Tag Archive for: free will

 

Why doesn’t God make Himself more obvious? If God truly exists, why wouldn’t He just appear to everyone and settle all doubts once and for all? In a world filled with skepticism, doubt, and unbelief, the “divine hiddenness” of God is one of the most common objections raised against Christianity. But is it really a valid reason to reject His existence? In this solo midweek episode, Frank tackles a listener’s question about God’s hiddenness and explores these questions along the way:

  • Does the hiddenness of God negate the evidence we already have for His existence?
  • What does Scripture reveal about why God may choose to remain unseen?
  • Would seeing the full presence of God actually eliminate doubt and unbelief for some people?
  • How do free will and love relate to divine hiddenness?
  • Why didn’t Jesus parade Himself around publicly post-resurrection so that everyone could see Him?
  • How did so many Pharisee priests come to believe in Jesus?
  • Were the angels ever exposed to the full presence of God?

If you—or someone you know—wrestles with the hiddenness of God, this episode will help you see how His presence can still be known. Don’t miss this thought-provoking discussion on one of the most challenging questions from skeptics!

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Resources mentioned during the episode:

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The Screwtape Letters by C.S. Lewis

 

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God created humans in a state of sinless perfection, but all of that changed when Adam and Eve ate of the forbidden fruit from the tree of knowledge of good and evil. “The Lord God took the man and put him in the garden of Eden to work it and keep it. And the Lord God commanded the man, saying, “You may surely eat of every tree of the garden, but of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil you shall not eat, for in the day that you eat of it you shall surely die” (Gen 2:15-17 ESV). So why did God put that tree in the Garden in the first place? Not only that, He put it right in the middle of the Garden! It wasn’t in some remote corner. Was He trying to set a trap for them?

Would you rather have Dangerous Freedom or Safe Determinism?

To better understand this, you might begin by asking yourself if you would rather hear the words “I love you” from another human being or from an AI computer like Siri or Alexa. One might ask, “What’s the difference? The same audible sounds are coming your way, right?”

Of course, even a child knows and feels the difference to that question, and it touches on God’s intentions in the Garden. Simply put, God didn’t create us to relate to Him like a Siri, Alexa, or any other such robotic creation that responds from a soup of pre-arranged equations. God is love, and He wants genuine love in return (as we all do, if we’re honest). But genuine love cannot be demonstrated unless there is the freedom to choose otherwise (to hate). Hence the tree of knowledge of good and evil.

Just before they ate the fruit, did God zap the tree to make it disappear? No, He did not. Could He have? Yes, of course. But that would have violated the very freedom He had given to them, and He would be kidding Himself to think that would solve their heart problem.

Fast forward a few years to the first murder when Cain killed his brother Abel. Before the tragedy, God approached Cain and warned him — pleaded with him — to not do it. “Sin is crouching at your door, but you must master it” (Genesis 4:7). Sadly, we see that Cain did not heed the warning. But couldn’t God have zapped the weapon (or whatever means) Cain used just prior to the murder? Sure. But if that had happened, do you think Cain would have given up on his intentions? Human nature makes it quite plausible to surmise that he would have continued looking for another weapon nearby since the murder had already taken place in Cain’s heart. If God had interfered with the scenario, He would have been taking away the very gift He has given to all humans: the freedom to choose.

Freedom to Love Includes Freedom to Hate

If we want to sing “all we need is love” then we must be willing to accept that this is not possible without room to hate. God’s gift of freedom must have a means of testing (e.g., the tree in the Garden). Otherwise we’re back to a “Siri, tell me you love me” relationship. In this life there will always be those who will reject love alongside those who accept it. Despite our best efforts, no amount of social reform can erase these extremes. This is not to say that we should not be involved in social reforms. Quite the opposite! Love compels us to seek the welfare of those around us. But it is frivolous when we see ourselves as the solution and that one day evil can be erased if we just try harder or pass enough laws. The only way out of this mess is to recognize the need to appeal to a higher power – to God Himself. It is pure hubris to think we humans can do this on our own strength. We cannot. And because God gave us the freedom to choose or reject Him, He will not force us to ask Him for help (though He desires us to ask). To do so forcefully would violate His own nature. And so we see the continuation of both love and hatred, as it has been since the Garden.

In one bit of news there are moments of incredible selfless beauty, followed immediately by stories of gross abuse. And yet our penchant is to tell ourselves that we’ll eventually overcome hate by our own strength. Deep down nobody really believes that at the gut level. Do you really think jealousy and envy will be gone forever with enough social reform? That never again will someone curse another in their heart? No, only a total transformation of our hearts can overcome this. Thank God He has given us a Rescuer through His Son, Jesus (Acts 4:12). His publicly attested death, burial & resurrection from the grave prove that He has power over sin & death. But here’s the rub: He leaves it up to you to freely accept or reject His gift (hence John 3:16). As CS Lewis said in the The Great Divorce:

“There are only two kinds of people in the end: those who say to God, ‘Thy will be done,’ and those to whom God says, in the end, ‘Thy will be done.’ All that are in Hell, choose it. Without that self-choice there could be no Hell. No soul that seriously and constantly desires joy will ever miss it. Those who seek find. Those who knock it is opened”
– C.S. Lewis, The Great Divorce, in The Complete C. S. Lewis Signature Classics, HarperSanFrancisco 2002, pg. 340.

Divine Restoration Through Christ Alone

God’s heart is always bent on restoration. If that weren’t the case He’d have destroyed us in the Garden. But He didn’t. Death came through Adam, but restoring life has come through Jesus. Now that’s great news! “For if while we were enemies we were reconciled to God by the death of his Son, much more, now that we are reconciled, shall we be saved by his life” (Rom 5:10). So which tree do you choose? The tree in the Garden that exalts yourself as ruler, bringing eternal enslavement and death? Or the tree on which Jesus hung and bled that brings you eternal freedom and life? So simple, yet so costly

Recommended Resources Related to this Topic

If God, Why Evil? (DVD Set), (MP3 Set), and (mp4 Download Set) by Frank Turek
Why Doesn’t God Intervene More? (DVD Set), (MP3 Set), and (mp4 Download Set) by Frank Turek
Why does God allow Bad Things to Happen to Good People? (DVD) and (mp4 Download) by Frank Turek
Hell? The Truth about Eternity (MP3 Set), (DVD Set), and (Mp4 Download Set) by Dr. Frank Turek
Short Answers to Long Questions (DVD) and (mp4 Download) by Dr. Frank Turek
Was Jesus Intolerant? (DVD) and (Mp4 Download) by Dr. Frank Turek
Oh, Why Didn’t I Say That? Is the Bible Historically Reliable? by Dr. Frank Turek DVD, Mp4, Mp3 Download.

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Kent Suter was raised in Atlanta, GA and earned his Bachelor’s degrees in Biblical Studies and in Christian Education from Bryan College in Dayton, TN (2002). From there he attained a Master’s degree in Christian Apologetics from Southern Evangelical Seminary (2008) where he served as student assistant to his late mentor and friend, Dr. Norman Geisler. Following his time at SES, he moved back to Atlanta and served as Youth Pastor for middle and high school students for 15 years at Cornerstone Bible Church. Today he and his wife of 20 years, Brook, and their four children reside in Orlando, FL, where he now serves as a financial advisor with OneAmerica Securities. You can read more about Kent’s story at ksuter.com.

 

By Al Serrato

There has always been evil and suffering in the world, and how to make sense of it is a principal object of Christian apologetics. Often, the argument is made that God gave us free will, and as a result, people have the liberty to choose to do evil. But this answer does not satisfy the atheist; often, he will challenge God’s goodness, with comments such as the following:

 

You claim your God is omniscient. When he created the universe, he saw the sufferings which humans would endure as a result of the sin of those original humans. Surely he would have known that it would have been better for those humans to never have been born (in fact, the Bible says this very thing), and surely this all-compassionate deity would have foregone the creation of a universe destined to imperfection in which many of the humans were doomed to eternal suffering…or alternatively only create those humans who will freely choose God, and eliminate the possibility of their suffering.

This challenge has much intuitive appeal. We all rail against the suffering that each of us must face, to varying degrees, as our lives progress. We realize the fragility of our human condition, and how inhospitable this creation seems to be to flesh and blood mortals. It is frightening, indeed, to think of all the ways that our lives can be tragically altered, or ended. But does the harshness of this reality “prove” that God is not “good”?

What do you mean by “Good”?

The first step in responding to this challenge is to get a better idea of what is meant by “good.” Generally speaking, “good” is a measure of quality; how a thing or an idea measures up to a standard of performance. A “good” knife is one that appropriately performs its function, or its intended use. A “good” person is one that lives up to a standard of behavior. But how can one determine what that standard should be? For example, any time two opposing things are in conflict, whether they are teams, or armies or ideas, the quality of the outcome will necessarily be decided from the unique perspective of each of the involved parties. For instance, the American victory in World War II was a “good” outcome for Western democracy, but a decidedly “bad” outcome for those who staked their future fortunes on the Nazis. A good outcome for my favorite baseball team is when the other side loses. In short, and at the risk of sounding flippant, when it comes to conflicting worldviews or ideas, a “win” is the outcome which is good for the winner and bad for the loser.

With this basic distinction in mind, it would seem that, at least preliminarily, answering whether it was “better” to have “foregone the creation of a universe destined to imperfection in which many of the humans were doomed to eternal suffering” would depend on the person being asked. For those spending eternity in heaven with a God of infinite power, who intends to allow us to live eternally and joyfully in his presence, He certainly did the right thing in creating us and in giving us this opportunity. Infinite and eternal joy and fulfillment versus, well, oblivion – that’s not a difficult choice. By contrast, for the person suffering torment in hell, realizing that he will spend eternity aware of, but separated from, this awesome being, it will probably seem “better” that man was never created.

Who decides what’s “better?”

But let’s take it to a deeper level. How does one decide which of two sides is right in claiming that a successful conclusion according to their desires is an objectively “good” outcome. For example, the Nazis deemed victory in Europe a good outcome. Would their victory actually have made Nazi domination of Europe a “good” result? The Nazis would argue that in the period of a few short years they transformed Germany from a beleaguered nation experiencing great suffering because of the Versailles Peace Treaty to an economic powerhouse, a state marked by efficiency and great industry. They sought to expand that “efficiency” to the rest of Europe, what they would claim to be a good result. The Allies countered that their victory was not good simply because their side won. As the victors, they did not simply assert that they were right and then impose punishment on the vanquished. Instead, they tried the Nazi leaders in what is known to history as the Nuremberg War Crimes Trials, the purpose of which was to establish that crimes against humanity had been committed. The underlying premise was that the “good” accomplished by the Allies was not a subjective good, i.e. we’re glad we won and you lost, but an objective good, i.e. Nazi officials were guilty of conduct that was objectively evil, and therefore justly punished. The premise of the trials was that such objective knowledge of good was available to us, and not that the might of the victor makes right. But how can this objective assessment be made, if each side can claim that “good” is what suits them? This, of course, is a frequent argument of the theist. While an atheist can be moral, he cannot ground his morality, because only the existence of a transcendent being provides the basis for judging objectively the “good” or “evil” of any conduct under consideration.

“While an atheist can be moral, he cannot ground his morality.”

Without such an objective and transcendent judge, the atheist’s conclusions are mere opinions, mere statements of likes or dislikes. By that standard, the challenger here is left saying that having people end up in hell displeases him. To conclude that allowing anyone to suffer in hell is worse than not creating at all, the atheist must appeal to a standard of good and evil, a standard of goodness. But what is that standard?

Christians can at least make sense of this standard: it is for the Creator to decide. As applied to my World War Two example, which side had objective good on its side is not difficult to determine. Granted, this does not mean that the Allies did no wrong, or where completely free of evil action. No, the law and rules applied to them as much as to the Axis powers and history shows that there were indeed transgressions by the western powers. But only an Allied victory could be deemed an objectively good outcome, one consistent with God’s desires. Contrary to Nazi philosophy, all human beings are made in God’s image and are therefore endowed with God-given rights that no government can justly take from them.

It’s for God to Decide

Returning to the question raised by the challenger, the answer is the same: it is for the Creator to decide. Given his perfect knowledge, He is in a better position to judge which is a better outcome. Indeed, challenging God in this fashion seems rather presumptuous. The Creator of this universe is obviously immensely intelligent and powerful. That we should decide what He should do in creating – how He should go about assigning a value to competing options – makes about as much sense as my dog giving me advice on careers or on moral issues. Without the proper frame of reference, a proper sense of humility should prevent us from telling God how he should have approached His creative work.

In the end, foregoing creation would not have been a “good” solution for the many individuals who responded to God’s gift and are, or will be, experiencing eternity in His presence. When you combine this with the realization that people who are separated from God are separated by their own choice and not simply chosen at random, then it would not be fair to deprive so many of such joy when those who have refused God’s gift have done so of their own volition.

Recommended Resources:

Stealing From God by Dr. Frank Turek (Book, 10-Part DVD Set, STUDENT Study Guide, TEACHER Study Guide)

Legislating Morality: Is it Wise? Is it Legal? Is it Possible? by Frank Turek (Book, DVD, Mp3, Mp4, PowerPoint download, PowerPoint CD)

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Al Serrato earned his law degree from the University of California at Berkeley in 1985. He began his career as an FBI special agent before becoming a prosecutor in California, where he worked for 33 years. An introduction to CS Lewis’ works sparked his interest in Apologetics, which he has pursued for the past three decades. He got his start writing apologetics with J. Warner Wallace and Pleaseconvinceme.com.

 

By Tim Stratton

Recently I have been accused of “historical eisegesis.”[1]

According to Wikipedia, “eisegesis is the process of interpreting text in such a way as to introduce one’s own presuppositions . . . It is commonly referred to as reading into the text.” This is definitely a problem when someone does this when reading Scripture, but it’s never a compliment to be accused of this in any context.

The context of this accusation is regarding my book, Human Freedom, Divine Knowledge, and Mere Molinism. After surveying Luther, Calvin, and Philip Melanchthon, I concluded that the original Reformers were quite open to the concept of “limited libertarian freedom.” That is to say, although they might have rejected libertarian freedom when it comes to soteriological matters, they seemed to affirm the libertarian freedom to make choices regarding issues not related to salvation.

Indeed, the eminent Reformed scholar Richard Muller has reached similar conclusions in his book, Divine Will and Human Choice (p 222-223):

“Not a few of the proponents and critics of the Reformed doctrine of free choice and divine willing have confused the specifically soteriological determination of the Reformed doctrine of predestination with a ‘divine determinism of all human actions.”

Although I am not the first to point this out, the charge of “historical eisegesis” seems to have been lodged against me alone which left me scratching my head. How could anyone reach this conclusion after reading multiple quotes from the great Reformers I shared in my dissertation/book? One quote from Melanchthon particularly stood out to me. Although I thought Luther and Calvin were clear enough, if there were still any doubt, the great systematic theologian of the Reformation made it clear that humans seem to possess the freedom, opportunity, and categorical ability to do otherwise (libertarian freedom) in mundane matters not related to soteriology (salvation). Indeed, it is my favorite quote from the historical survey. Here is how it reads in my dissertation submitted to North-West University (also found on pg. 111 of my book):

Melanchthon (1521b:151)—the acknowledged theologian to Lutheranism—explains Luther’s position more thoroughly:

“Nor, indeed, do we deny liberty to the human will. The human will has liberty in the choice of works and things which reason comprehends by itself. It can to a certain extent render civil righteousness or the righteousness of works; it can speak of God, offer to God a certain service by an outward work, obey magistrates, parents; in the choice of an outward work it can restrain the hands from murder, from adultery, from theft. Since there is left in human nature reason and judgement concerning objects subjected to the senses, choice between these things, and the liberty and power to render civil righteousness, are also left…. Therefore, although we concede free will the liberty and power to perform the outward works of the Law, yet we do not ascribe to free will these spiritual matters, namely, truly to fear God, truly to believe God, truly to be confident and hold that God regards us, hears us, forgives us, etc.” [151].

Following this quote, I included one more from Melanchthon which seems to seal the deal. In fact, this is my favorite quote from any Reformer because he seems to be explicitly clear in describing libertarian freedom noting that we have power to choose or choose otherwise:

In another place Melanchthon (1521b:151) says: “You yourself have experienced that it is in your power to greet or not to greet him, to put on this coat or not put it on, to eat or not to do so…. By contrast, internal affections are not in our power.”

 If that does not sound like the limited libertarian freedom to choose or choose otherwise, I’m not sure what does.

After reading the words of the Reformed systematic theologian, how could anyone accuse me of “historical eisegesis?” Indeed, it seems to me that anyone reading the Reformers in their own words and reaching a different conclusion could be accused of the same. After contemplating this charge, I went to my book and was met with horror . . . Melanchthon’s key quote somehow did not make the final cut!

I have no idea how this happened. One of the most important and key quotes from my dissertation did not make it to my book for some reason (I am sure I am to blame — or gremlins)! I will rectify this situation in the second edition of my book. I’m currently working on a “Mere Molinism Study Guide” (which will be published by Wipf and Stock) co-authored with Timothy Fox. We will find a way to include it in the study guide when we write the section on the historical survey. Stay tuned!

Bottom line: There is good reason to believe that the original Reformers, although they rejected the idea of libertarian freedom regarding salvation issues, would also reject the idea of exhaustive divine determinism (EDD). It seems that they affirmed the idea of limited libertarian freedom in external matters (libertarian freedom limited to things unrelated to salvation issues).

Oswald Bayer seems to affirm libertarian freedom in these “external matters.” In fact, he contends that even the unregenerate can freely choose to do “good” things (or not). These “good” choices in the context of the community of the external world are meaningless regarding issues pertaining to salvation. Bayer summarizes the views that Luther, Melanchthon, and the majority of Reformers probably shared:

A human being has the freedom to order his or her own life. He or she carries responsibility for the way in which this occurs. A Christian acts in the realm of worldly justice together with those who are not Christians. In this realm, God preserves the reason and freedom of both Christians and non-Christians.[2]

Bayer (along with multiple other scholars) vindicates me from the charge of historical eisegesis.[3] Moreover, and more importantly, if Bayer is right about the beliefs of the original Reformers regarding limited libertarian freedom, and the Reformers also believed that an omniscient God knows these limited libertarian free choices logically prior to the divine creative decree and that God is still sovereign over these libertarian choices, then the original Reformers were “mere Molinists” whether they realized it or not!

Stay reasonable (Isaiah 1:18),

Dr. Tim Stratton

Notes

[1] Guillaume Bignon, A critical review and fairly comprehensive refutation of “Human Freedom, Divine Knowledge, and Mere Molinism” by Timothy A. Stratton, http://www.associationaxiome.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/Response-to-Tim-Stratton.pdfSee my 50-page response here: Bignons’ Review of Mere Molinism: A Rejoinder.

[2] Freedom? The Anthropological Concepts in Luther and Melanchthon Compared Author(s): Oswald Bayer Source: The Harvard Theological Review, Vol. 91, No. 4 (Oct.,1998), pp. 373-387 Published by: Cambridge University Press on behalf of the Harvard Divinity School Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1509856 Accessed: 08-03-2018 20:23 UTC (Pg 385)

[3] Consider the words of Shedd (a Reformed systematic theologian) who affirms the sourcehood libertarian freedom of Adam:

“In respect to its having no sinful antecedent out of which it is made, sin is origination ex nihilo. Sin is the beginning of something from nothing, and there is this resemblance between it and creation proper. In holy Adam, there was no sinful inclination or corruption that prompted the first transgression. Adam started the wicked inclination itself ex nihilo, by a causative act of self-determination.”

William Greenough Thayer Shedd, Dogmatic Theology, ed. Alan W. Gomes, 3rd ed. (Phillipsburg, NJ: P & R Pub., 2003), p. 521

Recommended resources related to the topic:

How to Interpret Your Bible by Dr. Frank Turek DVD Complete Series, INSTRUCTOR Study Guide, and STUDENT Study Guide

How Philosophy Can Help Your Theology by Richard Howe (MP3 Set), (mp4 Download Set), and (DVD Set)

 

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Timothy A. Stratton (Ph.D., North-West University) is a professor at Trinity College of the Bible and Theological Seminary. As a former youth pastor, he is now devoted to answering deep theological and philosophical questions he first encountered from inquisitive teens in his church youth group. Stratton is the founder and president of FreeThinking Ministries, a web-based apologetics ministry. Stratton speaks on church and college campuses around the country and offers regular videos on FreeThinking Ministries’ YouTube channel.

Original Blog Source: https://cutt.ly/0vF2wLd

 

By Timothy Fox

A lot can be said about Marvel’s first Disney+ series, WandaVision (Spoilers ahead!), from its weird, off-putting sitcom beginning to the broader impact the series’ events will have on the MCU. But, being that we’re named FreeThinking Ministries, obviously, we have to talk about what WandaVision confirms to us about free will.

This show isn’t the first MCU story to address free will, determinism, and human responsibility (see my article “Captain America, Bucky, and Moral Responsibility”). Superhero movies all contain moral themes such as the struggle of good vs. evil, the dangers of power, and our obligations to one another. But no discussion of morality seems to make any sense without first assuming that we have some ability to choose between right and wrong. In the case of Bucky Barnes, he has his freedom overridden at times and is compelled to do terrible things. But when he is “himself” and in control of his choices, Bucky chooses to be a hero, which is really what matters most.

WandaVision begins with Wanda and Vision in a weird sitcom reality, and it’s obvious to the viewer that something just isn’t right. The people of Westview start doing and saying odd things and it seems that they are somehow being controlled by someone or something. Eventually, we discover that someone is Wanda. Due to her immense grief, Wanda creates her own bubble around the town of Westview, the Hex, and transforms the town into her perfect world. She creates her own Vision and controls the minds and actions of (almost) every human inhabitant in town. Vision, one of the few “free thinkers” inside the Hex, eventually realizes that something is wrong and temporarily breaks the spell of some of his neighbors. He discovers that they are not only being controlled but that this control causes them great suffering since their “real” selves are locked away inside of them.

It should be obvious to the viewers of WandaVision that what Wanda has done to these people is terrible, that they are just being used to create Wanda’s own perfect world. Even if the residents of Westview were not internally suffering and were completely oblivious that they were being mind-controlled, that would still be truly evil. Freedom is a great good, and controlling or manipulating people is evil.

But let’s move from Wanda’s actions to those of the residents of Westview. She has made them all to be her perfect neighbors. However, are the people actually being good neighbors? Are they doing anything that’s actually praiseworthy? No, they are simply doing whatever Wanda wants them to do. If Wanda had made the people terrible neighbors who hurt each other instead, should they be blamed for their bad behavior? Again, they should not, since Wanda is the one in control of their actions, not the townspeople. When the residents of Westview were under Wanda’s control, they would not be responsible for any of their actions, Wanda would.

There are many philosophers and theologians who deny human freedom, thinking that we are in some way similar to the citizens of Westview. Maybe we are not being directly controlled by a Scarlet Witch, but we simply “dance to our DNA,” follow our animal instincts, or pursue our heart’s greatest desire. Regardless, if we are not free in some meaningful sense, how can we deserve praise or blame for any of our actions? We can’t. Furthermore, we would not even be persons, but merely an extension of whatever controls or programs our thoughts and behaviors. If I’m a nice guy, don’t praise me; thank God or the laws of physics. If I’m a jerk, that’s not my fault—I was born this way.

Sometimes smart people think dumb things regarding human freedom and moral responsibility. But it doesn’t take an advanced degree to realize that the residents of Westview could not possibly be responsible for any of their actions while they were under Wanda’s control. And neither can we if all of our thoughts, beliefs, and actions are caused and determined by someone or something else. Once again, we see the importance of good stories and how they can illustrate basic truths about reality. In the case of WandaVision, we plainly see the value of freedom and, with further thought, its connection to moral responsibility.

Recommended resources related to the topic:

How Philosophy Can Help Your Theology by Richard Howe (DVD Set, Mp3, and Mp4)   

How to Interpret Your Bible by Dr. Frank Turek DVD Complete Series, INSTRUCTOR Study Guide, and Student Study Guide

How Philosophy Can Help Your Theology by Richard Howe (MP3 Set), (mp4 Download Set), and (DVD Set

Jesus, You and the Essentials of Christianity – Episode 14 Video DOWNLOAD by Frank Turek (DVD)

 

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Timothy Fox has a passion to equip the church to engage the culture. He is a part-time math teacher, full-time husband and father. He has an M.A. in Christian Apologetics from Biola University as well as an M.A. in Adolescent Education of Mathematics and a B.S. in Computer Science, both from Stony Brook University. He lives on Long Island, NY with his wife and two young children.

Original Blog Source: https://cutt.ly/bxG4UJL

 

By Tim Stratton

Question:

Dear Dr. Stratton,

In your interview with Jorge Gil on Cross Examined’s Hope One, you attempted to answer “all the problems of evil” by appealing to love. In fact, you said that “the best kind of love requires libertarian free will.”  Surely this is false, for I can think of a counter-example that clearly shows this to be false.

After all, the members of the Trinity are the epitome of perfect love and they do not have libertarian free will. They cannot do otherwise. They must love by necessity. So how can “the best kind of love” require libertarian free will?

– Phillip

Tim’s Response

I am thankful for your question, Phillip! When I read it I could have kicked myself for not providing this vital clarification in my interview with Jorge Gil. Your question provides this opportunity.

Contrary to your assertion, the members of the Trinity (God) do possess libertarian freedom. This is easy to demonstrate when considering creation. The vast majority of theologians agree that God possessed the ability — the power — to create the universe or to refrain from creation. This is the epitome of libertarian freedom. Moreover, if nothing other than God causally determined Him to create the universe, then God possesses libertarian freedom. In fact, this conclusion can be reached by merely thinking about the rational implications of the Kalam Cosmological Argument. The cause and creator of the universe must possess libertarian freedom.

If God possesses the libertarian freedom, for example, to create the universe or not to create the universe, then this is an “ability to do otherwise” kind of freedom. With that said, however, we are not discussing the creation of the universe, but something different. We are discussing the “best kind of love,” or the “kind of love worth wanting.” You aptly pointed out that God does not possess the “ability to do otherwise” when it comes to love — namely the love between the Trinity which you noted is the epitome of the “best kind of love.”

I agree that each member of the Trinity does not possess the ability to NOT love the other members. For example, it is impossible for the Holy Spirit not to love the Son, and it is impossible for the Son, not to love the Father. Does this not “destroy” my claim — that the best kind of love requires libertarian freedom?

Not at all!

Just because God might not have the ability to do otherwise when it comes to love, it does not follow that God does not possess the libertarian freedom to love. This is the case because NOTHING other than God causally determines God to love. Moreover, nothing other than the Father causally determines His love for the Son and the Spirit.

It is vital to remember that there are basically two definitions of libertarian freedom:
1- The PAP/”ability to do otherwise” version.

2- The source-hood version (which simply means that a person is not causally determined by something other than the person).

When it comes to love, God possesses the source-hood version of libertarian freedom. God is not causally determined by something other than Him to love. As 1 John 4:8 makes clear: “God IS love.”

So, with all the data in mind, the best kind of love still requires libertarian freedom to be possessed by each person in the relationship. The best kind of love is when persons are not causally determined to love the other. In fact, it is simply oxymoronic to refer to a relationship where at least one person in the union was causally determined to enter the relationship as a “love relationship.” It is not love at all, rather, it is simply an incoherent combination of words.

Since it would be impossible for God to create a contingent being whose nature is necessarily loving (like God is), without causally determining the nature of the creature, God creates humans with an “ability to do otherwise” kind of libertarian freedom so that a true love relationship with humanity can be attained. Humans, then, unlike God, possess both the source-hood version and the PAP version of the libertarian freedom to love. God only has the source-hood version.

Robots have neither!

Bottom line: The best kind of love, or the kind of love worth wanting, requires libertarian freedom.

Stay reasonable (Isaiah 1:18),

Tim Stratton

Recommended resources related to the topic:

If God, Why Evil? (DVD Set), (MP3 Set), and (mp4 Download Set) by Frank Turek 

Why Doesn’t God Intervene More? (DVD Set), (MP3 Set), and (mp4 Download Set) by Frank Turek

Why does God allow Bad Things to Happen to Good People? (DVD) and (mp4 Download) by Frank Turek 

 


Timothy A. Stratton (Ph.D., North-West University) is a professor at Trinity College of the Bible and Theological Seminary. As a former youth pastor, he is now devoted to answering deep theological and philosophical questions he first encountered from inquisitive teens in his church youth group. Stratton is the founder and president of FreeThinking Ministries, a web-based apologetics ministry. Stratton speaks on church and college campuses around the country and offers regular videos on FreeThinking Ministries’ YouTube channel.

Original Blog Source: https://bit.ly/2By5Cy6 

Have you been sending your questions to Hello@CrossExamined.org so Frank can answer them on this podcast? If not, why not? Here’s this week’s main question: How can we have freedom of the will if God is completely sovereign?

 

 

By Rajkumar Richard

The question, “Would there be less evil in a world without Satan?” could be relevant, for if the answer to this question is a yes, then we could plausibly ask, “Why did God create angels, i.e., Satan if evil in this world would be lesser without Satan?”

Within this context, if God had not created Satan, evil would have been less, and our world would have been a good world. However, since God created Satan, could we then infer that God erred in HIS decision to create Satan?

The entailment to this thought process could potentially debunk Historic Christianity. God (as a maximally great being) cannot err. If God erred in creating Satan, HE cannot be God. Hence God’s existence could be disputed. The infallibility of the Bible that reveals God to mankind could also be thus disputed. We could go on and on.

Let us discuss this theme by considering the following aspects albeit from a biblical standpoint.

The Source of Sin

Sin is an evil action or motive that opposes and assaults God. Sin replaces God with something or someone in God’s rightful place of supremacy. Sin entails evil.

Understanding the source of sin is vital to understanding the theme we are discussing now. If Satan is the source of sin and evil, one could argue that God should not have created Satan to keep the world free of sin and evil.

The “Animal Nature” of man is the source of sin, claimed British Philosopher and Theologian Frederick R. Tennant. Under this notion, humans possess natural animalistic impulses as a means to human survival that have intensified through natural selection based on their evolution from less highly developed forms. Other theologians have posited other sources of sin. However, each of these views has been found to be largely inadequate.[1]

The Bible teaches differently. Sin is not caused by God (James 1:13), but man is responsible for his sins (James 1: 14-15).

Man possesses certain innate desires. He could either satisfy those desires in moderation or sin by abusing those desires to either hurt himself or the others.

His ‘desire to enjoy’ could result in an enjoyment of eating in moderation or a sin by being a glutton, whereby he injures himself.  His ‘desire to obtain’ could be satisfied either by legitimately acquiring material possessions or he could sin by exploiting and stealing from others. His ‘desire to achieve’ could be satisfied either through legitimate achievement or he could sin and achieve at the expense of others.

Man could satisfy these desires in a godly manner by dwelling within the divinely imposed constraints. But man sins when he fails to accept the divine limits to these desires and makes these desires as ends in themselves, which are the cravings of a sinful man (1 John 2: 16).

While desires are natural, there could be external inducements (Satanic or human) that motivate a man to sin. Whatever be the case, man is wholly responsible for his sins. Sin is the choice of the person who commits it.

Function of Satan in Sin

Satan is a demon (cf. Luke 10: 17-20). He is the tempter and deceiver. Satan opposes God and the work of Christ by tempting and deceiving humans. Satan tempted Adam & Eve, Jesus, Judas, etc. (cf. Acts 5:3, 1 Corinthians 7:5, 2 Corinthians 2: 11, Ephesians 6: 11, 2 Timothy 2: 26).

Sometimes we state that Satan is the source of sins. While making such statements, we use the word “source” informally. In this informal usage, “source” refers to an ‘originator’ or an ‘instigatory cause.’

If we claim that Satan is the source of all sins, i.e., if we use the word ‘source’ to mean, in an Aristotelian sense, the material cause (‘that out of which’) or the efficient cause (‘the primary source of…’), then we posit dualism. Dualism contradicts the Bible, for there are no two equally ultimate powers, one good, and the other evil.

God is the only ultimate power and God is good. God is not the source or the originator of sin or evil. Moreover, Satan was originally created good; hence Satan is not the source of sin and evil.

Potency of Freewill to Sin without Satan

If asked differently, the title question would be, “Would Adam & Eve have sinned without Satan?” Since man is responsible for his sins, the answer should be yes.

The premise on which this argument is also predicated on is the freewill-based rebellion of angels in the heavenly realm. (This premise presupposes the metaphysical similarity of the free will of angels and humans.)

The angels that rebelled against God did not have an external inducement (as Adam & Eve had Satan as an external inducer). There were only two entities during the angelic fall – God and Angels. (Even if mankind was created before the fall of Satan, man was totally incapable of influencing Satan’s fall.)

Since God can neither tempt nor cause evil, the angelic rebellion was an entailment of their free will. Therefore, it is quite reasonable to conclude that Adam & Eve had the potential to sin or would have sinned irrespective of the presence of Satan.

Satan merely accelerated the sin of Adam and Eve. Had Satan not existed, Adam and Eve would have sinned (or eaten from the tree of the knowledge of good and evil) sooner or later.

Conclusion

Satan is not the source of sin. Man’s free will is the source of sin. Man would have inevitably sinned regardless of Satan’s existence.

Would the quantum and the extent of sins be minimized if Satan was not created? Not necessarily so, for if Satan is to be considered as an accelerant of sin, then there is a possibility that the quantum and the extent of sins would be actualized at a later time. So the quantum and the extent of sins would have been the same with or without Satan, for the potency of man’s free will to sin is independent of Satan.

The other possibility is that the quantum and the extent of sins would be lesser without Satan. In which case, the question, “If evil in this world would be lesser without Satan, then why did God create Satan?” gains legitimacy.

If Satan is the sole cause of evil, then evil would have been absolutely eliminated, had Satan not been created. However, since Satan exists and that Satan is not the sole cause of evil, only God, in HIS omniscient wisdom would be able to determine the extent to which evil would be reduced had angels not been created.

But on the other hand, if the good that is to be actualized from the good angels in ministering to people is commensurately immeasurable, then God would be justified to create Satan even with the potential of evil.

Finally, natural evil, which is devoid of human willing and acting, such as hurricanes, tornadoes, volcanic eruptions, earthquakes, tsunamis, etc. and suffering caused by a host of diseases such as cancer, cystic fibrosis, etc. exist independent of Satan and adds substantial numbers to the victims of evil. The pain and suffering caused by natural evil and diseases are innate in the creational design of this world and the human body.

The fact of the matter is that evil would not cease to exist if Satan were to be non-existent. Hence, numbers need not matter. When evil exists, the terms ‘lesser’ and ‘greater’ do not gain greater significance, for the world we live in would be evil even if only 1% of the total population (1 out of 10 people) are adversely affected by evil. Moreover, if only 1% of the total population is affected by evil, then there is a certain possibility for evil to increase.

Therefore, the question, “Would there be less evil in a world without Satan?” would neither debunk nor harm Historic Christianity.

Notes:

[1] Other theologians have posited various sources for sin. The “Anxiety of Finiteness” was proposed by Reinhold Niebuhr (1892-1971). The idea of “Existential Estrangement” was proposed by Paul Tillich (1886-1965), the “Economic Struggle” proposed by the Liberation Theology, and “Individualism and Competitiveness” as argued by Harrison Sacket Elliott (1882-1951).

 


Rajkumar Richard is passionate to strengthen the faith of fellow Christians, especially the young Christians. He has a Masters in Religion (Southern Evangelical Seminary, NC, USA) and Masters in Biology (School of Biological Sciences, Madurai Kamaraj University, India). He is a Christian blogger, itinerant speaker, social evangelist, and a mentor to young Christians.

Original Blog Source: http://bit.ly/2OKqCUp

By Evan Minton

Genesis 1 teaches that human beings are created in God’s image, in His likeness. Much debate and speculation over the years have occurred over what exactly that means. It obviously cannot mean that we look like God if for no other reason than that everyone looks different. In my blog post “What Does It Mean To Be Made In God’s Image?” I argued that to be made in God’s image entailed a number of attributes which we have that animals don’t have: rationality, a moral compass, and free will.

Some theologians, however, object to this list. They argue that if this is what it means to be made in God’s image, then that must mean that fetuses, infants, and the severely mentally incapacitated cannot be made in God’s image. The argument goes that if they’re not made in God’s image, then they have no intrinsic value. If they have no intrinsic value, then it would not be evil to kill them, any more than it would be evil to shoot a deer or stomp on a cockroach. Consequently, this position on the imago Dei falls on the horns of a dilemma: either abortion and infanticide are justified, or else this cannot be what constitutes the divine image.

Dr. Michael Heiser made this objection in his book The Unseen Realm. Heiser wrote: “Identifying the nature of the divine image has preoccupied students and pastors for a long time. Chances are you’ve heard a sermon or two on the topic. I’m willing to bet that what you’ve heard is that the image of God is similar to something on this list: •Intelligence •Reasoning ability •Emotions •The ability to commune with God •Self-awareness (sentience) •Language/ communication ability •The presence of a soul or spirit (or both) •The conscience •Free will All those things sound like possibilities, but they’re not. The image of God means none of those things. If it did, then Bible-believers ought to abandon the idea of the sanctity of human life in the womb.”[1]

It’s understandable why some would raise this objection. After all, fetuses cannot reason and neither can infants. Infants don’t know the difference between right and wrong (this is, after all, my primary argument against the reformed doctrine of infant damnation). So if rationality and moral knowledge are what makes the divine image, and fetuses and infants don’t have these, then obviously this must mean they’re not made in God’s image. Since this is absurd, we must reject this view of the imago Dei.

What do we say to this?

First: I Now Believe That These Are Necessary Conditions Of The Divine Image, But Not Sufficient Conditions

Doing some study of John Walton’s “Lost World” books has shown me some surprising insights into how the ancient Israelites would have read Genesis. In The Lost World Of Adam and Eve, Professor Walton explains that to be made “In God’s Image” meant to be God’s representative. Humans represent God on Earth in a similar way in which statues of deities represented those deities in the temples in which those deities were worshipped. Humans are God’s “statues” so to speak, in His “Cosmic Temple” (i.e. the universe, which took 7 days to inaugurate, as was customary of the inauguration of any temple in the ancient near east).[2]

This would explain why angels and demons are never considered by scripture to be divine image bearers. They have rationality, free will, and the moral law written on their hearts, but they are not God’s representatives on Earth. Indeed, angels rarely appear visibly to people, and even when they do, people are often unaware of it (see Hebrews 13:2).

  1. Richard Middleton (Roberts Wesleyan College) agrees with Walton. In, The Liberating Image, Middleton says that the image of God describes“the royal office or calling of human beings as God’s representatives and agents in the world.”Image of God means that humans have been given “power to share in God’s rule or administration of the earth’s resources and creatures.”[3]
    But notice this: in order to be a representative of God, you need to be rational, know the difference between good and evil, and have free will.  If you aren’t an a-rational, a-moral, causally determined creature, you won’t be a very good representative of God on Earth. Having rationality, free will, and moral knowledge are prerequisites to being God’s representative on Earth. So, I don’t recant what I said in “What Does It Mean To Be Made In God’s Image,” I merely admit that my list of essential attributes was incomplete.

For a creature to be created in God’s image, one must
1: Be God’s representative on Earth. 

This means that the creature must be

2: Capable of rational thought.

3: Capable of knowing morally right actions from morally wrong ones.

4: Have free will of the libertarian variety. 

If scholars like Walton, Middleton, and others are right; that being made in God’s image is to be his representative and co-regent in the world, then the mental qualities described simply follow by logical extension.

This, by the way, also answers Heiser’s other reductio ad absurdum; that “If one animal anywhere, at any time, learned anything contrary to instinct, or communicated intelligently (to us or within species), or displayed an emotional response (again to us or other creatures), those items must be ruled out as image bearing.”[4]  Lower animals weren’t cosigned by God to be his representatives on Earth, so even if apes became as smart as the apes in the Planet Of The Apes movie series, it wouldn’t mean that they suddenly gained the image of God. To bear the divine image means to be God’s representative on Earth which requires rationality, free will, and the moral law. But possessing the latter 3 doesn’t entail that you are the former. The latter are simply needed for the former to exist.

Secondly, Babies Don’t Have The Aforementioned Faculties, But They Will In Time.

While babies and fetuses aren’t yet capable of exercising these capacities, they will be eventually, if allowed to grow. They are the sort of creature that has the capacity to gain these abilities. They have the inherent potentiality to be rational, moral agents. A kitten or a baby chimp lacks this potentiality altogether. Even if the cat lives 20 years, it will never be capable of learning the 9 rules of logical inference or knowing that stealing is wrong. A fetus, on the other hand, will.

An imago Dei creature either has these abilities already or at the very least will have them and can have them.

Heiser anticipates this response and says that if you argue that those things are there potentially, then that means that you have only a potential person. The problem with Heiser’s objection is that it acts as a boomerang, coming back to hit him in the face. Heiser understands the image of God in the exact same way as Walton and Middleton do: i.e. as God’s representatives on Earth. As I said above, I don’t disagree with this, but the essential properties of a representative are rationality, morality, and free will. Not only does an unborn child only have the mere potential to have these mental qualities, but even the “status” (Heiser’s own words) to which the mental qualities are prerequisites is but a mere potential. I can’t imagine that an unconscious fetus 3 days after conception can represent God in any meaningful sense. If Heiser is correct that the mere potential to possess abilities entails that fetuses are only potential persons, then is it not the case that the potential to be God’s representative entail the same? How is Heiser’s view of the imago Dei immune to the objection he brings against the mental faculty position? He doesn’t explain.

It will not do though simply point out that Heiser’s proposal (which I don’t disagree with) falls under the same objection.

Conclusion
I don’t think theologians are wrong to say that our unique mental faculties are necessary conditions to the imago Dei, but I think it is wrong to say that they are sufficient conditions. If they were sufficient conditions, then even Satan would bear God’s image. Rather, we need to see the imago Dei as being God’s representatives on Earth. This, of course, presupposes the mental faculties of rationality and so on. This last quality is what humans have that angels and demons do not (or aliens if there are any out there).

Notes

[1] Heiser, Michael S. The Unseen Realm: Recovering the Supernatural Worldview of the Bible (p. 40). Lexham Press. Kindle Edition.

[2] See Walton, John H.. The Lost World of Adam and Eve: Genesis 2-3 and the Human Origins Debate (Kindle Location 1331-1356). InterVarsity Press. Kindle Edition.

[3] The Liberating Image: The Imago Dei in Genesis, March 1, 2005, by J. Richard Middleton, Brazos Press.

[4] Heiser, Michael S. The Unseen Realm: Recovering the Supernatural Worldview of the Bible (p. 41). Lexham Press. Kindle Edition.


Original Blog Source: http://bit.ly/2onLAvF

By Evan Minton

C.S Lewis once wrote “You don’t have a soul, you are a soul. You have a body“.[1] Most Christians believe that we are not merely physical bodies, but that we are immaterial entities that live inside our bodies. We are embodied spirits. This view is known as Substance Dualism. The Bible very clearly teaches substance dualism (see, for example, 1 Samuel 28, 2 Corinthians 5:6-8, Philippians 1:20-22, 2 Corinthians 12:2-4), so if you believe the Bible is divinely inspired and inerrant, then you ought to be a substance dualist. However, how would you demonstrate the reality of the soul to someone who doesn’t believe The Bible is divinely inspired? Quoting passages to prove that souls exist would do little good when talking to an atheist or an agnostic.

Fortunately, there are philosophical arguments we can draw on for the existence of the soul. One such argument is The FreeThinking Argument which I briefly surveyed in my blog post “5 Arguments For The Existence Of Free Will”. However, another argument reasons to the soul’s existence from the law of identity. This logical principle states that if you’re considering two objects, and every single property both objects have are in common, and there is literally nothing to distinguish the two, the most logical inference is that they are one in the same. That is to say, the two things really aren’t two things after all, but one thing. On the other hand, if the two things do have at least one property that distinguishes them, then the two things are totally separate entities.

In syllogistic form, the argument goes like this:

1: If the mind is identical to the brain, then whatever is true of the brain is true of the mind and vice versa.
2: There are things true of the mind that are not true of the brain.
3: Therefore, the mind and brain are not identical. 

This is a logically valid argument. The conclusion follows from the premises by the rule of modus ponens. In order for the conclusion to be justifiably reached, we must affirm that both premises are true. What reasons can be given in defense of these premises?

Premise 1: If The Mind Is Identical To The Brain, Then Whatever Is True Of The Mind Is True Of The Brain and Vice Versa.

The premise rests on the law of identity. The physicalist (i.e the person who believes that people don’t have souls) must prove that when one is talking about the “brain” and when one is talking about the “mind”, they are talking about the same object. In order for them to really be one in the same, any property that the brain has, the mind must have. Any property the mind has, the brain must have. If physicalism is true, the brain must have properties A, B, C, D, E, F, G, and the mind must have properties A, B, C, D, E, F, G. Moreover, there must be no property or properties, H, I, and/or J which exists in one but not in the other. For if properties H or I can be found in one but not in the other, then this shows that they are different entities.

Imagine an alien were to visit from a faraway galaxy and he asked an Earthling who the current president of the united states is. The Earthling tells the alien that the current president is the former host of the TV show The ApprenticeFurthermore, this Earthling later learns from another person that The Apprentice only had one host prior to Arnold Schwarzenegger, Donald Trump. So, if the current president is the former host of The Apprentice, and the former host of The Apprentice is Donald Trump, then the alien would rightly conclude that the name of the current President is Donald Trump. He also learns that Trump is a Caucasian man and that it was a Caucasian man who previously hosted the television show.

Now suppose that this alien knows nothing of how the U.S government works and doesn’t know that a President can only serve a maximum of 8 years. He comes back 20 years later and asks someone who the current U.S President is and the Earthling tells this alien that the president is an Asian Woman whose previous trade was a movie actress, like Reagan. The alien takes into account the facts learned before, namely “The current president is the former host of The Apprentice“, “The current president is a man”, “the previous host of The Apprentice is a man”, and contrasts them with the new information that the current president is an Asian Woman. This is a distinguishing property. The alien concludes from this that Donald Trump must no longer be the current president and that the current president is an entirely different individual, an individual who did not host The Apprentice.

In the above illustration, the alien never actually saw pictures or videos of both of these U.S Presidents. He simply logically inferred based on the law of identity that Donald Trump was the president during his first visit, but that someone else became president before his second visit.

Donald Trump had properties (A) Prior host of The Apprentice, (B) Is U.S President, (C) is Caucasian, (D) is a man.

Years later, the alien found a person who (E) is U.S President, (F) an Asian woman, (G) was a Hollywood actress, (G) never hosted The Apprentice.

E, F, and G, are incompatible with  A, C, and D. On this basis, the alien concludes they aren’t the same person. They do not have 100% of their properties in common.

Or another illustration: suppose your wife called you on the phone and said that she bought a bag of red fruit and set them on the counter. You come home to find red apples sitting on the table. You infer that the apples were the fruit your wife was referring to because (A) apple is a fruit, and (B) the apples are red. Your wife’s description and your observation connect to tell you that what your wife was talking about on the phone and what you’re now seeing with your own eyes are one in the same thing. Now, if you came home and found Granny Smith apples, you would think something is up. Although apples are a type of fruit, there’s a property that distinguishes them from the fruit your wife described on the phone, namely the color. You would infer that either your wife was lying, she’s color blind, or she bought two kinds of fruit and the fruit you’re looking at isn’t the kind she was talking about on the phone. But you would never say that the fruit you’re looking at and the fruit your wife talked about on the phone are the same type of fruit because they do not share 100% of the same properties in common. There is at least one property to distinguish them.

It can be stated simply: If X is identical to Y, then whatever is true of X is true of Y and vice versa. But if something is true of Y that is not true of X, then X is not identical to Y.

Premise 2: There Are Things True Of The Mind That Are Not True Of The Brain.

Now we come to the most crucial premise. Is the mind like the green apples and an Asian woman in the above illustrations? Do they have distinguishing properties that would lead us to conclude that are two distinct entities? I believe they do.

The mind has mental properties, such as the property of feeling sad, happy, angry. The mind thinks “about” things. For example, when I go for walks with my dog, I think “about” God, Jesus, philosophy, science, apologetics, or how lovely the trees in my yard looks. Sometimes I think “about” my childhood. The mind has the property of “aboutness” to it. The mind also has the property of first-person perspective. I know myself more intimately than anyone else in the world. I know first-hand what it’s like to feel my own happiness, my own sadness, my own anger, my own anxiety. I know what it’s like to be me. Moreover, the mind contains these things called beliefs, and beliefs can be either true or false.

What about the brain, that physical organ that sits inside our skulls? Does the brain have these properties? No. The brain is never “about” anything. A neuroscientist could hook me up to a machine that could show in exact detail every physiological phenomenon that are going on inside my brain, and never once will he see any of my thoughts. I could be thinking about Pokemon Battle Strategies, and the neuroscientist wouldn’t be able to point to a group of neurons and tell his colleagues “You see that? Those neurons are about Pokemon Battle Strategies”. He would never be able to locate my knowledge of The Bible or of Natural Theology argument. The neuroscientist couldn’t put his finger on the screen of the machine and say “Here’s The Kalam Cosmological Argument!” Even if they cut open my brain and put every molecule under a microscope, they wouldn’t find any property of “aboutness” anywhere. But if the mind is the brain, and mind is undergoing various thoughts, one ought to be able to locate and discern those thoughts if they can simply know what physical processes are going on in my brain, right?
It is also impossible for someone studying a person’s brain to have that first-person perspective. He could have Bob hooked up to a machine to show all of the physical processes currently going on in his brain. The doctor could then hit Bob’s toe with a hammer. The machine would register a pain signal going from Bob’s foot to his brain, indicating that he is experiencing pain, and the doctor would rightly conclude that Bob is in pain. Nevertheless, the doctor would not know what it is like for Bob to experience that pain. He doesn’t have the first-person perspective of the hammer pain. Now, one may object “But Bob could retaliate and hit the doctor on the foot”. True, but that would only result in the doctor having the first-person experience of his own pain. He still wouldn’t have first-person knowledge of Bob’s pain. The doctor might infer that this is what it was like when he struck Bob. In fact, this seems obvious. We all seem to be able to empathize with someone who is going through physical pain. We say “I’ve been there” or “I know what that’s like”. But this is merely a logical inference linking two independent experiences. We don’t really know what it’s like for that person from their first-person POV. We can only infer what it’s like for them on the basis of what it was like for us.
I can infer what it’s like for Bob to have a toothache on the basis of my own experience of tooth-aches, but I do not and cannot partake in Bob’s firsthand experience of tooth pain. The most advanced technology in the world could only tell you the physiological processes occurring when Bob experiences things, but it would never let you step into Bob’s shoes and have that experience yourself.
Now let’s consider beliefs. Beliefs can be true or false, but brain states cannot be true or false. A brain state is just a brain state. It simply is what it is. A neuroscientist can’t hook me up to an EEG and tell me “You know what you’re doing right now? You’re having a false brain state. Cut it out.” This shows that beliefs and brain states are not identical. The thought I’m having can be true or false, but the electrochemical process that occurs when I’m having the thought cannot be true or false.
So, to sum up:
The Mind’s properties — (1) Aboutness, (2) first-person POV, (3) has beliefs that are true or false.
The Brain — (1*) Lacks aboutness, (2*) can only have physiological processes associated with the 1st person POV observed, (3*) has physical states that cannot be either true or false (they are what they are).
Whatever properties they might have in common, it is indisputable that one has properties the other doesn’t have, thus the second premise is true.
Conclusion: Therefore, The Mind Is Not Identical To The Brain.
Since both premises are true, the conclusion follows by the law of modus ponens.
Objection 1: Whenever Something Occurs In The Mental Life, There Are Neurological Processes Occurring In The Brain That Go Along With It. This Shows That The Mind Is Really Just The Brain.
The primary argument for physicalism is that whenever mental events occur in the mind, there are physical events happening in the brain that occur simultaneously. Take the phenomenon of fear. When you have fear, undoubtedly there is brain activity that is correlated with the experience of fear. Physicalists will also point out that certain mental diseases, like Alzheimer’s, affect the brain, but as a result of affecting the brain, the mind is also affected. People with this dreadful disease lose more and more of their ability to think clearly and remember. Eventually, they even forget who their relatives are. Doesn’t this loss of brain/loss of mind correlation show that the mind is the brain?
I don’t think so. For one thing, it’s important that you don’t miss that my arguments given for premise 2 presuppose that there’s a correlation of events between the brain and the mind. If you re-read those paragraphs again, you’ll see that.
Secondly, this objection doesn’t even address my points that the mind has the property of aboutness and the brain does not (no neuron, cell, or electrical impulse is “about” any of your thoughts), nor it does address my point that even an exhaustive knowledge of the physical process of the brain wouldn’t show you that person’s first-person point of view. This objection refutes neither premise of the argument.
Thirdly, mental diseases like Alzheimer’s affecting one’s mental life doesn’t necessarily point to the conclusion that they are one in the same. At most, this just shows that the brain and mind can affect or influence one another. In a lecture at the Truth For A New Generation conference in 2012 titled “The Argument For The Soul”, J.P Moreland gave the following illustration. Suppose you’re in a car that has defected doors that won’t open, and the seatbelt can’t be released either. Wouldn’t it be the case that your mobility would be limited by where you can drive the car? Yes. You could go anywhere you wanted to except for places where the car couldn’t fit. Suppose something happened to the steering wheel that caused it to be stuck turned left. In this case, you’d be stuck driving around in circles.
Now suppose that you wreck the car, and you do so in such a way that the seatbelt snaps, the windshield shatters, and you get hurled out of the vehicle. No problems that existed with the vehicle would matter anymore because you’re not inside of it anymore.
In a similar way, while we’re stuck in these earthen vessels, we are mentally limited by our brains and bodies. If the brain is malfunctioning, that’s going to cause our minds to malfunction as well even though our minds are distinct. Now, when the mind (soul) leaves the body, it’s no longer constrained by the physical defects of the brain it depended on. Just as the physical defects of the car didn’t matter once our driver was able to get out.
Philosopher William Lane Craig answered it this way: “Noble Prize winning neurologist Sir John Eccles lecture on the relationship between the mind and the brain. He said that the mind and the brain are like a pianist and his piano. In order to produce music the pianist must have a finely tuned piano, and then he can produce the music. But if the piano is out of tune, even though the musician knows how to play the piece correctly, the music will be discordant, and he will not be able to produce the beautiful music. Similarly, Eccles said, the mind and the brain work together to produce thought. If the brain is malfunctioning or injured or impaired then thought will be impaired; the soul will not be able to think properly. Its instrument will be impaired and so it cannot think correctly.” [2]
So, to conclude: brain-state correlation with mental events doesn’t prove the mind is the brain. It could just mean there’s a two-way relationship of cause and effect between them. There’s a reason my blog’s slogan is “Using the brains that God gave us”. That reason is that I believe we do indeed use our physical brains to think, just a pianist uses a piano to make music.
Objection 2: The Mind-Body Interaction Problem
Some physicalists try to argue that substance dualism is false because of what is known as “The Mind-Body Interaction Problem”. This dilemma stated is that there is no way to explain how an immaterial thing like the soul can cause effects in the brain and body and vice versa. How exactly does this mysterious substance called “The soul” cause effects in my physical brain? What mechanism is there for the soul to cause the brain to cause my fingers to type this sentence? No one can give an answer. I certainly can’t at least.
Now, one could perhaps simply appeal to mystery. As long as we have good grounds for affirming that the soul and brain do indeed interact, we can simply shrug our shoulders at the how.
On the other hand, some actually make a more potent argument than simply saying “You can’t explain how the soul and body interact, so substance dualism must be false.” Some frame the counterargument to substance dualism this way:
(A1) A soul can interact with a body only if the interaction is in virtue of the transference of motion from the soul to the body.
(A2) Transference of motion from a soul to a body is impossible (because a soul does not have motion).
(A3) Therefore, a soul cannot interact with a body.
Dr. Jacobus Erasmus explains that first step asserts that for A to causally interact with B, a transference of motion from A to B has got to happen, such as through a collision or some other kind of impact. Now, many philosophers, (e.g Jonathan Barnes, Joshua Hoffman, and Gary Rosenkrantz), have noted that (A1) presupposes the following erroneous principle:
(A4) For any two objects A and B and some property F, if A causes B to be F, then A is F.
Dr. Jacobus Arasmas explains that “According to (A4), if a soul causes a body to be in motion, then the soul must be in motion. It is, thus, easy to see why (A1) presupposes (A4). Unfortunately, (A4) is demonstrably false. A lump of clay, for example, can be caused to be square by a non-square object, such as a hand or a rolling pin. Or consider the Law of Gravity, according to which two pieces of matter can accelerate toward each other (or gain motion) without motion being transferred from one to the other. Hence, since (A4) is false, (A1) is false.” [3] As any philosopher will tell you, it only takes the falsification of one premise to make an argument worthless. So even if A2 stands, A3 doesn’t follow because A1 is fallacious.
So, although we still don’t know how the mind/soul causes effects in the brain/body, we certainly don’t have any positive reason (as the above syllogism attempts to show) that such an interaction is impossible. As long as the arguments for substance dualism are sound, we can simply leave this issue an open question. Just as if Kirk MacGregor’s argument for middle knowledge is sound, we can leave the issue of how God knows CCFs an open question.
Conclusion
Other objections to the argument could be addressed, but for the sake of keeping this article a reasonable length, I only opted to respond to the two primary objections most frequently brought up by physicalists. Any other objections can be saved for future articles. It seems that the identity argument for the soul is sound, which gives us good extra-biblical grounds for being substance dualists.
Notes
1: C.S Lewis, ChristianQuotes.com, Retrieved December 20th 2017, https://www.christianquotes.info/images/c-s-lewis-quote-soul/#axzz51p9eNMVl
3: Dr. Jacobus Arasmus, “Objections To The Existence Of The Soul”, November 20th 2017, http://freethinkingministries.com/objections-to-the-existence-of-the-soul/

 


Evan Minton is a Christian Apologist and blogger at Cerebral Faith (www.cerebralfaith.blogspot.com). He is the author of “Inference To The One True God” and “A Hellacious Doctrine”. He has engaged in several debates which can be viewed on Cerebral Faith’s “My Debates” section. Mr. Minton lives in South Carolina, USA.

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