case Detective, Christian Case Maker, Senior Fellow at the Colson Center for Christian Worldview, and the author of Cold-Case Christianity, Cold-Case Christianity for Kids, God’s Crime Scene, God’s Crime Scene for Kids, and Forensic Faith.
Original Blog Source: http://bit.ly/2OpUowc
By Luke Nix
Introduction
A few months ago, an article on Lifehacker with some financial advice caught my attention. In today’s materialistic (financially speaking, not philosophically speaking) society, resentment towards those who spend more than we do is a real problem. Whether the source of the money is hard work, financial responsibility, a gift, a stroke of luck, a “cush” job, credit, something else, or a combination of any number of those things, there is a tendency for these people to be resented by others based upon their choices with money. While this may seem like something that is far removed from any apologetic topic, it really is not. This resentment is a feature of the fallen human condition, and any worldview that claims to be true must be able to explain its existence and have a solution for it, if it really is such a problem in the first place. Lifehacker is definitely not a religious site, and while I do not pretend to know the worldview of the author, generally there is at least an attempt by the authors to answer questions from within the secular worldview. So I was interested to see how the author would attempt to address this issue. I will start with looking at what is offered in the article and provide a practical critique, then I will offer an alternative that has greater explanatory power and practical usage. I would encourage the reader to check out the article before continuing. It can be read here: How to Deal With Resentment When Your Friends Make More Money Than You
What Solutions Did Lifehacker Offer?
While all the ideas in the article are good bandages, they do not address the cause of the problem. Since they do not address the cause, the resentment will return again and again. The solutions offered are good in the sense that they will last temporarily, but they will not fix the problem in the long term.
The first solution offered is to repeatedly “forgive” the other person for their ignorance of the resentful person’s situation. This will get frustrating over time because the resented person is never made aware of how they have “offended” the resentful person and will never be provided the opportunity to change (not that they have actually done anything immoral that requires a change, anyway, so communicating such is likely to be challenged and cause two-way resentment).
The second suggestion is that the resentful person replaces the negative story in their head, about the resented person’s situation and how they can spend more, with a more positive story about that person’s situation. The problem with this is that all that is being suggested is to replace one speculation with another speculation. The author encourages the reader to tell themselves whatever they have to (true or not) to make them feel good about the person they resent rather than feel resentful toward them. Unless the resentful person habitually lies to themselves for practical reasons or is used to believing useful fictions, this will not last long either. A person can only believe something they know to be false for so long before they finally reject it and lose any “benefit” from believing it.
The third idea offered is merely a more systematic way of “keeping up with the Joneses.” The goal is to be able to spend the way the other person does so that the resentful person is their materialistic equal. This too will not fix any issues with resentment for the object of the resentment will just change from the one person, who is now their equal, to the next person who spends even more. The resentment is not removed, it is displaced temporarily only to return and be targeted at another person. Ironically, in this “solution” resentment is self-perpetuating and never-ending.
The failure of all of these solutions indicates the failure of the explanation (worldview) that they are grounded in. Thus an alternative worldview (with a viable solution) is necessary.
What Is The Source?
While the author did not explicitly say that the resentful person is the problem, she did imply it in her focus on changing the person feeling the resentment. While I do believe that she is generally correct about the location of the problem, the specific identification of the problem is incorrect, thus so are the offered solutions based on that incorrect problem (this is how the secular worldview fails the test of practicality).
Temporary vs. Permanent
The author did get very close to the cause by suggesting that the resentful person ask a question of themselves: “What do I have to gain from being resentful.” But that was the wrong question. The right question is “Why am I so resentful?” Interestingly, the answer is universal to all humanity but was not identified by the author because the wrong question was asked. The cause of the problem is a lack of contentment and gratitude. If we learn to be content and grateful for what we have, rather than focusing on what we do not have, we can be satisfied with our own situation and not be constantly comparing it to that of others. Without comparison, resentment has no grounding point.
However, several worldviews would grant that the lack of contentment and gratitude is the source of the problem of resentment. For instance, Christianity, New Age and Eastern worldviews tend to grant this. However, I believe that there is an important distinction that separates Christianity from the rest. While other worldviews can only provide a temporary solution (even to the correctly identified problem), Christianity offers the only permanent solution. But what is it? The Apostle Paul told the Phillippians the missing component (“the secret”): Christ (Phil. 4:11-13).
But how can Christ be the missing component? Being discontent and ungrateful is the natural, default position of the human heart, and the heart cannot change itself, no matter how hard or how long it tries to deny what it is (another useful fiction similar to the one I described above). Thus the temporary effect that will necessarily result, even in other worldviews that accurately identify the problem, is that people will attempt to change their heart apart from something outside themselves that has the causal power to accomplish the change.
Contentment
Paul expounds on this in his letter to the Romans (8:18): when we are focused on Christ, we are focused not on the temporary, physical things of this universe (such as money and things) but on the permanent, eternal life beyond this universe. When we are concerned with what is permanent and everlasting, it is easy to be content with whatever we have that is temporary and finite. It is only the focus on Christ and the everlasting life beyond this universe that He offers to us that will ultimately allow us to overcome materialistic resentment- “I have learned the secret of being content in any and every situation, whether well fed or hungry, whether living in plenty or in want. I can do everything through Him, who gives me strength” (Phil. 4:12b-13). And while we are focused on Christ, He can change our heart.
It is not merely enough to be focused on something outside this universe (such as Nirvana or Moksha in the Eastern worldviews) because our focus will fade and no permanent change can take place. It takes a causal agent, who is also the object of our focus (Christ), to change our heart. Please do not mistake “focus” for an eastern-style “meditation;” the focus I speak of is not just a mental exercise but a complete surrender and dedication of our lives to Jesus Christ.
Gratitude
We also must recognize that “every good and perfect gift comes from the Father” (James 1:17). Giving thanks (gratitude) only makes sense if we have been provided something by someone other than ourselves. It is this second necessary solution to resentment that can only make sense if Christianity is true. God is the source of the temporary and finite things we have been given. So even though money and other temporary things are not our focus, we must still be grateful for them. This removes the focus on a second level- from what we do not have to what we do have. And with our lives surrendered and dedicated to Christ, we are free to search for ways to use what (little or much) God has given us for eternal purposes, not just the temporary purposes of this life. I think that financial guru Dave Ramsey puts it quite succinctly in his popular book “The Total Money Makeover”:
Conclusion
Considering the fact that God has given all people the intuition that resentment is evil (or at least undesirable) and He has given us a mind that can reliably solve problems, it is no surprise that even secular solutions can get some things right. However, they will never be complete without the whole of reality in view. The solution must include Christ. The solution to financial resentment can only take place through a renewed life in Christ. No other worldview can come even close to competing with Christianity’s solution offered to financial resentment. If you are struggling with financial resentment and are tired of struggling to rely on yourself to fix a problem you, as a human, do not have the ability to fix, Jesus is the only hope for a solution to your problem. He extends the invitation: “Come to me, all you who are weary and heavy laden, and I will give you rest” (Matt 11:28).
Original Blog Source: http://bit.ly/2qwSQHi
By Jacobus Erasmus
In a recent blog post, Professor Keith Parsons offers three reasons for why (he thinks) the soul does not exist. (You might recall that Parsons debated William Lane Craig in 1998). Since Parsons’ objections to substance dualism (for simplicity, I will hereafter refer to substance dualism simply as ‘dualism’) seem rather common among lay atheists, his objections are worth evaluating. Let us, then, evaluate Parsons’ blog post.
The Burden of Proof
Before offering his three objections to dualism, Parsons argues that the burden of proof falls on the dualist. According to Parsons, the non-dualist (i.e, the person who believes the soul does not exist, such as the physicalist or property dualist) does not have to defend their position because ‘the burden of proof falls entirely on those who support the existence of spiritual souls.’ Why does Parsons think this? Well, for two reasons. First, he argues that, since the brain can perform mental functions, one’s default position should be to assume that souls do not exist. He writes,
Well, first, let us consider what, I presume, is known to everyone: We know that certain configurations of matter–those configurations we refer to as ‘human beings,’ for instance–are capable of performing mental functions. They think, feel, perceive, imagine, desire, will, believe, and so forth. If, then, certain configurations of matter can perform mental functions and possess mental properties, the parsimonious, spontaneous, and natural assumption would be that matter, when organized in suitable ways, can perform mental functions and possess mental properties.
It seems perverse to make the opposite assumption, namely that material beings cannot think, and that therefore their mental functions and properties must be due to the operation of something non-physical, a soul perhaps. … Therefore, the burden of proof should be on those who say that matter is incapable of mental functions or of possessing mental properties, and that these must instead be due to something non-material.There are several problems with this argument. In the first place, Parsons first assumes non-dualism in order to argue that one should first assume non-dualism, and this is viciously circular (I use the term ‘non-dualism’ as an umbrella term to refer to all views that claim that the soul does not exist, such as physicalism, materialism, and property dualism). When Parsons claims that it is the brain that can ‘think, feel, perceive, … and possess mental properties’, he is simply describing non-dualism. Dualism, on the other hand, states that it is the soul (or the immaterial mind or self), and not the brain, that feels, perceives, has mental properties, etc. Thus, Parsons first assumes non-dualism, and then he concludes on the basis of this assumption that one should first assume non-dualism (what a messy argument!)In the second place, it is simply false that everyone ‘knows’ that brains can feel, believe, have mental properties, etc. What everyone seems to know is that there is a correlation between one’s brain and one’s mental life. For example, when one recalls a memory, electrical activity occurs in certain regions of the brain. However, this correlation relation is different to an identity relation; that the brain correlates to the mind does not imply that the brain just is the mind. Furthermore, I have a deep intuition that I am not just physical stuff, that I am more than my body, that my mind is not identical to my brain. Most people I have spoken to share this intuition. Hence, contra Parsons, not everybody thinks (or ‘knows’) that non-dualism is true. Indeed, if dualism seems intuitive to most people, then dualism should be the default starting position.
Parsons’ second reason for why the burden of proof falls on the dualist is that neuroscience (supposedly) presupposes the following principle:
Parsons explains,
The second reason for putting the burden of proof on the soul-theorist is that, surely, by now, the heuristic assumptions of neuroscience have gained some degree of authority. As I mentioned earlier, a regulative assumption of all the sciences that study mind and brain is that the brain is sufficient for all mental activity. … When a program of inquiry has produced hard, reproducible, and important results, as has neuroscience, then this would warrant prima facie acceptance of the heuristic principles that have guided such research. The burden of proof should therefore fall on those who reject the assumption of the sufficiency of the brain and instead invoke non-physical entities.
Unfortunately, Parsons’ argument above is misleading. To make such a bold claim as ‘neuroscience presupposes (A)’, one must provide some evidence for the claim. Parsons does not do this. He does not reference any neuroscientist that explicitly states that (A) is the heuristic principle of neuroscience. Nor does he reference any study that supports his argument above. Nor does Parsons interact with the recent scholarly work that shows that Parsons has got it completely wrong. For example, in their recent paper titled ‘Neuroscience: Dualism in Disguise’, Riccardo Manzotti and Paolo Moderato (2014) persuasively argue ‘that most of current neuroscientists, contrary to often-heralded physicalist credo, embrace dualism … [and, furthermore] that the implicit assumptions adopted by most neuroscientists invariably lead to some sort of dualistic framework’ (Manzotti and Moderato, 2014:81). Contra Parsons, most neuroscientists assume dualism and, thus, according to Parsons’ argument, the burden of proof should fall, not on the dualist, but on the non-dualist.
Therefore, Parsons’ two arguments above fail. It should be noted, moreover, that when it comes to a controversial topic (such as free will, the nature of time, the mind-body problem) the burden of proof falls on those on both sides of the debate. I take this to be obvious, and it would be disingenuous to deny this. Furthermore, I find it odd that Parsons first argues that he, as a non-dualist, does not need to argue for non-dualism, and then goes on to argue for non-dualism. One would expect Parsons to engage instead with the arguments for dualism, which he does not do. This gives the impression that Parsons does not really believe that the burden of proof falls completely on the dualist. Let’s turn now to Parsons’ three objections to dualism.
Objection 1: The Interaction Problem
Parsons’ first move against dualism is to appeal to the interaction problem, which states that it is difficult to see how a non-physical, immaterial entity, such as a soul, can causally interact with a physical entity, such as a brain. Now, Parsons does not describe the interaction problem in any detail. Nevertheless, the interaction problem usually runs similar to the following:
(A1) A soul can interact with a body only if the interaction is in virtue of the transference of motion from the soul to the body.
(A2) Transference of motion from a soul to a body is impossible (because a soul does not have motion).
(A3) Therefore, a soul cannot interact with a body.
The idea behind (A1) is that, in order for some entity A to causally interact with some physical entity B, a transference of motion from A to B must occur through, for example, collision or impact. Now, many philosophers, such as Jonathan Barnes, Joshua Hoffman, and Gary Rosenkrantz, have noted that (A1) presupposes the following erroneous principle:
(A4) For any two objects A and B and some property F, if A causes B to be F, then A is F.
According to (A4), if a soul causes a body to be in motion, then the soul must be in motion. It is, thus, easy to see why (A1) presupposes (A4). Unfortunately, (A4) is demonstrably false. A lump of clay, for example, can be caused to be square by a non-square object, such as a hand or a rolling pin. Or consider the Law of Gravity, according to which two pieces of matter can accelerate toward each other (or gain motion) without motion being transferred from one to the other. Hence, since (A4) is false, (A1) is false.
What does Parsons have to say in response to the above mentioned philosophers? Not much. Parsons concedes that there are (or may be) causal relations in the physical universe that are inexplicable brute facts. However, he argues that
the brute facts of physical theory may be there, but they are down very deep. With soul-theory, the incomprehensibility is right up front and on top. … It matters where you put your brute facts.
This response does not deal with the central issue about (A1) or (A4). In fact, this response is nothing more than an unjustified assertion. Parsons is essentially stating (without defending) the following argument:
(B1) A brute fact that lies at the end of a very long chain of deeply satisfactory explanations is acceptable.
(B2) If soul-body interaction is a brute fact, it does not lie at the end of a very long chain of deeply satisfactory explanations.
(B3) Therefore, it is unacceptable to claim that soul-body interaction is a brute fact.
As noted above, Parsons simply states these premises without defending them. But why, exactly, should it matter where a brute fact is situated in a chain of explanations? And why, if soul-body interaction is a brute fact, would it not be situated at the end of a long chain of satisfactory explanations? Surely such interaction would take place at a very fundamental (perhaps even quantum) level of physical reality, with the chain of explanations running up to a higher level, such as the brain itself. And why think that soul-body interaction must be a brute fact? Parsons does not interact with the dualistic arguments that try explain soul-body interaction (e.g., some argue that both the soul and brain have the property of being (or being able to be) conscious, and soul-body interaction occurs, not as a brute fact, but in virtue of the transference of consciousness from the soul to the brain). Thus, since Parsons does not defend his assertions, it is difficult to see why we should affirm the assertions. Parsons’ first objection to dualism, then, has little (if any) force.
Objection 2: The Self is Not Simple
Parsons’ second objection is that, since dualism entails that the self is a simple substance, and since the self is not a simple substance, dualism is false. In this entire section, Parsons uses the term ‘self’ in different senses: he uses the term at times to denote an immaterial, simple substance, and at other times to denote a person’s traits, abilities, and experiences. Thus, Parsons commits the (sneaky) fallacy of equivocation. Let me explain.
Parsons begins his second objection by claiming,
Soul-theory holds that your soul is you. That is, from the moment you acquire a soul (this bit is murky), that soul is your essential self, and it remains you throughout your life—and after. The soul is therefore a simple, spiritual essence, an abiding self that remains a unified whole throughout the vagaries of your mental being as you go through all the stages of life.
Here Parsons is referring to the fact that dualism entails that the soul is a non-spatial substance that has mental properties. When the dualist claims that the soul is a simple substance, he/she means that the soul is not composed of parts, even though the soul can have properties, traits, abilities, and experiences. Parsons, then, is here using the term ‘self’ to mean ‘non-spatial substance that has mental properties’.
Parsons then goes on to use the term ‘self’ to refer to a set of connected mental properties and personal characteristics that change over time. He writes,
[W]hat I call my ‘self’ seems to be, first, a nexus of fleeting thoughts, feelings, and perceptions. … Then there is my ‘true’ or ‘real’ self, those values, beliefs, and desires that are deep and longstanding and with which I identify. … Then there are certain long-term personality traits that you might carry your whole life. … Further, the self clearly seems to change over time.
We can plainly see that Parsons’ second usage of ‘self’ differs from his first usage. A mind as a simple substance is not identical to the set of properties it has; a mind can be a simple entity (i.e. have no parts) and yet have a complex set of properties that change over time. Nevertheless, Parsons then concludes,
The above considerations point to an even deeper problem. The self is anything but a thing. As noted, the self is defined in complex terms of our experiences, character, propensities, abilities, personalities, narratives, and so forth.
Our discussion above reveals that this conclusion of Parsons’ does not follow from the fact that dualism entails that the soul is a simple substance. After all, a set of mental properties (including experiences, mental abilities, traits, etc.) cannot exist on its own but, rather, something has to posses the set. And that something, claims the dualist, is a non-physical, simple substance. Since Parsons’ second objection commits the fallacy of equivocation, his objection is unsound.
Objection 3: Do Animals Have Souls?
As a final objection to dualism, Parsons asks, ‘If souls are necessary for mental operations, what about the mental operations of animals?’ His point here is this:
Where do we drive the golden spike indicating that from this point brains are insufficient? How do we give a principled and non-arbitrary answer? If no such principled answer is possible, and I submit that none is, the whole rationale for a soul seems to disappear.
Parsons seems to be expecting the dualist to claim that a non-human animal lacks a soul, to which he will respond, ‘Huh! Animals have a mental life and this proves that souls are unnecessary to explain mental life”. Now, I cannot speak for all types of dualists, but Christians have traditionally held that all animals have souls, albeit more primitive souls than humans. One reason for this is that the Bible uses the same term for ‘soul’ or ‘spirit’ when talking about the life of animals in Genesis 1:30, Ecclesiastes 3:21, and Revelation 8:9.
Of course, there can be different levels of souls or degrees of consciousness (God is a more powerful soul than a human soul). Hence, as we move down the animal chain, from apes to insects, we see less and less mental capabilities and degrees of consciousness. The degree of consciousness a dog has, for example, is clearly more than that of a spider. Nevertheless, all living organisms defined as animals have souls and, thus, there is no point at which to ‘drive the golden spike’ (this is why many Christians believe it is plausible that God will resurrect non-human animals with their souls when He creates the new earth). However, the difference between a human soul and a non-human soul is that, unlike the latter, the former is created in God’s image and has a much richer structure. Therefore, I don’t think the Christian dualist faces the difficulty that Parsons perceives.
Conclusion
However interesting, Parsons’ objections to dualism remain unsuccessful. Unfortunately, it does not help his case that he fails to interact with the many arguments in favour of the soul put forward by dualists. But perhaps in a follow up post he will interact with these arguments, in which case we will, once again, be happy to evaluate his interaction.
Resource
Manzotti, R., Moderato, P., 2014. “Neuroscience: Dualism in disguise”. In: Lavazza, A., Robinson, H. (Eds.), Contemporary Dualism: A Defense. Routledge, New York, pp. 81–97.
The claim that Christianity is at war with science is one of the most common claims I hear from young people today. In fact, the belief that Christianity is opposed to modern science is one of the top reasons young people cite for leaving the church.[1] That’s why in the updated Evidence that Demands a Verdict, my father and I respond to this charge before advancing the historical evidence for Christianity.
But where did this idea come from? Is it accurate? In 1896 Cornell University president Andrew Dickson White released a book entitled A History of the Warfare of Science with Theology in Christendom. White is largely credited with inventing and propagating the idea that science and Christianity are adversaries in the search for truth. White cast Christians as fanatics who clung to scriptural claims that the earth was flat. But is this account true? Sociologist Rodney Stark responds,
White’s book remains influential despite the fact that modern historians of science dismiss it as nothing but a polemic—White himself admitted that he wrote the book to get even with Christian critics of his plans for Cornell . . . many of White’s other accounts are as bogus as his report of the flat earth and Columbus.[2]
The Warfare Myth
Why has this warfare myth been so influential? The truth is that the supposed warfare between religion and science is a polemical device used in the secular attack on faith. In reality, theology was essential for the rise of modern science.
How so? In their book The Soul of Science, Nancy Pearcey and Charles Thaxton demonstrate that Christian assumptions, such as the conviction that nature is lawful (since it was the creation of a rational God) and that science is meant to alleviate toil and suffering, provided the backdrop for the emergence of the scientific revolution in Europe.
Most scientific pioneers were theists as well, including prominent figures such as Copernicus (1473–1543), Boyle (1627–1691), Newton (1642–1727), Pascal (1623–1662), Kepler (1571–1630), Pasteur (1822–1895), Bacon (1561–1626), and Max Planck (1858–1947). Many of these pioneers intently pursued science because of their belief in the Christian God.
The Real Conflict
While the theistic worldview fosters the development of science, ironically, naturalistic evolution undermines it. Since according to naturalism we humans are the product of a blind, purposeless, and unguided evolutionary process, how can we trust our rational faculties to produce true beliefs?
In his book Where the Conflict Really Lies, Notre Dame philosopher Alvin Plantinga explains that what naturalistic evolution guarantees is
…(at most) that we behave in certain ways—in such ways as to promote survival or more exactly reproductive success. The principal function or purpose, then, of our cognitive faculties is not that of producing true or verisimilitudinous (nearly true) beliefs, but instead that of contributing to survival by getting the body parts in the right place. What evolution underwrites is only (at most) that our behavior is reasonably adaptive to the circumstances in which our ancestors found themselves; hence it does not guarantee mostly true or verisimilitudinous beliefs. Our beliefs might be mostly true or verisimilitudinous; but there is no particular reason to think they would be: natural selection is interested, not in truth, but in appropriate behavior. (314–315)
Certainly, some Christians resist science. This is undeniable. And, as Plantinga observes, there are some beliefs individual Christians hold that are in tension with modern science. But this is only shallow conflict. No real conflict between theism and science exists. The real conflict—the deep conflict—is between science and naturalism.
Notes
[1] David Kinnaman, You Lost Me (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Books, 2011), 135-136.
[2] Rodney Stark, For the Glory of God (Princeton, NJ: Princeton, 2009), 123
Sean McDowell, Ph.D. is a professor of Christian Apologetics at Biola University, best-selling author, popular speaker, part-time high school teacher, and the Resident Scholar for Summit Ministries, California. Follow him on Twitter: @sean_mcdowell and his blog: seanmcdowell.org
By Evan Minton
“Jesus went out as usual to the Mount of Olives, and his disciples followed him. On reaching the place, he said to them, ‘Pray that you will not fall into temptation.’ He withdrew about a stone’s throw beyond them, knelt down and prayed, ‘Father, if you are willing, take this cup from me; yet not my will, but yours be done.’ An angel from heaven appeared to him and strengthened him. And being in anguish, he prayed more earnestly, and his sweat was like drops of blood falling to the ground.” – Luke 22:39-44
This passage records the events preceding Jesus’ trial, crucifixion, and resurrection. As anyone would be the night before facing a death sentence in which one is executed via long, drawn-out torture, Jesus was experiencing severe anxiety. The second person of The Trinity spent fervent prayer in the Garden of Gethsemane talking to the first person (i.e The Father). He asks if it is possible to remove the cup from Him, but that he doesn’t want His will to be done, but The Father’s.
Whatchu Talkin about Yeshu?
This one sentence out of the whole narrative raises questions in the minds of anyone who reads The Bible; Christian and non-Christian alike. Why did Jesus say “Father, if you are willing, take this cup from me; yet not my will, but yours be done?” The usual explanation from apologists and preachers is that Jesus was asking for The Father to not allow Him to be crucified. Basically, Jesus was saying “Look, this is going to be extremely unpleasant. I don’t want to go through with this. If there’s any other way to save humanity from their sins, let’s do that thing instead. Yet, I want to what you want to do, not what I want to do.” Additionally, it is argued that this is an instance of Jesus’ human nature taking over. God cannot get hungry, thirsty, tired, or scared in His divine nature, but given that He took on human nature (John 1:14, Philippians 2:5-8), He can experience these things in His human nature. Jesus was willing to go to the cross, no doubt, but in this passage, He was just checking with The Father to see if there was a slightly more pleasant alternative to saving mankind.
These explanations never really set right with me, but I didn’t really know of any alternatives on the table. Why is the above explanation untenable
Why Are The Above Explanations Not Tenable?
There are three problems with the usual interpretation of the “Take This Cup From Me” passage.
First of all, if Jesus was actually asking for The Father to not allow Him to be crucified, it would mean that Jesus’ will is in contradiction to The Father’s will. If Jesus and The Father are both members of The Godhead, we would have God contradicting God. Moreover, it is a sin, by definition, to desire the opposite of what God desires. If Jesus desired the opposite of what The Father desired, then Jesus would be in sin. Yet, The Bible tells us “For we do not have a high priest who is unable to empathize with our weaknesses, but we have one who has been tempted in every way, just as we are-yet he did not sin.”(Hebrews 4:15). Secondly, Jesus said that anything He asks The Father to do, The Father will do it (John 11:41-42). If Jesus was asking The Father to not let Him be crucified, there would be no atonement. Thirdly, Jesus knew all along that He was going to die and He knew why. In fact, He predicted it many times (e.g. Matthew 17:22). Fourthly, Jesus said that He lays His life down of His own accord, that He has the authority to lay it down and take it up again (John 10:18), so Jesus wasn’t forced to die against His will by anyone. He didn’t have to ask anyone “Don’t let this happen,” not even the Father.
So, What Did Jesus Actually Mean?
Recently, as you know, I attended The National Conference On Christian Apologetics in Charlotte North Carolina, staying at Jorge Gil’s house during the duration of the conference. After the second and final day of the conference, we went to an Applebees for dinner with some of Jorge’s friends. One of his friends who was pursuing a doctorate of divinity and currently holds a master brought up this question at the table and asked what we all thought about it. I had no clue. This part of The Bible had been a giant question mark for me for a long time.
After explaining the problems with the usual explanation of this passage, he then gave his own commentary on the issue, which I found much more intellectually satisfying. First, keep in mind that the specific account we’re examining is written by a doctor: Luke. Jorge’s friend pointed out that in the context of Luke’s account in which Jesus prays this prayer, he sweats drops of blood. This is a condition known in the medical literature as Hematidrosis. Hematidrosis occurs when someone is under such extreme stress and anxiety that their capillaries rupture and blood gets into the sweat glands. I knew about hematidrosis, but what I didn’t know is that it can be much more serious than a little bit of blood getting into the sweat. If the rupturing of the capillaries is severe enough, it can result in death by internal bleeding.
So, “This cup” that Jesus was asking The Father to take from Him could very well have been the death-by-internal-bleeding resulting from Jesus’ hematidrosis. When something is going on inside of your body, and it’s about to cause you to die, we sometimes know about it in advance. Not always, but a great deal of the time (e.g. heart attacks). Jesus probably knew He might die right there in the Garden of Gethsemane and not even make it to the cross, and therefore there’d be no atonement. He was asking The Father not to let that happen. Jesus was essentially saying “Father, don’t let me die right here in this garden. I need to die on the cross. Yet, I know that whatever your plan is, it’s right, and it’s my desire to do that.”
This interpretation is strengthened by the verse that says that an angel came and ministered to Him. In the Greek, this is a medical term. Its used in contexts of when doctors administer first aid or surgery to heal a sick or injured patient. So, basically what this implies is that the angel cured Jesus from the condition that would have lead to His premature death.
Jesus trusted that The Father could bring Him back from the dead even if it was His will that he experiences a pre-crucifixion death, much like how Abraham trusted that God would bring Isaac back if it was His will that he sacrifice Isaac on the alter (see Hebrew 11:19). This is an important lesson for us to: trust in God and submit to His will. He knows what He’s doing.
Conclusion
The explanation I just gave you is the one he gave. When I heard it, I was blown away! Now, Jesus’ prayer made perfect sense! When I got back to Jorge’s house, I jotted it down on 2 pages of notebook paper so that it wouldn’t leave my memory. I just had to blog about this. I never expected to learn something new post-conference. I thought it would be at the conference itself.
Original Blog Source: http://bit.ly/2zjeVvz
Por Brian Chilton
A lo largo de las últimas semanas, hemos estado explorando quiénes fueron los autores de los libros del Nuevo Testamento. Ya hemos visto que hay buenas razones para apoyar la visión tradicional de que los apóstoles Mateo y Juan escribieron los Evangelios atribuidos a ellos; Juan, Marcos escribiendo el Segundo Evangelio que era una documentación del testimonio de Simón Pedro; el Dr. Lucas como el autor del Tercer Evangelio y de Hechos después de haber atribuido información de numerosos testigos; y el apóstol Pablo como el autor de las trece epístolas que se le atribuyeron. Ahora, examinamos una carta más misteriosa. Miremos el Libro de Hebreos.
Fecha
Muchos eruditos creen que Hebreos fue escrito en algún momento antes de la destrucción del templo (70 d. C.). Lo más probable es que la epístola haya sido escrita en algún momento durante el reinado del emperador Nerón (64-68 d.C.).[1]
Propósito
El libro de Hebreos exalta a Jesús y muestra que él es superior a los sacrificios de antaño. El término kreitton (literalmente, “más excelente” o “mejor”) impregna el libro. El libro de Hebreos vincula el Antiguo y el Nuevo Testamento mejor que ningún otro en el Nuevo Testamento.
Autor
Aquí está la pregunta del millón; ¿Quién escribió el libro de Hebreos? Muchos líderes de la iglesia primitiva creían que Pablo había sido el autor. A menudo se cita a Orígenes diciendo, en referencia a la autoría del libro de Hebreos, que “en verdad, sólo Dios sabe”. Sin embargo, una investigación adicional de los escritos de Orígenes demostrará que creía que Pablo había sido el autor.[2] ¿Pero fue Pablo el autor? Es posible, pero no seguro.
A diferencia de las trece cartas atribuidas a Pablo,[3] Hebreos en ninguna parte identifica a Pablo ni a nadie más como su autor. Sólo hay una certeza con respecto al autor de Hebreos y es que el autor era alguien que se conocía en las filas de las cohortes de Pablo. El autor conoció a Timoteo y se refirió a él como “nuestro hermano” (Hebreos 13:23, CSB) en lugar de “mi hijo” como lo hizo Pablo en (1 Timoteo 1: 2). Por lo tanto, parecería que el escritor es una cohorte de Pablo, quizás incluso un cristiano de segunda generación, ya que el escritor señala que “la salvación tuvo su comienzo cuando fue dicha por el Señor, y fue confirmada por aquellos de quienes lo oí”(Hebreos 2: 3). Los eruditos han propuesto a Lucas, Clemente de Roma, Bernabé, Apolos, Timoteo, Felipe, Pedro, Silas, Judas y Aristón como los autores.
Debido a que el autor es un cristiano de segunda generación, no creo que Bernabé, Pedro, Silas o Judas (si hace referencia al hermano del Señor) fueran candidatos. Debido a que el autor hace referencia a Timoteo como hermano, tampoco creo que Timoteo sea un candidato probable. Yo solía pensar que Bernabé era el autor, pero como Bernabé fue un cristiano primitivo y el autor de Hebreos es un cristiano de segunda generación, ya no creo que ese sea el caso. Con toda probabilidad, creo que Lucas fue el autor del libro. Al final, sin embargo, Dios sabe. El autor, quien quiera que sea, tenía el respaldo del apóstol Pablo y es por eso por lo que el libro se estableció como canónico en lo que se refiere a la autoridad apostólica.
Notas
[1] CSB Study Bible (Nashville: Holman, 2017), 1946.
[2] Orígenes escribe: “Sin embargo, alguien fuertemente presionado por este argumento puede recurrir a la opinión de aquellos que rechazan esta epístola como si no fuera de Pablo; contra quien debo usar en otro momento otros argumentos para probar que es de Pablo.” Orígenes, A Letter from Origen to Africanus, 9.
[3] Ver Brian Chilton, ¿Escribió Pablo Las Trece Cartas Atribuidas A Él? http://www.filosofocristiano.com/single-post/Escribio-Pablo-Las-Trece-Cartas-Atribuidas-A-El
Brian Chilton es el fundador de BellatorChristi.com y es el anfitrión de The Bellator Christi Podcast. Recibió su Maestría de Divinidad en Teología de la Liberty University (con gran distinción); su Licenciatura en Ciencias en Estudios Religiosos y Filosofía de la Gardner-Webb University (con honores); y recibió la certificación en Christian Apologetics de la Biola University. Brian está actualmente estudiando en el Ph.D. Programa de Teología y Apologética en la Liberty University. Brian es miembro de pleno derecho de la International Society of Christian Apologetics y de la Christian Apologetics Alliance. Brian ha estado en el ministerio por más de 14 años y sirve como pastor de la Huntsville Baptist Church en Yadkinville, Carolina del Norte.
Blog Original: http://bit.ly/2KeBt5f
Traducido por Jairo Izquierdo
By Tim Stratton
Question
Hey Tim,
A question from your fellow Nebraska Reasonable Faith chapter director! When discussing the Moral Argument with my Reasonable Faith chapter in Omaha, I received some pushback from one of our members, who just so happens to have his Ph.D. in meta-ethics. The objection he had to the Moral Argument was to the premise, “If God does not exist, then objective moral values and duties do not exist.” Erik Wielenberg, an atheist philosopher from DePauw University, proposes a model by which the atheist is able to hold to objective morality without the need for the existence of God. I’ll restate his model as best as I can (apologies for the long question, but there’s a lot to discuss).
Wielenberg proposes that there exists some of what he calls basic ethical facts. These are ethical facts that are metaphysically necessary, substantive (actually mean something and are not tautologous), and brute. Brute facts, according to Wielenberg, are facts that need not be explained in terms of other facts. An example of a basic ethical fact is the fact that causing pain for fun is intrinsically bad. This fact isn’t true in virtue of any other facts, but rather it just is the case that causing pain for fun is intrinsically bad. In other words, the fact that causing pain for fun is intrinsically bad needs no explanation.
Here is where I think Wielenberg has a good point. We as theists seem to hold to the existence of God as being a necessary, substantive, and brute fact. When he says that theists hold to the existence of God as being an example of this kind of fact, he is speaking in an ontological sense, not an epistemological one. Certainly, we can come to know the fact that God exists through explanations and other facts, but the truth of the fact of God’s existence is not dependent on other facts, thus making it a brute fact. So why does Wielenberg point this out? Well, his argumentative purpose in pointing to types of brute facts to which theists are committed is to show that the theist cannot consistently reject his (that is, Wielenberg’s) proposed means of accommodating objective morality in an atheistic worldview simply by rejecting the tenability of the existence of brute facts. With this in mind, Wielenberg sees no guiding principle as to which facts are brute and which ones require further explanation. They need to be examined on a case-by-case basis. If we accept his analysis of brute facts as correct, then it seems we need to give some sort of reason as to why ethical facts are facts in need of further explanation and cannot be considered brute. Because if ethical facts can just be considered as brute facts, then it seems atheism would have no trouble accounting for objective morality since it is false that these ethical facts need a foundation (because they’re brute).
Let me show you what I mean. As Christians, we might say that something is good because it approximates God’s nature. In saying this, we imply that we believe that the Good is God’s nature. If this is the case, then we seem to be positing a basic ethical fact: An action is considered good if it approximates God’s nature. We don’t have an explanation for why this is the case, but rather we simply seem to hold it as a brute fact! So, what’s the issue for the atheist then? If Christians are allowed to posit certain basic ethical facts that require no explanation, then it seems arbitrary to say that atheists cannot do the same when they posit basic ethical facts such as “causing pain for fun is morally wrong.” Both sides must posit these basic ethical facts that have no external foundation.
We could say something similar about moral obligations. As Christians, we might say that, if God commands you to do something, then you are morally obligated to do that thing. Well, why is this the case? It seems to me this fact has no explanation, and thus it is a brute fact. Why couldn’t the atheist merely posit a basic ethical fact that says “you ought not to do something that is morally wrong”? Both facts posited here by the theist and atheist have no external foundation, and thus both seem equally justified.
I know Dr. Craig will be debating Dr. Wielenberg on this very topic next year, but I thought we might get a head start on the conversation. Keep fighting the good fight brother! Thanks!
– Scott Olson
Tim’s Response
Hey Scott! It’s great to receive a fantastic question from a good friend (and a fellow RF Chapter leader)!
I am really looking forward to William Lane Craig’s interaction with Erik Wielenberg this February. I have not discussed this matter with Dr. Craig so I have no idea as to what “angle” he is going to take with Wielenberg. With that said, however (and with all due respect to Wielenberg), I think there are several problems with his proposed model.
“Need Not” vs Cannot
Regarding the claim that basic ethical facts and God share the same three properties — metaphysically necessary, substantive, and brute — is not accurate (or so it seems to me). This is because God is metaphysically necessary and simply CANNOT (as opposed to “need not”) be explained by other facts. However, as you noted, other facts like the premises in the Leibnizian Cosmological Argument demonstrate that a necessary being (God) must exist. Ethical facts seem to be necessary as well, however, if they are metaphysically necessary in all possible worlds, it seems that these facts CAN ONLY be explained by other facts — the existence of God and the purpose in which He created mankind. It is important to note that if one asserts that brute facts “need not” be explained by other facts, it does not logically follow that these facts cannot be explained by other facts (I will discuss these other facts below).
You noted that Wielenberg claims that,
An example of a basic ethical fact is the fact that causing pain for fun is intrinsically bad. This fact isn’t true in virtue of any other facts, but rather it just is the case that causing pain for fun is intrinsically bad. In other words, the fact that causing pain for fun is intrinsically bad needs no explanation.
I disagree! It seems to me that causing pain for fun is unloving; however, the question is raised: is it bad to be unloving? How would we ground this truth or come to know it is true if it is in fact true? The fact that it is bad (missing the mark of the purpose of human existence) to cause pain for fun is explained by other facts. The fact that causing pain for fun is bad, wrong, and/or evil is explained by the fact that God created humanity on purpose and for the specific purpose to love Him and all other people (from our neighbors to those who consider us enemies). Since causing pain for fun is definitely unloving, then causing pain for fun does not approximate to the objective purpose of the human existence (an objective truth about humanity irrespective of the subjective opinions from humanity). To a degree that a thing or being does not approximate to its objective purpose, then to that same degree that thing or being is objectively “bad.”
Actions can only really be good or bad in relation to an ultimate and objective purpose (this does not exist on atheism). So, it might be objectively true that torture causes pain; however, claiming that “causing pain for fun is bad” is nonsensical if life was not created on purpose and for a specific purpose. Namely, we were created to love our fellow man, not harm him.
So, if humanity was not created on purpose and for a specific purpose, then I contend that there are no objective ethical facts regarding human actions. Take homosexuality, for example. If Jesus is right, then God created human sexual relationships to specifically approximate to the following model: one man with one woman becoming one flesh for one lifetime (Matthew 19). Thus, it is objectively true that this is one of the specific purposes humans were created to follow. If one engages in homosexual actions — let alone gay marriage — then they are objectively wrong and “missing the mark” (sin). However, if God does not exist, then humans are accidental and there is no objective purpose of our existence or standard in which humanity was created to approximate.
If God did not create humanity to only have heterosexual relationships within the bonds of marriage, then there would be nothing objectively wrong with having premarital sex or any sexual relations outside the bonds of marriage. These sexual boundaries are only objective if God really did create humans to approximate to the one man with one woman becoming one flesh for one lifetime model of marriage that Jesus advocated. Humans are free to disagree with God, but they are subjectively disagreeing with the creator of humanity about the purpose and plan He had in mind for humanity. Thus, humans would only subjectively disagree with an objective purpose in which humans were actually created to attain.
Thus, if atheism is true, then there is nothing objectively wrong with anything — including homosexual marriage. With that said, however, it would also not be objectively wrong to persecute homosexuals (See A Biblical Argument for Gay Rights)!
It follows that when ISIS cuts the heads off of homosexuals, atheists, and Christians, these Muslims are opposing the objective purpose of human life and thus, they are objectively wrong. When the Nazis slaughtered Jews, the Nazis were not loving their fellow humans and thus, they were objectively bad. When white supremacists are violent to humans of another skin color or Antifa is violent towards those with different political ideas these groups are all objectively wrong and missing the objective mark and purpose of life. Since the objective purpose human life was created for is love, it is objectively evil not to love. That is easy to remember because LOVE backwards is EVOL.
Consider the following argument:
It follows from this argument that if one acts in a manner that is not loving toward God and all people, then they are objectively wrong in their behavior. They are not approximating to the objective purpose of life and are thus, “bad” and “missing the objective mark” (a.k.a., sin).
On Purpose & For a Purpose
Now, if God does not exist, then life was not created on purpose or for any specific purpose. Thus, on an atheistic worldview, there is no objective purpose to the existence of humanity, and thus, there is nothing really good, bad, right, or wrong — let alone evil — with any manner in which one chooses to behave toward his fellow man or woman. There is no objective plan, purpose, or goal about humanity in which humans have a choice to approximate or not.
You noted that,
If we accept his analysis of brute facts as correct, then it seems we need to give some sort of reason as to why ethical facts are facts in need of further explanation and cannot be considered brute
I do not accept his analysis of brute facts as correct, but even if I did, ethical facts make no sense to postulate apart from a design plan or purpose of mankind which is true irrespective of the subjective opinions offered from mankind. Ethical facts are necessary in that they are grounded in the nature of a necessary being in which any possible world — including the actual world — is contingent. Moreover, if God created this world and all humanity on purpose and for the specific purpose of love, then it is true apart from a human subjective opinion that humans ought to love one another. After all, this would be the reason humans exist.
You pointed out that,
As Christians, we might say that, if God commands you to do something, then you are morally obligated to do that thing. Well, why is this the case? It seems to me this fact has no explanation, and thus it is a brute fact.
Some Christians “might say” this kind of thing, but I do not. Well, I am sure I probably have said similar things in the past, but if I am being careful to articulate my views clearly, then I contend that something is objectively good for a human if it approximates to the objective purpose of human existence. This objective purpose of the human existence must be up to something external to humanity, and thus, cannot be up to humanity. Thus, this fact does have an explanation! Moreover, it stands to reason that a perfectly intelligent and loving being would only issue commands to humanity that approximate to God’s loving purpose for creating humanity (which is a purpose true apart from the human opinion). Thus, although we have the freedom to disobey God’s commands since God has eternal human flourishing in mind, we ought to choose to approximate to His commands.
However, God gives us the freedom to choose not to flourish. This brings me to my final point:
An Eternal “Or Else!”
If atheism is true (and human persons are not immaterial and eternal souls), then all humans ultimately share the same fate. If this is the case, why should it matter if one chooses to live like Mother Theresa or Hitler — like Gandhi or Ted Bundy? If atheism is true, each one of those individuals is equal in that none of them are experiencing any punishment or benefit for choosing to approximate to any supposed moral brute facts in the absence of God. In fact, it could be argued that Hitler and Bundy experienced more physical pleasures during their lives than Mother Theresa or Gandhi. If all people always share the same ultimate fate, then why should anyone care how they live on earth. Why should Hitler and Bundy not “go for the gusto”?
Jesus offered a big “or else” to humanity! If one does not wish to live according to the Law of Christ and God’s purpose for humanity — to always love all people — they are free to spend eternity apart from God’s loving plan. They are free to do things their own way for eternity. Jesus referred to this state of affairs as hell.
If Wielenberg’s view were true — even if it could account for abstract objective moral values — why should anyone care? So what if some things are objectively wrong to do? We are all just going to die anyway! And who cares about legacy either? Eventually, the entire universe is going to suffer a cosmic heat death (there will be no heat, light, or life anywhere in the entire universe) and ultimately “no one will remember your name” or any of your supposed moral actions you performed. In the end, this atheistic attempt to desperately account for objective morality is fairly useless. After all, what good is a moral theory if one has no reason to act morally?
Conclusion
So, to recap, it seems to me that there are at least three problems with Wielneberg’s model. First, the assertion that one “need not” provide an explanation does not entail that one cannot provide an explanation. Second, if God exists and created humanity on purpose and for a specific purpose, then this purpose would logically ground human actions as objectively good or bad. Atheists have no access to this foundation. Third, on Christian theism, Jesus provides an eternal “or else,” which provides an additional reason to approximate to the Law of Christ.
I just do not see how Wielenberg’s view is tenable if humans are accidental and that it is not a fact of the matter that humans were created for the purpose of love and flourishing. There is no objective standard about human existence in which we were created to approximate if atheism is true. There is no such thing as “missing the mark” or the objective purpose of our existence. On atheism there is no objective purpose — and that is why there is nothing really wrong with homosexuality or anything else if God did not create humanity on purpose and for a specific purpose.
Thus, on Wielenberg’s view, the phrase, “causing pain for fun is intrinsically bad,” is metaphysically meaningless. This is due to the fact that on atheism, “bad,” does not have any real meaning in a logically broad sense. If God did not create humanity on purpose or for a specific purpose, then one cannot logically claim that causing pain for fun is “bad” or “wrong,” because there is no objective purpose to the human existence in which causing pain for fun does not approximate. The reason Wielenberg’s view is useless is because phrases like, “causing pain for fun is bad and wrong,” are vacuous. On atheism, these claims literally mean nothing!
Thanks for the great question, Scott! I hope to see you in Rhode Island at the next Reasonable Faith chapter director annual meeting. If not, I am only a three-hour drive away!
Your friend and brother in Christ,
Tim
Original Blog Post: http://bit.ly/2zWlVCq
By Al Serrato
The blood-curdling scream signaled that she had not yet given up. Hours of pushing and the baby had still not descended. The OB was weighing her options, while dad wiped mom’s forehead and encouraged her on. She screamed again, pushing and puffing and praying that this agony might soon draw to a close. The pain was so… intense, so utterly mind-numbing that she wondered, for the thousandth time, why she had wanted to have another child…
This is a scene that plays out day after day in hospitals all over the world – women experiencing extreme pain as they do their part to bring new life to – and into – the world. But what does this have to do with Christian apologetics?
Recently, I corresponded with a skeptic who posed some interesting questions about the Christian faith. She began by arguing that if indeed Christ rose from the dead, this would have been no sacrifice on his part, but a bargain, as he traded a normal body for a perfect one.
This, I responded, misses the point of what Jesus did: because his body was human, he experienced the pain and suffering that the crucifixion brought with it, in the way that any flesh and blood human would. There are many things that may result in the eventual gain that is exceedingly painful. You wouldn’t tell a mother who is about to deliver that her “sacrifice” and pain are any less real because she will be getting a healthy child “in return.” The mother’s suffering doesn’t “cause” the child to be born; it simply accompanies it, a feature as it were of the nature of things. But willingly enduring pain or suffering, in the service of others, is worthy of recognition and praise. What she endures still constitutes a sacrifice for her, even if she too gains in the process.
So too for Christ: though something better was in store, it nonetheless was a sacrifice for him to go through the steps necessary to complete his “substitutionary atonement.” And it wasn’t the pain that brought salvation; like the child birth referred to above, pain isn’t the point of the process; it is simply, and sadly, a byproduct of it.
Christianity does not teach that Christ’s suffering “caused” our salvation as if he needed to satisfy the whims of some sadist. The mistake implicit in the challenge is the assumption that God is some kind of monster, who measured the pain Jesus suffered until it reached some point where he was finally satisfied. No, it was not Jesus’ experience of agony that God was measuring. It was, instead, Jesus’ perfect life, while a man, that put him in a position to accept in our stead what we in fact deserved. Many people have suffered similar, or even worse, deaths, but they could not take on for others what they themselves deserved based on their own conduct. Since sin is something that we all do, and since sin results in separation from God, then a sinless man would be the only kind of man who could take, on our behalf, the consequences that we merited. This is why Jesus made a point of saying that no one took his life; he did what he did voluntarily, which is the only way it would, or could, have been accepted.
Had he been a sinner himself, this “sacrifice” would have been of no avail, as he would have had his own debt to pay. Had he been simply another man, chosen at random to be the scapegoat for God’s wrath, a colossal act of unfairness would have resulted. But God took the punishment upon himself. Since God the Father and God the Son are “consubstantial” – of the same essence – God’s infinite wrath is absorbed and balance by an infinite and all-powerful being.
Skeptics often claim that perfect justice and perfect mercy cannot coexist; one or the other must give way. But hasn’t God done just that? Has he not balanced perfect justice and perfect mercy through his perfect love – satisfied for eternity within the persons of the Godhead? Those who accept God’s gift receive forgiveness through Christ, while those who die in rebellion receive the just consequence of their choice.
In dying for our sins, Jesus did more than “sacrifice.” He demonstrated the sublime elegance that can solve even apparently insoluble problems, and open for us a path back to the Father.
Original Blog Source: http://bit.ly/2zbCw1v
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Frank interviews the co-author of the modern apologetics classic that started it all and is now completely revised and updated—the truth of the Bible doesn’t change, but its critics do. With the original Evidence That Demands a Verdict, bestselling author Josh McDowell gave Christian readers the answers they needed to defend their faith against the harshest critics and skeptics. Now, with his son Sean McDowell, Josh McDowell has updated and expanded this classic resource for a new generation. Sean shares how 70% of this books is now new information! Don’t miss this podcast!
Evidence That Demands a Verdict: Life-Changing Truth for a Skeptical World
