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Should Christians Reject the Soul for Biblical Reasons?

By Jacobus Erasmus

Question

Dear Dr. Erasmus,

Tim Stratton shared your post, Objections to the Existence of the Soul, to the UK Apologetics and Evangelism Facebook group, of which I am a member. In that group, there is a very knowledgeable Christian who does not seem to believe in the existence of a soul yet says he is not a strict materialist or physicalist. I’m sending you a discussion he had with Lenny Esposito in which Lenny posted about atheism’s weakness regarding the lack of a soul and he took exception to it (click here).

So whilst I am a dualist, I do not know how to respond to his assertions. If you have time, I’d love to hear your thoughts.

Kind regards,

David

Jacobus’s Response

Thank you for the email, David. When trying to come to a conclusion about the existence of the soul, the Christian must explore the issue from three perspectives, namely, from (1) a theological perspective (what does the Bible say about the soul?), (2) a philosophical perspective (are there good philosophical arguments for/against the soul?), and (3) a scientific perspective (what does science say about the mind?).

Now, your friend seems to address the theological perspective only and does not engage with any philosophical arguments in favour of the soul. He also fails to recognise that most philosophers of mind agree that science (or neuroscience) cannot address the physicalism-dualism debate. Since science studies the physical, it cannot, by its nature, disprove the immaterial. Moreover, both the physicalist and the dualist agree that there is a strong correlation between the mind and the brain. Thus, the fact that Alzheimer’s disease affects the mind in no way supports physicalism; a correlation relationship is not an identity relationship.

It seems, then, that Jocelyn is more concerned about whether Scripture teaches that humans have souls. He thinks that the Bible does not teach or imply that we have souls. How does he arrive at this conclusion? Simply by analysing the various meanings of the Hebrew and Greek words for “soul” and “spirit”. The problem with this approach is that is confuses words with concepts. The same concept may be expressed in various ways with various words. For example, the concept of the Trinity is expressed in the Bible even though the Bible does not use the exact words “the Trinity”. Hence, we are not merely interested in the meaning of the word for “spirit” but we are mainly interested in whether the concept of dualism is explicit or implicit in Scripture.

Now, it seems that the concept that human beings comprise both material and immaterial parts (or are made up of matter/body and spirit/soul) is made clear throughout the Bible:

First, souls do exist because God Himself is a soul or spirit and so too are the angelic beings. Thus, the existence of souls is not impossible according to Scripture.

Second, in 1 Samuel 28, Saul instructs a medium to call the deceased Samuel from Sheol so that Saul could talk to him. Interestingly, the medium does as she is told, and Saul speaks with Samuel’s spirit.

Third, Paul believed that we, as human beings, can exist without our bodies. For example, Paul writes:

“So we are always of good courage. We know that while we are at home in the body we are away from the Lord, for we walk by faith, not by sight. Yes, we are of good courage, and we would rather be away from the body and at home with the Lord” (2 Corinthians 5:6-8 ESV).

“…as it is my eager expectation and hope that I will not be at all ashamed, but that with full courage now as always Christ will be honored in my body, whether by life or by death. For to me to live is Christ, and to die is gain. If I am to live in the flesh, that means fruitful labor for me. Yet which I shall choose I cannot tell” (Philippians 1:20-22 ESV).

“I know a man in Christ who fourteen years ago was caught up to the third heaven—whether in the body or out of the body I do not know, God knows. And I know that this man was caught up into paradise—whether in the body or out of the body I do not know, God knows— and he heard things that cannot be told, which man may not utter.” (2 Corinthians 12:2-4)

Fourth, while on the cross, Jesus said to the thief beside him, “Truly, I say to you, today you will be with me in paradise” (Luke 23:43). Jesus could not have meant that the thief’s body was going to be in paradise, since a grave is no paradise. Rather, Jesus must have meant that the theif’s soul/spirit will experience joy once his body dies.

Fifth, the disciples believed that spirits exist because they thought that Jesus was a spirit when they saw him walking on water (Matthew 14:26; Mark 6:49).

Sixth, Jesus distinguished between the body and soul and treated them as two different parts of a human: “And do not fear those who kill the body but cannot kill the soul. Rather fear him who can destroy both soul and body in hell”
(Matthew 10:28).

Finally, Jesus’ human body obviously had a soul/spirit, since it was animated with Jesus’ spirit. Consequently, according to Scripture, a human can comprise both matter/body and soul/spirit.

It is very difficult to align the above passages with monism or physicalism. These passages, I believe, clearly imply the concept of dualism.

Kind regards,

Jacobus Erasmus, Ph.D

Postdoctoral researcher

www.JacobusErasmus.com

https://www.facebook.com/DrJacobusErasmus

Original Blog Source: http://bit.ly/2nJ1x2z

December 10, 2017/by Guest

Does an Objective Moral Compass Point to God?

Legislating Morality, Culture & Politics, Theology and Christian Apologetics

By Tim Stratton

Question

Hey Tim,

A question from your fellow Nebraska Reasonable Faith chapter director! When discussing the Moral Argument with my Reasonable Faith chapter in Omaha, I received some pushback from one of our members, who just so happens to have his Ph.D. in meta-ethics. The objection he had to the Moral Argument was to the premise, “If God does not exist, then objective moral values and duties do not exist.” Erik Wielenberg, an atheist philosopher from DePauw University, proposes a model by which the atheist is able to hold to objective morality without the need for the existence of God. I’ll restate his model as best as I can (apologies for the long question, but there’s a lot to discuss).

Wielenberg proposes that there exists some of what he calls basic ethical facts. These are ethical facts that are metaphysically necessary, substantive (actually mean something and are not tautologous), and brute. Brute facts, according to Wielenberg, are facts that need not be explained in terms of other facts. An example of a basic ethical fact is the fact that causing pain for fun is intrinsically bad. This fact isn’t true in virtue of any other facts, but rather it just is the case that causing pain for fun is intrinsically bad. In other words, the fact that causing pain for fun is intrinsically bad needs no explanation.

Here is where I think Wielenberg has a good point. We as theists seem to hold to the existence of God as being a necessary, substantive, and brute fact. When he says that theists hold to the existence of God as being an example of this kind of fact, he is speaking in an ontological sense, not an epistemological one. Certainly, we can come to know the fact that God exists through explanations and other facts, but the truth of the fact of God’s existence is not dependent on other facts, thus making it a brute fact. So why does Wielenberg point this out? Well, his argumentative purpose in pointing to types of brute facts to which theists are committed is to show that the theist cannot consistently reject his (that is, Wielenberg’s) proposed means of accommodating objective morality in an atheistic worldview simply by rejecting the tenability of the existence of brute facts. With this in mind, Wielenberg sees no guiding principle as to which facts are brute and which ones require further explanation. They need to be examined on a case-by-case basis. If we accept his analysis of brute facts as correct, then it seems we need to give some sort of reason as to why ethical facts are facts in need of further explanation and cannot be considered brute. Because if ethical facts can just be considered as brute facts, then it seems atheism would have no trouble accounting for objective morality since it is false that these ethical facts need a foundation (because they’re brute).

Let me show you what I mean. As Christians, we might say that something is good because it approximates God’s nature. In saying this, we imply that we believe that the Good is God’s nature. If this is the case, then we seem to be positing a basic ethical fact: An action is considered good if it approximates God’s nature. We don’t have an explanation for why this is the case, but rather we simply seem to hold it as a brute fact! So, what’s the issue for the atheist then? If Christians are allowed to posit certain basic ethical facts that require no explanation, then it seems arbitrary to say that atheists cannot do the same when they posit basic ethical facts such as “causing pain for fun is morally wrong.” Both sides must posit these basic ethical facts that have no external foundation.

We could say something similar about moral obligations. As Christians, we might say that, if God commands you to do something, then you are morally obligated to do that thing. Well, why is this the case? It seems to me this fact has no explanation, and thus it is a brute fact. Why couldn’t the atheist merely posit a basic ethical fact that says “you ought not to do something that is morally wrong”? Both facts posited here by the theist and atheist have no external foundation, and thus both seem equally justified.

I know Dr. Craig will be debating Dr. Wielenberg on this very topic next year, but I thought we might get a head start on the conversation. Keep fighting the good fight brother! Thanks!

– Scott Olson

Tim’s Response

Hey Scott! It’s great to receive a fantastic question from a good friend (and a fellow RF Chapter leader)!

I am really looking forward to William Lane Craig’s interaction with Erik Wielenberg this February. I have not discussed this matter with Dr. Craig so I have no idea as to what “angle” he is going to take with Wielenberg. With that said, however (and with all due respect to Wielenberg), I think there are several problems with his proposed model.

“Need Not” vs Cannot

Regarding the claim that basic ethical facts and God share the same three properties — metaphysically necessary, substantive, and brute — is not accurate (or so it seems to me). This is because God is metaphysically necessary and simply CANNOT (as opposed to “need not”) be explained by other facts. However, as you noted, other facts like the premises in the Leibnizian Cosmological Argument demonstrate that a necessary being (God) must exist. Ethical facts seem to be necessary as well, however, if they are metaphysically necessary in all possible worlds, it seems that these facts CAN ONLY be explained by other facts — the existence of God and the purpose in which He created mankind. It is important to note that if one asserts that brute facts “need not” be explained by other facts, it does not logically follow that these facts cannot be explained by other facts (I will discuss these other facts below).

You noted that Wielenberg claims that,

An example of a basic ethical fact is the fact that causing pain for fun is intrinsically bad. This fact isn’t true in virtue of any other facts, but rather it just is the case that causing pain for fun is intrinsically bad. In other words, the fact that causing pain for fun is intrinsically bad needs no explanation.

I disagree! It seems to me that causing pain for fun is unloving; however, the question is raised: is it bad to be unloving? How would we ground this truth or come to know it is true if it is in fact true? The fact that it is bad (missing the mark of the purpose of human existence) to cause pain for fun is explained by other facts. The fact that causing pain for fun is bad, wrong, and/or evil is explained by the fact that God created humanity on purpose and for the specific purpose to love Him and all other people (from our neighbors to those who consider us enemies). Since causing pain for fun is definitely unloving, then causing pain for fun does not approximate to the objective purpose of the human existence (an objective truth about humanity irrespective of the subjective opinions from humanity). To a degree that a thing or being does not approximate to its objective purpose, then to that same degree that thing or being is objectively “bad.”

Actions can only really be good or bad in relation to an ultimate and objective purpose (this does not exist on atheism). So, it might be objectively true that torture causes pain; however, claiming that “causing pain for fun is bad” is nonsensical if life was not created on purpose and for a specific purpose. Namely, we were created to love our fellow man, not harm him.

So, if humanity was not created on purpose and for a specific purpose, then I contend that there are no objective ethical facts regarding human actions. Take homosexuality, for example. If Jesus is right, then God created human sexual relationships to specifically approximate to the following model: one man with one woman becoming one flesh for one lifetime (Matthew 19). Thus, it is objectively true that this is one of the specific purposes humans were created to follow. If one engages in homosexual actions — let alone gay marriage — then they are objectively wrong and “missing the mark” (sin). However, if God does not exist, then humans are accidental and there is no objective purpose of our existence or standard in which humanity was created to approximate.

If God did not create humanity to only have heterosexual relationships within the bonds of marriage, then there would be nothing objectively wrong with having premarital sex or any sexual relations outside the bonds of marriage. These sexual boundaries are only objective if God really did create humans to approximate to the one man with one woman becoming one flesh for one lifetime model of marriage that Jesus advocated. Humans are free to disagree with God, but they are subjectively disagreeing with the creator of humanity about the purpose and plan He had in mind for humanity. Thus, humans would only subjectively disagree with an objective purpose in which humans were actually created to attain.

Thus, if atheism is true, then there is nothing objectively wrong with anything — including homosexual marriage. With that said, however, it would also not be objectively wrong to persecute homosexuals (See A Biblical Argument for Gay Rights)!

It follows that when ISIS cuts the heads off of homosexuals, atheists, and Christians, these Muslims are opposing the objective purpose of human life and thus, they are objectively wrong. When the Nazis slaughtered Jews, the Nazis were not loving their fellow humans and thus, they were objectively bad. When white supremacists are violent to humans of another skin color or Antifa is violent towards those with different political ideas these groups are all objectively wrong and missing the objective mark and purpose of life. Since the objective purpose human life was created for is love, it is objectively evil not to love. That is easy to remember because LOVE backwards is EVOL.

Consider the following argument:

If a truth corresponds to reality, it is objectively true [apart from human opinion].
2. If God created humanity for a purpose, then this purpose is a truth that corresponds to reality.
3. Therefore, if God created humanity for a purpose, then this purpose is objectively true.
4. God created humanity for a purpose. [To Love God and all people]
5. Therefore, God’s purpose for creating humanity is objectively true [apart from human opinion].

It follows from this argument that if one acts in a manner that is not loving toward God and all people, then they are objectively wrong in their behavior. They are not approximating to the objective purpose of life and are thus, “bad” and “missing the objective mark” (a.k.a., sin).

On Purpose & For a Purpose

Now, if God does not exist, then life was not created on purpose or for any specific purpose. Thus, on an atheistic worldview, there is no objective purpose to the existence of humanity, and thus, there is nothing really good, bad, right, or wrong — let alone evil — with any manner in which one chooses to behave toward his fellow man or woman. There is no objective plan, purpose, or goal about humanity in which humans have a choice to approximate or not.

You noted that,

If we accept his analysis of brute facts as correct, then it seems we need to give some sort of reason as to why ethical facts are facts in need of further explanation and cannot be considered brute

I do not accept his analysis of brute facts as correct, but even if I did, ethical facts make no sense to postulate apart from a design plan or purpose of mankind which is true irrespective of the subjective opinions offered from mankind. Ethical facts are necessary in that they are grounded in the nature of a necessary being in which any possible world — including the actual world — is contingent. Moreover, if God created this world and all humanity on purpose and for the specific purpose of love, then it is true apart from a human subjective opinion that humans ought to love one another. After all, this would be the reason humans exist.

You pointed out that,

As Christians, we might say that, if God commands you to do something, then you are morally obligated to do that thing. Well, why is this the case? It seems to me this fact has no explanation, and thus it is a brute fact.

Some Christians “might say” this kind of thing, but I do not. Well, I am sure I probably have said similar things in the past, but if I am being careful to articulate my views clearly, then I contend that something is objectively good for a human if it approximates to the objective purpose of human existence. This objective purpose of the human existence must be up to something external to humanity, and thus, cannot be up to humanity. Thus, this fact does have an explanation! Moreover, it stands to reason that a perfectly intelligent and loving being would only issue commands to humanity that approximate to God’s loving purpose for creating humanity (which is a purpose true apart from the human opinion). Thus, although we have the freedom to disobey God’s commands since God has eternal human flourishing in mind, we ought to choose to approximate to His commands.

However, God gives us the freedom to choose not to flourish. This brings me to my final point:

An Eternal “Or Else!”

If atheism is true (and human persons are not immaterial and eternal souls), then all humans ultimately share the same fate. If this is the case, why should it matter if one chooses to live like Mother Theresa or Hitler — like Gandhi or Ted Bundy? If atheism is true, each one of those individuals is equal in that none of them are experiencing any punishment or benefit for choosing to approximate to any supposed moral brute facts in the absence of God. In fact, it could be argued that Hitler and Bundy experienced more physical pleasures during their lives than Mother Theresa or Gandhi. If all people always share the same ultimate fate, then why should anyone care how they live on earth. Why should Hitler and Bundy not “go for the gusto”?

Jesus offered a big “or else” to humanity! If one does not wish to live according to the Law of Christ and God’s purpose for humanity — to always love all people — they are free to spend eternity apart from God’s loving plan. They are free to do things their own way for eternity. Jesus referred to this state of affairs as hell.

If Wielenberg’s view were true — even if it could account for abstract objective moral values — why should anyone care? So what if some things are objectively wrong to do? We are all just going to die anyway! And who cares about legacy either? Eventually, the entire universe is going to suffer a cosmic heat death (there will be no heat, light, or life anywhere in the entire universe) and ultimately “no one will remember your name” or any of your supposed moral actions you performed. In the end, this atheistic attempt to desperately account for objective morality is fairly useless. After all, what good is a moral theory if one has no reason to act morally?

Conclusion

So, to recap, it seems to me that there are at least three problems with Wielneberg’s model. First, the assertion that one “need not” provide an explanation does not entail that one cannot provide an explanation. Second, if God exists and created humanity on purpose and for a specific purpose, then this purpose would logically ground human actions as objectively good or bad. Atheists have no access to this foundation. Third, on Christian theism, Jesus provides an eternal “or else,” which provides an additional reason to approximate to the Law of Christ.

I just do not see how Wielenberg’s view is tenable if humans are accidental and that it is not a fact of the matter that humans were created for the purpose of love and flourishing. There is no objective standard about human existence in which we were created to approximate if atheism is true. There is no such thing as “missing the mark” or the objective purpose of our existence. On atheism there is no objective purpose — and that is why there is nothing really wrong with homosexuality or anything else if God did not create humanity on purpose and for a specific purpose.

Thus, on Wielenberg’s view, the phrase, “causing pain for fun is intrinsically bad,” is metaphysically meaningless. This is due to the fact that on atheism, “bad,” does not have any real meaning in a logically broad sense. If God did not create humanity on purpose or for a specific purpose, then one cannot logically claim that causing pain for fun is “bad” or “wrong,” because there is no objective purpose to the human existence in which causing pain for fun does not approximate. The reason Wielenberg’s view is useless is because phrases like, “causing pain for fun is bad and wrong,” are vacuous. On atheism, these claims literally mean nothing!

Thanks for the great question, Scott! I hope to see you in Rhode Island at the next Reasonable Faith chapter director annual meeting. If not, I am only a three-hour drive away!

Your friend and brother in Christ,

Tim

Original Blog Post: http://bit.ly/2zWlVCq

November 21, 2017/by Guest

Responding To Free Will Critics

Theology and Christian Apologetics

By Evan Minton

My article “5 Arguments For The Existence Of Free Will” became very popular. Tim Stratton liked it so much that he featured it as a guest post on his blog FreeThinkingMinistires.com, Martin Glynn specifically asked me to post it to The Society Of Evangelical Arminians’ website, and Jairo Izquierdo published it as a guest post on CrossExamined.org. In the case of the latter, several comments came flooding in as pushback to the things I said in the article. This isn’t surprising given how popular CrossExamined.org is as an apologetics ministry. Instead of responding to the comments specifically and getting into long back-and-forth conversations with people, I thought it would be more edifying if I actually made a response article addressing a few of those rebuttals.

To the readers of this site, I will assume you have already read “5 Arguments For The Existence Of Free Will“, and the following content will assume that background knowledge. If you haven’t read it, go read that first. Moreover, I’ll address these rebuttals according to each specific argument that the rebuttal is aimed towards.

The Argument From True Love

Rebuttal: You Can’t Choose Who You Fall In Love With.

Andy Ryan wrote “You can talk about ‘love freely given’ but does anyone believe they have a choice over who they love? It’s pretty much something that just happens. Many people wish they could stop loving someone they love or regain a love they’ve lost. But in vain. So I don’t get how you connect love to free will.”

The problem with this response is that it’s equivocating “love” with “infatuation”. I’ve pointed out in other blog posts that love is not an emotion. It’s not a feeling. Love is an action or series of actions aimed at the wellbeing of the one being loved. You can choose who you love if love is an action or series of actions rather than a feeling. Obviously, you can’t control how you feel. If that were the case, I’d never feel worried, angry, or sad a single day in my entire life. When someone I love dies, I’d choose to just be giddy rather than heartbroken. While you can’t control how you feel, you can control how you act.

The idea that love is action and not an emotion is grounded in scripture. Let’s turn to one of the most famous passages on love; 1 Corinthians 13.

“Love is patient, love is kind. It does not envy, it does not boast, it is not proud. It does not dishonor others, it is not self-seeking, it is not easily angered, it keeps no record of wrongs. Love does not delight in evil but rejoices with the truth. It always protects, always trusts, always hopes, always perseveres. Love never fails.” – 1 Corinthians 13:4-8

This passage is a description of not just love, but perfect love. Go up and read the passage again very carefully. I want you to notice something. There isn’t much talk of warm, fuzzy feelings in this passage.

Kindness is not a feeling. Kindness is an action. If I buy you a house, it doesn’t matter how I feel about you. My action was a kindness towards you. My choice to buy you a house was just that: a choice. You can have very bitter feelings towards someone and will yourself to do something nice for them. Kindness does not have to be associated with feelings.

What about patience? Well, that might seem like an emotion, but in reality, patience itself is an action. I might be irritated that someone is taking a long time in doing something they said they were going to do for me, but I can choose to not to express my agitation. I can conceal it, and say “Take your time. There’s no hurry.”. An impatient person would say “What is taking you so long? Get on with it already!” I may be experiencing a feeling of impatience, but I can still express the action of patience. A friend and I may both be waiting on another friend to pick us up to take us to dinner, and I may say “What is taking him so long? He should have been here 20 minutes ago! This is going to screw up my whole schedule.” while my friend next to me may be experiencing the same emotion but keeps his impatient emotion to himself. So, although we’re both feeling the same emotion, I choose to express impatience while he chooses to express patience. When my future wife takes a long time in the bathroom getting ready, I may be irritated at that, but what will I express? Patience or impatience? The choice is up to me.

“It keeps no record of wrongs”. This is also a choice. You may incidentally remember wrongs done to you, but the one who loves will try to forget them. The one who loves will not purposefully keep a list so that he can keep throwing the misdeeds up in the misdeed doer’s face. I have been wronged by some of the people in my life, and while I can remember that I was wrong, I can’t remember very many of the specific wrongs (except when something triggers a memory). I’m trying not to keep a record.

“It does not dishonor others”. Is dishonoring others a feeling? Surely not.

“It does not boast” — regardless of what your emotional state is, you can choose not to brag about things.

“It is not self-seeking” — another action that’s not a feeling. You can choose to seek the good of others instead of your own good.

The only things resembling emotions in this passage would be the parts that say “It is not easily angered” and “rejoices in the truth”. Now, these are emotions. Does this contradict everything I’ve just said? I don’t think so. I don’t think love itself is an emotion, but that doesn’t mean it’s completely isolated from emotions. Love can invoke emotions. I’ve heard testimonies of Christians who have done kind things for their enemies. While initially gritting their teeth in distaste, over time, their continued choice to express love softened their hearts towards their enemies and they actually had emotional feelings towards them. One of my Bible teachers spoke of a man he worked for years ago who made his life Hell. The employer developed cancer and my Bible teacher reluctantly prayed for him over a long period of time. The more he prayed for his boss, the less hard feelings he had towards him. When he learned of his employer’s passing, he said that it actually broke his heart and he burst into tears. I have had similar experiences. Doing love can actually transform your feelings towards someone. This is why I think it’s entirely possible to learn to “love the one you’re with”. This would also explain why so many arranged marriages actually worked out in times past.[1]

In light of this, Jesus’ command in Matthew 5 to love our enemies makes a lot more sense. Jesus isn’t commanding us to have warm and fuzzy feelings towards the people who treat us horribly. Rather, he’s telling us to show them kindness, patience, to avoid dishonoring them, to not boast if you one up them, to seek their well-being. Most of Jesus’ examples of loving your enemies are *drum roll* actions: “ If someone strikes you on the right cheek, turn to him the other also. And if someone wants to sue you and take your tunic, let him have your cloak as well. If someone forces you to go one mile, go with him two miles. Give to the one who asks you, and do not turn away from the one who wants to borrow from you.”(verses 39-42).

In conclusion: I can’t control who I become infatuated with, but I can control which woman I show love to. I don’t have to have warm and fuzzy feelings towards someone to love them.

The Argument From Moral Accountability

Rebuttal: Your Argument doesn’t follow because you haven’t demonstrated that The Bible is true.

In one of KR’s comments, he said: “Your conclusion doesn’t follow from your premises since you haven’t established that what the Bible teaches is actually true. Your 2nd argument suffers from the same problem.”

My article was primarily aimed at Calvinists, who believe The Bible is divinely inspired and inerrant, and ergo true. So, I admit that I presupposed that The Bible was true in most of the arguments I used in my blog post. I wasn’t concerned with refuting atheistic determinists, but determinists who were Christians. The only argument in the blog post that would apply to both Christian and non-Christian determinists was The FreeThinking Argument. I’ve argued with KR in the comment sections of other blog posts on Cross Examined’s website, so I know that he isn’t a Christian. It isn’t surprising that he wouldn’t find the argument from moral accountability compelling since it does presuppose that The Bible is true.

The Appearance Of Free Will Problem

Rebuttal: I Feel Determined?

In the same comment, KR wrote “As for the appearance of free will, it may be the case that we have different experiences. While I certainly feel that I have a self and that this self-performs various actions and has various thoughts, it feels to me that these actions and thoughts are always a reaction to something that happened before. I don’t feel that I decide to perform an action or have a thought ‘ex nihilo'”.

I don’t like responding to arguments when I’m not 100% sure I understand. But I studied this response carefully and I think I know what he’s saying here. I suspect that KR may be misrepresenting what libertarian free will is when he says “I don’t feel that I decide to perform an action or have a thought ex nihilo.” It is a common misconception that libertarian free will asserts that our choices are “random” or “spontaneous”, like the appearance of a particle in the quantum vacuum. No one knows when and where one is going to pop up. I don’t think my choices originate “ex nihilo” either, at least if KR is using that term the way I think he’s using it. Certainly, there are previously existing factors inside and outside of myself that have an influence on my choices, but does this mean that they determine my choices? I would say no. My feeling of hunger may influence me to get up and grab something to eat, but the hunger doesn’t determine me to eat. My urge for sex may influence my decision to have intercourse with someone, but that doesn’t mean I couldn’t have refrained from having sex with that person. Libertarian Free Will (LFW) neither asserts that our choices have no good reasons or motivations behind them. I may choose to eat because I’m hungry or I may choose to refrain from eating because I’m too busy working on a blog post, or maybe I’m in the middle of a fast, or maybe I’m dieting to lose weight. LFW doesn’t assert that our choices are without purpose, just that it laid within our power to choose the opposite of what we actually chose.

Does KR have an accurate understanding of LFW? If not, that might explain why he feels he doesn’t have it. If he thinks of free will as spontaneous actions devoid of any influences or motivations, then it’s no wonder why he doesn’t think he has it. I don’t believe I have that kind of free will either!

The Free Thinking Argument

Rebuttal 1: Computers Do Calculations And They Don’t Have Free Will.

Andy Ryan wrote “You’ve not shown or demonstrated this. Why does the latter follow from the former?” Premise 3 of The Free Thinking Argument states that if libertarian free will does not exist, the rationality and knowledge does not exist. He says I haven’t demonstrated that this premise is true. Why does he think that?

The argument I put forth was a quote from Tim Stratton. Stratton said “Premise (3) is equivalent with ‘if all things are causally determined, then that includes all thoughts and beliefs.’ If our thoughts and beliefs are forced upon us, and we could not have chosen better beliefs, then we are simply left assuming that our determined beliefs are good (let alone true). Therefore, we could never rationally affirm that our beliefs are the inference to the best explanation – we can only assume it. Here is the big problem for the atheistic naturalist: it logically follows that if naturalism is true, then atheists — or anyone else for that matter — cannot possess knowledge. Knowledge is defined as ‘justified true belief.’ One can happen to have true beliefs; however, if they do not possess warrant or justification for a specific belief, their belief does not qualify as a knowledge claim. If one cannot freely infer the best explanation, then one has no justification that their belief really is the best explanation. Without justification, knowledge goes down the drain. All we are left with is question-begging assumptions.”[2]

Andy responded “Why does one have to ‘freely’ infer it? Do computers require free will to make accurate calculations? Evidently not – they seem to get by just fine! Imagine giving two computers sentience. They argue between them over a particular course of action and which option is the best. What’s wrong with describing what they have as ‘knowledge’?”

To hark back to Stratton’s explanation: knowledge is “justified true belief”. In order to have a belief that is both true and justified, one must be able to think freely. In order to think freely, one must have free will. You can’t be a free thinker without free will. In the case of computers, yes, they do mathematical calculations and they always come up with the right answer to the equation, but that’s because there were people who causally determined the computer to have an infallible calculator inside of it. The programmer just as well could have programmed the computer to come up with wrong answers, and the computer wouldn’t know the difference. Or perhaps someone hacked into the computer and infected it with a virus that causally determines it to come up with calculations. If human beings are causally determined, then how do you know that the beliefs you hold to aren’t irrational? How could you keep yourself from committing fallacies? How could you know whether or not the beliefs you were determined to hold are true? They could be true, they could have good reasons for them, but you wouldn’t be able to rationally weigh alternatives. If person 1 is causally determined to believe truth A, if person 1 was causally determined to believe lie B, he was determined to believe B.

Just as a computer will come up with the truth or a lie depending on how it’s wired, so we will come to true or false beliefs depending on how we’re wired. Can it really be said that someone possesses knowledge (i.e justified true belief) when the conclusions they came to were a mere matter of the molecules and chemistry in their brain + their environment? If the atoms in their brains bumped around differently, or if they had lived different lives in different circumstances and environments, their beliefs very well could have been different. What someone believes, on naturalism, depends on happenstance. If what someone believes depends on happenstance, how can that belief be said to be justified? It could, by happenstance, be a true belief, but it would not be a justified true belief. You would just happen to hold to the correct viewpoint.

The same problem affects theological determinism. If God causally determines everything we think, say, and do, then if we believe the correct theological doctrines or not just depends on whatever God decreed we would believe.

William Lane Craig said it well: “There is a sort of dizzying, self-defeating character to determinism. For if one comes to believe that determinism is true, one has to believe that the reason he has come to believe it is simply that he was determined to do so. One has not in fact been able to weigh the arguments pro and con and freely make up one’s mind on that basis. The difference between the person who weighs the arguments for determinism and rejects them and the person who weighs them and accepts them is wholly that one was determined by causal factors outside himself to believe and the other not to believe. When you come to realize that your decision to believe in determinism was itself determined and that even your present realization of that fact right now is likewise determined, a sort of vertigo sets in, for everything that you think, even this very thought itself, is outside your control. Determinism could be true; but it is very hard to see how it could ever be rationally affirmed since its affirmation undermines the rationality of its affirmation.”[3]

Rebuttal 2: What Is A Soul And How Does It Allow For Free Will but Physicalism Doesn’t?

In that same comment, Andy Ryan said “What exactly is a soul and by what exact mechanism does it make libertarian free will possible where it is otherwise impossible? If one person has a soul and another person doesn’t, how does the soul lead to better or more informed decisions in the first person? If their brains are otherwise working exactly the same, I don’t see the difference.”

Andy is responding to the second premise of The Free Thinking Argument which states that if the soul does not exist, then no one has a libertarian free will. First, souls are immaterial entities that animate the physical bodies of humans and higher animals. It controls the brain and the brain controls the body. When a person dies, the soul leaves the body, leaving it lifeless. A soul isn’t something you have, it’s something you are. A body is what you have.

If people are merely physical organisms, then that means all of our thoughts, feelings, and actions are causally determined by brain chemistry, firing neurons, external environmental conditions and so on. How can free will exist if a man is nothing more than a collection of physical parts? Does a computer have free will? Does an amoeba have free will? Do thunderclouds have free will? No. All of the above react to physical cause and effect because they are purely physical things. I just took a swig of diet coke after typing that last sentence. If humans are purely physical creatures, then I don’t see how we can control what we do any more than my diet coke can control whether or not it fizzes.

Many atheists, like Francis Crick who I quoted in the article, are determinists precisely because they are physicalists. It’s their physicalism that drives them to the conclusion that we are merely organisms reacting to stimuli. The assertion of premise 2 is that if the soul doesn’t exist, then free will doesn’t exist. I think I’ve done a pretty good job explaining that we have good reason to believe this is true. Now, how does the soul solve the problem? I’m not entirely sure what it is about a soul that gives it the ability to choose between alternatives, but I do know that it makes human beings more than mere physical objects. If I am a soul with a body, then there’s an aspect of me that transcends the natural realm, and that therefore entails that I am not necessarily subject to do whatever my environment and internal brain activity make me do. I have a mind, not just a brain. And while the brain can affect/influence the mind (e.g mental illnesses like schizophrenia), and the reverse is also true (e.g studies have shown that positive thoughts and negative thoughts can shape your brain), it is not the case that my brain makes me do anything.

Conclusion
I don’t think any of the people in the comment section successfully refuted any of the arguments I put forth in libertarian free will.

By the way, there was a comment left by a person named John B Moore, but I didn’t address it because he didn’t get any rebuttals. All he did was essentially say “Your arguments are no good. You’re wrong”. Not a quote, but that’s the essence of his comment. He didn’t say which of the premises of which of the arguments were not true, nor did he tackle my arguments for the truth of the premises.

Notes

[1] I ‘m not advocating for arranged marriages. I’m just saying that maybe a reason so many of them actually turned out well was that the people realized “This is who I’m going to be stuck with for the rest of my life. I should make every effort to show love to him or her”.

[2] Tim Stratton, “The FreeThinking Argument In A Nutshell”, November 30th 2015, http://freethinkingministries.com/the-freethinking-argument-in-a-nutshell/

[3] William Lane Craig, from the article “Q&A: Molinism VS. Calvinism: Troubled By Calvinists”, – http://www.reasonablefaith.org/molinism-vs-calvinism

Original Blog Source: http://bit.ly/2ku9IhP

October 8, 2017/by Guest

Freedom Through Obedience: A Lesson from Star Wars

2. Does God Exist?, Theology and Christian Apologetics

Personal autonomy has become the reigning virtue of our day. If it feels true to you, then it must be true for you. As SCOTUS Justice Anthony Kennedy famously said, “At the heart of liberty is the right to define one’s own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life.” On this view, freedom entails obeying only the self.

But the Star Wars franchise portrays a different kind of freedom, a freedom that is found through obedience. For instance, in episode IV (the first Star Wars film) Obi-Wan Kenobi sneaks Luke Skywalker, R2-D2, and C-3PO past a small group of stormtroopers. When the stormtroopers stop them for inquiry, Ob-Wan simply waves his hand and says, “These aren’t the droids you’re looking for.” One of the stormtroopers repeats the phrase and they obey.

In The Empire Strikes Back, Luke learns the powers of the Force by submitting to Yoda. Luke realizes he cannot learn the Force alone and that he must obey his Master. And in the climactic scene of Return of the Jedi, Darth Vader ultimately saves his son Luke through not obeying the Emperor and fatally heaving him into a chasm in the Death Star.

In his excellent book Movies are Prayers, Josh Larsen describes how the newest Star Wars hero, Rey, learns freedom through obedience in The Force Awakens (2015):

Interestingly, Rey initially refused to acknowledge the power of the Force when she encountered it earlier in the film, after discovering the lightsaber that once belonged to Luke Skywalker. Her journey, then, is one in which she learns that submitting to the Force leads to flourishing. In both that mind-control showdown with Kylo Ren and a climactic lightsaber duel with him, it isn’t until Rey closes her eyes and prayerfully steps outside of her own self that the Force fully flows through her. In following the Force, she is freed. In trying to bend the Force to his own will, Kylo Ren suffers (p. 124).

Star Wars, of course, is fiction. But it is based upon a premise that runs against the prevailing virtue of our day—personal autonomy. Star Wars portrays freedom as being found through submitting to proper authority and objective reality, not through defining one’s own existence. On this view, freedom is not found through following one’s feelings, but submitting one’s feelings to reality. In other words, freedom is found through obedience.

Biblical Freedom

This is the paradox of freedom. And it is the view of freedom portrayed in the Bible. In his final speech to the Israelites before they enter the Promised Land, Moses sums up what God desires of them:

And now, Israel, what does the Lord your God require of you, but to fear the Lord your God, to walk in all His ways, to love Him, to serve the Lord your God with all your heart and with all your soul, and to keep the commandments and statutes of the Lord, which I am commanding you today for your good? (Deuteronomy 10:12-13).

In other words, the Israelites would only be free if they obey God by “walk[ing] in His ways,” which were given for their good. The Israelites would find freedom if they submitted their lives to God’s direction rather than their own.

The idea of freedom through obedience is counterintuitive for those raised in a culture that values personal autonomy. But Star Wars subversively portrays a truth we intuitively grasp—that obedience is required for genuine freedom. That is why King David said, “The law of the Lord is perfect, reviving the soul; the testimony of the Lord is sure, making wise the simple” (Ps. 19:7).

August 6, 2017/by Sean Mcdowell

The Contingency Argument For God’s Existence

2. Does God Exist?, Theology and Christian Apologetics

By Evan Minton

Why does anything at all exist? Why isn’t there just nothing? This is the first philosophical question I ever remember asking myself. I remember lying in bed at night when I was about 6 years old, and I asked and pondered this very question. I thought to myself “Everything must have been made by God. If God didn’t exist, then nothing else would exist either. Since everything exists, God must exist. But what if God didn’t exist either? Then nothing else would exist.” It was only 15 years later that I discovered that my childlike insight was actually developed into a sophisticated philosophical argument for the existence of God long before I was even born. In fact, I had even forgotten that moment of reflection when I was a small child until I started reading about the argument as an adult. Then I remembered.

The argument is called “The Contingency Argument For God’s Existence”. Sometimes it’s referred to as “The Leibnizian Cosmological Argument”, the reason why it is called that is that the argument was first formulated by the mathematician Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz. The argument’s premises are:

1: Everything that exists has an explanation of its existence (either in the necessity of its own nature or in an external cause).

2: If the universe has an explanation of its existence, that explanation is God.

3: The universe exists.

4: Therefore, The universe has an explanation of its existence.

5: Therefore, the explanation of the universe’s existence is God.

Now, this is a logically airtight argument. So if the atheist wants to deny the conclusion, he has to say that one of the three premises is false. Let’s examine the premises to see what reasons can be given for affirming them.

Premise 1: Everything That Exists Has An Explanation Of Its Existence (Either In The Necessity Of Its Own Nature Or In An External Cause).

*Types Of Explanations – There are 2 types of explanations for why something exists. X was either caused to exist by something that exists outside of and prior to X or X exists out of a necessity of its own nature (I.e its non-existence is impossible and it depends on nothing outside of itself to bring it into or keep it in existence). Something was either caused to exist by something else or it exists out of logical necessity.

*This Premise Is Self-Evident – We all intuitively know that whatever exists has some sort of explanation as to why it exists. Imagine you were walking in the forest with a friend and found a ball lying on the ground. You would naturally wonder how the ball came to be there. If your friend said to you “Don’t worry about it. The Ball just exists inexplicably” you would either think he was crazy or was joking around. Either way, you’d never take seriously the notion that the ball just existed there with no explanation for why it existed or how it came to be there.

Whatever it is we think about, whether it be cars, trucks, chairs, tables, people, houses, trees, balloons, mountains, planets, galaxies, etc. we know that they must have some explanation for their existence. Nothing exists for no reason. Even little children know this. Why else would they ask Mom and Dad “Where do babies come from?” They know that they have an explanation for their existence. They know that they don’t exist inexplicably.

*Objection: Does God Have An Explanation Of His Existence?

Critics of this argument frequently object to this premise by saying that if everything that exists must have an explanation for why it exists, then God must have an explanation for His existence. If God exists, then the premise applies to Him as well. However, that would demean God as it would mean something existed outside of God Himself which brought Him into existence. In other words, God would have a Creator and we would have a Heavenly Grandfather. Now, if we make God an exception to premise 1, the skeptic would rightly accuse us of special pleading. And moreover, he could ask that if we’re allowed to make God an exception to premise 1, why not exempt the universe?

This objection does not succeed. Read the first premise again. “Everything that exists has an explanation of its existence (either in the necessity of its own nature or in an external cause)”. We would agree that God’s greatness would be diminished if he had anexternal cause for His existence. But that’s not the only type of explanation there is. One category of existence-explanation is necessary existence. What the Christian Apologist would say in response is that God does indeed have an explanation for His existence, but that explanation is that He exists by the necessity of His own nature. If God exists, He cannot not exist. His non-existence is logically impossible.

So premise 1 certainly seems to be true. What about premise 2? Is premise 2 true?

Premise 2: If The Universe Has An Explanation Of Its Existence, That Explanation Is God.

At first, this premise may seem like a huge logical leap. But it actually makes sense when you think about it. In order to have caused the universe to come into being, the cause of the universe must be beyond the universe, beyond space and time. And therefore cannot be a material, spatial, or temporal type of thing. Whatever caused the universe to come into being must be a spaceless, immaterial, uncaused, powerful, personal Creator. Why is that?

The cause must be

Spaceless — because it brought space into existence. If the cause is responsible for space’s existence, it cannot be inside of space. It cannot exist inside of something that doesn’t exist yet. Just as the builder of your house could not have existed inside your house, so the cause could not have existed inside of space.

Immaterial – The cause’s non-spatiality entails immateriality. How? Because material objects cannot exist unless space exists. Material objects occupy spatial dimensions. If there is no space, matter cannot exist. This means that because the cause is non-spatial, it is therefore non-material.

Supernatural – “Nature” and “The universe” are synonyms. Since the cause is beyond nature (given that its the explanation why nature exists), it follows that the cause is supernatural. After all, that’s what phenomenon transcendent to nature is. Supernatural, that which transcends the natural.

Powerful – Whatever is able to create and/or sustain the entire physical cosmos must have enormous power.

Uncaused – Given that the cause of the universe is a necesarilly existent being, it must therefore be uncaused. Necesarry existence presupposes eternal existence.

Personal – This is an entailment of the cause’s immateriality. There are two types of things recognized by philosophers that are immaterial: abstract objects (such as numbers, sets, or other mathematical entities) or unembodied minds. Philosophers realize that abstract objects if they exist, they exist as non-physical entities. However, abstract objects cannot produce any effects. That’s part of what it means to be abstract. The number 3 isn’t going to be producing any effects anytime soon. Given that abstract objects are causally impotent, it, therefore, follows that an unembodied mind is the cause of the universe’ beginning.

This sounds an awful lot like God to me. Now, we don’t have to call this cause “God” if that makes the atheist feel uncomfortable. We could just call it “The non-spatial, immaterial, unimaginably powerful, necesarilly existent Mind behind the universe”. But to avoid getting out of breath, I prefer to label this explanation “God”.

Moreover, even if the universe were beginningless, it would still be the case that it needs a cause that has the aforementioned properties. Leibniz’ argument doesn’t depend on proving that the universe had a beginning. As long as the universe is not a necessarily existent thing, then it needs a non-spatial, non-material, powerful, uncreated Mind to be the explanation for why it exists. For The Contingency Argument to succeed, all that needs to be true is that the universe is contingent.

3: The Universe Exists.

The truth of this premise is overwhelmingly obvious to anyone with even a small shred of sanity. No defense of this premise needs to be given.

Of course, if someone wanted to resort to some crazy idea like solipsism (the view that you are the only thing that exists, and the entire universe and everything you experience are projections of your own mind), that doesn’t get you out of this premise. In this case, one could just say that YOU are the universe.

4: Therefore, The Universe Has An Explanation Of Its Existence.

This follows logically from premises 1 and 3.

5: Therefore, The Explanation Of The Existence Of The Universe Is God.

This follows logically from premises 2 and 4.

*Objection: “Well, Maybe The Universe Doesn’t Need To Have An External Explanation For Its Existence. Maybe The Universe Exists By A Necessity Of Its Own Nature.”

This is one way an atheist could escape the conclusion of this argument. Perhaps premise 2 of this argument is false. The atheist could say “Well, granted. God or a being remarkably similar to God must be the explanation of the universe’s existence provided the assumption that the universe requires an external cause. But maybe that assumption is wrong. Maybe the explanation for the universe’s existence is that exists by a nature of its own existence.”

In order to save premise 2 and ergo the argument’s conclusion, we’ll need to show that the universe does require an external cause for its existence. There are some pretty clear reasons why we wouldn’t want to embrace this alternative. As we think about this big ole world we live in, none of the things that it consists of seem to exist necessarily. It seems like all of these things didn’t have to exist. It seems like they could have failed to exist.

But, you might say, perhaps the matter that these things are made of exists necessarily? Perhaps that although the galaxies, stars, planets, people, etc. and everything in the universe doesn’t exist necesarilly, the material stuff these things are made of exists necesarilly.

This proposal just simply doesn’t work. Allow me to explain why. You see, according to physicists, matter consists of teensy weensy particles called “quarks.” Everything in our world are just different arrangements of these quarks. But it seems to me that one could ask why a different collection of quarks could not have existed in the stead of this one? Are we expected to believe that every single quark in existence cannot possibly fail to exist? Does the skeptic want us to buy into the notion that all of the quarks in the universe have to exist?

“Okay, well maybe quarks aren’t necessarily existent. But maybe the particles of which the quarks are composed exist necessarily.” This suggestion won’t work because quarks aren’t composed of anything! They just are the basic units of matter. So if a quark doesn’t exist, the matter doesn’t exist.

It seems obvious to me that the existence of a different collection of quarks comprising everything of the cosmos was possible, but in that case, it follows that a different universe could have existed, and if a different universe could have existed, then it follows that our universe isn’t necessarily existent.

To see the point, think of your house. Could your house have been made of candy? Now, I’m not asking if you could have had a different house (one made of candy) in the stead of the one you actually live in. I’m asking if the very house you’re currently living in ifthat house could have been composed of candy. Obviously not. If it did, then it would not be the same house. It would be a different house.

Similarly, a cosmos comrpised of different quarks would be a different cosmos. Even if the said quarks were arranged in such a way as to resemble our universe identically, it still wouldn’t be the same universe because the quarks comrprising it would be different quarks. It follows from this that the universe does not exist by a necessity of its own nature.

Moreover, we have powerful scientific evidence that not only could the universe have failed to exist, but there was a time when it actually did not in fact exist. The Big Bang Theory has a lot of scientific evidence in its favor. A Big Bang beginning is a logical entailment of the expansion of the universe which is itself an entailment of the empirically verified “red shift” of distant galaxies, and moreover, The Big Bang is the only explanation for the abundance of light elements in the universe. Moreover, the universe is running out of usable energy over time, and if the universe had existed from eternity past, it would have run out of usable energy by now. Yet the universe has not run out of usable energy by now. This means that the universe cannot be eternal in the past, but must have an absolute beginning. Since the universe had an absolute beginning, it cannot exist by a necessity of its own nature. Why? Because necessary existence entails beginningless existence. It something cannot possibly not exist, then it could not have had a beginning to its existence. Since if it had a beginning to its existence, that would mean there was a time that it did not exist.

Conclusion

Given the truth of the 3 premises, the conclusion follows: God is the explanation for why the universe exists.

Original Blog Source: http://bit.ly/2te1kFa

July 4, 2017/by Guest

Should We Be Moral Relativists?

Legislating Morality, Culture & Politics, Theology and Christian Apologetics

By Rajkumar Richard

INTRODUCTION

This is a short introductory essay to defend objective moral values. In philosophy, the term ‘objective,’ is defined as the existence of an object independent of human mind (mind-independency); “the object would “be there,” as it is, even if no subject perceived it.”¹ In contrast, the term ‘relative’ refers to the perception of an object by the subject (mind-dependency).

‘Relativism’ espouses true or false moral judgments relative to language, culture or biological makeup.²For instance, relativism need not consider polygamy as crime, for cultures or people can justify polygamy relative to their thought paradigm. Relativism denies objectivity and appeals to man’s mind.

Alternatively, ‘Objectivism’ espouses truth and falsity as independent of mind, so to claim and appeal to the reality of objective moral facts. Therefore, objectivism will rule polygamy to be a crime by appealing to the existence of objective moral laws (which is discovered and not invented by humans). This is similar to objectivism affirming the objective reality that sun is more massive than the earth.

THESIS

I – A Case for Objective Moral Values:

‘Objectivism’ or ‘we should not be moral relativists’ could be reasonably defended by positing the presence of ‘objective moral values.’ Moral relativism opposes ‘objectivism’ by negating the presence of objective realities.³ But if objective moral values can be postulated to exist, then moral relativism could be reasonably debunked.

(1) Objective Reality is Factual

There are objective realities. The fact that sun is more massive than earth is an objective reality. This fact does not depend on anyone affirming or negating it.

(2) Objective Moral Values are a Reality

It’s morally wrong to not assist a person in need when we are able to. Similarly genocide is morally wrong; it is morally wrong to deliberately and systematically eliminate a group of people. These are universally affirmed objective moral values and do not depend on people’s mind (whether anyone believes or accepts, it is morally wrong to not assist a person and to commit genocide). Thus there are universally affirmed objective moral values.

(3) An Objective Basis is Necessary for Objective Moral Values to Exist

The “objectivism” proposed by Ayn Rand (1905-1982) posits man’s selfishness or man’s survival as the objective foundation to objective moral values.⁴ But human selfishness cannot be sustained as an objective foundation against an argument that a certain human subjectivity ought to be involved in deciding opposing values of human selfishness.

Would it be objectively true if the Nazi’s argued that it was morally right for them to eliminate the entire Jewish population because the Jews were an economic burden to Germany? The human selfishness of the Nazis was predicated upon the economic crisis in Germany, but in stark contrast, the human selfishness of the Jews was predicated on protecting their own life. So the Randian objectivism would crumble when two opposing cases of human selfishness collide with each other. Thus one ought to subjectively decide between the opposing objective moral values espoused by the two groups.

But ‘God’ can be reasonably posited as the sole objective source for moral values. God, as the greatest conceivable being, transcends humanity and the space-time coordinates. Hence God is an objective reality and the sole objective basis for objective moral laws.

However, proof of God’s existence ought to be reasonably provided, if not, God cannot be posited as the basis of mind-independent objective moral laws. Many arguments for God’s existence have been reasonably and plausibly posited, such as the Teleological Argument,⁵ Cosmological Argument,⁶ Moral Argument⁷ etc.

Since objectivity, objective moral values, and an objective moral value giver (God) can be posited, a reasonable conclusion is that there are objective moral values. Hence, we should not be moral relativists.

II – A Case for an Immoral World:

Moral relativism would stimulate an immoral world without any restraint whatsoever. When moral values are predicated on human mind, morality would be a slave of the dogma that controls that human mind. If one’s dogma is cannibalism, he would appeal to moral relativism to justify his devouring of his neighbor. Since moral relativism promotes an immoral world, we should not be moral relativists.

CONCLUSION

Two mutually contradicting statements cannot be true within the same context, at the same time and for all people. So objective and relative moral values cannot both be true for they contradict each other. The presence of objective moral values and the case for an immoral world portrays that moral relativism exists by ignoring or suppressing the truth of objective moral values. Therefore, we should not be moral relativists.

END NOTES:

¹http://www.iep.utm.edu/objectiv/#SH2a

²http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/relativism/

³http://www.iep.utm.edu/moral-re/#H3

⁴http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ayn-rand/

⁵J.P Moreland, Scaling the Secular City – A Defense of Christianity, (Michigan: Baker Academic, 1987), p43-76.

⁶Ibid, p15-42.

⁷http://www.reasonablefaith.org/moral-argument#ixzz2mPz3C86b

This article was posted at http://rajkumarrichard.blogspot.in/2013/12/should-we-be-moral-relativists_28.html

Original Blog Source: http://bit.ly/2th89GR

June 27, 2017/by Guest

The Price of Denying Free Will

Theology and Christian Apologetics

By Timothy Fox

Every time I turn around I find someone else denying that humans have free will. From scientists to philosophers to theologians, it’s the cool new trend. We aren’t actually making free choices. We have been programmed either by God or our DNA to act in a certain way and have no choice but to follow it.

To be perfectly clear, we deny all types of determinism, whether it’s physical or divine. Free will is what puts the free in Freethinking Ministries and our cornerstone is the Freethinking Argument. Yet many people still don’t understand the consequences of denying free will.

But first, what is determinism? Basically, it means there is no free will. All of our beliefs, thoughts, actions, etc. are “decided” for us, either by internal or external forces: our DNA, the laws of physics, or a deity. You’re a train on a fixed track with no control whatsoever. Even if you think that you really deliberated about what color socks you were going to wear this morning, you wore what you wore and you were completely unable to do otherwise.

So before you join all the cool kids, you need to know the price of admission. This is what it will cost you to deny free will:

No free will = no moral responsibility

If every one of our actions have been predetermined for us, how can we be held accountable for them? Or how can a divine puppet master condemn you for performing evil actions if he’s the one pulling your strings? The murderer has no choice but to murder. The rapist has no choice but to rape. Whether you are loving and kind or an intolerant, sexist, racist, bigot, you have no control over it. You were born that way, just like everyone else. Nothing you do is your fault.

But do we honestly believe that? Of course not. We hold criminals accountable for their crimes. We praise altruism and self-sacrifice. Only free will makes those things possible.

No free will = no meaning, purpose, or love

The most basic aspects of humanity hinge on the existence of free will: meaning, purpose, and love. True love cannot be coerced; it requires people freely and genuinely committing to each other’s well-being. One’s meaning in life is based on deep thought, reflection, and ultimately a desire to pursue it. But apart from free will, meaning, purpose, and love are void and empty words.

No free will = no rationality

As Tim Stratton argues in his Freethinking Argument, in a deterministic world, there is no true thought or rationality. These things are based on the ability to analyze data, weigh evidence, and select the best conclusion.

After all, if you think free will is a lie, how did you come to that conclusion? Did you survey the evidence and freely choose to accept determinism? I hope you see how absurd that is. If there is no free will, you did not rationally come to believe that. You were determined to accept it, just like everything else you think and believe. You never came to freely believe in anything; you were merely determined to do so.

This ties into the next…

No free will = absolute uncertainty about everything

If all of your thoughts and beliefs have been predetermined for you, how do you know if any of them are actually true? You can’t freely test them or reflect on them. You’re stuck in complete uncertainty. If any of your beliefs actually match reality – which is the definition of truth – it’s a grand cosmic accident, and you would never know the difference. So if you reject free will, you must also reject justified true belief, meaning knowledge.

Yes, if you deny free will, you also reject all knowledge.

Other Nonsense

Think about how ridiculous it is to write a book, article, blog, or whatever against free will. Did the author freely write it? Did he actually think, reflect, and carefully choose his words to make the best argument possible? And does he expect you to freely read it and be persuaded to believe that free will does not exist?

You may also hear a free will denier say something like “There is no free will but we have to live as if there were.” That’s ridiculous. It assumes you have the ability to choose to live a certain way. The moment the determinist attempts to convince you to deny free will, he contradicts himself.

Conclusion

This is the price of denying free will. If you reject it, you must also discard moral responsibility, purpose, meaning, love, rationality, and knowledge. Are you really willing to give those things up by espousing determinism? Or look at it the other way. If you believe that you are a true freethinker, that humans have real moral obligations, and that we are free to find meaning in life, you must also affirm free will.

And then you need a worldview that accommodates free will. Naturalism won’t cut it. Neither will a religion where God exhaustively determines all things in the universe, including the actions of human beings. We think the best choice is a worldview with a God who is fully sovereign, yet has granted humans free will, including the ability to freely accept his offer of forgiveness or to reject him.

The choice is yours.

Original Blog Source: http://bit.ly/2scsTPZ

June 13, 2017/by Guest

Is Religion the Practice of Avoiding Truth?

Theology and Christian Apologetics

By Luke Nix

Introduction

A month or so ago, I came across an interesting challenge to Christianity. A skeptic told me that religion was an exercise in avoiding truth- a willful delusion. He observed that many Christians (and religious people, in general) tend to believe the claims of their “holy” books over what has been discovered about nature, history, or the very nature of reality. He noticed that many religious people have a precommitment to a particular understanding of the world and no amount of evidence provided will persuade them otherwise. He, as an intellectual, does not want to make this same mistake. In this post, I want to explore the possibility that he is making the same mistake based upon the philosophical foundations of the claim he makes for rejecting religion, and Christianity specifically.

Missing Philosophical Foundations

While several things did strike me as dissonant about his claim, one of the first things that I noticed about the language the skeptic chose was that his naturalistic worldview could not provide any such grounding for the claim. I am specifically referring to his references to the will and ability to reason.

The Missing Will and Intentionality

First, if naturalism is true then any specific event is the cumulative result of the events prior to it, governed by laws of nature. Not only does this apply to any specific event, it applies to all events in the history of the universe all the way back to the big bang. On this view, ultimately, the laws of physics and the initial conditions of the universe fatalistically determined every event that would take place. This includes every “willful” “decision” that humans would make. Ultimately, there are no true decisions being made, no person is “willfully” denying anything; they are merely reacting to the events prior to their “decisions.” The claim that anyone is doing anything “willfully” does not make sense in a naturalistic world. So, the naturalist cannot actually claim an intentional anything and be speaking accurately about reality.

The Missing Ability to Reason Reliably

Second, an assumption of the claim is that it is possible for people to reason reliably and accurately (but have just chosen not to). If naturalism is true, then the brains responsible for reasoning and the senses responsible for sensing the environment are not focused on true inferences or true observations but on survival. Alvin Plantinga spends an entire book on this very topic that I have recently read and reviewed. However, I’d like to reinforce Plantinga’s conclusion, that if naturalism is true then we cannot trust our brains to reason towards truth, with some evidence from the real world. If naturalism is true, there is no such thing as free agency (see paragraph above). This means that everything that we believe about the intentionality of others is false. We intend to get up in the morning, to eat, to walk, to drive, to work, to organize, to engineer, to account, to create, to relate, to think, and numerous other things. If evolution has produced brains that believe that we actually do these things intentionally, then our brains survived for their ability to produce a majority of beliefs that are false yet highly practical in the environment.

The Over-Abundance of “Useful Fictions”

What makes this so powerful is that intentionality is merely one all-encompassing belief about reality that, if false, demonstrates that our brains are unreliable when it comes to inferring truth about reality, yet we have evidence that our brains have survived and that we do believe these false notions. With every additional false notion that is brought to the table of evidence (the concept of design, the concept of purpose, the concept of value, the concept of progress [all four require true intentionality, even value grounded in purpose], objective morality, moral and creative responsibility, reward and punishment, and even the existence of God- just to name a few more), the conclusion that Plantinga argued philosophically becomes even more certain evidentially.

But some naturalists attempt to escape this conclusion by saying that these are merely “useful fictions.” I find this to be an astounding concession. When we are discussing the ability to discover truth, “useful fictions” is actually an oxymoron. This becomes painfully apparent when one considers how deeply grounded in and encompassing of our beliefs about reality these fictions truly are. And yet, we still believe them because the fictions are useful. Useful for survival, but obviously not for their truth-value, for if it were for their truth-value, we would not believe them. Any naturalist who grants that “useful fictions” are believed fall prey to this devastating argument. And what is even more devastating than all our beliefs being based in fiction? The fact that we have near-certainty that no belief will ever be believed for its truth-value. For the naturalist, this brings annihilation to the only source they thought they had for truth: science. Science depends upon the reliability of our senses and our brains to infer true things about reality, and if they can never be reasonably expected to produce such, then science has no place to begin or go regarding the search for what is true. Science is merely another “useful fiction” that we falsely believe for its survival value.

Conclusion

The skeptic who raises such a challenge fundamentally contradicts their worldview when they claim that someone is “willfully avoiding truth.” And the evidence closely approaches 100% that they should be speaking that claim to a mirror: it is all-but-certain that they are the ones with the willful delusion, possessing faith despite the evidence–a blind faith. Based upon the weight of the evidence and the logical contradiction within the worldview, any skeptic, who raises this challenge out of concern for the pursuit of truth, should abandon their naturalism and the idea that our brains are the result of unguided processes otherwise they fall victim to the very evil they wish to escape.

For more information on this argument against naturalism I highly recommend:

Where the Conflict Really Lies– Alvin Plantinga
Agents Under Fire– Angus Menuge
The Programming of Life– Donald E. Johnson

Original Blog Source: http://bit.ly/2sc7V3P

June 11, 2017/by Guest

Skeptics Can’t Have It Both Ways

Theology and Christian Apologetics

By Brent Hardaway

Former L.A. County District Attorney and agnostic Vince Bugliosi believes that the problem of evil is fatal to believing in Christianity.

“I’m an agnostic only on the issue of whether there is a God, a supernatural being who created the universe. I’m not an agnostic on the Christian God… while God can be all-powerful or all-good, he cannot be both, since these are irreconcilable virtues in a world overflowing with the bloody crops of evil. Even eliminating all the other supposed attributes of God, if he is all-powerful, and hence capable of preventing evil, for him to cause, or do nothing to stop, the unbelievable suffering and horror in this world immediately tells one that God cannot be all-good, as Christianity believes its God to be.” ¹

But then, in a later chapter in his book he mentions numerous parts of the Bible where God actually does something to put a stop to evil, and he is furiously outraged at Him for doing so. Ok, technically, he doesn’t say it that way. But he argues, as skeptics increasingly have in recent years,

“So Christians and Jews call God all-good and all-perfect, but when they get around to printing their bibles that describe his conduct, they describe someone who would make history’s greatest villains look like very pale imitations by comparison. Would even Adolf Hitler, Josef Stalin, Mao Zedong, Pol Pot, Osama bin Laden, or Tomas de Torquemada do the things the God of Jewish and Christian scriptures did?” ²

Of course, he is referring here to events like The Flood and the destruction of Jericho, among others.

But let’s think about this a moment. What if God hadn’t sent the flood? No doubt, Bugliosi and other skeptics would cry out something like this –

“God created humans, and within a short time, the earth was filled with violence. Violence, violence everywhere! And where was God in all this? Why didn’t he do something about it?”

And if God hadn’t wiped out Jericho and other cities and kingdoms around Israel, we’d no doubt here the complaint that –

“The Caananites were sacrificing children to their gods generation after generation. It had gone on for 400 years at one point, but God just let it continue! How can God be considered all-loving and all-powerful at the same time?”

One might object that God has no right to take the life of innocent children who haven’t done anything wrong, as scripture records God doing in these cases. But what about the possibility that the children of the flood and of Jericho could easily have gone on to be as savage as their parents? I wonder what Bugliosi would say if Adolf Hitler had died in a house fire in Austria in 1890, when he was 1 years old. Probably something like this –

“An innocent baby named Adolf Hitler, who had done nothing wrong, nothing at all, was allowed by this supposedly merciful God to die in a fire. Why didn’t God stop it? Couldn’t He have easily stopped it with an impromptu rain shower?”

We have no way of knowing if a particular baby would have grown up to be a mass murderer or worse. But perhaps if Bugliosi was God, he would have let the child grow old enough until it had actually done something wrong, was no longer innocent, and then taken its life. But then, he’s just allowed evil to take place, and some skeptic would blast him because he could have stopped it. Oops!

But perhaps Bugliosi has a better idea on what to do with evil people. Instead of taking the life of those who will commit evil, perhaps he would keep them permanently suspended in a perpetual force field that keeps them from moving. But how long before this becomes sheer torture of boredom, if nothing else? How would Bugliosi respond to the skeptics who would no doubt complain that this is cruel and unusual punishment?

When all is said and done, God is merciful and has decided to withhold His wrath in many cases precisely because He isn’t the cruel, uncompassionate monster skeptics thinks He is. Yet, His goodness means that He won’t withhold it forever, and He does choose to intervene – even if skeptics call him a monster for doing so.

¹ Bugliosi, Vincent. Divinity of Doubt, pp. 25-26

² Bugliosi, Vincent. Divinity of Doubt, pp. 156

Original Blog Source: http://bit.ly/2qt3G3u

May 30, 2017/by Guest

The Difference Between What A View Asserts And Implies

Theology and Christian Apologetics

By Luke Nix

Introduction

In any discussion in which we are defending a particular view, we must present both a positive case and the negative case. The positive case shows the evidence for the view we are defending, while the negative case shows the problems with the alternative being presented. Both are necessary in the overall case. The negative case is necessary because the adherent of the other view needs a logical reason to abandon their view for an alternative. The positive case is necessary because if an adherent is provided a logical reason to abandon their view, the other view being presented may not be the only option. The way that a view is shown to be incorrect is that its claims are put to the test against reality and reason. If the claims are found to not reflect reality or they are not logical, then the view is false. However, the claims of a view can be of (at least) two different types that require a different approach. Today I want to discuss the differences in the assertions and the implications of a view or model. Understanding the differences will help us be more aware of how to properly address them in other views, and the understanding will also assist us in our formation and critique of our own views. This applies to worldviews, scientific models, philosophical theories, and really anything view that makes claims about reality, regardless of which area of reality it is.

Assertions are propositions that a view or model explicitly claims to be true. When we are talking about worldviews, a worldview’s assertions are the collection of propositions that it claims are true about reality. This collection is explicitly stated and defended by the adherents to the particular worldview that makes those claims.

When critiquing a worldview, it is important that we properly understand the assertions of that worldview. If we fail to understand the assertions correctly, then we run the risk of arguing against a misunderstanding of the worldview- a strawman. If we argue against a strawman, then we have not shown the worldview we are attempting to critique as having any issues. Thus our critique has not provided the adherent of that worldview a valid reason to reject it in favor of an alternative. Our critique simply does not apply to the debate at hand, and we sound like some crazy person who has decided to just start telling a story that has no applicability to the discussion at hand. Unless we are willing to take the time to properly understand what a worldview asserts, there is really no point in attempting to argue against it.

Some assertions are essential to the worldview, so if they are shown to be false, the entire worldview falls apart. While other assertions are not so essential to the worldview, and if they are shown to be false, they can either be adjusted or removed altogether. What gets really interesting and often causes great disagreements among adherent to the same worldview is that they do not always agree upon what is essential to the worldview and what is non-essential. For details on this, see my post “Zombies of Christianity.”

Testing the assertions of a worldview or model is a direct way to test for its ability to accurately describe reality (truthfulness). If one of the essential propositions is found to be false, then the whole worldview or model may be rejected and an alternative needs to be found. If an assertion that is non-essential is found to be false, the worldview or model simply needs to be adjusted to accommodate the new data; however, that adjustment must not violate (it must be logically consistent) with the rest of the worldview or model. Sometimes what seems to be a minor adjustment affects the whole worldview or model, but not necessarily to the point of changing the essentials. As long as the essential assertions are not compromised, the main worldview or model remains intact, just with some different details. For those who are committed to a basic worldview (such as mere Christianity), the discovery that they need to adjust the details of their theology, science, or another part of the worldview does not undermine the historic event of the Resurrection of Jesus Christ, so there is no need to be afraid or even resistant to change the detailed assertions of our worldview when the evidence demonstrates a non-essential detail to be incorrect.

What Are Implications?

While attacking the assertions of a worldview or model is a more direct challenge, one can use a more indirect method that is just as powerful. Many critiques of worldviews or models come in the form of critiquing, not the assertions of the view but, the implications. Implications are the collection of propositions that the assertions of a view necessarily leads to when the logic is carried to its end (or just a few steps from the assertion). Implications are not explicitly claimed by the worldview or its adherents, and in some cases, certain implications are not even held by the adherents because the adherents have not worked the logic through to discover them.

Necessary implications can be discovered using the assertions of the view and deductive reasoning. Any sound conclusion that results yet is not explicitly claimed, is an implication of the view. Since implications are necessarily dependent upon the assertions, it is, once again, extremely important to ensure that we properly understand the assertions of a worldview before attempting to deduce its implications.

As I mentioned earlier, implications can be used to critique a worldview indirectly but just as conclusively as testing assertions. If a validly concluded implication is false, then that indicates that one of the premises in the deductive argument is false. If that premise is an assertion of a worldview, then that worldview has been demonstrated logically to be false (as it is currently held- both essentials and non-essentials included). If an adherent wishes to maintain that worldview consistently, the false assertion would either need to be adjusted, so as to not lead to the false implication, or it would need to be removed from the worldview altogether. Of course, this flexibility would only apply to assertions that are not essential. If the false premise is an essential assertion, then the worldview has been completely falsified, and even the basic worldview cannot be believed reasonably, only emotionally- against reason, logic, and evidence.

Now, as I mentioned, not all implications are held by adherents to different worldviews or models. So it is extremely important to understand what an adherent believes. They may very well agree that a particular implication is false, but they may insist that they are being consistent. This is usually an opportunity to get them to go into further details of their worldview or model. If they are correct that they are being consistent with rejecting the implication, then it is likely that there is another assertion (or collection of assertions) that place a nuance on the “false” premise that adjusts it to avoid the implication (see my post “Providing Alternative Explanations“). The newly discovered nuances of the view may also make the implication not one that is necessary but one that is optional, which, of course, the adherent would simply avoid. Now, clarification does not always undermine a false implication; the adherent may simply not understand the deductive argument, or they are more committed to the false assertion than they are committed against the implication- they may be actually willing to accept the implication as true, which would demonstrate that they are actually more committed to a view than committed to truth.

Conclusion

The differences in assertions and implications are important to analyzing and addressing both properly. In our own views, the understanding will help us identify where a view can be flexible to follow the evidence where it leads. This allows us to adjust our own views as necessary and allows us to be more reserved and pointed, where applicable, in our claims of showing an opposing view to be inaccurate (which helps keep discussions cordial and respectful). In my discussions with people about different views, I try to identify if what I’m arguing against is an assertion or an implication; simply saying something like “I know you may not hold to this particular claim, but if you allow me to show you how your view logically leads to it by necessity, you may be able to more clearly see why I reject that view and why I think you should also, based upon your rejection of it.” In the effort to be more careful thinkers, recognition of the distinction between assertions and implications will also help in our effort to be more persuasive presenters and defenders.

Original Blog Source: http://bit.ly/2r59CLN

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May 14, 2017/by Guest

Tag Archive for: philosophy

Should Christians Reject the Soul for Biblical Reasons?

Does an Objective Moral Compass Point to God?

Responding To Free Will Critics

Freedom Through Obedience: A Lesson from Star Wars

The Contingency Argument For God’s Existence

Should We Be Moral Relativists?

INTRODUCTION

THESIS

I – A Case for Objective Moral Values:

(1) Objective Reality is Factual

(2) Objective Moral Values are a Reality

(3) An Objective Basis is Necessary for Objective Moral Values to Exist

II – A Case for an Immoral World:

CONCLUSION

END NOTES:

The Price of Denying Free Will

Is Religion the Practice of Avoiding Truth?

Skeptics Can’t Have It Both Ways

The Difference Between What A View Asserts And Implies

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