Tag Archive for: Kalam Cosmological Argument

Who Created and Fine-Tuned the Universe? | With Dr. William Lane Craig

In this mid-week bonus episode of the, I Don’t Have Enough Faith to Be an Atheist podcast, Frank sits down with legendary philosopher, Dr. William Lane Craig, for a fascinating discussion on the beginning of the universe. Dr. Craig is perhaps best known for his work on the Kalam Cosmological Argument which offers an excellent philosophical foundation (supported by physics) for a theistic creator. What type of theistic creator might that be? Only one meets the criteria! Listen to this great conversation between Frank and one of his greatest influences, recorded at the Evangelical Theological Society Meeting in Denver, CO. Then go subscribe to the Reasonable Faith podcast to hear more from the brilliant mind of Dr. William Lane Craig.

If you would like to submit a question to be answered on the show, please email your question to Hello@Crossexamined.org.

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Dealing with two arguments against Kalam

As I was reviewing one of the many emails we received, one of them raised two objections against the Kalam cosmological argument, specifically the argument offered for God as the cause of the beginning of the universe. A version of the Kalam cosmological argument can be formulated as follows:

  1. Whatever begins to exist has a cause of its existence.
  2. The universe began to exist.
    2.1 Argument based on the impossibility of an actual infinite:
    2.1.1 An actual infinite cannot exist.
    2.1.2 An infinite temporal regress of events is an actual infinite.
    2.1.3 Therefore, an infinite temporal regress of events cannot exist.
    2.2 Argument based on the impossibility of the formation of an actual infinite by successive addition:
    2.2.1 A collection formed by successive addition cannot be actually infinite.
    2.2.2 The temporal series of past events is a collection formed by successive addition.
    2.2.3 Therefore, the temporal series of past events cannot be actually infinite.
    2.3 Confirmation based on the expansion of the universe.
    2.4 Confirmation based on the thermodynamic properties of the universe.
  3. Therefore, the universe has a cause of its existence.
  4. If the universe has a cause of its existence, then an uncaused, personal Creator of the universe exists, who sans creation is beginningless, changeless, immaterial, timeless, spaceless, and enormously powerful and intelligent.
    4.1 Argument that the cause of the universe is a personal Creator:
    4.1.1 The universe was brought into being either by a mechanically operating set of necessary and sufficient conditions or by a personal, free agent.
    4.1.2 The universe could not have been brought into being by a mechanically operating set of necessary and sufficient conditions.
    4.1.3 Therefore, the universe was brought into being by a personal, free agent.
    4.2 Argument that the Creator sans creation is uncaused, beginningless, changeless, immaterial, timeless, spaceless, and enormously powerful and intelligent:
    4.2.1 The Creator is uncaused.
    4.2.1.1 An infinite temporal regress of causes cannot exist. (2.13, 2.23)
    4.2.2 The Creator is beginningless.
    4.2.2.1 Whatever is uncaused does not begin to exist. (1)
    4.2.3 The Creator is changeless.
    4.2.3.1 An infinite temporal regress of changes cannot exist. (2.13, 2.23)
    4.2.4 The Creator is immaterial.
    4.2.4.1 Whatever is material involves change on the atomic and molecular levels, but the Creator is changeless. (4.23)
    4.2.5 The Creator is timeless.
    4.2.5.1 In the complete absence of change, time does not exist, and the Creator is changeless. (4.23)
    4.2.6 The Creator is spaceless.
    4.2.6.1 Whatever is immaterial and timeless cannot be spatial, and the Creator is immaterial and timeless (4.24, 4.25)
    4.2.7 The Creator is enormously powerful.
    4.2.7.1 He brought the universe into being out of nothing. (3)
    4.2.8 The Creator is enormously intelligent.
    4.2.8.1 The initial conditions of the universe involve incomprehensible fine-tuning that points to intelligent design.
  5. Therefore, an uncaused, personal Creator of the universe exists, who sans creation is “beginningless,” changeless, immaterial, timeless, spaceless, and enormously powerful and intelligent.

Now let’s look at the following objection to what I have called the Argument of Immutability Against a Personal Cause (AIAPC):

  1. If God is timeless, then He is immutable.
  2. If God is immutable, then God cannot act to bring the universe into existence.
  3. God is a personal being who without creation is timeless (given by the Kalam).
  4. God is unchangeable (from 1 and 3)
  5. Therefore, God cannot act to bring the universe into existence (from 2 and 4).

As you can see, the argument attacks the premises (4.1.3), (4.2.3), and (4.2.5) of this version of the Kalam by trying to demonstrate that there is an inconsistency between God’s properties of being personal, immutable, and timeless.

How solid is the argument? Well, not that good. First, the detractor seems to think that since there is no time without the universe, God is immutable, but this is not the case. What the argument says is this:

  1. In the total absence of change, time does not exist, and the Creator does not change. (4.2.5.1.)
  2. Therefore, God is timeless (4.2.5.)

Y

  • There cannot be an infinite temporal regression of changes. (4.2.3.1)
  • Therefore, God is changeless (4.2.3)

Note that the argument does not say that God’s immutability is inferred from His timelessness; rather, that immutability is inferred from the impossibility of an infinite regression of changes, and timelessness is inferred from His immutability. But what do we mean by the “absence of all change?” Simple, it is not doing something different. Some activities do not require either change or time, for example, knowing something (God can know all truths in that immutable state without time). And the same could be said about our intentions: as long as these do not change, we can sustain them timelessly. So, we can say that (1) of the AIAPC is false.

Second, (2) it is false too. The premise seems to assert that the immutability of God is equivalent to immobility, which would be true if we were talking about an impersonal cause, but we have seen that we can infer that the cause is personal, so that it has volition to simply decide to create the universe from eternity. As William Lane Craig explains when he uses the example of a man sitting from eternity

…my thought experiment serves to illustrate a point about free will. A person can exist unchangeably and then freely execute a certain intention because free will does not require some predetermined condition. The very nature of free will is the absence of causal determinants. So, a free action has the appearance of a purely spontaneous event. Man can simply and freely desire to get up. So, you can get a timeless effect from an immutable cause if that cause is a free agent. Now, in the case of God, God exists unchangeably without the universe. Creation is an act of free will which, when it occurs, brings time into existence along with the universe. Therefore, to say that “from a finite time a Creator endowed with free will could have wanted to bring the world into existence at that moment” does not imply that there was a time prior to that moment.[1]

Now, at this point, there is an objection that time then does not begin with the beginning of the universe, but at the moment when God decides to bring the universe into existence, which is contradictory to the implications of the beginning of the universe of the Big Bang. Now, even when Dr. Craig does not argue that God has to deliberate temporarily, he has responded to similar objections by making a distinction between physical time and metaphysical time:

Metaphysical time is independent of physical processes, for example, if God was counting down, he could say, “3, 2, 1, let there be light,” and in this case, we would have a sequence of mental events, we would have time prior to the beginning of the universe. What would begin at the beginning of the universe would be physical time, the time which is the subject of study in the field of physics.[2]

So, with all this, we can say that the AIAPC is not a solid argument after all.

Now let’s move on to the next argument which I have called the Argument of the Timelessness Against Causation (ATAC):

  1. If God is timeless without creation, time intervals do not exist (granted by the kalam).
  2. God is timeless without creation.
  3. Therefore, time intervals do not exist (from1 and 2).
  4. If the time intervals do not exist, the cause-effect relationship cannot occur without creation.
  5. The cause-effect relationship cannot occur without creation (from 3 and 4)

When one analyzes this argument, one will notice that in essence, it is similar to the first one, only the immutability is omitted, but the timelessness factor is still there, specifically, that it takes time intervals for a God-type cause and effect to exist by deciding to create the universe and then another time when the universe comes into existence. To this William Lane Craig has responded on another occasion that:

[…] it seems to me that this assumption is false. For under His omniscience, God’s choices are not events, since He does not temporarily deliberate nor does Him will move from a state of indecision to a decision. He simply has free will determinations to execute certain actions, and any deliberation can only be said to be explanatory, not temporary, before His decrees.[3]

Let us now return to the matter that the cause must precede the effect. I consider (4) to be false because it depends on the unjustified belief that cause-effect cannot be simultaneous and that the cause-effect relationship cannot exist without time. But Dr. Craig has already explained that there is no reason to accept these conditions and that it is possible to have cause and effect simultaneously[4] so that the creation of the universe is simultaneous with the origin of the universe[5]. Moreover, there is the possibility that every cause and effect relationship is ultimately simultaneous:

I do not see any conceptual inconsistency in thinking that a cause and effect can be simultaneous. Philosophers will often talk about how the direction of the causal influence between A and B is perceived when A and B are simultaneous. A and B may be at the same time, they may be simultaneous, but how do you draw the line of causal influence? Is A causing B, or is B causing A? Philosophers will argue about that. So, I don’t see any inconsistency in the notion of simultaneous causation. Some metaphysicists have argued that all causes are ultimately simultaneous because until the cause impacts some other object to produce an effect, there is no way that the causal influence can jump through time, from t2 to t1, to produce the effect in t1. That cause must last until the moment t1 and then produce its effect at that moment. But there is no way that a causal influence can travel through time and jump from t2 to t1 to produce the event. So many philosophers will say that all causation is ultimately simultaneous.

I think that’s a very persuasive argument. I can’t see how you can have a causal influence by jumping through time. It seems to me that effect will not occur until the cause impacts the thing to produce its effect; for example, the cue must hit the billiard ball to set it in motion. And until it does, there is no way that the causal influence of the cue’s movement will jump in time to make the ball move.[6]

Conclusion

We have seen that the AIAPC fails because of a misunderstanding of the meaning of immutability and how immutability is inferred. On the other hand, although the ATAC is a better argument, it is not entirely sound; since there are no good reasons to reject the simultaneity of cause and effect.

Notes

[1] William Lane Craig, “God and Time” on William Lane Craig: A Reasonable Response.

[2] An Explanation of Physical Time and Metaphysical Time.

[3] Timelessness and Creation.

[4] Causation and Spacetime.

[5] God, Time and Creation

[6] Misunderstandings About God and the Big Bang.

Recommended resources related to the topic:

God’s Crime Scene: Cold-Case…Evidence for a Divinely Created Universe (Paperback), (Mp4 Download), and (DVD Set) by J. Warner Wallace

God’s Crime Scene: The Case for God’s Existence from the Appearance of Design (mp4 Download Set) by J. Warner Wallace 

God’s Crime Scene: The Case for God’s Existence from the Appearance of Design in Biology DVD Set by J. Warner Wallace 

What is God Like? Look to the Heavens by Dr. Frank Turek (DVD and Mp4) I Don’t Have Enough Faith to Be an Atheist (Paperback), and (Sermon) by Norman Geisler and Frank Turek

Jairo Izquierdo is an author and Community Manager for the Christian organization Cross Examined. He studies philosophy and theology, his current focus of study being classical logic, epistemology and molinism. He is co-founder of Filósofo Cristiano and editor at World View Media. Jairo resides in Puebla, Mexico and is an active member of Cristo es la Respuesta Church.

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The Kalam Cosmological Argument NOT Debunked

The Kalam Cosmological Argument NOT Debunked

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By Evan Minton

I discovered a YouTuber called “Rationality Rules” very recently. One of his many videos is “The Kalam Cosmological Argument Debunked – (First Cause Argument Refuted)” which you can watch here. One of my patrons brought this video to my attention and requested that I respond to it, so here we go.

For the uninitiated, The Kalam Cosmological Argument is formulated as follows:

1: Whatever begins to exist has a cause.

2: The universe began to exist.

3: Therefore, the universe has a cause.

Let’s look at each of Rationality Rules’ rebuttals.

Objection 1: The Argument Doesn’t Support Theism 

Rationality Rules (RR) says “Even if the Cosmological Argument were accepted in its entirely, all it would prove is that there was a cause of the universe, and that’s it. It doesn’t even suggest, let alone prove that this cause was a being, and it certainly doesn’t suggest that that cause was a being that is eternal, omnipotent, omniscient, omnibenevolent, personal and moral. That is one hell of a leap. Hence, even if accepted, the argument doesn’t even remotely support theism.” 

I really couldn’t believe what I was hearing. Has RR even paid the slightest bit attention to apologists’ defenses of The Cosmological Argument? This is patently false. Given that everything that has a beginning has something that caused it to come into being, and since Big Bang cosmology, the second law of thermodynamics, and the two arguments against actual infinites establish that the universe came into being out of nothing a finite time ago, it follows that a cause transcendent to matter, energy, space, and time must have caused matter, energy, space, and time (i.e the universe) to come into existence. Now, granted, the syllogism doesn’t define this cause as “God”. It only asserts “Therefore, the universe has a cause”. However, in every defense of The Kalam Cosmological Argument I’ve ever heard given, this is not where the argument stops. Once it is established that the universe a transcendent cause, the apologist (William Lane Craig, Frank Turek, Lee Strobel, Myself) do a conceptual analysis of what it means to be a cause of the universe. The conceptual analysis part of the argument is being totally ignored by RR.

When you do a conceptual analysis of what attributes or properties the universe’s cause must have, you do indeed end up with a being heavily resembling God.

The cause must be

Spaceless – Because space came into being and did not exist until this cause brought it into existence, the cause cannot be a spatial being. It must be spaceless or non-spatial. You cannot be inside of something if you are that something’s cause. You cannot be inside of something if that something did not exist until you brought it into existence.

Timeless – Since time did not exist until The Big Bang, the cause cannot be inside of time. It must be a timeless being.

Immaterial – The cause’s non-spatiality entails immateriality. How so? Because material objects cannot exist unless space exists. Material objects have mass and ergo occupy spatial dimensions. If there is no space, matter cannot exist. This means that because the cause is non-spatial, it is therefore non-material.

Unimaginably Powerful (if not omnipotent) – Anything able to create all matter, energy, space, and time out of absolutely nothing must be extremely powerful, if not omnipotent.

Supernatural – “Nature” and “The universe” are synonyms. Nature did not begin to exist until The Big Bang. Therefore, a natural cause (a cause coming, by definition, from nature) cannot be responsible for the origin of nature. To say otherwise would be to spout incoherence. You’d basically be saying “Nature caused nature to come into being.”

Uncaused – Given that the cause of the universe is timeless, the cause cannot itself have a beginning. To have a beginning to one’s existence entails a before and after relationship. There’s a time before one existed and a time after one came into existence. But a before and after of anything is impossible without time. Since the cause existed sans time, the cause, therefore, cannot have a beginning. It’s beginningless.

Personal – This is an entailment of the cause’s immateriality. There are two types of things recognized by philosophers that are immaterial: abstract objects (such as numbers, sets, or other mathematical entities) or unembodied minds. Philosophers realize that abstract objects if they exist, they exist as non-physical entities. However, abstract objects cannot produce any effects. That’s part of what it means to be abstract. The number 3 isn’t going to be producing any effects anytime soon. Given that abstract objects are causally impotent, it, therefore, follows that an unembodied mind is the cause of the universe’ beginning. Two other arguments for the personhood of the universe’s cause can be given, and I’ve unpacked these in my book The Case For The One True God: A Scientific, Philosophical, and Historical Case For The God Of Christianity available on Amazon.com in both paperback and Kindle.

Whatever begins to exist has a cause, given that the universe began to exist, if follows that the universe has a cause of its existence. The cause of the universe must be a spaceless, timeless, immaterial, powerful, supernatural, uncaused, personal Creator.

This being that is demonstrated to exist by this argument is consistent with The Christian God. The Bible describes God as spaceless (see 1 Kings 8:27, 2 Chronicles 2:6), timeless (1 Corinthians 2:7, 2 Timothy 1:9, Titus 1:2), immaterial (John 4:24, 1 Timothy 1:17, 1 Timothy 6:16), powerful (Psalm 62:11-12, Job 9:14, Matthew 19:26), uncaused (Psalm 90:2, Isaiah 57:15, 1 Timothy 1:17, Revelation 1:8), supernatural, and is a personal being (John 1:12, James 4:8). Moreover, The Bible credits Him with being the Creator of all physical reality (John 1:1-3).

Additionally, as I point out in my book The Case For The One True God: A Scientific, Philosophical, and Historical Case For The God Of Christianity a study of comparative religions demonstrates that only 4 religions are consistent with the Cosmological argument’s conclusion: Judaism, Christianity, Islam (that’s why Ghazali defended it), and Deism. All other religions involve either an eternal cosmos that have God or gods bringing order out of the eternally existing matter, energy, space and time, or else their god is the universe itself (pantheism). Therefore, if you’re picking a view about God based on the cosmological argument alone, your list of options consistent with the evidence is limited to just 4 options, Christianity being among them. Only the Abrahamic religions (and Deism) teach that a God like the one described above brought all physical reality into existence from nothing.

Rationality Rules complains that the argument doesn’t demonstrate the omniscience, omnipresence, or the moral character of the universe’s cause, but the argument was never designed to get those qualities. Richard Dawkins made this same complaint about the argument. Dawkins said it like this “Even if we allow the dubious luxury of arbitrarily conjuring up a terminator to an infinite regress and giving it a name, there is absolutely no reason to endow that terminator with any of the properties normally ascribed to God: omnipotence, omniscience, goodness, creativity of design, to say nothing of such human attributes as listening to prayers, forgiving sins and reading innermost thoughts.”[1] and Dr. William Lane Craig responded to it thusly:

“Apart from the opening slur, this is an amazingly concessionary statement! Dawkins doesn’t dispute that the argument successfully proves the existence of an uncaused, beginningless, changeless, timeless, spaceless, and unimaginably powerful personal Creator of the universe. He merely complains that this cause hasn’t also been shown to be omnipotent, omniscient, good, creative of design, listening to prayers, forgiving sins, and reading innermost thoughts. So what? The argument isn’t intended to prove those things. It would be a bizarre form of atheism, indeed an atheism not worth the name, which admitted that there exists an uncaused, beginningless, changeless, timeless, immaterial, spaceless, unimaginably powerful, personal Creator of the universe who may (for all we know) also possess the properties listed by Dawkins. So we needn’t call the personal Creator of the universe “God” if Dawkins finds this unhelpful or misleading. But the point remains that such a being as described by this argument must exist”[2]

This is just a pitiful objection to The Kalam Cosmological Argument.

Objection 2: It Doesn’t Prove The Universe’s Cause Was The First Cause. 

I facepalmed even harder at this objection than I did the previous one. Rationality Rules said “A second problem that even we accepted the argument. It wouldn’t prove that the universe itself was without a cause. Or in another words, it wouldn’t prove that first cause existed, which for a first cause argument is pretty damn ridiculous. To be fair, the proponents of this argument do indeed offer additional arguments in an attempt to assert that the cause of the universe must be without a cause. But the point that I’m trying to make here and now is that The Kalam Cosmological Argument, by itself, is pretty damn trivial. And hence, the proponents of this argument almost always employ additional arguments to reach their conclusions including the likes of Craig” 

There are good reasons given as to why the cause of the universe must be uncaused. I’ve given one of them above. I wrote “Given that the cause of the universe is timeless, the cause cannot itself have a beginning. To have a beginning to one’s existence entails a before and after relationship. There’s a time before one existed and a time after one came into existence. But a before and after of anything is impossible without time. Since the cause existed sans time, the cause, therefore, cannot have a beginning. It’s beginningless.” Another reason is that if you do not allow for an uncreated Creator, if you insist that God must have a Creator, you get thrown into an infinite regression. For God to come into being, His creator must have come into being, and before that creator could come into being, the creator before him had to come into being, and before that creator could come into being, the creator before him had to come into being, and so on back into infinity. No creator could ever come into being because there would always have to be a creator before him to bring him into being. In fact, no creator in the entire infinite past series of creators could ever come into being because each would have to be preceded by a previously created creator. And since no creator could ever come into being, the specific creator that brought our universe into existence couldn’t have come into being. But obviously, here we are. This suggests that there wasn’t an infinite regression of creators begetting creators. But if there was no infinite regression of creators begetting creators, then that logically brings us to an uncreated Creator, a Creator without beginning.

Even Rationality Rules admits that Kalam proponents back up the assertion that the cause is uncaused by arguments, as you can see in the quotation above. However, he doesn’t dispute the arguments. He doesn’t even say what the arguments are. He seems to think that merely having to bolster the conclusion “the universe had a cause” with additional arguments is an invalid move. But why think a thing like that? Yes, the syllogism by itself only gets you to “The universe had a cause”, but why take Christian Apologists to task for unpacking the implications of that conclusion with additional arguments?

The question RR should be asking is not whether additional arguments are needed, but whether the additional arguments given are good. RR’s objection is pretty damn trivial.

Objection 3: It Commits The Fallacy Of Equivocation

Rationality Rules indicts The Kalam Cosmological Argument for committing the fallacy of equivocation. What is the fallacy of equivocation? The fallacy of equivocation is when an argument uses the exact same word, but employs two different definitions of the word. It would be like if someone argued “God made everything. Everything is made in China. Therefore, God is Chinese”. The word being equivocated on here is the word “everything”. In the first premise, it means literally everything that exists, whereas, in premise 2, it only refers to everything that American consumers purchase.

Rationality Rules says that in the second premise, what we mean by the term “Universe” is the scientific definition of universe (i.e all matter, energy, space, and time), whereas in the conclusion, we employ the colloquial usage of the term “Universe”, meaning literally everything that ever was, is, and ever will be. Thus, RR says that steps 2 and 3 of the argument employ the same words with different meanings.

This objection is just as underwhelming as the previous two. For one thing, why isn’t “all matter, energy, space, and time) not synonymous with “everything that ever was, is, or will be”? Perhaps RR is assuming The Mother Universe theory whereby The Big Bang was not the absolute origin of all material objects, but only the birth of one of many “baby” universes” that come into being inside of a much wider Mother Universe. In that case, the origin of our universe would indeed not be “everything that ever was, is, or will be”.

But as I argue in my blog posts “Does The Multi-Verse Explain Away The Need For A Creator?” and “Is The Universe A Computer Simulation?” not to mention chapter 1 of The Case For The One True God, this Mother Multiverse scenario cannot be extended into past eternity. The Borde-Guth-Velinken Theorem, as well as the impossibility of traversing actual infinites, bring us to an absolute beginning of literally everything at some point, whether that be the beginning of our universe, The Mother Universe, The Grandmother Universe, or whatever.

This leads to my next point; we do mean literally everything in both steps 2 and 3. We mean all matter, energy, space, and time that ever was, is or will be in both steps 2 and 3. Now, RR can dispute whether premise 2 is true, but if I, William Lane Craig, Lee Strobel, Frank Turek, Hugh Ross, etc. mean literally everything in both steps, then a charge of the fallacy of equivocation cannot stand. We mean the same thing by “universe” in both steps 2 and 3.

Objection 4: Nothing Has Ever Been Demonstrated To Come Into Being From Nothing 

RR says “And this brings us comfortably to another critical flaw with the Kalam Cosmological Argument. It asserts that something can indeed come from nothing – a concept in philosophy known as Creatio Ex Nihilo (creation out of nothing), when this has never been demonstrated to occur. In fact, to the contrary, everything we know about cause and effect overwhelmingly and unanimously tells us that when a new thing is created it is due to the rearrangement of energy and matter that already existed… that is, everything is the result of Creatio Ex Materia (creation out of material).”

Another underwhelming objection. Before I give my response, let me inform my readers that I distinguish causes via Aristotelian Causation. The ancient philosopher Aristotle recognized that there are different types of causes. A “material cause” is the stuff out of which something is made. For example, a chair’s material cause is the wood gathered from chopped down trees. An efficient cause of the chair would be the carpenter who fashioned the chair from the wood. Another type of cause Aristotle identified was Final Causality. This is the teleology, the purpose or end goal of bringing something into being. In the example of the chair, the final cause would be the purpose of sitting. But for this discussion, only efficient and material causes need to be distinguished.

The objection here is that the inductive evidence is overwhelmingly against the idea that things can come into being without a material cause. The conclusion of The Kalam Cosmological Argument is that the universe came into being via an efficient cause (God), but with no material cause. God didn’t use previously existing material to manufacture the universe.

Now, I would agree that our experience shows us that whenever something comes into being, it had a material cause as well as an efficient cause, thus rendering us with as much inductive evidence for material causation, but this inductive evidence can be overridden if we have powerful evidence that all physical reality came into being out of nothing a finite time ago. The Big Bang demonstrates just that. To look at the evidence, see my blog posts “The Kalam Cosmological Argument” and “Is The Big Bang The Origin Of The Universe?”

As I explain in the above blog posts, we do in fact have powerful scientific evidence as well as philosophical arguments which show us that the whole of physical reality (space, time, matter, and energy) had an absolute beginning.

Objection 5: Special Pleading Fallacy 

RR says that Kalam proponents commit the special pleading fallacy. What is that? The Special Pleading Fallacy occurs whenever you make an exception to an established rule without justification. RR says “they [Kalam proponents] assert that the cause of the universe didn’t begin to exist and therefore it didn’t have a cause, without adequately justifying why this cause is an exception.”

My face is hurting from all the facepalming I’ve been doing throughout watching this dude’s videos. First of all, there’s no exception to even be made! The argument is that “Whatever begins to exist has a cause.” The Kalam proponent would only be special pleading if he or she said that God began to exist, but made him the exception by saying he came into being uncaused. However, all proponents of The Kalam Cosmological Argument hold that (A) God is uncaused, uncreated. And (B) we give arguments for that. I’ve given arguments for that above.

Objection 6: Argument From Ignorance

Of course. The overused “God Of The Gaps” objection. This is not based on what we don’t know. It’s based on what we do know. As I explained in subheader 1, the cause of the universe must be spaceless, timeless, immaterial, powerful, uncaused, and personal. And I didn’t just arbitrarily assign these attribute’s to the universe’s cause, I gave positive arguments for why the universe’s cause must have these attributes. I, nor has any proponent of this argument ever said, “Scientists can’t explain how the universe came into being, so it must be God” or anything of that sort. One must suppose that atheists continue to illegitimately accuse the Kalam of committing this fallacy because they just don’t pay attention when it is explained to them. If you keep falling asleep in class, it’s no surprise that you don’t know what you’re talking about when it’s time to do your essay.

As for being the specific God I believe in, I’d recommend a look at The Case For The One True God. I admit that The Kalam doesn’t get you to the uniquely Christian conception of God, but it does get you to a conception of God that doesn’t match the majority of the ones most religions out there. Abrahamic religions and Deism are consistent with this argument, but polytheistic, animistic, and pantheistic religions are not. And atheism certainly is not consistent with the argument’s conclusion.

Conclusion 

When my patron Kevin Walker, asked me to make a response to this video, I was actually bracing myself for some pretty hard-hitting rebuttals, if not refutations. I was like “Boy, I hope I can handle these responses.” I never expected the pitiful, flimsy objections RR put forth.

Notes 

[1] Richard Dawkins, “The God Delusion” p. 158.

[2] William Lane Craig, “Deconstructing New Atheist Objections To The Arguments For God,” https://www.reasonablefaith.org/videos/short-videos/deconstructing-new-atheist-objections-to-the-arguments-for-god/

 

Evan Minton is a Christian Apologist and blogger at Cerebral Faith (www.cerebralfaith.blogspot.com). He is the author of “Inference to The One True God” and “A Hellacious Doctrine.” He has engaged in several debates which can be viewed on Cerebral Faith’s “My Debates” section. Mr. Minton lives in South Carolina, USA.

Original Blog Source:  http://bit.ly/2VrWpAg

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Lowder’s Comments to My Assessment of His Debate with Turek

Lowder’s Comments to My Assessment of His Debate with Turek

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By Jacobus Erasmus

In 2016, Jeffery Jay Lowder[1] debated Frank Turek on the topic Naturalism vs theism. See here:

In early 2017, I wrote two articles in which I assess Lowder’s opening statement (see here and here). It was brought to my attention that Lowder recently made some comments to my assessment (see the comment section here).

Lowder’s Comments to My Assessment of His Debate with Turek

I do not usually respond to comments on blogs because (1) it takes too much of my time and (2) I think that my responses will not change many minds. Nevertheless, occasionally it seems worthwhile to make such a response. I wish to take the opportunity in this post to make some remarks about Lowder’s comments in order to remind us how to engage with those that disagree with us. Let me begin by making some general remarks about how (I think) we should engage with an opponent.[2]

First, we should occasionally remind our opponent that we are not criticizing them but a specific view or argument. This implies that we should not attack our opponent personally, that is to say, we should not criticize their personal attributes, such as character, appearance, intelligence, or moral standards. Of course, nor should we physically attack our opponent, nor throw stuff at them, nor give them a wedgie[3] (you get the point). However, it is important to (now and then) make it clear to our opponent that we are not criticizing them even if they attack us personally.

Second, we should occasionally remind our opponent that we value them. As Christians, we believe that every person is created in God’s image and, thus, has tremendous value and worth (Genesis 1:26). This implies that we should treat our opponent with respect and in such a way that they can see we value them. We should not, of course, treat our opponent as if they are less valuable than us; for example, do not talk to your opponent as if they were an earthworm, or blob, or ogre. Furthermore, we should occasionally tell our opponent that we value them as this act shows that we value them. Doing so would also give our opponent an ‘awww-how-nice-of-you’ feeling. I, for one, would feel very warm in my heart if my opponent told me that they value me (I might even give them a hug, but a man hugs, of course).[4]

Moreover, if we truly value our opponent, then we will defend them when relevant. For example, if somebody attacks Lowder personally, and if I am aware of it or in the vicinity, I will defend Lowder. I will be very angry with Lowder’s attacker and I might even give them a wedgie. So, Lowder, if you are reading this, please know that I value you!

Finally, we should occasionally ask our opponent to be patient with us. We all make mistakes and no one is perfect. Thus, it will be beneficial if we remind ourselves that we are not an inerrant, unique snowflake that the world revolves around. And then, once we are humbled, we should ask our opponent to please be patient with us as we interact with them because we might make a blunder here and there. If we do this, then perhaps our opponent will have more respect towards us.

Now, with those general remarks out of the way, let us look at Lowder’s comments. On Sunday, December 30, 2018, 11:04 PM,[5] a person with the username (or real name?) Bogdan Taranu[6] made the following comment to Lowder’s post:

I don’t know if you’re aware of this but Jacobus Erasmus over at Free Thinking Ministries critiqued the case for Naturalism you made during your debate with Turek in a two-part analysis. This was back in 2017. The relevant links are at the end of this comment.

The part I found most interesting is about your claim that Naturalism is intrinsically more probable than Theism. Basically, there are two types of modesty: linguistic and ontological. The former is about the number of claims a hypothesis asserts, while the latter is about the number of entities a hypothesis asserts (a hypothesis is more modest than another if the former asserts the existence of fewer entities – objects, events, properties – than the latter). Linguistic modesty seems to allow one to rig the process of inference to the best explanation.” More to the point linguistic modesty allows us to „define our hypotheses such that they make as many assertions as we want, and then we can choose as the most modest the hypothesis that makes the least number of claims”. This means the theist can say that Theism asserts only that “God exists” while holding that Naturalism asserts several things – thus making Theism more modest than Naturalism.

I would like to know what you think about the above criticism…

Lowder then posted several comments in response to Bogdan. Let us look at them piece by piece. Lowder says,

I’m flattered he found the opening statement worthy of a detailed reply.

Here is a good lesson for all of us: If someone writes a detailed response to your argument, that does not necessarily mean that your argument is, or that they think it is, worthy of a detailed response. In many cases, it is not the argument per se but, rather, the splash or effect generated by the argument that justifies one writing a response to the argument. Consider, for example, some of Richard Dawkins’ objections to theism. His objections are so bad that I (as well as several other scholars) feel embarrassed for Dawkins.[7] His objections are not worthy of a detailed reply. Nevertheless, the influence of his arguments does seem to justify the responses that scholars have offered since many laypersons get moved by the emotional tone of Dawkins and fail to see his reasoning errors.

However, Lowder’s opening statement is worthy of a detailed reply. Lowder is no Dawkins. Indeed, I wish that Lowder had Dawkins’ prominence as Lowder is far more reasonable than Dawkins.

Lowder continues,

It will come as no surprise to anyone that I disagree with him on virtually every point, but more important is the fact that I don’t consider his point about “linguistic modesty” to be an accurate or even charitable representation of my argument.

When we say that someone does not offer a charitable interpretation of an argument, we usually (and should) mean that they have not offered a lenient or tolerant interpretation of the argument. For example, suppose that some sentence is ambiguous and could be read in either a strong, reasonable sense or in a weak, unreasonable sense. A charitable interpretation would be to understand the sentence in the strong, reasonable sense. Lowder, then, is accusing me of not being charitable or accurate in representing his argument. Fair enough. But why, exactly, am I being uncharitable? Lowder continues,

In fact, my points about coherence and modesty show that naturalism (as I have defined it) and supernaturalism (as I have defined it), are equally ontologically modest, whereas theism (as I have defined it) is ontologically less modest than naturalism.

This does not explain how, exactly, I am being uncharitable. We are not talking about how Lowder defines naturalism, supernaturalism, and theism but, rather, with his definition of ‘intrinsic probability’ and ‘modesty’ as these are the definitions he relies on to argue that naturalism is more intrinsically probable than theism. Now, in his opening statement, Lowder explains that the ‘intrinsic probability of a hypothesis is determined entirely by its modesty and coherence’. And what does he mean by ‘modesty’?

Intrinsic probability is determined by modesty, coherence, and nothing else. By “modesty,” I mean a measure of how much the hypothesis asserts. The more a hypothesis claims, the more ways there are for it to be false and so, before we start looking at the evidence, the less likely it is to be true.

Now, I interpret the above quote as talking about linguistic modest, which refers to the number of claims (or propositions) a hypothesis asserts. Am I being uncharitable here? I do not think so. I cannot see how else to interpret the quote.

Lowder continues in his recent comments,

I think he’s barking up the wrong tree.

Is this not a cute saying? Barking up the wrong tree! Nice. Let us see if I can use this saying somewhere later in this post. He continues,

If I were trying to defend theism (or Christian theism) against my opening statement, I would concede the first contention (from my opening statement), but try to minimize the impact of the point about intrinsic probability by arguing that theism is not significantly less intrinsically probable than supernaturalism and/or argue that the evidence favoring theism over naturalism “swamps” its intrinsic improbability.

I sure hope that Lowder would one day be defending Christian theism. We could surely use someone as articulate as him on our side! Lowder, please, please, come over to our side. Lowder continues,

I stand by what I wrote: I don’t think Erasmus has accurately or even charitably represented my view. Here is one of many examples. He writes: “Since naturalism is the view that physical reality is all that exists…” Except that is precisely NOT how I defined naturalism in my opening statement. I understand that many naturalists do define naturalism in that way, which is why I spent precious speaking time in my opening statement to offer nuanced definitions of my terms. And in every speech after my opening statement, I made it very clear that I was NOT defending the view that physical reality is all that exists.

Uhh, so there is a section in my post in which I use the term ‘naturalism’ slightly different to how Lowder defined the term. Why did I do this? I am not sure. After re-reading my post, I think I just made a mistake. The important point, however, is that the meaning of my paragraph does not change when I use Lowder’s definition. My paragraph would then read as follows:

“Since naturalism is the view that the physical exists and, if the mental exists, the physical explains why the mental exists, most versions of naturalism affirm that physical reality is eternal in that either (i) there exists one universe that has existed for an infinite number of events, or (ii) there exists a multiverse that comprises an infinite number of universes.”

Indeed, we can even leave that part of the sentence out, as it does not seem to be relevant to my argument:

“Most versions of naturalism affirm that physical reality is eternal in that either (i) there exists one universe that has existed for an infinite number of events, or (ii) there exists a multiverse that comprises an infinite number of universes.”

I think Lowder is barking up the wrong tree (huh, I used the saying. Lowder, you have to give me credit for this at least). He is focusing on my definition of naturalism when he should be focusing on the central point or argument that I am making. Lowder continues,

I will leave it as an exercise for the reader to determine why Erasmus has failed to show that theism is more modest than naturalism.

But I am the reader, and I cannot see where I went wrong here? He continues,

Here’s another example of where I think Erasmus is being quite uncharitable. He writes: “Indeed, it seems to me that theism wins here. Since naturalism is the view that physical reality is all that exists, most versions of naturalism affirm that physical reality is eternal in that either (i) there exists one universe that has existed for an infinite number of events, or (ii) there exists a multiverse that comprises an infinite number of universes. Either way, this version of naturalism asserts the existence of an infinite number of events or universes.” This is doubly uncharitable. First, he’s attempting to measure the intrinsic probability of one hypothesis, naturalism, by measuring the intrinsic probability of that hypothesis conjoined with an auxiliary hypothesis–his (i) or (ii). But that’s an apples to apples-plus-oranges comparison.

Lowder sure likes to use the word ‘uncharitable’. However, once again, I cannot see how I am being uncharitable. I think it is clear in my paragraph that I am talking about some versions of naturalism, not conjoined hypotheses. I have spoken to naturalists who claim that physical reality is all that exists, and when asked what they mean by ‘physical reality’, they refer to an infinite (or at least very large) multiverse. Others define physical reality as an infinitely old universe. These are single hypotheses or versions of naturalism. Moreover, as Lowder acknowledges, a hypothesis can have multiple claims. Thus, I am referring to versions of naturalism that make these claims; they are not hypotheses conjoined with auxiliary hypotheses.

He continues,

Naturalism, as I’ve defined it, isn’t committed to either (i) or (ii). If a naturalist subscribes to either (i) or (ii), then that would be the result of some factor which is extrinsic to the content of naturalism. For example, a scientist, who could be a theist or a naturalist, might posit a multiverse in order to explain such puzzling phenomena as the so-called “cold spot” … But, if they do, they’re appealing to a posteriori information which is by definition irrelevant to intrinsic probability.

Lowder’s bare-bones-super-skinny-desperate-for-flesh definition of naturalism, of course, might not be committed to either (i) or (ii) depending on what he means by ‘physical reality’. However, I was discussing more substantial and (as I see it) common versions of naturalism. As I see it, as soon as a naturalist posits a multiverse or an infinitely old universe, that forms part of their naturalism because it alters their understanding of ‘physical reality’. So, for example, if Lowder believes in a multiverse, then he will understand ‘physical reality’ to include a multiverse and his view of naturalism will affirm a multiverse. Well, this is how I see things anyway. You are free to see things differently.

I will end here. Lowder does make a few more remarks (I believe that what I have already said applies to most of his other remarks) and he might make further comments after this writing (I wrote this early on the 03 January 2018). This was enjoyable and pleasant. I enjoy reading about Lowder’s ideas, and I hope he will be more active on his blog in the future.

Notes

[1] Don’t you just like the name ‘Lowder’? I would not mind having that name. It rolls nicely off the tongue. But I can think of some awkward situations that the name can get you into. For example, since it sounds like ‘louder’, can you imagine someone who is struggling to hear you ask, ‘Please talk louder’?

[2] I readily admit that I have not always followed the advice I present here. I have made mistakes. But I am trying. Moreover, please feel free to disagree with some (or all!) of my remarks. I am simply explaining how I see things.

[3] Definition of wedgie: ‘The condition of having one’s clothing stuck between the buttocks, often from having had one’s pants or underwear pulled up as a prank’ (https://www.wordnik.com/words/wedgie).

[4] What is a ‘man hug’? It is a type of hug that has several characteristics that distinguish it from a normal hug: (1) The hug is performed by a man. (2) While performing the hug, the man tenses or flexes his arm, shoulder, and chest muscles as to not come across as squishy. (3) The hug is performed for a very short duration, usually under one second.

[5] Yes, you should be impressed by my precision.

[6] Let us just agree that the name ‘Bogdan Taranu’ is unusual for us Westerners.

[7] When I say that I feel ‘embarrassed for Dawkins’ I do not mean this in a derogatory or demeaning or belittling sense. Rather, I mean that I truly feel embarrassed or sympathy for him. Let me try to clarify this somewhat. When I watch a Mr. Bean or Johnny English movie, I feel embarrassed for the main character because they do things in the story that I would be too embarrassed to do, and part of me wishes that the character would not have behaved in such a silly manner. It is this same feeling I have towards Dawkins. When I see Dawkins I see Mr. Bean. In fact, I have a suspicion that Dawkins is Mr. Bean undercover.

 

Jacobus Erasmus (Kobus) Dr. Jacobus Erasmus is the author of the book “The Kalām Cosmological Argument: A Reassessment”. He is currently a researcher at North-West University, South Africa and a computer programmer. He received his Ph.D. in philosophy from North-West University and was awarded the Merit Prize in 2015 by the university’s School of Philosophy for superior performance for his doctoral dissertation. Dr. Erasmus also holds an Honours Degree in IT. His main research interests include Natural Theology, Philosophy of Religion, and Metaphysics. www.JacobusErasmus.com

Original Blog Source: http://bit.ly/2FqYof7

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COMPUTER SIMULATION

Is The Universe A Computer Simulation?

Por Evan Minton

Some atheists, in an attempt to avoid the conclusion that The Big Bang origin of our universe was caused by a spaceless, timeless, immaterial, uncaused, powerful, supernatural Being (i.e God), have posited that perhaps our universe and everything in it is just a computer simulation being run by aliens in a laboratory. The Big Bang was the launch of the program and the development of the universe by its finely tuned laws were all a part of the program-universe’s code.

If you think I’m making this up, check out this quote from Neil deGrasse Tyson in his award-winning book Astrophysics For People In A Hurry:

“Or what if everything we know and love were just a computer simulation rendered for entertainment by a superintelligent alien species?” [1][2]

I also saw this idea flushed out in a cartoon where a couple of aliens were at this massive particle accelerator. The aliens were your typical little green men, with no hair, giant black eyes, and silvery space suits. And the picture depicts our universe as being the result of an experiment the aliens were doing with the large particle accelerator/collider.

Are these atheists right? Was The Big Bang the result of aliens messing around with a particle accelerator in their universe?[3] Or are we just a simulation in a program by beings more advanced than we are? Refuting this proposal is the aim of this blog post.

ANY UNIVERSE OF ALIENS CREATING A COMPUTER SIMULATION MUST HAVE A BEGINNING

First of all, even if we conceded this idea (which even Tyson only throws out as a bare possibility), it wouldn’t get rid of God. It wouldn’t eradicate the conceptual analysis of The Kalam Cosmological Argument. Why? Because in the universe in which the computer simulating ours exists, that universe must be enduring through time. If this universe is enduring through time, then it must have a beginning and therefore a transcendent cause.

How did I reach this conclusion? From one of the same philosophical/mathematical arguments that lead me to conclude that our universe had a beginning. First of all, we know that these aliens would have to be enduring through time because the aliens are living in a world of cause and effect, of before-and-after relationships. There was a time before these alien scientists were born and a time after they were born. There was a time before they got their degrees in computer engineering and a time after they graduated. There was a time before they built the computer which caused our simulated universe and a time after they ran the simulation. Before-and-after relationships are impossible without time. According to the description of this theory, our alien creature creators are temporal beings. This leads me to my next point.

1: It is impossible to traverse an actually infinite number of temporal moments.

2: If it is impossible to traverse an actually infinite number of moments, then the present moment cannot be reached.

3: The present moment has been reached.

4: Therefore, we have not endured through an actually infinite number of temporal moments (i.e the universe had a beginning).

This is a logically valid syllogism. If the premises are true, so is the conclusion. So, are the premises true? I think they are.

Let’s look at premise 1. If the universe of our alien creators were eternal and beginningless (unlike the universe they simulated), then that means their world endured through an actually infinite number of moments to reach the point in time in which they caused their simulation. Before the day of the simulation, the day before the simulation had to dawn. And before the day before the day of the simulation could dawn, the day before the day before the day before the simulation could dawn. Before that day could dawn, the day before it had to dawn. Before that day could dawn, the day before it had to dawn, and so on and so forth. As you can see, the day in which the alien scientists caused their universe simulation could never have arrived, because there would need to pass an infinite number of prior moments. In fact, no moment in their universe at all could dawn. Before each day in the infinite series of days, there would always have to be a day that had to dawn first.

Getting to the present moment while having to first cross an infinite number of past events is analogous to jumping out of a bottomless pit, or causing a bottomless coffee pot to overflow. No matter how much coffee you pour into the cup, it will never fill up to the brim.

But if an infinite past could not be crossed, then that means the day of the start of the simulation could not arrive. And that means our present day could not arrive. The start of our 14 billion year history could never have occurred (this is premise 2). But clearly, the present moment has arrived (premise 3). We’re here. You’re reading this blog post right now. It is self-evident that the present has arrived. This means that the universe of our alien creators could not have endured forever, but must have a beginning. And since everything that begins to exist must have a cause, it follows that the universe of our alien creators must have a cause.

BUT MAYBE WE’RE IN A SIMULATION THAT’S INSIDE A SIMULATION
At this point, the atheist might respond “Okay, but maybe the universe of our alien creators is a simulation as well. We’re in a simulation that’s inside a simulation. Just like how a nesting doll can be inside of another nesting doll”. This doesn’t solve the problem. It only pushes it back a notch. Are those aliens subject to time? It would seem so if they evolved, were born, grew up, went to universities to get degrees in computer programming, and then created a universe-simulation that would have a universe-simulation within it. In that case, you run into the same problem. That universe must also have a beginning.

But perhaps the atheist could say “Well, perhaps we’re a simulation within a simulation within a simulation?” Again, the same problems apply.

What happens is that in this alien-scientist-creating-a-universe-simulation scenario is that you get thrown into an infinite regress of aliens creating universe simulations which themselves contain aliens that create universe simulations which themselves contain universe simulations with themselves contain universe simulations ad infinitum.

As already explained above, traversing an actually infinite number of things is impossible. Our own simulation could never have arisen if a past infinite number of universe simulations had to come into being first. Before the aliens could simulate our universe, their universe had to be simulated, and before their universe could be simulated, their universe had to be a simulation, and so on ad infinitum. No simulation could ever come to past, and ergo the present simulation (and present moment within the simulation) could never come to be.

WHAT DOES THIS ALL MEAN?

It means that even in a scenario which posits super advanced aliens creating a computer program of a universe, you eventually get traced back to a universe that is not a computer simulation, but nevertheless contains super advanced alien creatures and (wait for it….) had a beginning. In this scenario, we must come to a first universe, the first beginning, and therefore, the first cause.

But what properties would this cause have? It wouldn’t be a team of super advanced aliens since this first-universe is not itself the result of a prior team of alien scientists. The cause would transcend all physical reality, all of space and time, and therefore be immaterial and uncaused. In other words, God rears His holy head again.

God is exempt from the problems the aliens creators would have. He had no beginning and is uncaused, and therefore needs no prior cause to explain Him. God being beginningless wouldn’t imply that He endured through an actually infinite number of moments because God, sans creation of time, existed outside of time. There was no time. Once God flicked the first domino, time began. This is a bit of a heavy subject, and Christian philosopher William Lane Craig has devoted an entire book the to the subject,[4] but I just wanted to point out that being timeless sans creation, God avoids the problems associated with being beginningless in a temporal manner.

CONCLUSION 
Unfortunately for the atheists, this alien computer simulation idea only forces God to go upstairs at most. It doesn’t get rid of Him. The conceptual analysis of The Kalam Cosmological Argument still stands.

Notes 

[1] deGrasse Tyson, Neil. Astrophysics for People in a Hurry (Kindle Locations 170-171). W. W. Norton & Company. Kindle Edition.

[2] Don’t let this wild idea deter you from getting Tyson’s book by the way. He only mentions the simulation idea in this one place. Astrophysics For People In A Hurry It is a fantastic introductory course in astrophysics. Tyson does not put forth wild theories like this throughout, and he only shows his atheistic sleeve a total of two times. The first in this part of the book, and the second, in the final chapter. It’s an overall religiously neutral work. I recommend anyone who loves science (and is especially not well read in science) to pick up the book.

[3] By the way, this happened in a Doctor Who episode (titled Extremis). I won’t describe what happened in the episode. Watch it yourself. Watch the whole series in fact. It’s an awesome show!

[4] The book is called “Time and Eternity: Exploring God’s Relationship To Time”.

 

Original Blog Source: http://bit.ly/2ErH4n3

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COMPUTER SIMULATION

¿Es el universo una simulación computarizada?

Por Evan Minton

Algunos ateos, en un intento de evitar la conclusión de que el origen del Big Bang de nuestro universo fue causado por un ser sin espacio, intemporal, inmaterial, sin causa, poderoso, sobrenatural (es decir, Dios), han postulado que tal vez nuestro universo y todo lo que hay en él es solo una simulación computarizada dirigida por extraterrestres en un laboratorio. El Big Bang fue el lanzamiento del programa y el desarrollo del universo por sus leyes finamente ajustadas formaba parte del código del programa-universo.

COMPUTER SIMULATION

Si crees que estoy inventando esto, revisa esta cita de Neil deGrasse Tyson en su galardonado libro Astrophysics For People In A Hurry (en español: Astrofísica para la gente que tiene prisa):

“¿O qué pasaría si todo lo que conocemos y amamos fuera solo una simulación computarizada hechos para el entretenimiento por una especie de alienígena supe inteligente?”[1][2]

También vi esta idea arrojada en una caricatura donde un par de extraterrestres estaban en este enorme acelerador de partículas. Los extraterrestres eran tus típicos hombrecillos verdes, sin pelo, ojos negros gigantescos,   y trajes espaciales plateados. Y la imagen muestra nuestro universo como el resultado de un experimento que los extraterrestres estaban haciendo con el acelerador/colisionador de partículas grandes.

¿Estos son estos ateos, verdad? ¿Fue el Big Bang el resultado de extraterrestres jugando con un acelerador de partículas en su universo? [3] ¿O solo somos una simulación en un programa de seres más avanzados que nosotros? Refutar esta propuesta es el objetivo de esta entrada en el blog.

CUALQUIER UNIVERSO DE SIMULACIÓN COMPUTARIZADA CREADO POR EXTRATERRESTRES DEBE TENER UN PRINCIPIO

En primer lugar, incluso si admitimos esta idea (de la cual Tyson solo descarta como una posibilidad), no se desharía de Dios. No erradicaría el análisis conceptual del Argumento cosmológico Kalam. ¿Por qué? Porque en el universo en el que la computadora simula nuestro existir, ese universo debe perdurar en el tiempo. Si este universo perdura en el tiempo, entonces debe tener un comienzo y, por lo tanto, una causa trascendente.

¿Cómo llegué a esta conclusión? De uno de los mismos argumentos filosóficos/matemáticos que me llevan a la conclusión de que nuestro universo tuvo un comienzo. En primer lugar, sabemos que estos extraterrestres tendrían que perdurar en el tiempo porque los alienígenas viven en un mundo de causa y efecto, de relaciones de antes y después. Hubo un tiempo antes de que estos científicos alienígenas nacieran y un tiempo después que ellos nacieran. Hubo un tiempo antes de obtener sus títulos en ingeniería informática y un tiempo después que ellos se graduaran. Hubo un tiempo antes de que construyeran la computadora que causó nuestro universo simulado, y un tiempo después que funcionara la simulación. Las relaciones de antes y después son imposibles sin tiempo. Según la descripción de esta teoría, nuestras criaturas alienígenas creadores son seres temporales. Esto me lleva al siguiente punto.

  1. Es imposible atravesar una cantidad realmente infinita de momentos temporales.
  2. Si es imposible atravesar un número realmente infinito de momentos, entonces no se puede alcanzar el momento presente.
  3. El momento presente ha sido alcanzado.
  4. Por lo tanto, no hemos perdurado a través de un número realmente infinito de momentos temporales (es decir, el universo tuvo un comienzo).

Este es un silogismo lógicamente válido. Si las premisas son verdaderas, también lo es la conclusión. Entonces, ¿son ciertas las premisas? Creo que lo son.

Veamos la premisa 1. Si el universo de nuestros creadores alienígenas fuera eterno y sin comienzo (a diferencia del universo que simularon), eso significa que su mundo soportó un número infinito de momentos para llegar al momento en el que causaron su simulación. Antes del día de la simulación, el día antes de la simulación tenía que comenzar. Y antes del día anterior al día de la simulación podría amanecer, el día anterior al día antes del día anterior a la simulación podría amanecer. Antes de que ese día pudiera amanecer, el día anterior tenía que amanecer. Antes de que ese día pudiera amanecer, el día anterior tenía que amanecer, y así sucesivamente. Como puedes ver, el día en que los científicos alienígenas causaron su simulación del universo nunca pudo haber llegado, porque habría que pasar un número infinito de momentos previos. De hecho, ningún momento en su universo en absoluto podría comenzar. Antes de cada día en la serie infinita de días, siempre tendría que haber un día que tuviera que amanecer primero.

Llegar al momento presente mientras se tiene que cruzar primero un número infinito de eventos pasados ​​es análogo a saltar de un pozo sin fondo, o hacer que se desborde una cafetera sin fondo. No importa cuánto café vierta en la taza, nunca se llenará hasta el borde.

Pero si un pasado infinito no se puede cruzar, entonces eso significa que el día del inicio de la simulación no pudo llegar. Y eso significa que nuestro día actual no pudo llegar. El comienzo de nuestra historia de 14 mil millones de años nunca pudo haber ocurrido (esta es la premisa 2). Pero claramente, el momento presente ha llegado (premisa 3). Estamos aquí. Estás leyendo esta publicación en el blog ahora mismo. Es evidente que el presente ha llegado. Esto significa que el universo de nuestros creadores alienígenas no podría haber perdurado para siempre, sino que debe tener un comienzo. Y dado que todo lo que comienza a existir debe tener una causa, se deduce que el universo de nuestros creadores alienígenas debe tener una causa.

PERO QUIZÁS ESTEMOS EN UNA SIMULACIÓN DENTRO DE UNA SIMULACIÓN

En este punto, el ateo podría responder: “Está bien, pero tal vez el universo de nuestros creadores alienígenas es también una simulación. Estamos en una simulación que está dentro de una simulación. Así como una muñeca que hace su nido puede estar dentro de otro nido de muñeca”. Esto no resuelve el problema. Solo lo empuja hacia atrás otro nivel. ¿Están esos extraterrestres sujetos al tiempo? Parecería ser así, si evolucionaran, nacieran, crecieran, fueran a universidades para obtener títulos en programación de computadoras y luego crearan una simulación universal que tendría una simulación de universo dentro de ella. En ese caso, te encuentras con el mismo problema. Ese universo también debe tener un comienzo.

Pero tal vez el ateo podría decir: “Bueno, ¿tal vez somos una simulación dentro de una simulación dentro de una simulación?”. Nuevamente, se aplican los mismos problemas.

Lo que ocurre es que en este escenario de simulación-alienígena-científica-creadora-de-un-universo es que te lanzas a un retroceso infinito de alienígenas creando simulaciones universales que contienen alienígenas que crean simulaciones del universo que contienen simulaciones del universo consigo mismas que contienen simulaciones del universo indefinidamente.

Como ya se explicó anteriormente, atravesar un número realmente infinito de cosas es imposible. Nuestra propia simulación nunca podría haber surgido si un número pasado e infinito de simulaciones del universo tuviera que surgir primero. Antes de que los extraterrestres pudieran simular nuestro universo, su universo tendría que ser simulado, y antes de que su universo pudiera ser simulado, su universo tendría que ser una simulación, y así sucesivamente hasta el infinito. Ninguna simulación podría llegar al pasado, y ergo la simulación actual (y el momento presente dentro de la simulación) nunca podría llegar a ser.

¿QUÉ SIGNIFICA TODO ESTO?

Significa que incluso en un escenario en el que los alienígenas súper avanzados creen un programa informático de un universo, eventualmente se remonta a un universo que no sea una simulación por computadora, pero sin embargo contiene criaturas alienígenas súper avanzadas y (espera…) tuvo un comienzo. En este escenario, debemos llegar a un primer universo, el primer comienzo y, por lo tanto, la primera causa.

Pero, ¿qué propiedades tendría esta causa? No sería un equipo de extraterrestres avanzados ya que este primer universo no es en sí mismo el resultado de un equipo anterior de científicos alienígenas. La causa trascendería toda la realidad física, todo el espacio y el tiempo, y por lo tanto sería inmaterial y no causada. En otras palabras, Dios levanta Su santa cabeza otra vez.

Dios está exento de los problemas que los creadores de alienígenas tendrían. Él no tuvo comienzo y no es causado, y por lo tanto no necesita una causa previa para explicarlo. El hecho de que Dios no tenga principio no implicaría que Él haya aguantado a través de un número realmente infinito de momentos porque Dios, sin la creación del tiempo, existió fuera del tiempo. No había tiempo. Una vez que Dios movió el primer dominó, el tiempo comenzó. Este es un tema un tanto pesado, y el filósofo cristiano William Lane Craig ha dedicado un libro completo al tema, [4] pero solo quería señalar que siendo intemporal y sin haber sido creado, Dios evita los problemas asociados con el hecho de no tener un principio de manera temporal.

CONCLUSIÓN 
Desafortunadamente para los ateos, esta idea alienígena de simulación por computadora solo hace a Dios subir las escaleras al máximo. No se deshace de Él. El análisis conceptual del Argumento Cosmológico Kalam sigue en pie.

Notas 

[1] deGrasse Tyson, Neil.Astrophysics for People in a Hurry (Ubicaciones Kindle 170-171). W. W. Norton & Company. Versión Kindle.

[2] Por cierto, no dejes que esta idea descabellada te impida obtener el libro de Tyson. Solo menciona la idea de simulación en este lugar.  “Astrophysics For People In A Hurry” es un fantástico curso de introducción a la astrofísica. Tyson no presenta teorías salvajes como esta, y solo muestra su manga atea un total de dos veces. El primero en esta parte del libro, y el segundo, en el capítulo final. Es una obra religiosamente neutral en general. Recomiendo a cualquiera que ame la ciencia (y sea especialmente no muy letrado en ciencias) adquirir el libro.

[3] Por cierto, esto sucedió en un episodio de Doctor Who (titulado Extremis). No describiré lo que sucedió en el episodio. Míralo tú mismo. Mira toda la serie de hecho. ¡Es un espectáculo increíble!

[4] El libro se llama “Time and Eternity: Exploring God’s Relationship To Time” (Tiempo y eternidad: explorando la relación de Dios con el tiempo).

 

Blog Original: http://bit.ly/2ErH4n3

Traducido por María Andreina Cerrada

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objections kalam

11 Objections to the Kalam Cosmological Argument

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By Randy Everist

The Kalam Cosmological Argument is one of the most popular cosmological arguments around today. The argument is fairly straightforward and enjoys intuitive support. It goes like this: “Whatever begins to exist had a cause; the universe began to exist; therefore, the universe had a cause.” The argument has several common objections, and eleven of them are listed here, along with some of my comments. I believe each objection can be satisfactorily answered so that one is justified in accepting the KCA.

1. “Something cannot come from nothing” is disproved by quantum mechanics.

Answer: This is a fundamental misunderstanding of the claim. The claim of the first premise is “whatever begins to exist had a cause.” It’s often demonstrated by listing the causal principle “something cannot come from nothing,” or ex nihilo, nihilo fit. Quantum mechanics does not in fact posit something coming from nothing, but rather things coming from the quantum vacuum–which is not “nothing.”

2. Truth cannot be discovered wholly from reason.

Answer: It’s true that one needs some level of empiricism in order to judge many things. However, one absolutely needs reason to judge all things. I just don’t see how this is an objection against arguments, for it must use reasoning (of some metaphysically-ultimate sort, even if it’s a brute fact) in order to tell us reason doesn’t tell us the whole story. Well, how will we know if the reasoning behind this claim is telling us the whole story? The answer: because this is the kind of claim that can be reasoned out. The KCA is just such an argument, by its very nature.

3. Some truths are counterintuitive, and therefore intuition cannot be a guide to truth.

Answer: This is a classic non-sequitur, on par with “some people have incorrect thoughts, therefore thoughts cannot be a reliable guide for truth.” The point is this: why should I doubt my intuition because someone else got theirs wrong? Indeed, why should I doubt my own intuitions even if I have been wrong in the past? I mean, if I am insane or intuiting on things I have frequently been incorrect on, or if there are necessary or empirical truths that overcome my intuition, or even if I have a competing intuition that I hold stronger than the original, then fine: I should abandon it. But otherwise, rational intuition is at the very core of reasoning. It is said that by rational intuition, we mean the way we know “if X, then Y; X; Therefore, Y” is true. Therefore, it may be argued that not only is jettisoning intuition wholesale unjustified, but actually irrational (by definition). “But wait!” I can hear one protest. “Just because you intuit this doesn’t mean I do.” Fair enough. But since I do, I am free to accept the ramifications, unless one of the conditions for jettisoning an intuition apply. In fact, we ought to accept our intuitions in the absence of these undercutters or defeaters, unless there is some reason to suspect our cognitive function is impaired.

4. Since science is not itself a metaphysical enterprise, the arguer cannot apply science to a metaphysical argument.

Answer: That science is not a metaphysical enterprise is, I think, absolutely correct. However, it does not therefore follow that science cannot be employed in a metaphysical claim. This is somewhat akin to claiming philosophy and science don’t mix, which is surely impossible (how can anyone come to a scientific claim or know anything without applying reasoning to what has been observed?). The KCA does not have science itself do the metaphysical work; rather, it simply uses the best and most current science to show that the universe most likely had a finite beginning and does not avoid it. It’s then the philosophy that takes over given this.

5. The first cause is logically incoherent because it existed “before” time.

Answer: First, it should be noted that this is not an objection to either premise, and thus one could claim this and still believe the universe had a cause. Second, the foremost proponent of the KCA, William Lane Craig, points out that the First Cause need not be in existence before time, as there is a first moment–the incoherence runs both ways. So what we have is a timeless, unchanging (because it is timeless) First Cause whose first act is bringing the world into existence. If the objector wants to insist this is impossible because the First Cause existed before time, he must remember that positing a moment before time began is incoherent, so his objection cannot get off the ground. The first moment is itself identical with the first act of bringing the universe into existence.

6. If some metaphysical truth is not well-established, one is unjustified in saying it is true.

Answer: It’s difficult to know what is meant by “well-established,” but it seems to mean something like “gained wide acceptance among philosophers.” But that’s a fairly poor way of evaluating an argument: a poll! Sure, philosophers are more likely than your average person to be able to evaluate the argument properly, but let’s not pretend this is the only way to discover truth. Moreover, this is an impossible epistemology. If no one is justified in believing some metaphysical claim to be true unless a majority of philosophers accept it, then either no such majority will exist (because the vast majority will stick with this claim) or if such a majority exists it will be a “tipsy coachman” kind of group (where they are right for the wrong reasons). Surely this is a poor epistemology.

7. There could be other deities besides the Christian God.

Answer: Again, it must be noted that this is not an objection to either premise and hence not the conclusion. It is an objection to the application of the conclusion. However, it must be noted that the KCA is an argument for natural theology, not revealed theology (cf. Charles Taliaferro, The Blackwell Companion to Natural Theology, ch. 1). It is not the domain of natural theology to discuss, explicitly, the Christian God. Of course, we Christians happen to believe this being is identical to the Christian God ontologically. However, let’s take a look at some of the properties: timeless, spaceless, changeless (logically prior to the Big Bang), immensely powerful, and the creator of the universe. Hmm, sounds far more like the God of Christian theology and the Bible than any of the other alternatives, doesn’t it?

8. There are non-theistic explanations that remain live possibilities.

Answer: This objection attempts to state that although the universe had a beginning, some non-theistic explanation is just as possible (or even probable) as God. The multiverse, aliens, whatever. However, most of these examples (such as a multiverse) can really best be described as objections to the second premise, not the application of the conclusion. The multiverse, for instance, really doesn’t solve the problem, but merely places it back one step. One may reply the multiverse could be identical with Lewis’ plurality of worlds, so that every logically-possible world actually exists, and it was impossible that any such possible world fail to exist. However, this is extremely ad hoc, and there is literally no reason to believe that if there is a multiverse, it is as complete as Lewis claimed (in fact, there’s decent reason to believe such a state of affairs is impossible if identity across worlds holds).

9. Popular-level science teaches the universe had a beginning, but someone says the real science shows it doesn’t.

Answer: This is a bit of an odd claim. We aren’t given any argument as to why it’s really the case that a potentially-successful model for the beginning of the universe shows no finite beginning. We’re simply to take someone’s word for it, when we actually have physicists and scientists admitting these theories don’t work.

10. The KCA relies entirely on current science, and science can change.

Answer: It’s very true that science is changing, and any claim should be held tentatively (even gravity–seems dubious though, right?). However, two points remain. First, simply because some claim remains open to change does not mean that claim cannot be accepted as true. It seems bizarre to say that because some claim is in the purview of science, one should not claim it as true. Of course we can claim it is true! Second, the KCA does not rely entirely on science. In fact, the second premise (“the universe began to exist”) can be defended solely on rational argumentation. One may think these arguments fail, but to claim the KCA rests almost wholly on the science demonstrates a lack of familiarity with the basic defenses of the KCA’s premises.

11. There is some problem of infinite regress of a first cause.

Answer: Presumably, this is the “Who created God?” problem (I can’t for the life of me think of any other problem). I don’t see why this is a problem, given the formulation of the argument. “Whatever begins to exist had a cause.” God did not begin to exist. “Ad hoc!” one might cry. But they would be mistaken. There is a very good reason for stating this. The application of the conclusion demands that the First Cause precede, logically, all else. The First Cause’s act of bringing the universe into existence is the first moment. Hence, if the First Cause was not really the first cause after all, then the first moment of time would already have existed. But it did not exist. Hence, the First Cause was the first.

Each objection has been dealt with by providing an answer. This means that each Christian, and each person, is rationally justified in accepting the KCA. If that is true, then it seems that the KCA’s truth implies God–not just any God, but the God of the Bible!

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New Proofs for God's Existence

New Proofs for God’s Existence

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Such was the name for a talk recently given at UT Dallas by Robert C. Koons, a philosophy professor from UT Austin. Actually, Koons is currently a visiting scholar at Princeton but took time out of his busy schedule to make a special trip to the Dallas area to speak on our campus.1  I was originally wondering whether or not Koon’s requested title might be over-stating the theistic case by claiming to be a “proof.” Wanting to be conservative in our claims, I added this footnote on our poster used for advertising the event:

“’Proof’ in the sense that the conclusion follows out of logical necessity if the premises are granted. Arguments are made for the truth of the premises but it is recognized that the premises cannot be proven with mathematical certainty.”

In retrospect perhaps this was probably unnecessary as everyone should know that even a valid proof is only as good as its premises. Even in math, axioms upon which proofs are based cannot themselves be proven. Gödel’s second incompleteness theorem shows that all but the most trivial mathematical systems cannot demonstrate their own consistency. But I think that Koon’s argument did rise to the level of what is meant by proof in philosophy. There are ways of resisting any proof, but the intellectual cost of denying a premise that nearly all people accept in other contexts is a high price to pay.

So what is this “new proof?” The overall argument Koons was making is actually one of the oldest around – a cosmological argument for God’s existence similar to that argued by ancient Greek and Roman philosophers, Jewish, Christian, Muslim thinkers, and even 10th-century Indian thinkers of the Nyaya School. However, Koons did present new arguments for the truth of the key premise of the argument.

Here is a video of Koon’s recent presentation on the UTD campus.

Summary

Here is my rough attempt to summarize Koons’ arguments but you really need to see the video for details. Koons started off by saying that if you can know that there is a hand with five fingers in front of you, then you can know that God exists. You know about your hand through empirical knowledge – by observation and memory, and the testimony of others. These are the same means that are necessary for scientific and historical reasoning. Anything that we know empirically is linked by a chain of causes. For example, sensory perception involves light being reflected into your eyes, stimulating your retina such that a message is sent through your optic nerve to the brain. Scientific reasoning infers causes from effects or effects from causes. If any of the steps involved in seeing your hand could occur without a cause, knowledge would be impossible.

Does everything have a cause?

Everything involved as a link in the chain of empirical knowledge must have a cause. If, for example, visual sensations could occur without any cause whatsoever, it would undermine our scientific inferences because such “uncaused” sensations would be completely unpredictable and would have a probability which could not be estimated. We would have good reason to think that we might be “Boltzmann brains” right now – with nothing but illusory sensations.

Empirical knowledge, such as knowing there is a hand in front of you with 5 fingers, is impossible unless we know that every step involved necessarily has a cause. We can’t know the principle that every step in a causal chain necessarily has a cause by empirical means (at least without vicious circularity). Thus, this type of minimal principle of sufficient reason must be a self-evident principle of reason. To doubt this is the unhealthy kind of doubt because it undermines all empirical knowledge.

However, surely there is one sort of thing that could fail to be caused without threatening empirical knowledge – things that are obviously uncausable. We here refer to things which are not just uncaused but self-evidently uncausable. If absolutely everything had a cause, then the network of causation would have to contain either loops (things that caused themselves) or infinite regresses. However, nothing can cause itself, since it would have to simultaneously both exist (in order to be the cause) and not exist (in order to be a potential effect). So if we can show the impossibility of an infinite regress of causes, then the contingent effects we see in the universe must ultimately trace back to an uncausable cause.

Analogies to Show the Impossibility of an Infinite Regress of Causes

Couldn’t there be an infinite regress of causes just extending back into the eternal past? Koon argues not and gives several examples of contradictions entailed by an infinite regress of causes:

1)      The Grim Reaper – this analogy was originally conceived by Jose Benardete in 1964 and modified slightly by Alexander Pruss.2  Consider a Grim Reaper (GR) who will kill Fred in 1 BC but if only if all other GRs failed to previously. Similarly, an additional GR will kill Fred in 2 BC if he is still alive in that year. There is a separate GR for each year prior to that with the same instructions going back into the infinite past. This story is possible if an infinite regress is possible. However, this scenario is not logically possible because it leads to a contradiction. At least one Grim Reaper has initiated a death warrant, since otherwise, all would have failed to do their duty. Suppose it was the N’th GR. But GR #N would have acted only if all earlier GR’s did not act. So both GR #(N+1) and GR #(N+2) did not act. But if GR #(N+2) and all earlier GRs did not act, then GR #(N+1) would have acted and thus a contradiction results. Thus we have a reductio ad absurdum, and an infinite regress is logically impossible.

2)      Even if an infinite regress was possible, an explanation would still be required according to a new argument by Alexander Pruss: http://alexanderpruss.blogspot.com/2013/06/cannonball-and-regress.html.

3)      Koons also provides a counter-example from considering an infinite fair lottery. See the video for details.

Koons then argued that the attributes that we can deduce for a first cause to the universe correspond to some of the key properties of God in classical theism. He also went on to cite some scientific evidence that points to a Creator from evidence for an origin to the universe and from the fine-tuning of the laws and constants of nature to be life-supporting.

Koons closes by saying that “my overall point here is [that] theistic metaphysics is not a competitor to empirical science. Quite the contrary, if you don’t buy into theistic metaphysics, you’re undermining empirical science. The two grew up together historically and are culturally and philosophically inter-dependent… If you say I just don’t buy this causality principle – that’s going to be a big big problem for empirical science.” This is a powerful argument for God’s existence – if you want to explore additional writings on this subject I recommend the following:

Powerpoint summary of a similar argument by Joshua Rasmussen

A paper by Alexander Pruss and Richard Gale published by Cambridge University Press

Notes

[1] He was coming from New Jersey anyway to Waco to participate in a philosophy conference at Baylor honoring Alvin Plantinga but made the special trip to Dallas.

[2] Jose Benardete’s Infinity: An Essay in Metaphysics (1964)

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