Tag Archive for: J. Brian Huffling

By J. Brian Huffling

“There are some Jehovah’s Witnesses in the neighborhood if you want to talk them,” my wife said. I was excited. I have had numerous and long-standing discussions with Mormons, but never anything meaningful with Jehovah’s Witnesses. After a while, they finally came to my door. While I couldn’t talk to them at the time, we scheduled a meeting for them to come back. I have been meeting with them for about a month now. It has been great! I have studied their teachings for a while, but I have never had the chance to get it from the horse’s mouth and really ask questions to help me better understand their belief system. It really has been a lot of fun, and I would like to share my experiences with you, including their beliefs and the questions I have asked them.

The Name of Jehovah

The first teaching they shared with me was the importance of the name “Jehovah.” In Hebrew (the original language of the Old Testament) God’s personal name is Yahweh. The original Hebrew did not contain vowels, and so this name was spelled YHWH. It was thought to be sacred, and so the Hebrew scribes did not want to pronounce the divine name. Instead, they added the letters of Adonai, which means “Master” or “Lord.” Thus, we get the English spelling “Yahoveh.” Rumor has it that “Jehovah” came about because the Germans had a hard time pronouncing the “Y” and instead made a “J” sound, hence, Jehovah.

However, this name Jehovah came about; Jehovah’s’ Witnesses are adamant that we should call him by his divine name. They teach that English translations have lost this teaching, and it is important to get it right. This is one reason they have their own version of the Bible, which is called the “New World Translation.” Translating words like YHWH as Jehovah is just one difference, and relatively minor in comparison to other teachings that drastically change the text.

Jesus Is “a” God, Not God Almighty

I was surprised that they threw this one at me right out of the gate, but on the second meeting, they brought an elder who admitted that in their view, Jesus is not God. I had known this teaching for years but was not sure exactly how open they would be about it. Happily, for me, they were very open about it. After some general teaching through a pamphlet that they gave me, the elder and I agreed to focus on the topic of Jesus’ deity on our next meeting. I did some preparation, so I could try to prove to them that Jesus did, in fact claim to be God.

He ended up coming by himself on this particular visit, and we went over two passages of Scripture from which he wanted to demonstrate that Jesus was a created being and thus not God. One passage was Proverbs 8:22-23, which says: “The Lord possessed me at the beginning of his work, the first of his acts of old. 23 Ages ago, I was set up, at the first, before the beginning of the earth” (ESV). His point was that “Wisdom” refers to Jesus. I do not remember getting a very clear answer as to why he thought this, but I pointed out that as wisdom literature, “Wisdom” is personified often, and even as a woman. In fact, verse twelve says, “I, wisdom, dwell with prudence, and I find knowledge and discretion.” I asked, “If Wisdom is Jesus, then who is Prudence?” There was no real answer.

His second, and more well-known passage cited by them on this topic, was Colossians 1:15, which says, “He [Jesus] is the image of the invisible God, the firstborn of all creation.” Since Jesus is “the firstborn of all creation,” Jehovah’s Witnesses argue that he is the first created being. However, the Greek word for ‘firstborn’ actually means “preeminent”, not the first in a series of things. In fact, the Greek translation of Psalm 89:27 uses the exact word for David: “And I will make him the firstborn, the highest of the kings of the earth.” However, David was not only not the firstborn, he was the last born. So I argued these two passages are not teaching that Jesus was created. The first was simply a personification of wisdom, which happens all the time in Hebrew wisdom literature. And the second simply doesn’t mean what they say it means. The elder was not convinced, and even said that we can’t go by what the dictionary says. I could not knock him off his script on this point. He simply refused to concede what the word means.

I offered several lines of argument that Jesus claimed to be God. For example, Isaiah 44:6 says, “I am the first and I am the last; besides me there is no god.” However, in Revelation 1:17-18 Jesus claimed, “I am the first and the last, 18 and the living one. I died, and behold I am alive forevermore, and I have the keys of Death and Hades.” This is Jesus talking and not Jehovah (Jehovah never died according to Jehovah’s Witnesses). That Jesus was the one speaking was agreed upon by the elder. My point was that if Jehovah was claiming to be the first and the last and so was Jesus, then Jesus was claiming to be Jehovah. The reply was that Jesus merely was thinking like Jehovah, not claiming to be Jehovah. However, as I pointed out, this is not what the text says. (See this post for more material on Jesus’ claims to deity.)

After making several connections like the one above, I asked the elder what would make him believe Jesus was God if such clear identity claims did not serve as evidence. His answer was that God would not allow himself to be put to death by men. (To be clear, Christians don’t believe God was put to death; rather, the human nature of Jesus was put to death. His deity can not be touched by death.) We never agreed on the deity of Jesus.

Jesus Was Raised from the Dead Spiritually, Not Physically

The elder brought another Jehovah’s Witnesses for this meeting where we further discussed Jesus’ deity and the resurrection. They believe that Jesus pre-existed his human life as the archangel Michael. His life was transferred to the virgin Mary, and he became a human. The elder said that after Jesus’ death he was raised, but spiritually, not physically. He argued that flesh and blood cannot enter the kingdom of God, and since Jesus is in Heaven, he must be spiritual. He also pointed to Scriptures where those who talked to him on the road to Emmaus did not recognize Jesus after his resurrection. Thus, he was not in his former body. For example, Luke 24:13-16 reads, “That very day two of them were going to a village named Emmaus, about seven miles from Jerusalem, 14 and they were talking with each other about all these things that had happened. 15 While they were talking and discussing together, Jesus himself drew near and went with them. 16 But their eyes were kept from recognizing him.” As I pointed out, the text does not say he looked different, but “their eyes were kept from recognizing him.” Further, Scripture teaches that Jesus was raised in his same physical body he had.

Luke 24:39-43 states: “See my hands and my feet, that it is I myself. Touch me, and see. For a spirit does not have flesh and bones as you see that I have.” 40 And when he had said this, he showed them his hands and his feet. 41 And while they still disbelieved for joy and were marveling, he said to them, “Have you anything here to eat?” 42 They gave him a piece of broiled fish, 43 and he took it and ate before them.” Clearly, Jesus was claiming to be a physical being. This was not contested by the elder. However, his response was simply that Jesus materialized in the way angels could in the Old Testament.

I pointed out that John 2:19-21 says, “Jesus answered them, ‘Destroy this temple, and in three days I will raise it up.’ 20 The Jews then said, ‘It has taken forty-six years to build this temple, and will you raise it up in three days?’ 21 But he was speaking about the temple of his body.” So, the same body that was killed would be raised up after death. It is also important to note that in Acts 2:24 Peter says that God raised up Jesus: “God raised him up, loosing the pangs of death because it was not possible for him to be held by it.” This is another claim to Jesus’ deity since he said, “I will raise” my body, and here Peter says, “God raised up Jesus.”

In the end, I asked them what evidence would count for the physical resurrection, even in principle, since Jesus saying that the same body that was killed was the same one raised, and he demonstrated his body to be physical in many ways and on many occasions. But if showing his physical body after his resurrection doesn’t count as evidence (in conjunction with the claim that the same body would be raised), then it seems like nothing in principle could ever be used as evidence for a physical resurrection. The younger Jehovah’s Witness tried to change the subject, but I politely asked for an answer. There really wasn’t one.

The New World Translation, The Trinity, and Jesus

We will be discussing the Trinity next time, although it came up in our last meeting. Jehovah’s Witnesses deny the Trinity. They teach it is a pagan lie and that Christianity stole the idea from other religions that also had trinities; however, such is false. Other religions had a triad of beings but nothing like the Christian view of the Trinity. But Jehovah’s Witnesses cannot hold to the Trinity since they deny Jesus is God. They further teach that the Holy Spirit is not a person but rather God’s active force. In their own translation of the Bible, the New World Translation, “Holy Spirit” is actually translated “active force.” In the NWT, Genesis 1:2 actually says, “…and God’s active force was moving about over the surface of the waters.” This is a gross mistranslation that betrays the NWT‘s bias. The Hebrew is accurately translated in the ESV: “And the Spirit of God was hovering over the face of the waters.” There is simply no justification for translating “spirit” as “active force.”

Another, perhaps the most famous, example of bias in the NWT is John 1:1. The ESV reads, “In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God.” The NWT adds the word “a” to make the text read: “In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was a god.” The reason they give is that in Greek the word “God” does not have the word “the” (the definite article) in front of it, which would make it definite. (Greek sometimes has the definite article before nouns even though English doesn’t always translate it. Greek can read “the God” which is merely translated “God.”) They claim that without the definite article, “God” should be translated indefinitely as “a god.” However, as one scholar has pointed out, the NWT only follows this principle 6% of the time. In fact, in John 1:6 the word “God” appears in Greek without the article and the NWT still translates it “God” as referring to Jehovah. This is clear bias. Without going into Greek grammar suffice it to say that a word can be definite even without the article in front of it. In Greek the article has a very rich and broad way of functioning. In Daniel Wallace’s Greek Grammar Beyond the Basics, over 100 pages are dedicated to how the article functions (and by the way he argues against the NWT‘s translation here—which incidentally is where my earlier 6% came from). In short, Greek scholars are not impressed with the NWT, to put it nicely.

Conclusion

I hope that this brief article has helped make you more aware of the teachings of the Jehovah’s Witnesses. For direct info regarding their beliefs see their website. An excellent resource to explain and counter their views is Ron Rhodes’ Reasoning from the Scriptures with the Jehovah’s Witnesses. Robert Bowman, Jr also has excellent material, such as Jehovah’s Witnesses.

Recommended resources related to the topic:

Jesus Among Other Gods: The Absolute Claims of the Christian Message (book) by Ravi Zacharias

Counter Culture Christian: Is There Truth in Religion? (DVD) by Frank Turek

World Religions: What Makes Jesus Unique? mp3 by Ron Carlson

Jehovah’s Witnesses & the Trinity (mp3) by Ed Havaich

Can All Religions Be True? mp3 by Frank Turek

 


J. Brian Huffling, PH.D. have a BA in History from Lee University, an MA in (3 majors) Apologetics, Philosophy, and Biblical Studies from Southern Evangelical Seminary (SES), and a Ph.D. in Philosophy of Religion from SES. He is the Director of the Ph.D. Program and Associate Professor of Philosophy and Theology at SES. He also teaches courses for Apologia Online Academy. He has previously taught at The Art Institute of Charlotte. He has served in the Marines, Navy, and is currently a reserve chaplain in the Air Force at Maxwell Air Force Base. His hobbies include golf, backyard astronomy, martial arts, and guitar.

Original Blog Source: http://bit.ly/2num9My

Por J. Brian Huffling

En el 2004, comencé a cursar una maestría en Apologética Cristiana en el “Southern Evangelical Seminary”. Realmente no conocía mucho del tema, solo quería saber cómo defender la fe cristiana y tener una mejor justificación para mis propias creencias. Me di cuenta que tanto cristianos como no cristianos mantenían debates acerca de la veracidad de la fe, pero no tenía idea que los cristianos debatían entre sí acerca de cómo –e incluso si– se debía practicar la defensa de la fe. Existen distintas perspectivas acerca de si se debe hacer apologética o no, y de la forma en que se debe llevar a cabo. Este artículo describirá, brevemente, diversos métodos de apologética y presentará un argumento acerca de la superioridad del método clásico.

Diversos Métodos

Apologética Clásica

La apologética clásica ha sido conocida como el método de dos pasos. El primer paso, es demostrar la existencia de Dios mediante las pruebas teístas tradicionales (los diversos argumentos cosmológicos, los argumentos del diseño, los ontológicos, etc.). Este método se apoya en la posibilidad de la teología natural —la habilidad que tiene el razonamiento para demostrar la existencia de Dios. Este primer paso no demuestra que el cristianismo sea cierto, sino el monoteísmo.  El Segundo paso es demostrar la veracidad del cristianismo al presentar, por ejemplo, (aunque no necesariamente de esta manera exacta), que los milagros son posibles, la Biblia es confiable, Jesús afirmó y demostró que Él era Dios, etc. Se conoce como el método “clásico” porque ha sido el método clásico y tradicional utilizado a través de los tiempos. Entre algunos defensores se encuentran Agustín, Anselmo, Tomás de Aquino, William Paley, integrantes de la Universidad de Princeton tales como B. B. Warfield, Norman Geisler y R. C. Sproul (entre muchos otros). Algunos libros clásicos de apologética son: “Christian Apologetics” (La Apologética Cristiana) de Norman Geisler y No tengo suficiente fe para ser ateo de Frank Turek y Norman Geisler.

Apologética Evidencial

Los apologistas evidenciales no pretenden demostrar que Dios existe. Algunos lo hacen porque no creen que la teología natural sea posible; otros piensan que simplemente es mucho más fácil empezar con la defensa bíblica. Van directamente a las evidencias para demostrar que el cristianismo es verdadero a partir de campos como la historia y la arqueología. Para ellos, esto evita los argumentos y las objeciones filosóficas difíciles. La gente, comúnmente, es más propensa a entender la historia y cosas por el estilo. La idea es; si podemos demostrar que la Biblia es confiable y que Jesús fue resucitado de entre los muertos, entonces una persona razonable se convencerá de que el cristianismo es verdadero. Eso incluiría la existencia de Dios. Entre los defensores de esta perspectiva se encuentran Joseph Butler, Josh McDowell, Gary Habermas y Michael Licona, entre otros. Algunas de las obras de la apologética evidencial son The Case for the Resurrection of Jesus (La defensa de la resurrección de Jesús) de Gary Habermas y Michael Licona, y Nueva Evidencia que demanda un veredicto de Josh McDowell.

Apologética Presuposicional

La apologética presuposicional es directamente contraria a la apologética clásica, ya que sus seguidores rechazan la idea de que podemos razonar en cuanto a la existencia de Dios. Los apologistas presuposicionalistas argumentan que debemos presuponer la verdad del cristianismo y demostrar que todas las demás cosmovisiones (y religiones) son falsas. Los presuposicionalistas llegan al punto de concluir que uno no puede razonar del todo (ni dar cuenta de su capacidad para razonar) sin el cristianismo ser verdadero. Ellos afirman que debemos argumentar de manera trascendental, al demostrar que la racionalidad en sí presupone la veracidad del cristianismo y que cualquier cosmovisión ajena a él, fracasa. El conocido presuposicionalista Greg Bahnsen dijo en su debate con R. C. Sproul que él no podía saber que su auto estuviera en el estacionamiento de la playa, sin presuponer la existencia del Dios Trino. En un debate que mantuve con un presuposicionalista, fui desafiado a explicar cómo podía saber que el árbol está fuera de mi ventana sin presuponer la veracidad del cristianismo. Los que apoyan este método alegan que debemos defender el cristianismo en base a la imposibilidad de lo contrario. En otras palabras, debido a que se ha comprobado que las demás cosmovisiones y religiones son falsas, el cristianismo debe ser verdadero. Los defensores de este método son Cornelius Van Til, Greg Bahnsen, Gordon Clark, John Frame y K. Scott Oliphant. Algunas obras de la apologética presuposicional son “Christian Apologetics” (La apologética cristiana) de Cornelius Van Til y “Presuppositional Apologetics: Stated and Defended” (La apologética presuposicional: afirmada y defendida) de Greg Bahnsen.

Caso Apologético Acumulativo

Algunos apologistas afirman que debemos tomar lo mejor de todos estos métodos y utilizar el enfoque del caso apologético acumulativo. Es decir, debemos tomar los mejores argumentos de cada método y usarlos enfocándonos en la idea principal. Paul Feinberg toma esta postura en “Five Views on Apologetics” (Cinco perspectivas de la apologética). Este es un buen libro para buscar más información sobre esta perspectiva.

La superioridad de la apologética clásica

Con este breve resumen, uno puede preguntarse, ¿qué método es mejor?, o ¿por qué no utilizar el caso apologético acumulativo y tomamos lo bueno de cada modelo? Ahora, estaré argumentando sobre la superioridad del método clásico.

En primer lugar, la Biblia dice que podemos conocer acerca de Dios por medio de la naturaleza. Pablo, en Romanos 1:19-20 dice:

“1:18 Porque la ira de Dios se revela desde el cielo contra toda impiedad e injusticia de los hombres que detienen con injusticia la verdad; 1:19 porque lo que de Dios se conoce les es manifiesto, pues Dios se lo manifestó.  1:20 Porque las cosas invisibles de él, su eterno poder y deidad, se hacen claramente visibles desde la creación del mundo, siendo entendidas por medio de las cosas hechas”

Por lo tanto, no solo podemos conocer que Dios existe por medio de la naturaleza, sino que también podemos tener una idea de cómo es Él. Si Dios puede darse a conocer por medio de la naturaleza, entonces existe la posibilidad de que tal conocimiento se pueda usar en forma de un argumento lógico. La única pregunta que nos queda es, “¿Estos argumentos son sólidos?” Bueno, esa ya es otra pregunta, pero al menos, desde el punto de vista bíblico, parecen ser posibles. Por lo tanto, resulta difícil ver cómo alguien puede alegar que la Biblia no enseña la teología natural.

Además, parece que muchos de los argumentos teístas son sólidos desde un punto de vista racional. Por ejemplo, si el universo es un ser contingente y no puede dar razón de su propia existencia, y una causa que produce un efecto no puede continuar hasta el infinito, entonces parece que, en algún punto, debemos llegar a una causa que no sea contingente, sino necesaria. Tal causa debe ser Dios.

Segundo, la apologética clásica comienza un paso antes de argumentar a favor de Dios; comienza por conocer la realidad y la naturaleza de la verdad absoluta. En una era de relativismo, debemos responder objeciones tales como: “Bueno, eso puede ser verdad para ti, pero no para mí”. Además, la apologética clásica trata con asuntos filosóficos básicos de la metafísica (la naturaleza de la realidad) y la epistemología (cómo conocemos la realidad) de una manera más sólida e intencionada que en los otros métodos.

Tercero, la apologética clásica utiliza las evidencias a favor del cristianismo en un contexto teísta. Como lo afirma Norman Geisler: “No puede haber actos de Dios a menos que haya un Dios que pueda actuar”. Además, como ha dicho C. S. Lewis, si Dios existe, entonces no podemos rechazar la posibilidad de los milagros. Establecer la existencia de Dios, antes de pasar a los milagros, nos ayuda a que estos datos tengan más sentido. También, los milagros son señales de algo. No fueron solamente maravillas; ellos demostraban o señalaban hacia algo. Por ejemplo, los milagros que Jesús realizó demostraron quien él dijo ser. Como lo dijo Nicodemo, solamente alguien que tuviera el poder de Dios tenía la capacidad de hacer las obras que él hizo. Finalmente, por muy tonto que pudiera sonar, alguien podría afirmar que los eventos como el de la resurrección pudo haber sido llevado a cabo de una forma sobrehumana, como por los extraterrestres. Sé que es ridículo, pero es una objeción que se debe vencer si no se ha establecido la existencia de Dios. En resumen, las evidencias en favor de la Biblia y el cristianismo están allí, pero cobran más sentido y son más poderosas después de haberlas colocado en un contexto teísta.

Cuarto, la apologética presuposicional tiene muchos problemas. Los mismos presuposicionalistas admiten que su postura es circular. Sin embargo, ellos alegan que todas las perspectivas son circulares. Por ejemplo, dicen que la noción de que no podemos evitar el razonamiento es circular, pues cualquier intento de rechazar esa postura requeriría el uso de la razón. Sin embargo, ese no es un problema circular, pues es básicamente innegable que razonar sea inevitable en las discusiones o en los argumentos. Uno no usa la razón para probar la razón; sino que simplemente está diciendo que es inevitable e innegable. Sin embargo, asumir que una postura es verdadera y demostrarla desde esa misma postura es la definición de la circularidad. Además, alegar que podemos demostrar que el cristianismo es verdadero en base a la imposibilidad de lo contrario es simplemente un error. La contrariedad es una relación lógica entre dos afirmaciones. De este modo, cuando nos referimos a las afirmaciones que son contrarias, estamos hablando de la naturaleza de la lógica. Las afirmaciones (y únicamente las afirmaciones) son opuestas cuando ambas pueden ser falsas, pero ninguna de las dos puede ser verdadera. Por ejemplo, las afirmaciones “El cristianismo es verdadero” y “El ateísmo es verdadero” son opuestas ya que ambas pueden ser lógicamente falsas. Pero, debido a que ambas pueden ser falsas, jamás podríamos probar la verdad del cristianismo al demostrar la falsedad de sus contrarios. Además, el presunto argumento trascendental para el cristianismo auténtico nunca ha sido articulado, menos aún, defendido. Créeme, si existe un argumento que garantice una victoria sin importar que… yo lo quiero. Desafortunadamente, no existe. Nadie se ha dado por vencido. A Bahnsen se le ha dado muchas oportunidades en su debate con Sproul, pero no tuvo éxito.

Entonces, ¿por qué no tomar lo mejor de todos los métodos y utilizar el enfoque del caso apologético acumulativo? Porque lo mejor de cada método ya es propio del modelo clásico. El modelo clásico es más exhaustivo que los demás, coloca los milagros y las evidencias en un contexto teísta y evita los problemas del presuposicionalismo. De este modo, la apologética clásica es el modelo más sólido y el más completo.

Entre las obras sobre apologética se incluyen: “Faith Has Its Reasons: Integrative Approaches to Defending the Christian Faith” (La fe tiene sus razones: enfoques integradores para defender la fe cristiana), de Ken Boa y Robert Bowman (este es mi favorito) y “Five Views on Apologetics” (Cinco perspectivas sobre la apologética).

 


J. Brian Huffling, PH.D., cuenta con una Licenciatura en Historia de la Universidad de Lee, una Licenciatura en Apologética (con 3 especializaciones), Filosofía y Estudios Bíblicos del Seminario Evangélico del Sur (SES, por sus siglas en inglés), y un Doctorado en Filosofía de la Religión de la misma institución. Es el Director del Programa de Doctorado y Profesor Asociado de Filosofía y Teología en el SES. También dicta cursos en la Academia En Línea de Apología. Anteriormente, ha enseñado en el Instituto de las Artes de Charlotte. Ha prestado servicios en la Infantería de Marina, en la Armada y actualmente, sirve como capellán de reserva en las Fuerzas Aéreas en la Base Aérea Maxwell. Entre sus aficiones se incluyen el golf, la astronomía casera, las artes marciales y la guitarra.

Blog Original: http://bit.ly/2ZcyYsq

Traducido por Leonardo Padilla

Editado por Billy Morales Mujica

By J. Brian Huffling

In a NY Times article titled “A God Problem: Perfect. All-powerful. All-knowing. The idea of the deity most Westerners accept is actually not coherent,” Peter Atterton argues, well, that the concept of God is not coherent. Atterton describes God in the classical sense as his subtitle suggests. He argues that such a view of God is logically incoherent because assuming one attribute, a problem seemingly arises with the others. I will briefly summarize his arguments and respond to them, focusing on his arguments about omniscience.

Atterton’s Argument

Atterton wants to “first consider the attribute of omnipotence.” After considering the cliché question, “Can God make a rock bigger than he can move,” he points to the way Thomas Aquinas’ would answer this question, namely, that such a thing would be a contradiction and even God can’t do what is contradictory (such as making a square circle).

Atterton then moves to question whether it is contradictory for God to create a world in which there was no evil. He avers that it should be possible to do so. So why didn’t God do that? This is basically where he leaves it and moves on to God’s omniscience.

He states,

“Philosophically, this presents us with no less of a conundrum. Leaving aside the highly implausible idea that God knows all the facts in the universe [yes you read that right], no matter how trivial or useless (Saint Jerome thought it was beneath the dignity of God to concern Himself with such base questions as how many fleas are born or die every moment), if God knows all there is to know, then He knows at least as much as we know.”

Atterton believes that if God does, in fact, know what we know; this is a problem. This is the case because we know what lust and envy are; thus, God must know what lust and envy are. However, he says, “one cannot know lust and envy unless one has experienced them. But to have had feelings of lust and envy is to have sinned, in which case, God cannot be morally perfect.” Such can’t be the case, he claims, if God is morally perfect. So God does not know what we know. But then he is not omniscient, “and the concept of God is contradictory. God cannot be both omniscient and morally perfect. Hence, God could not exist.”

Atterton ends his article by referencing Blaise Pascal’s rejection of philosophy and taking God’s existence on faith alone. It is not clear to me from this article whether Atterton believes in the existence of God or whether he merely thinks that “the God of the philosophers” doesn’t exist or can’t be proven to exist. It is to the alleged incoherence that I wish to respond.

Response

Atterton does not make too much about God’s omnipotence other than casting doubt on it, so I’m going to focus on his objection to God’s knowledge, which is what he seems to think is a stronger point. My overall critique is that Atterton over-anthropomorphizes God. This is very typical of how people think of God. We usually think that because we do things a certain way, like know, then God must do them the same way too.

For Atterton, if God knows something, then the way in which he knows it must be similar, or the same, with how we know it. We know things passively through experience, such as a thing’s existence. For example, we know of a flea’s existence because we experience fleas and can sense them. We are creatures just like fleas. But should we think God knows in the same way as us?

Atterton references Aquinas regarding God’s omnipotence but doesn’t cite what Aquinas says about the way he believes God knows the world. This either betrays ignorance or negligence. Historically, classical theism (that teaches that God is all-knowing, powerful, etc.) has taught that God is impassible and yet all-knowing, infinite, and perfect. This means that God is not affected in any way, does not learn, for an infinite amount of knowledge cannot be added to, and he cannot gain in perfection.

It also means that God is not passive in his knowledge. As Aquinas teaches in Summa Theologiae part 1 question 14, God’s knowledge is not like ours. And why should it be, he’s not a limited, passible, changeable, material, temporal, finite, contingent human. Rather, he is the unlimited, impassible, unchangeable, immaterial, eternal, infinite, necessary Creator. How this detail escapes Atterton and others who over anthropomorphize God is nothing short of perplexing?

Rather than God’s knowledge being reactive and passive like ours, it is active and causative. We know imperfectly and through the effects of nature. God knows perfectly; not through effects, but through the cause of those effects. Such is surely a more perfect and complete knowledge. God does not have to “look at” something to know it as if the thing exists apart from God’s knowledge or sustaining power. God actively causes all things to exist and sustains those things for as long as they exist. So, contrary to Atterton and Saint Jerome, God not only has knowledge of seemingly trivial things like fleas, God upholds those fleas in existence as their cause of being. They, as contingent being, cannot account even for their own present existence without an efficient cause. God thus knows all of the universe simply by knowing himself as their cause.

Atterton’s “God” is more akin to a view of deism rather than classical theism. Many holds to such a view of God. This view of God that makes him dependent, passible, changeable, etc., sees God more as a creature rather than the Creator.

When it comes to imperfections such as lust, Atterton doesn’t even ask the question if it is possible for God to do such things. (He leaves the question of the incarnation of Jesus out of his discussion.) Rather, God must know lust since he knows what we do, and since we know lust, God must as well. However, we know lust through experience and because we have the capability to be imperfect. Lust is something that humans can do, which is imperfection. However, God is not human. Historically it has been held that such passions as lust are tied to a physical body. Since God does not have a physical body, he can’t lust. Further, lusting would require a change. If God is unchangeable and eternal, then he can’t lust. Further, such would require God to have the potency to lust; however, if such classical attributes of God as simplicity, then he has no potency to become anything other than he is. Finally, again, God does not know via experience, but by being the perfect cause of all contingent being. He thus knows his effects (i.e., the universe) by knowing himself as their perfect cause.

Rather than the concept of the classical view of God being incoherent, Atterton’s own view demonstrates either a complete lack of familiarity with classical theism or simply neglects to inform his readers of such views.

While Atterton’s attempt at killing the traditional concept of God is DOA, the God of the philosophers lives on.

 


J. Brian Huffling, PH.D. has a BA in History from Lee University, an MA in (3 majors) Apologetics, Philosophy, and Biblical Studies from Southern Evangelical Seminary (SES), and a Ph.D. in Philosophy of Religion from SES. He is the Director of the Ph.D. Program and Associate Professor of Philosophy and Theology at SES. He also teaches courses for Apologia Online Academy. He has previously taught at The Art Institute of Charlotte. He has served in the Marines, Navy, and is currently a reserve chaplain in the Air Force at Maxwell Air Force Base. His hobbies include golf, backyard astronomy, martial arts, and guitar.

Original Blog Source: http://bit.ly/2Oy0ShT

By J. Brian Huffling

When one thinks about apologetics, he usually thinks about such disciplines as philosophy, history, archaeology, etc. There is one area; however, that is relatively undeveloped in the practice of apologetics, and yet it is ripe for the work: literary studies. I am not talking about what genre the gospels happen to be, or if the saints in Matthew 27 were literally raised, or any such argument that has been popular as of late. I am talking about theories in English and literature that dramatically influence the field of hermeneutics (how we study the Bible). One of my majors in grad school was Biblical Studies, and I have taught Bible Study Methods at the BA level, and Hermeneutics and Advanced Hermeneutics at the grad level. In doing so, I have read many books on the issue of biblical interpretation and have scoured many resources for my classes. While there are many issues I could talk about, such as deconstructivism, postmodernism, etc., the issue that seems to come up a lot in standard textbooks is the role of the interpreter and how he either uncovers or imparts meaning to the biblical texts. In this article, I will talk about two books that are standard for evangelical studies on biblical interpretation, and why I think they are undermining the objective meaning of the text.

The Books and Their Claims

The first book is Introduction to Biblical Interpretation, revised  and updated edition, by William W. Klein, Craig L. Blomberg, and Robert L. Hubbard Jr. (There is a newer 3rd edition.) In general, this is a very good book, which is why it is used by many Bible colleges and seminaries. I even use it. Many pastors have been taught using this book. The principles that the authors teach that we should use for interpreting our Bibles are very good. So what’s the problem?

The problem is what they say about the role of the interpreter and the nature of bias, presuppositions, and preunderstanding (the body of knowledge the reader brings to the text). They state:

“No one interprets anything without a set of underlying assumptions. When we presume to explain the meaning of the Bible, we do so with a set of preconceived ideas or presuppositions. These presuppositions may be examined and stated, or simply embraced unconsciously. But anyone who says that he or she has discarded all presuppositions and will only study the text objectively and inductively is either deceived or naïve.” (143)

It is certainly true that we all have biases, etc. However, the startling claim these authors make is since we have biases, we can’t study the Bible objectively. Unfortunately, and per usual for these kinds of books, the notion of “objectivity” is left undefined and unclear. They later deny that such biases leave the reader bereft of objectivity; however, they do not explain how he can be objective since they have seemingly taken it away via the role of biases and presuppositions. Such is especially the case given this statement:

“The preunderstanding and presuppositions of the interpreter contribute enormously to the results of the interpretive process. We might even say they determine the results.” (197)

If the preunderstanding and presuppositions determine the interpretive results, then it is not clear at all how the reader can be objective. We wouldn’t discover the truth or meaning of the text; we would determine it.

The other book is The Hermeneutical Spiral, revised and expanded, by Grant Osborne. Like the previous work, this book is generally very good when it comes to interpreting the Bible. However, in the appendix, Osborne espouses a dangerous view, namely, the sociology of knowledge. He states:

“The sociology of knowledge recognizes the influence of societal values on all perceptions of reality. This is a critical factor in coming to grips with the place of preunderstanding in the interpretive process. Basically, sociology of knowledge states that no act of coming to understanding can escape the formative power of the background and the paradigm community to which an interpreter belongs.” (505)

Basically, what this means is that one’s culture is “formative” in how one knows, and it influences one’s “perceptions of reality.” In other words, the way in which one knows is at least somewhat determined by his culture. Different cultures will produce different perceptions of reality. What does this mean for the biblical interpreter? He answers this question clearly:

“A close reading of the text cannot be done without a perspective provided by one’s preunderstanding as identified by a “sociology of knowledge” perspective. Reflection itself demands mental categories, and these are built on one’s presupposed worldview and by the faith or reading community to which one belongs. Since neutral exegesis is impossible, no necessarily ‘true’ or final interpretation is possible.” (516, emphasis added)

Some people will find this shocking while others will express agreement. Evangelicals who hold to the idea that we can (and must) be able to know absolute truth should find this kind of assertion by a leading evangelical very scary. If true, we would not be able to claim to know the truth or the meaning of the biblical text, if there even is any.

Evaluation

One wonders how the authors of these books think that their meaning can be grasped. If what they say is true, we could never know the meaning of their books! Such claims made by these authors are hopelessly self-defeating. Further, it is simply an assumption that biases are always necessarily wrong, or that subjectivity entails falsehood. But this has never been demonstrated. Presuppositions are not inherently bad or wrong, as the authors of Introduction to Biblical Interpretation seem to imply when they argue for a certain set of presuppositions in order to interpret the Bible, such as believing in the supernatural.

Introduction to Biblical Interpretation claims that we can still have an objective understanding of the text, but they don’t offer a method for giving that objectivity to the reader after they took it away in the name of bias, presuppositions, and preunderstandings. We are thus left in subjectivity. Or are we? While the above authors do not tell us how to overcome the interpretive problems brought on by the interpreter, there are ways of explaining how an interpreter can simultaneously be biased and objective. After all, aren’t the authors of the above books biased and yet trying to pass off their text as objective? Surely. So how can they do that?

In his Objectivity and Biblical Interpretation, Thomas A. Howe explains how this is possible. (See also my article on objectivity and historical knowledge.) As mentioned earlier, authors like those above rarely define what they mean by “objective.” I am in agreement with Howe that a proposition is objective if it can be verified or falsified by external, mind-independent evidence that is also based on (objective) first principles. In other words, something is objective when it is based on extra-mental evidence that by definition, is not subjective, or merely in one’s mind. Further, propositions can be evaluated by the use of first principles, such as the principles of non-contradiction, identity, and excluded middle. (For more discussion on these, see my article on logic.) Such laws of logic are based in the being/existence of things in the external world. For example, the principle of non-contradiction says that something can’t simultaneously be and not-be. In other words, something can’t be a tree and not a tree at the same time and in the same sense. Such laws are not just made up. They are not just rational constructs. They are metaphysical and based in and reducible to existent things in reality. These principles are objective because they are based on objectively existing things in the world.

These principles can be applied to everyday issues, such as interpreting a written text. It is obvious that the authors of the cited works think that their readers can read books objectively. Otherwise, why write them? And why have principles to follow if there is really no use since we can’t be objective or know the true meaning of the text? Being an objective interpreter of the Bible is possible. We simply use language and interpretive principles according to our everyday, commonsense way. There is no great barrier to objectivity, whether it be bias, presuppositions, preunderstandings, or a sociology of knowledge. The very knowing process built into our human nature and the way we use language ensures that an objective understanding of the Bible is indeed possible.

 


J. Brian Huffling, PH.D. have a BA in History from Lee University, an MA in (3 majors) Apologetics, Philosophy, and Biblical Studies from Southern Evangelical Seminary (SES), and a Ph.D. in Philosophy of Religion from SES. He is the Director of the Ph.D. Program and Associate Professor of Philosophy and Theology at SES. He also teaches courses for Apologia Online Academy. He has previously taught at The Art Institute of Charlotte. He has served in the Marines, Navy, and is currently a reserve chaplain in the Air Force at Maxwell Air Force Base. His hobbies include golf, backyard astronomy, martial arts, and guitar.

Original Blog Source: http://bit.ly/2NuvG2F

By J. Brian Huffling

In 2004 I began to pursue an MA in Christian Apologetics at Southern Evangelical Seminary. I didn’t really know much about the topic, I just really wanted to know how to defend the Christian faith and have a better justification for my own beliefs. I realized that Christians and non-Christians had debates about the veracity of the faith, but I had no idea Christians argued among themselves about how (and even if) apologetics should be done. There are certainly different views about whether or not, and how, apologetics should be done. This article will briefly describe various apologetic methods and will argue for the superiority of the classical method.

Various Methods

Classical Apologetics

Classical apologetics has been called a two-step method. The first step is to prove the existence of God via traditional theistic proofs (the various cosmological arguments, design arguments, ontological, etc.). This method holds to the possibility of natural theology—the ability for a reason to demonstrate God’s existence. This first step does not prove Christianity, only monotheism.  The second step is to prove the veracity of Christianity by showing, for example (but not necessarily in this exact fashion), that miracles are possible, the Bible is reliable, Jesus claimed and proved himself to be God, etc. It is called the “classical” method because it has been the classical, traditional method used throughout the ages. Some proponents include Augustine, Anselm, Thomas Aquinas, William Paley, the Princetonians such as B. B. Warfield, Norman Geisler,  and R. C. Sproul (among many others). Some good classical apologetics books would be Christian Apologetics by Norman Geisler, and I Don’t Have Enough Faith to be An Atheist by Frank Turek and Norman Geisler.

Evidential Apologetics

Evidential apologists avoid an attempt to demonstrate that God exists. Some do this because they don’t think natural theology is possible; others think it is simply easier to start with the biblical case. They jump straight to evidences for showing that Christianity is true from fields such as history and archaeology. To them, this bypasses difficult philosophical arguments and objections. People are ordinarily more prone to understanding history and the like. The thinking here is: if we can show the Bible to be reliable and that Jesus was raised from the dead, then a reasonable person will be convinced that Christianity is true. Such would include the existence of God. Proponents of this view, among others, are Joseph Butler, Josh McDowell, Gary Habermas, and Michael Licona. Some evidential apologetics works are  The Case for the Resurrection of Jesus by Gary Habermas and Michael Licona and The New Evidence that Demands a Verdict by Josh McDowell.

Presuppositional Apologetics

Presuppositional apologetics is directly antithetical to classical apologetics as its adherents deny that we can reason to God’s existence. Presuppositional apologists argue that we must presuppose the truth of Christianity and show that every other worldview (and religion) is false. Presuppositionalists go so far as to say that one cannot reason at all (or given an account for their ability to reason) without Christianity being true. They claim that we should argue transcendentally, showing that rationality itself presupposes Christianity and that any worldview other than Christianity fails. Well-known presuppositionalist Greg Bahnsen said in his debate with R. C. Sproul that he couldn’t know his car was in the parking lot without presupposing the Triune God. In a debate I had with a presuppositionalist, I was challenged to give an account of how I can know the tree is outside my window without presupposing Christianity to be true. Those who hold to this method argue that we should argue for Christianity based on the impossibility of the contrary. In other words, since other worldviews and religions are shown to be false, Christianity must be true. Proponents of this method include Cornelius Van Til, Greg Bahnsen, Gordon Clark, John Frame, and K. Scott Oliphant. Presuppositional works include Christian Apologetics by Cornelius Van Til and Presuppositional Apologetics: Stated and Defended by Greg Bahnsen.

Cumulative Case Apologetics

Some apologists say we should take the best of all of these methods and use a cumulative case approach. That is, we should take the best arguments from each method and use them in a big picture approach. Paul Feinberg takes this position in Five Views on Apologetics. This is a good place to look for more information on this view.

The Superiority of Classical Apologetics

With this brief overview, one may wonder which method is best, or if we should just go along with the cumulative case and take all the good stuff from each model. At this point, I am going to argue for the superiority of the classical method.

First, the Bible says that we can know about God through nature. Paul says this in Romans 1:19-20:

For the wrath of God is revealed from heaven against all ungodliness and unrighteousness of men, who by their unrighteousness suppress the truth. 19For what can be known about God is plain to them because God has shown it to them. 20 For his invisible attributes, namely, his eternal power and divine nature, have been clearly perceived, ever since the creation of the world, in the things that have been made.

Thus, not only can we know God exists from nature, we can have some idea of what he is like. If God can be known via nature, then it is at least possible that such knowledge can be put in the form of a logical argument. The only question that remains is, “Are the arguments sound?” Well, that is another question, but it would seem that such is at least possible from a biblical point of view. Thus, it is hard to see how one could argue that the Bible does not allow for natural theology.

Further, it does seem that many of the theistic arguments are indeed sound from a rational point of view. For example, if the universe is contingent and cannot account for its own existence, and one cause leading to an effect cannot go on to infinity, then it seems that we must at some point arrive at a cause that is not contingent, but necessary. Such would be God.

Second, classical apologetics actually starts one step before arguing for God: it starts with knowing reality and the absolute nature of truth. In an age of relativism, we must answer objections such as, “Well, that may be true for you, but it’s not for me.” Further, classical apologetics deals with basic philosophical issues of metaphysics (the nature of reality) and epistemology (how we know reality) in a more robust and intentional way than do the other methods.

Third, classical apologetics puts evidences for Christianity in a theistic context. As Norman Geisler is apt to say, “There can’t be acts of God unless there is a God who can act.” Further, as C. S. Lewis has said, if God exists, then we cannot deny the possibility of miracles. Establishing the existence of God before moving onto miracles helps make more sense of the data. Also, miracles are signs of something. They were not just wonders; they demonstrated or pointed to something. For example, the miracles that Jesus performed showed that he was who he claimed he was. As Nicodemus said, only someone with the power of God could do the works that he did. Finally, as silly is it might sound, someone could claim that events such as the resurrection could have been performed in some superhuman say, such as by aliens. I know that’s ridiculous, but it is an objection that has to be overcome if God’s existence hasn’t been established. In short, the evidences for the Bible and Christianity are there, but they make more sense and are more powerful after they are put in a theistic context.

Fourth, presuppositional apologetics has many problems. It is admitted even by presuppositionalists that their position is circular. However, they argue that all views are circular. For example, they say the notion that we cannot help but use reason is circular since any attempt to deny that position would require the use of reason. However, such is not a circular problem, it is merely undeniable that reason is unavoidable in discussions or arguments. One is not using reason to prove reason; he is simply saying that it is unavoidable and undeniable. However, assuming a position to be true and then from that position to prove it is the definition of circularity. Also, arguing that we can show Christianity to be true based on the impossibility of the contrary is simply wrong. Contrariety is a logical relationship between statements. Thus, when we talk about statements being contrary, we are talking about the nature of logic. Statements (and only statements) are contrary when they can both be false but not both be true. For example, the statements “Christianity is true” and “Atheism is true” are contrary since they can both logically be false. But since they can both be false, we could never show the truth of Christianity by showing the falsity of its contraries. Further, the alleged transcendental argument for full-blown Christianity has never been articulated, let alone defended. Believe me, if there is an argument that guarantees I win no matter what… I want it. Unfortunately, it doesn’t exist. No one has ever given it. Bahnsen was given several opportunities in his debate with Sproul, but could not do it.

So why not just take the best parts of all the methods and use a cumulative case approach? Because the best parts of each method are already inherent in the classical model. The classical model is more comprehensive than the others, puts miracles and evidences in a theistic context, and avoids the problems of presuppositionalism. Thus, classical apologetics is the strongest, most comprehensive model.

Works on apologetic systems include: Faith Has Its Reasons: Integrative Approaches to Defending the Christian Faith by Ken Boa and Robert Bowman (this is my favorite) and Five Views on Apologetics.

 


J. Brian Huffling, PH.D. have a BA in History from Lee University, an MA in (3 majors) Apologetics, Philosophy, and Biblical Studies from Southern Evangelical Seminary (SES), and a Ph.D. in Philosophy of Religion from SES. He is the Director of the Ph.D. Program and Associate Professor of Philosophy and Theology at SES. He also teaches courses for Apologia Online Academy. He has previously taught at The Art Institute of Charlotte. He has served in the Marines, Navy, and is currently a reserve chaplain in the Air Force at Maxwell Air Force Base. His hobbies include golf, backyard astronomy, martial arts, and guitar.

Original Blog Source: http://bit.ly/2JWaz6P

By J. Brian Huffling

Having seen Dr. Michael Shermer debate many times, I was excited to be able to get a chance to have a discussion with him. Shermer, the founding publisher of Skeptic magazine, accepted Southern Evangelical Seminary‘s invitation to have an informal, but moderated, discussion with me on the topic, “Is the Reality of Evil Good Evidence against the Christian God?” This discussion was the culmination of a mini-conference on the problem of evil at SES. He was a delight to have, and the event was a blast.

My Discussion with Dr. Michael Shermer on God and Evil

I am not going to recount the whole debate. I am simply going to discuss some of the most important points and issues. (For those interested, Michael has a podcast of the debate/issue.)

What is ‘Evil’?

Michael was asked by the moderator, Adam Tucker (his thoughts on the discussion are here), to define what he meant by ‘evil.’ He said that evil is the intentional harm of a sentient being. There is no such thing, he said, of an entity that is evil, such as evil spirits, or anything that is pure evil.

I largely agree. Following Augustine, I hold that evil is simply the privation of good. In other words, evil is the corruption of a good thing. The classic example is blindness in the eye. The eye should have a certain power (sight) that it does not. It is lacking and is corrupted. Thus, it is physically evil. Then there is a moral evil. This happens when a person lacks virtues. Overall, though, Michael and I basically agree on what evil is and that there is no existing thing that is pure evil. For Christians, to exist is to somehow be like God, which is good. Further, following Aquinas, good seeks its perfection. Thus, there is a contradiction with an existing evil. Evil really has no goal or purpose in itself. Thus, an existing thing that is somehow good since it has being (in a sense like God) and that seeks its perfection cannot be pure evil.

At this point, we discussed the problem of evil and what it is exactly.

The Problem of Evil Briefly Stated

There are basically 2 forms of the problem of evil: the deductive form and the inductive form. The deductive form is also called the logical argument from evil and argues that the co-existence of the classical view of God and evil are logically impossible. This is the argument Michael used (from the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy):

  1. If God exists, then God is omnipotent, omniscient, and morally perfect.
  2. If God is omnipotent, then God has the power to eliminate all evil.
  3. If God is omniscient, then God knows when evil exists.
  4. If God is morally perfect, then God has the desire to eliminate all evil.
  5. Evil exists.
  6. If evil exists and God exists, then either God doesn’t have the power to eliminate all evil, or doesn’t know when evil exists or doesn’t have the desire to eliminate all evil.
  7. Therefore, God doesn’t exist.

This argument makes several assumptions. The most problematic in my view is that God is morally perfect. Many, if not most, Christian theologians take it for granted that God is morally perfect. However, I would argue that God is not the kind of being to be moral. That is not to say he is not good; he is just not morally good. I have written that God is not a moral being. I have also written that God’s goodness does not depend on what he does, but what he is. How does this relate to the problem of evil? If it is indeed the case that God is not a moral being with obligations to man, it makes all the difference in the world. I will not rewrite the articles above on God, morality, and goodness. I will summarize those positions here as they relate to the problem of evil.

As I said in the debate, J. L. Mackie, a notorious atheist of the twentieth century, said that if one gives up a premise in the problem of evil as just laid out, then the problem doesn’t arise (see The Problem of Evil edited by Adams and Adams, page 1). This is exactly what I said we need to do. There are certain assertions/assumptions that have to be made in order for this argument (the problem of evil) to work. I argue that the assertion that God is a morally perfect being is false. If we take that out of the problem, the problem falls.

I am not suggesting this simply to get out of this argument. There are really good reasons for not thinking that God is a moral being, at least in the sense we normally mean when referring to humans being moral. When we say a person is moral, we mean that he behaves well and as he should. In other words, there is a prescribed way in which men are supposed to behave. If they do, they are moral. If they don’t, they are immoral.

I am arguing that God has no prescribed way in which he should behave. There are no obligations imposing on God. God transcends the category of morality like he transcends time and space. Morality is a created category wrapped up in what it means to be a human. Without created beings to live up to some objective standard that God has created him to live up to, there is no moral law.

If this is correct, then God is not a moral being and thus cannot be a morally perfect being. But this is the linchpin of the logical problem of evil as Michael has argued. Once this assertion is removed, as Mackie says, there simply is no logical problem of evil. There is no contradiction with an omnipotent, omniscient being existing alongside of evil. Thus, the problem of evil does not even arise.

All of this is to say that God has no obligation to how he orchestrates the universe. To say that God is morally obligated means that he has to treat his creation in a certain way. This is the basic thrust of the problem of evil. To put it another way, as Michael did at one point, the problem of evil boils down to this: “If God really does exist I would expect the universe to be different/better.” The assumption here is that God should operate the way we think he should. He doesn’t. The inference is that he doesn’t exist.

Again, if we take away the assumption/assertion that God is morally perfect then the problem of evil not only fails, it never gets off the ground. (Please remember we are talking about the academic/philosophical issue of evil and not the emotional/pastoral concern.)

This is not to say God is not good; he is just not morally good. He is metaphysically good and perfect. Given our definition of evil, this just means God lacks nothing. His existence is perfect and cannot be corrupted.

The story of Job illustrates my point that God is not obligated to treat his creatures in any certain way. In the opening chapters of Job God basically dares Satan to attack Job. God maintains to Satan that Job will not curse him (God). Satan agrees. The only caveat is that Satan cannot touch Job. Job’s family (except his wife) is killed, and he loses all of his many possessions. Yet he does not curse God. God gives Satan another chance, but this time Satan can inflict Job with disease; although he cannot kill him. Job is inflicted with sores and physical issues. Still, he does not curse God.

Job’s friends show up and stay with Job, silent, for a week. For many chapters after this Job’s friends argue about what Job did to bring this judgment upon him. They maintain that God would not do this without some (just) cause. Job maintained his innocence and wanted to take God to court and try him for being unjust.

At the end of the book, God shows up. Does he try to explain to Job why he did what he did? Does he offer a theodicy or defense for his actions? No. He basically asks Job where he was when God made all of the wonders of the world. Job cannot answer and repents. In short, God does not try to get off the hook, as it were. Rather he says, “I’m God, and you are not.”

I think this illustrates my point that God does not have to act in any certain way with his people. He is not unjust in dealing with Job the way he did. However, let’s put a human in the place of God and Satan in this story. If a human did to Job what God and Satan did, we would almost certainly say the human would be unjust. However, we would not, presumably, say that God is unjust. Why? Because he’s God. There is no standard by which to judge him. God transcends morality and yet is still perfectly good.

Philosophy vs. Science

This above point is one that I could not get Michael to acknowledge. He did not want to stray from his scientific position. (By ‘scientific’ I mean the modern sense of the word to refer to the natural sciences like biology and chemistry. This should be contrasted with the historical sense of a discipline’s conclusions being demonstrated via first principles and logic. In this latter sense, philosophy and theology were considered sciences.) This is unfortunate because the issues of God and evil are inherently philosophical. As I have written, natural science alone cannot demonstrate God’s existence. Thus, to adequately deal with the issues of the discussion we have to delve into philosophy. Michael would have none of it.

Michael’s main point here is that if God is not measurable, then we can’t know he exists. As I pointed out this is a category mistake as God is not a material being. Thus, even if he did exist, we could not measure him–which Michael acknowledged.

Throughout the debate, Michael approached the issue from the point of view of natural science. I approached it from philosophy. In short, the questions of God’s existence and evil cannot be decided by natural science since they are not physical things in the natural world to be studied: God is not a being in nature and evil is a description of the nature of being (a philosophical concept).

Michael offered a lot of red herrings. I will not deal with those here as they are, well, red herrings.

Conclusion

The problem of evil is not a problem concerning God’s existence if God is not a moral being. Further, questions of God’s existence and evil are inherently philosophical. If you are interested in this topic, I recommend Brian Davies’ The Reality of God and the Problem of Evil.

 


J. Brian Huffling, PH.D. have a BA in History from Lee University, an MA in (3 majors) Apologetics, Philosophy, and Biblical Studies from Southern Evangelical Seminary (SES), and a Ph.D. in Philosophy of Religion from SES. He is the Director of the Ph.D. Program and Associate Professor of Philosophy and Theology at SES. He also teaches courses for Apologia Online Academy. He has previously taught at The Art Institute of Charlotte. He has served in the Marines, Navy, and is currently a reserve chaplain in the Air Force at Maxwell Air Force Base. His hobbies include golf, backyard astronomy, martial arts, and guitar.

Original Blog Source: http://bit.ly/2v4rTNa

By J. Brian Huffling

Introduction

Ever since humans have walked the earth, they have been plagued with many and various questions. Perhaps the most vexing question one can ask is, “How did we get here?” The question of origins, both of the universe and of life on Earth, is a question of great importance. Areas such as philosophy and theology seek to answer this question.  The theistic religions, viz., Judaism, Christianity, and Islam, teach that an infinite, all-powerful, all-knowing, all-good, immaterial, eternal being created the universe and life on this planet. This being is commonly called ‘God.’ The position that such a being exists is called ‘theism.’ Theism is an old position that has had many adherents. The denial of theism is called ‘atheism.’ Atheism (as the alpha privative suggests) is the denial of theism. In other words, atheism denies the existence of such a theistic being. [1]

Theism has been argued for on two fronts: reason (philosophy) and revelation (sacred Scriptures, such as the Bible). In terms of the former, arguments are proffered to demonstrate the existence of God. [2] In arguing against God, atheists historically have attempted to disprove his existence at least in part by showing that theistic arguments fail. Thus, atheists have historically interacted with the claims of theists and have attempted to show that theism is logically untenable. However, the last few years has seen a different type of atheism. This new type of atheism, dubbed ‘the new atheism,’ is very different from the traditional form of atheism. In what remains, the author shall explicate the differences of the traditional, or ‘old atheism,’ and the new atheism. This is not an attempt to disprove either type of atheism, just to understand the differences between the two.

A Sketch of the New Atheism

The old atheism is based on logic, argumentation, counter-examples, and is primarily aimed at scholars. The new atheism is the opposite of this. Rather than being based on logical argumentation, sound reasoning, and dealing with typical theistic arguments, the new atheism is an assault of rhetoric aimed at a popular audience. Some of the more well-known new atheists are Richard Dawkins, Sam Harris, Daniel Dennett, and Christopher Hitchens. These four are known as the Four Horsemen (a play on the biblical four horsemen of the Book of Revelation).

Paul Copan says of the new atheists, “Rather than sticking to rational, carefully reasoned arguments, they have taken off the gloves to launch angry, sarcastic, and sloppily argued attacks.” [3] He adds, “They lob their rhetorical grenades in hopes of creating the (incorrect) impression that belief in God is for intellectual lightweights who believe ridiculous, incoherent doctrines and are opposed to all scientific endeavor and discovery. These objectors are writing books… that tend to be more bluster and emotion than substance.” [4] Elsewhere, Copan gives several earmarks of the new atheism. “First,” he says, “for all their emphasis on cool-headed, scientific rationality, they express themselves not just passionately, but angrily.[5] Perhaps the best example of such emotivism comes from Richard Dawkins. William Lane Craig calls Dawkins “the enfant terrible” of new atheism. [6] He continues, “His best-selling book The God Delusion has become the literary centerpiece of” the new atheism. [7] In this book Dawkins attempts to demonstrate that the existence of God is false, or, to pull from his title, a delusion.  Dawkins is a well-known biologist and staunch supporter of Darwinism. One can see Copan’s first point exemplified in the following excerpt from Dawkins’ book:

“The God of the Old Testament is arguable the most unpleasant character in all fiction: jealous and proud of it; a petty, unjust, unforgiving control-freak; a vindictive, bloodthirsty ethnic cleanser; a misogynistic, homophobic, racist, infanticidal, genocidal, filicidal, pestilential, megalomaniacal, sadomasochistic, capriciously malevolent bully.” [8]

Dawkins’s book is filled with such emotion. Christopher Hitchens is not unlike Dawkins in his appeal to emotion; however, he may be a little more tame. In his book, god is not Great: How Religion Poisons Everything, Hitchens argues, again, as the title suggests, that religion is at the root of many problems. He argues, “As I write these words, and as you read them, people of faith are in their different ways planning your and my destruction, and the destruction of all the hard-won human attainments that I have touched upon. Religion poisons everything.” [9]

The second point that Copan makes regarding the new atheists is that “the Neo-atheists’ arguments against God’s existence are surprisingly flimsy, often resembling the simplistic village atheist far more than the credentialed academician.[10] An example of this will be given in the next section concerning a traditional theistic argument and how the new atheists’ method compares with traditional atheism. In commenting on this type of reasoning that Copan addresses, William Lane Craig states:

“Several years ago my atheist colleague Quentin Smith unceremoniously crowned Stephen Hawking’s argument against God in A Brief History of Time as ‘the worst atheistic argument in the history of Western thought.’ [11] With the advent of The God Delusion the time has come to relieve Hawking of this weighty crown and to recognize Richard Dawkins’s accession to the throne.” [12]

Third,” Copan continues, “the New Atheists aren’t willing to own up to atrocities committed in the name of atheism by Stalin, Pol Pot, or Mao Zedong, yet they expect Christians to own up to all barbarous acts performed in Jesus’s name.” [13] Indeed, new atheists such as Hitchens and Dawkins do believe that religion is a source of inhumane acts. For example, both Hitchens and Dawkins deplore a morality that is based on the Bible or any type of religious dogma and do blame religion for many of the world’s atrocities. [14] Dawkins does discuss Hitler and Staling being atheists. He says that two points are normally brought up to him: “(1) [not only] were Stalin and Hitler atheists, but (2) they did their terrible deeds because they were atheists.” [15] However, Dawkins rejects the idea that their atheism caused their horrible deeds. He argues, “Assumption (1) is irrelevant anyway because assumption (2) is false. It is certainly illogical if it is thought to follow from (1).” [16] He thus denies that “atheism systematically influences people to do bad things,” whereas he believes that religion does. [17]

Thus, Copan has presented a few of the earmarks of the new atheism. In order to contrast the new atheism with traditional atheism, the author shall present a traditional theistic proof and give the evaluations of both types of atheism. The argument that is presented is a type of cosmological argument, viz., Thomas Aquinas’ second way.

The Cosmological Argument: A Test Case

There are many theistic arguments. One of the most popular, and perhaps the most powerful, is the cosmological argument. The cosmological argument takes many forms.  The one presented here is the second of Thomas Aquinas’ famous Five Ways. It states:

“The second way is from the nature of the efficient cause. In the world of sense, we find there is an order of efficient causes. There is no case known (neither is it, indeed, possible) in which a thing is found to be the efficient cause of itself; for so it would be prior to itself, which is impossible. Now in efficient causes, it is not possible to go on to infinity, because in all efficient causes following in order, the first is the cause of the intermediate cause, and the intermediate is the cause of the ultimate cause, whether the intermediate cause be several, or one only. Now to take away the cause is to take away the effect. Therefore, if there be no first cause among efficient causes, there will be no ultimate, nor any intermediate cause. But if in efficient causes it is possible to go on to infinity, there will be no first efficient cause, neither will there be an ultimate effect, nor any intermediate efficient causes; all of which is plainly false. Therefore, it is necessary to admit a first efficient cause, to which everyone gives the name of God.” [18]

It is important in a discussion of the second way for one to be clear about what is meant by ‘efficient causes.’ Maurice R. Holloway gives as a definition of efficient causes “an agent that exercises its influence over the existence of some other being, the effect, through an activity that is properly its own nature, its own form—an activity that is proportioned to the nature of the agent.” [19] To illustrate his point, he explains how efficient causality relates to his writing his book. There are many types of causes involved in its production, but the efficient cause is the man himself. “Thus the first characteristic of a proper [efficient] cause is this: it produces the effect by an activity that is proportioned to its own nature or being.” [20]

With this understanding of efficient causality in mind, what Aquinas is saying in his second way is that nothing can be the efficient cause of itself, because in order for this to happen the effect would have to exist “prior to itself,” which is a contradiction. Further, efficient causes cannot “go on to infinity,” for then there would be no first cause, and if there is no first cause then there is no effect. However, there is an effect. Therefore, it is necessary to posit a first efficient cause, which is understood to be God.

At this point, it will be instructive to explore what traditional atheists have to say about the above argument in contradistinction with what the new atheists say. Michael Martin and J. L. Mackie will represent the traditional atheism, while Christopher Hitchens and Richard Dawkins will represent the new atheism. The agnostic David Berlinski will also have something to say about the argument, especially in light of Dawkins’ comments.  This comparison will give the reader some idea of the differences between the two types of atheism.

A Traditional Response to the Second Way

Michael Martin considers the first three of the five ways “sophisticated versions” of more simple cosmological arguments.[21] Martin understands efficient causality in this context to mean “not a prior event but a substantial agent that brings about change.”[22] He further adds that “the priority of a cause need not be temporal; a cause is prior to its effects in the sense that the cause can exist without the effect but not conversely.”[23] Martin thinks it “important to realize that Aquinas’s argument purports to establish a first cause that maintains the universe here and now. His second way is not concerned with establishing a first cause of the universe in the distant past,” which Aquinas did not think could be done from the realm of reason alone.” [24] At this point, Martin gives two illustrations to make the argument more clear. “Consider,” he says, “a series of falling dominos. It is analogous to a temporal causal sequence. Aquinas does not deny on philosophical grounds that infinite sequences of this sort can exist. But now consider a chain in which one link supports the next. There is no temporal sequence here.” [25] This latter example, Martin notes, is analogous to Thomas’ understanding of efficient causality. This is Martin’s explanation and understanding of the second way.

In evaluating the argument, Martin explains that

“the first cause, even if established, need not be God; and Aquinas gives no non-question-begging reason why there could not be a nontemporal infinite regress of causes. This latter is an especially acute problem. Unless some relevant difference is shown between a temporal and a nontemporal infinite series, Aquinas’s claim that an infinite temporal sequence cannot be shown to be impossible by philosophical argument seems indirectly to cast doubt on his claim that philosophical argument can show the impossibility of a nontemporal causal series.” [26]

Thus, Martin explains and evaluates Aquinas’s second way.

J. L. Mackie gives the argument of the second way within the context of the third way. In other words, in examining the third way, he says that Aquinas uses the second way to show that an infinite regress of causes is not possible. After examining the second way to explicate the problem of infinite regresses in terms of efficient causes, he then pronounces the second way unsound. He goes on to say, “Although in a finite ordered series of causes the intermediat… is caused by the first item, this would not be so if there were an infinite series. In an infinite series, every item is caused by an earlier item. The way in which the first item is ‘removed’ if we go from a finite to an infinite series does not entail the removal of the later items.” [27] He then states that “Aquinas… has simply begged the question against an infinite regress of causes.  But is this a sheer mistake, or is there some coherent thought behind it?” [28] To illustrate the point, Mackie points out that if one was told about a watch without a spring, adding an infinite number of gears would not help the watch operate correctly. Also, one would not be satisfied to learn of an infinite number of boxcars in a train without an engine. The gears depend on a spring, and the boxcars depend on an engine. Thus, Mackie argues, “There is here an implicit appeal to the following general principle: Where items are ordered by a relation of dependence, the regress must end somewhere; it cannot be either infinite or circular.” [29] For Mackie, “this principle is at least highly plausible; the problem will be to decide when we have such a relation of dependence.” [30] Mackie thus rejects the second way in his overall discussion of the third way.

In summary, Martin and Mackie both interact with and evaluate Aquinas’ second way.  Whatever one’s opinion of their conclusions, they at least attempt to present the argument as Aquinas put it and try to allow their readers to feel its force. If one wanted to dismiss their conclusion, he would have to dismiss at least part of their argument. Thus, while one may disagree with Martin and Mackie, they put forth a logical argument as to why they believe the cosmological argument, in this form, to be invalid.  They have a philosophical and rational argument against it.

Now that the traditional atheistic responses have been given to the second way it is appropriate to examine what the new atheism has to say.

The New Atheism’s Response to the Second Way

Perhaps the most instructive critique from the new atheism regarding the cosmological arguments for God comes from Richard Dawkins. Before laying out the argument, Dawkins claims, “The five ‘proofs’ asserted by Thomas Aquinas in the thirteenth century don’t prove anything, and are easily—though I hesitate to say so, given his eminence—exposed as vacuous.” [31] After this unflattering introduction, Dawkins gives a very abbreviated synopsis of the first three ways.  He lays the argument out in these words: “Nothing is caused by itself. Every effect has a prior cause, and again we are pushed back into regress. This has to be terminated by a first cause, which we call God.” [32] After giving such summaries of the first three ways, Dawkins gives his response. He declares that each of these arguments

“make the entirely unwarranted assumption that God himself is immune to the regress. Even if we allow the dubious luxury of arbitrarily conjuring up a terminator to an infinite regress and giving it a name, simply because we need one, there is absolutely no reason to endow that terminator with any of the properties normally ascribed to God; omnipotence, omniscience, goodness, creativity of design, to say nothing of such human attributes as listening to prayers, forgiving sins and reading innermost thoughts.  Incidentally, it has not escaped the notice of logicians that omniscience and omnipotence are mutually incompatible. If God is omniscient, he must already know how he is going to intervene to change the course of history using his omnipotence. But that means he can’t change his mind about his intervention, which means he is not omnipotent.” [33]

Dawkins further rejects the notion that an infinite regress is impossible. He argues “some regresses do reach a natural terminator. Scientists used to wonder what would happen if you could dissect, say, gold into the smallest possible pieces.  Why shouldn’t you cut one of those pieces in half and produce an even smaller smidgen of gold?” [34] In fact, this is precisely what Dawkins says happens. According to him, “The regress, in this case, is decisively terminated by the atom. The smallest possible piece of gold is a nucleus consisting of exactly seventy-nine protons and a slightly larger number of neutrons, attended by a swarm of seventy-nine electrons.” [35] Thus, for Dawkins, “The atom provides a natural terminator to [this] type of regress. [Thus,] it is by no means clear that God provides a natural terminator to the regresses of Aquinas.” [36]

In Christopher Hitchens’ book, the fifth chapter is titled, “The Metaphysical Claims of Religion Are False.” Of all the chapters in his book, if one wanted to see how he handles such arguments as the cosmological argument, one should look here. In the opening sentence of this chapter he writes, “I wrote earlier that we would never again have to confront the impressive faith of an Aquinas or a Maimonides… This is for a simple reason. Faith of that sort—the sort that can stand up at least for a while in a confrontation with reason—is now plainly impossible.” [37] “The early fathers of faith,” he says, “were living in a time of abysmal ignorance and fear.” [38] To illustrate this alleged ignorance, Hitchens says that “Aquinas half believed in astrology, and was convinced that the fully formed nucleus… of a human being was contained inside each individual sperm. One can only mourn over the dismal and stupid lectures on sexual continence that we might have been spared if this nonsense had been exposed earlier than it was.” [39] Hitchens goes on to inform, “One must state it plainly. Religion comes from the period of human prehistory where nobody… had the smallest idea what was going on. It comes from the bawling and fearful infancy of our species, and is a babyish attempt to meet our inescapable demand for knowledge.” [40]

In a discussion on William of Occam (Aquinas does not appear again in this chapter), he argues that “even the first cause has its difficulties since a cause will itself need another cause.” [41] This is the closest to an actual metaphysical statement that occurs in the chapter (and the whole book). “Thus,” he asserts, “the postulate of a designer or creator only raises the unanswerable question of who designed the designer or created the creator. Religion and theology… have consistently failed to overcome this objection.” [42] This concludes the metaphysical chapter.

Even the casual reader can tell a vast difference between the traditional atheism and the new atheism in terms of how they handle the above argument. While the traditional atheists have a more cool, logical tone to their evaluation, the new atheists, who want to believe they have an unbiased, scientific position, are drenched in inflamed rhetoric. In the above quote, Dawkins uses words and phrases such as “unwarranted assumption” and “the dubious luxury of arbitrarily conjuring up” a termination to the regress “simply because we need one.” These types of words are designed to appeal to the emotions of the reader. There are times when “unwarranted assumptions” are made; however if one is going to make accusations of this sort, it would be appropriate to know what the assumptions are. Hitchens uses the same type of rhetoric. He talks about the early fathers “living in a time of abysmal ignorance,” about “dismal and stupid lectures,” and that religion originated from people who did not have “the smallest idea what was going on,” and that it came “from the bawling and fearful infancy of our species, and is a babyish attempt to meet our inescapable demand for knowledge.”

Such language is a smoke screen for people who have no logical arguments to offer. It sounds good to people who agree with their conclusions, but it is bankrupt of rational power. As such, this rhetoric is fallacious as it rests solely on emotion. It also commits the ad hominem fallacy as it is an attack on the persons making the arguments and not the arguments themselves. Further, the fact that Hitchens attacks Aquinas for having a particular belief (without a single reference) about biology is a straw man fallacy. Such quotations (which are not few in number) are cannon fodder for even the first-semester logic student.

Further, Dawkins seems unable to stay on track in attacking the second way. Such issues as the nature of the cause, such as omniscience and omnipotence, is a discussion for philosophical theology and is not part of Aquinas’ argument for a cause. Aquinas, here, simply says that the cause must be necessary. A discussion about the nature of the cause, while possibly implied by such arguments, are not germane to a discussion on the necessity of an uncaused cause. Such doctrines are debated among theists. There are theists on both sides of the debate. Thus, the nature of the cause does not negate the existence of the cause.

The new atheists do not offer clear arguments for their case. An argument where premises lead to a conclusion is wholly lacking in their works, at least on the level that they are found in the traditional atheism. Rather than offering logical arguments, they offer rhetoric, fallacious reasoning, and nonsense. David Berlinski, himself an agnostic, says of Aquinas’s argument, “This is a weak but not an absurd argument, and while Aquinas’s conclusion may not be true, objections to his argument are frequently inept.  Thus, Richard Dawkins writes that Aquinas ‘makes the entirely unwarranted assumption that God is immune to the regress.’  It is a commonly made criticism.” [43] He adds, “But Aquinas makes no such assumption, and thus none that could be unwarranted. It is the conclusion of his argument that causes in nature cannot form an infinite series. If [he is] prepared to reject this conclusion, Dawkins … must show that the argument on which it depends is either invalid or unsound. This [he has] not done.” [44]

Another hallmark of the new atheism is a complete misrepresentation of the arguments they are trying to attack. The above representation of the second way has been given, and the reader can see that Dawkins does not even attempt to seriously interact with it. He does the same thing with other arguments, and even worse. Aquinas gives his third way as follows:

“The third way is taken from possibility and necessity, and runs thus. We find in nature things that are possible to be and not to be, since they are found to be generated, and to corrupt, and consequently, they are possible to be and not to be. But it is impossible for these always to exist, for that which is possible not to be at some time is not. Therefore, if everything is possible not to be, then at one time there could have been nothing in existence. Now if this were true, even now there would be nothing in existence because that which does not exist only begins to exist by something already existing. Therefore, if at one time nothing was in existence, it would have been impossible for anything to have begun to exist; and thus even now nothing would be in existence—which is absurd. Therefore, not all beings are merely possible, but there must exist something the existence of which is necessary. But every necessary thing either has its necessity caused by another or not. Now it is impossible to go on to infinity in necessary things which have their necessity caused by another, as has been already proved in regard to efficient causes. Therefore, we cannot but postulate the existence of some being having of itself its own necessity, and not receiving it from another, but rather causing in others their necessity. This all men speak of as God.” [45]

However, Dawkins phrases it this way: “There must have been a time when no physical things existed. But, since physical things exist now, there must have been something non-physical to bring them into existence, and that something we call God.” [46] Now, it is one thing to summarize an argument. It is quite another to misrepresent it. Aquinas does not discuss ‘physical things.’ Rather, his argument is metaphysical in nature. Dawkins simply does not understand what he is attempting to refute.

The same is the case for the others as well. The fifth way is probably the most misunderstood.  Dawkins, as many do, misunderstand it for a design argument when it, in fact, is an argument from final causality. Here is the argument as Aquinas gives it:

“The fifth way is taken from the governance of the world. We see that things which lack intelligence, such as natural bodies, act for an end, and this is evident from their acting always, or nearly always, in the same way, so as to obtain the best result. Hence it is plain that not fortuitously, but designedly, do they achieve their end. Now whatever lacks intelligence cannot move towards an end, unless it be directed by some being endowed with knowledge and intelligence; as the arrow is shot to its mark by the archer. Therefore, some intelligent being exists by whom all natural things are directed to their end; and this being we call God.” [47]

Of this argument, Dawkins says, “The argument from design is the only one still in regular use today, and it still sounds to many like the ultimate knockdown argument.” [48] However, such is not the case. Rather than being an argument from design it is an argument from final causality. In other words, the argument does not say that since things are designed there must be a designer; rather, it says that such things as animals and “natural bodies” act in accordance with some goal. However, such things can only do so if they are directed. Therefore, some being must exist that directs them. One cannot fault Dawkins too much for this particular blunder since so many others make it as well; however, it is characteristic of the new atheists failure to understand the argument they are responding to and to deal with them fairly.

The point is not simply to show that the new atheists are wrong in their work; rather, the point is to show that they have nothing to contribute to the discussion other than heated rambling.

Before concluding, it will be instructive to give the best “argument” that Richard Dawkins, perhaps the champion of the new atheism, offers. In his book in a chapter titled, “Why There is Almost Certainly No God,” Dawkins offers what he considers to be “the central argument of [his] book.” [49] At the end of the chapter Dawkins gives a six-point summary of the argument. As David Berlinski does in his book, I shall only give the first three points, as they are the main concern.

  1.  One of the Greatest challenges to the human intellect, over the centuries, has been to explain how the complex, improbable appearance of design in the universe arises.
  2.  The natural temptation is to attribute the appearance of design to actual design itself. In the case of a man-made artifact such as a watch, the designer really was an intelligent engineer. It is tempting to apply the same logic to an eye or a wing, a spider or a person.
  3.  The temptation is a false one because the designer hypothesis immediately raises the larger problem of who designed the designer. The whole problem we started out with was the problem of explaining statistical improbability. It is obviously no solution to postulate something even more improbable. We need a ‘crane’, not a ‘skyhook’, for only a crane can do the business of working up gradually and plausibly from simplicity to otherwise improbable complexity. [50]

This is indeed not a logical argument, but more of a probabilistic argument.  In fact, it is not really an argument at all.  In referring to Dawkins’ argument, Berlinski retorts, “In all this, Dawkins has failed only to explain his reasoning, and I am left with the considerable inconvenience of establishing his argument before rejecting it.” [51]

The main problem with the above points is Dawkins assertion that “the designer hypothesis raises the larger problem of who designed the designer,” and that a designer would be even “more improbable.” Such objections as “who created the creator,” and “who designed the designer” are staples of the new atheism. Dawkins seems to miss the design argument, which states: Everything that has a design needs a designer. The universe is designed. Therefore, the universe needs a designer.

According to the argument which usually takes this form, only designs needs designers; designers do not need designers. [52] Everything does not need a designer, only things that are designed need a designer.

Further, Dawkins asserts that a designer or creator of the universe is even more improbable than the universe itself and would also be complex. However, this is patently false. Berlinski again brings clarity to the argument by saying, “We explain creation by appealing to creators, whether deities or the inflexible laws of nature. We explain what is chancy by appealing to chance. We cannot do both. If God did make the world, it is not improbable. If it is improbable, then God did not make it.” [53] He further notes, “The best we could say is that God made a world that would be improbable had it been produced by chance. But it wasn’t, and so He didn’t. This is a discouraging first step in an argument said to come close to proving that God does not exist.” [54]

Craig believes that Dawkins’ assertion that God would need explaining in the manner of the universe has many flaws. “First, in order to recognize an explanation as the best, one needn’t have an explanation of the explanation. This is an elementary point concerning inference to the best explanation as practiced in the philosophy of science.” [55] The second point concerns the assumption that “the designer is just as complex as the thing to be explained so that no explanatory advance is made.” [56] Here Craig argues that an explanation may be less simple than others but may still be true. However, I believe that there is a more fundamental problem with Dawkins’ point, and again, this is characteristic of the new atheism. Dawkins does not ever explain why it is the case that God would have to be just as complex, or more so, than the universe. In fact, in his own discipline, he teaches, per Darwinian theory, that simple organisms give rise to more complex organisms. [57] However, Dawkins’ assertion is false metaphysically. As Aquinas shows in the first way, the cause of all effects must be simple, i.e., having no parts. The first way argues:

“The first and more manifest way is the argument from motion. It is certain, and evident to our senses, that in the world some things are in motion. Now whatever is in motion is put in motion by another, for nothing can be in motion except it is in potentiality to that towards which it is in motion; whereas a thing moves inasmuch as it is in act. For motion is nothing else than the reduction of something from potentiality to actuality. But nothing can be reduced from potentiality to actuality, except by something in a state of actuality. Thus that which is actually hot, as fire, makes wood, which is potentially hot, to be actually hot, and thereby moves and changes it. Now it is not possible that the same thing should be at once in actuality and potentiality in the same respect, but only in different respects. For what is actually hot cannot simultaneously be potentially hot; but it is simultaneously potentially cold. It is therefore impossible that in the same respect and in the same way a thing should be both mover and moved, i.e. that it should move itself. Therefore, whatever is in motion must be put in motion by another. If that by which it is put in motion be itself put in motion, then this also must needs be put in motion by another, and that by another again. But this cannot go on to infinity, because then there would be no first mover, and, consequently, no other mover; seeing that subsequent movers move only inasmuch as they are put in motion by the first mover; as the staff moves only because it is put in motion by the hand. Therefore, it is necessary to arrive at a first mover, put in motion by no other; and this everyone understands to be God.” [58]

This argument shows that not only do causes have to be like their effects in complexity, but that the ultimate cause cannot be like its effects. While the effects are composed of act and potency, the cause is not so composed but is simple. Thus, Dawkins’ point fails.

Conclusion

The question of God’s existence is one that haunts all of humanity. Theists argue that he does in fact exist, while atheists argue that he does not. It has been shown that there are at least two types of atheism, the old, traditional atheism, and the new atheism. The old atheism gives theistic arguments their due, tries to understand and explain them, and evaluates them according to the canons of logical argumentation and reason. Such is not the case for the new atheism. The new atheism is marked by rhetoric, flawed or missing arguments, and appeal to emotion. This, of course, does not make the conclusions of the new atheism wrong; however, it does suggest that the new atheism is bankrupt in terms of its ability to deal honestly with theistic arguments and that the new atheist’s conclusions about such arguments do not follow logically. All of the new atheists have not been surveyed, and they do differ in their level of philosophical competence. However, the arguments presented here are typical for their camp. Christians should thus not be intimidated by them. Rather, Christians need to understand the principles of logic in order to evaluate their arguments and to extinguish the emotional hysteria associated with their work.

Notes

[1] Atheists sometimes like to redefine atheism to mean simply that they do not possess believe in a theistic God; however, the above definition of atheism shall be the one adopted for this work.

[2] The term ‘God’ shall be used in the classical sense throughout this article.

[3] Paul Copan and William Lane Craig, eds., Contending with Christianity’s Critics: Answering New Atheists and other Objectors (Nashville: B&H Academic, 2009), vii.

[4] Ibid.

[5] Paul Copan, Is God a Moral Monster?: Making Sense of the Old Testament God (Grand Rapids: Baker Books, 2011), 16 (emphasis in original).

[6] William Lane Craig, “Dawkins’s Delusion,” in Contending, 2 (emphasis in original).

[7] Ibid.

[8] Richard Dawkins, The God Delusion (Boston: First Mariner Books, 2008), 51.

[9] Christopher Hitchens, god is not Great: How Religion Poisons Everything (New York: Twelve, 2009), 13 (emphasis in original).

[10] Copan, God, 17 (emphasis in original).

[11] This reference is to Quentin Smith, “The Wave Function of a Godless Universe,” in Theism, Atheism, and Big Bang Cosmology (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993), 322.

[12] Craig, “Dawkins’s Delusion,” in Contending, 5.

[13] Copan, God, 18 (emphasis in original).

[14] Cf. especially chapters 7-8 in both god is not Great, and The God Delusion.

[15] Dawkins, 309 (emphasis in original).

[16] Ibid.

[17] Ibid. (emphasis in original).

[18] Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theological, trans. by Fathers of the English Dominican Province, 2ndand revised edition (Notre Dame: Ave Maria Press, Inc. 1920), Ia q. 2 a. 3.

[19] Maurice R. Holloway, Introduction to Natural Theology (Saint Louis: Saint Louis University Press, 1959), 61.

[20] Ibid.

[21] Michael Martin, Atheism: A Philosophical Justification (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1990), 97.

[22] Ibid., 98.

[23] Ibid.

[24] Ibid.

[25] Ibid.

[26] Ibid., 98-99.

[27] J. L. Mackie, The Miracle of Theism: Arguments for and Against the Existence of God (Oxford: Clarendon Press), 1982), 90 (emphasis in original).

[28] Ibid.

[29] Ibid.

[30] Ibid., 90-91.

[31] Dawkins, 100.

[32] Ibid.

[33] Ibid.

[34] Ibid., 102.

[35] Ibid.

[36] Ibid.

[37] Hitchens, 63.

[38] Ibid., 63-64.

[39] Ibid.

[40] Ibid.

[41] Ibid., 71.

[42] Ibid. During this discussion Hitchens quotes Occam as agreeing with his position.  However, he does not give a reference to Occam’s work. There is a reference to Frederick Copleston, History of Philosophy, vol 3 (Kent, England: Search Press, 1953). If this is what he is using for his work, then it would still not be a primary source from Occam.

[43] David Berlinski, The Devil’s Delusion: Atheism and Its Scientific Pretensions (New York: Crown Forum: 2008), 68 (emphasis in original).

[44] Ibid. (emphasis in original).

[45] Aquinas, Summa, Ia, q. 2, a. 3.

[46] Dawkins, 101.

[47] Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Ia q. 2 a. 3.

[48] Dawkins, 103.

[49] Dawkins, 187.

[50] Ibid., 188.

[51] Berlinski, 138.

[52] I am indebted to Richard G. Howe for this insight.

[53] Berlinski, 144.

[54] Ibid. (emphasis in original).

[55] Craig, “Dawkins’s Delusion,” in Contending, 4.

[56] Ibid.

[57] I am indebted to Greg Barrett for this understanding.

[58] Aquinas, Summa, Ia, q. 2, a. 3.

You can also see about this topic here:

DVD WHAT BEST EXPLAINS REALITY: ATHEISM OR THEISM?

 


J. Brian Huffling, PH.D. have a BA in History from Lee University, an MA in (3 majors) Apologetics, Philosophy, and Biblical Studies from Southern Evangelical Seminary (SES), and a Ph.D. in Philosophy of Religion from SES. He is the Director of the Ph.D. Program and Associate Professor of Philosophy and Theology at SES. He also teaches courses for Apologia Online Academy. He has previously taught at The Art Institute of Charlotte. He has served in the Marines, Navy, and is currently a reserve chaplain in the Air Force at Maxwell Air Force Base. His hobbies include golf, backyard astronomy, martial arts, and guitar.

Original Blog Source: http://bit.ly/2GYUfAE

By J. Brian Huffling

Many Christians believe that philosophy is a pagan discipline practiced either by ivory tower professors or Starbucks hippies. This belief has led some to object to the importance of philosophy, believing that only a relatively small group can do it, or that it deals with problems so mysterious or abstract that it would be a waste of time. Many Christian theologians object that philosophy is rooted in paganism and therefore has no place in Christian theology. After explaining what philosophy is about, it should be abundantly clear that these objections are not only incorrect, but that philosophy is inevitable.

‘Philosophy’ literally means “love (philo) of wisdom (sofia).” It is the search for knowledge, truth, and how to live the good (moral) life. There are several general branches of philosophy. Among them, one and the most fundamental, is metaphysics. Metaphysics is the study of being, or what it means to be true. While biologists study life as things happen, mathematicians study beings according to their number, and physicists study beings according to their physical parts or motion, the metaphysician studies what it means to be in general. They ask questions like, “What is the difference between Snoopy and the bloodhound you might go for a walk with?” Another branch of philosophy is epistemology, which is the study of knowledge. Epistemologists ask the questions, “How can knowledge be obtained?” “What is knowledge?” and “Is there a difference between knowledge and belief?” Moral philosophy seeks to know what it means to be good in the moral sense. Where does goodness come from, and what makes something good? Logic studies correct reasoning and the mistakes (fallacies) that are often made when making a rational argument. Aesthetics studies the nature of beauty, asking questions like, “What does it mean to be beautiful? Is beauty objective?” And so on.

A large number of philosophical fields emerge from these categories. The philosophy of mathematics deals with the nature of numbers, and asks whether numbers are real (for example, does the number 4 really exist?). In other words, it deals with the nature of mathematics. The philosophy of science deals with the nature of science. The philosophy of history deals with the nature of history and historical knowledge. My area is the philosophy of religion, which deals with issues such as the existence of God and His nature, how we talk about Him, the problem of evil, and the nature of miracles.

When you say something that purports to be true, you are talking about reality and claiming to know something about it. You are also making a logical claim. In addition, you are assuming (explicitly or implicitly) a certain perspective on how language works (philosophy of language). Even when you are talking about the tree in your front yard, you are saying something about the existence of the tree and of nature. I am not saying that everyone is a “philosopher” in the strict academic sense. What I am saying is that it is not possible to make claims about the world, God, or the Bible without taking philosophical positions, regardless of whether you know them or not.

The same is true of theology and the study/interpretation of the Bible. We cannot make theological claims without using philosophy. For example, when we talk about Jesus taking on a human nature, we must understand what a “nature” is. This is a philosophical category. When a scholar says that biblical interpreters cannot be objective because of their biases, this is a philosophical claim about the nature of objectivity, bias, the knower, and the process of knowing.

Far from being a pagan practice, this is how God made us. He made us rational beings. This is what sets us apart from other animals. Philosophy is useful and inevitable. Instead of trying to avoid it, we should try to become better philosophers, and worship God with our minds.

 


J. Brian Huffling, Ph.D., holds a B.A. in History from Lee University, M.A. (3 M.A.s.) in Apologetics, Philosophy, and Biblical Studies from Southern Evangelical Seminary (SES), and a Ph.D. in Philosophy of Religion from SES. He is the Director of the Doctoral Program and Associate Professor of Philosophy and Theology at SES. He also teaches courses for Apologia Online Academy. He previously taught at the Art Institute of Charlotte. He has served in the Marine Corps, Navy, and is currently an Air Force Reserve Chaplain at Maxwell Air Force Base. His hobbies include golf, backyard astronomy, martial arts, and guitar.

Original Blog: http://bit.ly/2EiStYA

Translated by Natalia Armando

Edited by Malachi Toro Vielma

By J. Brian Huffling

“Historians are biased and choose what they report. As such, history can’t be known.” That’s a typical objection to the ability to know history. If such objections prove that we can’t know history, then we can’t know that Christianity is true since it is known through history and historical claims. In his prologue, Luke says,

“In as much as many have undertaken to compile a narrative of the things that have been accomplished among us, just as those who from the beginning were eyewitnesses and ministers of the word have delivered them to us, it seemed good to me also, having followed all things closely for some time past, to write an orderly account for you, most excellent Theophilus, that you may have certainty concerning the things you have been taught” (Luke 1:1-4; emphasis added).

The above passage demonstrates that Luke was writing as an historian. Words such as the ones underlined show his desire to write the truth of the events he wanted to convey. So, if history can’t be known, then we can’t know that Christianity is true. Let’s look at a typical objection.

Bias is probably the most popular objection to knowing history. It is claimed by some that historians are biased. It is not always clear what the objection is really getting at, but usually it is something like the historian holds certain views that in some way make his reporting subjective or unfair. For example, an historian may be writing about a religious issue and if he is part of that religion he is likely going to be accused of being biased. The disciples are often said to be biased regarding the events of the life of Jesus, particularly his resurrection. Since they knew him and had a vested interest they must have made up the claims of the resurrection.

Ironically, there are many assumptions (i.e., biases) about the nature of bias. It is more often than not used in a negative way and is equated with subjectivity and falsity. But why should this be the case? Why should the notion of either bias or subjectivity be equated with something being false? People could be biased because of evidence. If the disciples really did see Jesus alive after he was dead, then the reason they were biased was because of evidence and proof. But this bias would not be based on any subjectivity since their knowledge was based on objective and empirical evidence. Further, someone could have a subjective view of something and still be correct. There is nothing about being biased or subjective that guarantees that the belief is false. Such is an assumption in itself.

Consider this popular argument against objectivity:

  1. To be objective one must be free from bias.
  2. No one is free from bias.
  3. Therefore, no one is objective.

This is a valid argument, meaning that the conclusion follows from the premises. But is it sound (i.e., is the argument valid and the premises and conclusion true)? Well, if no one is free from bias that means the one making this argument is not free from bias. But statements like “No one is . . .” is a universal statement that applies to everyone everywhere. But aren’t universal statements objective? What else would ‘objective’ means other than something that is universal and not simply limited to the subjective beliefs of an individual? This whole line of argument is self-defeating. In other words, when using the argument’s criteria, the very argument itself fails. The objector, in this case, is objective in trying to argue that no one is free from bias and that no one is objective. However, the only way to make such universal statements is for the objector to make objective statements. If they were subjective, then they wouldn’t necessarily be universal. If they weren’t universal, then maybe some people aren’t biased. But this contradicts the argument. Assuming the argument holds water because no one really denies that people are biased, it shows that one can be biased and objective. (Note, it is not guaranteed that one is going to be objective and biased, just that it’s logically possible. The objection is thus deflated.)

This raises another question that is rarely asked and usually assumed: What does it mean for something to be ‘objective’? By now it should be clear that it can’t mean free from bias since we’ve just seen that a person can be both biased and objective. So being free from bias is not necessary to be objective (in fact I would agree that everyone is biased in a general sense). So what does it mean? Most people think that it means being detached from a given circumstance so that one can see it as an objective outsider. In his fascinating work Jesus and the Eyewitnesses: The Gospels as Eyewitness Testimony, drawing on other work on this topic (such as Samuel Byrskog’s Story as History—History as Story: The Gospel Tradition in the Context of Ancient Oral History), Richard Bauckham makes the surprising and unfashionable statement:

“A very important point that . . . for Greek and Roman historians, the ideal eyewitness was not the dispassionate observer but one who, as a participant, had been closest to the events and whose direct experience enabled him to understand and interpret the significance of what he had seen” (page 9).

He further notes that many historians wanted someone who was involved in the events in question because that person would have a vested interest. They wanted someone who was involved and really there.

This counters the usual desire or assumed need for detatchment, but it does not say what objectivity is. Objectivity is arriving at conclusions that are based on evidence and principles that have their foundation in external reality. Everyone can use and measure truth claims based on external (objective) reality. Put negatively; it is the opposite of one making conclusions that arise simply out of one’s subjective mind. Such evidence based on reality and the principles that follow is mind-independent. Since reality is objective, that is, everyone can know it (as long as their faculties are working properly), the conclusions based on reality can also be objective. When one uses universal (objective) principles to ascertain the truth of a conclusion, one can be objective. Such principles are the laws of logic (or being). One such law is the law of non-contradiction. It declares that if two statements are mutually exclusive one must be true and the other must be false. For example, Christianity teaches that Jesus died. Islam counters that Jesus did not die. These statements are mutually exclusive—one must be true and the other false since there is no third option. Thus, they are contradictory. (This is contrasted with statements that can both logically be false, such as “Buddhism is true” and “Atheism is true.” Such statements that can both be false are called ‘contrary.’) Regarding this principle and its application to historical objectivity, Maurice Mandelbaum says,

“Our knowledge is objective if, and only if, it is the case that when two persons make contradictory statements concerning the same subject matter, at least one of them must be mistaken” (The Anatomy of Historical Knowledge, 150).

The law of non-contradiction is based in the nature of reality. It is not just a principle of thought, but of being. A tree cannot exist and not exist at the same time in the same sense. That would be a contradiction. Such first principles of thought and arising out of the nature of reality since something can’t simultaneously be and not be. It is not simply a made-up principle. In fact, it is undeniable since to deny it would require using it.

Thus, if one’s conclusions are based on external and objective reality and evidence, and the principles from such reality, those conclusions can be objective. There is, in a sense, an objective apparatus giving us the possibility of being objective. Again, this is contrasted with something arising only from one’s (subjective) mind rather than from external (objective) reality. There is, therefore, nothing about biases that preclude one from making objective historical statements. Biases do not guarantee subjectivity or falsity.

Back to Bauckham’s point regarding bias, it is often the case that people are indeed biased, but biased because of the evidence. They have seen so much evidence, that they are convinced that what they are saying is true. This, however, is not subjective bias or assumption, but rather the careful examination of objective reality and the evidence that all can investigate.

When looking at historical questions, such as the resurrection, one should not base his conclusions on notions such as the alleged bias of the ones making claims. Rather, one should examine the evidence for the claims to discover their veracity. We can recognize bias in every area and by all people. However, that alone is not enough to show that a person’s claim is false. To be good and responsible historians and investigators, we must follow the evidence.

(I would like to thank Norman L. Geisler for his direction regarding my MA thesis topic which was on this issue, as well as Thomas A. Howe to whom my thoughts and work are indebted greatly.)

 


Original Blog Source: http://bit.ly/2HOROSC

By J. Brian Huffling 

A few months ago I wrote a post titled “Why Christian Apologetics Is Not A Discipline.” Dr. Robert Bowman has graciously responded with a blog post titled “Is Apologetics a Discipline?” I appreciate Bowman’s article as it highlights the importance and nature of apologetics. I have been a fan of his for well over decade since I read his and Kenneth Boa’s Faith Has Its Reasons, which is probably the best book on apologetic methodology. I also greatly appreciate his The Word-Faith Controversy: Understanding the Health and Wealth Gospel. I had the chance to Meet Rob a couple of years ago at Southern Evangelical Seminary’s National Conference on Christian Apologetics. He is incredibly friendly and courteous, and I greatly appreciate his work in apologetics.

Is Apologetics A Discipline A Conversation with Robert Bowman

The Importance of Apologetics

My first post on this topic argues that apologetics is not a discipline. Bowman disagrees and argues that it is. Before I respond to Bowman’s post, I would like to be very clear that I am not denigrating apologetics in the least. I went to SES in 2004 to study apologetics and earned a masters degree in that area in 2009 (along with majors in Biblical Studies and Philosophy). I am currently a professor at SES and co-teach Intro to Apologetics with Norman Geisler. I have argued for years that apologetics is needed. Thus, it should be clear that I consider myself an apologist and think that doing apologetics is very important.

I also want to be clear that I do not think that one must be a specialist in order to be an effective apologist. (In my first piece I argued that to be a good apologist one must be a specialist. However, my main point there was aimed at those looking to be professionals. One can certainly be good and effective as a lay apologist; however, I do maintain that there is a risk of being over-simplistic regarding complex issues as a generalist.) Most people who practice apologetics are not professional apologists, meaning that they don’t earn their living that way. Some are, though, and do very well for themselves (although I think there are few). My point in my original post was simply that if one wants to be a professional apologist, especially in academics, then he should be a specialist in a given field. I do argue and believe that pastors and lay people should practice apologetics, and they don’t need to be specialists in order to do so. I have served on several church staffs, and I am currently a reserve chaplain in the Air Force. We need people doing apologetics, and most apologists will be bi-vocational or laymen. I am not denigrating general apologetics. It is needed. I do argue, though, that general apologetics is possible because of specialists in other fields who make their information and data available to laymen. Without specialists, there would basically be no apologetics. At least not to the level, there is now.

Response to Bowman’s Article

Having said that, I stand by my original claim that apologetics is not an academic discipline; it is a practice. Let me now respond to Bowman’s post.

After summarizing my overall position, and agreeing “in general,” he makes several points. The first regards the course offerings at SES that are apologetics classes. He lists several types of classes that we offer (world religions and new religious movements, philosophy, biblical studies, etc.), focusing on the scientific classes that are offered as electives and comprise one of our certificate programs. Bowman states:

One problem with the science-related courses at SES of relevance to Huffling’s concern is that they are not intended to enable the student to become proficient in any scientific discipline. There is an apologetics course surveying science-related issues and four courses on “scientific apologetics” instructing students in intelligent design theory and objections to evolutionary theory. By no means am I criticizing these courses; my point is that if Huffling is correct, these courses are inadequate to prepare students to become good apologists. The only subject areas other than apologetics with course offerings sufficiently robust at SES to make students proficient in those areas are biblical studies and philosophy.

As I have already stated, and as Bowman admits, my concerns are really aimed at those who are trying to be full-time or professional apologists. People can certainly have a positive impact with lay-level or general apologetics training. I will say, though, that I do think that without proper training in science it is challenging to rightly understand the scientific issues relating to these topics. Yes, people can study astronomy, chemistry, and the like, and become better apologists. That is why we offer the classes. We want people to take them and learn and hopefully go on to study science at a higher level. But these are not science classes as such; they are apologetics classes. It is hoped that our students will take their knowledge from these classes and apply it to their ministries. (It is probably worth noting that it is the application of these classes to ministries and not academics that is the point of these classes. They are not scientific classes as such, and would probably not transfer to a secular school to replace an actual class on these topics. This is because these classes are not outright science classes, they are apologetics classes from a scientific point of view. They are great classes taught by excellent teachers who are scientists, such a Hugh Ross, but they are not science classes as such. I think this highlights my point that apologetics relies on disciplines for its content, but it is itself simply the application of those disciplines, such as astronomy, to defend the faith.)

Bowman then makes the correct point that “SES has a number of courses in apologetics per se—perhaps more than any other seminary. These include surveys touching on multiple disciplines but also courses on apologetic methods, the history of apologetics, and so on. These courses are not about nothing.” Agreed. In saying that apologetics is not a discipline, but a practice is not to equate it with nothing.

Next, he states, “A pastor or evangelist or missionary who takes a variety of these courses might indeed be well prepared to do their ministry better. Some of Huffling’s critics on Facebook made this point, and I think it is a reasonable one, though it is not directly germane to his concern regarding those seeking to be full-time apologists.” Again, agreed. I have never maintained otherwise, contrary to said Facebookers. As Bowman admits, that was not even relevant to my point in my post as I had in mind those trying to be full-time professionals.

Bowman now comes to his “main disagreement” which is my “assertion that apologetics is not a discipline.” His overall point here is that apologetics is “in the same category as philosophy, which Huffling views as a legitimate discipline.” He states,

In my view, apologetics and philosophy are both second-order disciplines. A first-order discipline concerns subject areas of human knowledge such as the sciences, the arts, and theology. A second-order discipline has as its subject or subjects other disciplines, especially first-order disciplines. For example, in philosophy one is studying philosophy of science, philosophy of language, philosophical ethics, philosophy of religion, philosophical theology, and the like.

It is not clear to me how apologetics is a second order discipline. According to Bowmans’ definition if it were, then it would have as its subject other first-order disciplines. Let’s take history as an example. Is history the subject of apologetics? It seems not, at least not in an exclusive way since other disciplines can as well. But for the sake of argument lets go along with this idea. When apologists use history to defend the faith they usually have in mind the reliability of the Bible or the truth of the resurrection. So then how would apologetics as a second-order discipline have a history as its subject here? It would look at the claims being made such as “The Bible is historically reliable” or “Jesus rose from the dead.” But the only way to proceed would be to compare the claims made with what we know about reality and can prove historically. In other words, the only way the apologist can proceed by using history in his defense is simply to claim that history is on his side. But this doesn’t seem like a second order discipline; it seems like we are simply pointing to what historians say. People point to what historians all the time and are not “doing apologetics.” Or, in the broadest sense, we could say that any historical case made for something is an apologetic for that issue. But this stresses my point that apologetics is the use of a discipline to prove a point, not a discipline in itself. When someone says “X happened in history” it is hard to see how that is itself a discipline other than history.

There are aspects of philosophy that are second order, but that does not mean that philosophy as such is a second order discipline. Bowman states that he comes “down on the side of the analytic tradition in philosophy.” In defining philosophy, he quotes Faith Has Its Reasons, saying, “ the task of philosophy is to clarify the meaning of knowledge claims and to assess the rationality of those claims” (168). Defining philosophy this way makes it easier to view philosophy as a second-order discipline. Those like we at SES who view philosophy from a more systematic approach would not agree that philosophy as such is a second order discipline. We lament philosophy being reduced to mere linguistic analysis or simply assessing the rationality of claims. Such a view relegates philosophy to a fact-checking system. Historically philosophy was more than that, and it still is in many circles. Rather than being a way to analyze statements, answer problems, or demonstrate that something is rational, philosophy has its own unique subject matter. For example, the subject of metaphysics is not something that piggybacks on other disciplines, but rather, is a discipline in itself. No other discipline inquires into the nature of being as such. Metaphysics studies the nature of existence, essences, change, and the like. This is its primary and direct subject matter. The analytic tradition that Bowman espouses rejects the rich traditions in metaphysics and relegates philosophy to mere linguistic analysis. Perhaps Bowman doesn’t mean to do this, but this is indeed the history of the analytic tradition: the rejection of metaphysics and the emptying of philosophy of its rich content. When one understands what analytic philosophy is, it is easy to see why Peter Unger titled his book Empty Ideas: A Critique of Analytic Philosophy. Only if philosophy is merely analytic in this way can it be said to be a second-order discipline.

What about the “philosophy of ___________” areas? Let’s look at philosophy of religion. Again, I would argue that this is its own discipline since it has its own unique subject matter. Philosophy of religion studies God’s existence and nature, miracles, the problem of evil, religious experience, how our language relates to God (religious epistemology, or God-talk), etc. As such, philosophy of religion does not look to another discipline to do this. It has its own unique and well-defined subject matter.

There are areas in philosophy that arise out of analysis of other disciplines, such as the philosophy of math and the philosophy of science. Such fields ask about the nature of such enterprises. However, even in this case, it is clear that each has its own unique and well-defined subject matter. Philosophy of math is not the same as the philosophy of science, for example.

In order to be a discipline of study a field must have its own unique and well-defined subject matter. Philosophy certainly has this, as do the “philosophy of’s.” However, this can’t be said for apologetics since it can have as its subject matter history, archaeology, chemistry, biology, physics, astronomy, philosophy, biblical studies, etc. No actual discipline has such a broad area of study. This can only be the case since apologetics requires fields of study, such as history, to defend the Christian faith. Historians practice apologetics when they use historical arguments in defense of the faith. Astronomers do apologetics when they apply their expertise to defending aspects of the faith. The same is said of all of these other disciples from which apologetics is practiced. There is no such thing as “mere apologetics.” Whenever someone tries to defend the faith, he is always doing it by practicing some field of study.

Bowman next claims, “Philosophy and apologetics can even involve the study of one another: much of philosophy of religion examines apologetic arguments for specific religious beliefs, and philosophical apologetics is itself a type of apologetics.” It is not at all clear how apologetics studies philosophy. I am also not clear as to what arguments he is referring to, but I’m assuming theistic proofs for God’s existence, the problem of evil, the nature and possibility of miracles, etc. It seems that he is referring to this when he refers to philosophical apologetics as a type of apologetics. Rather than the philosophy of religion examining apologetic arguments, there are arguments used in defense of our faith that are philosophical in nature. These arguments come from applying philosophy to our faith. Without the philosophy of religion, there would simply be no apologetic arguments in this regard. Philosophical apologetics is nothing more than the application of philosophy to Christianity. Philosophers aren’t examining apologetic arguments; philosophers are making apologetic arguments by applying philosophy to a defense of the faith. This is a one-way street as philosophers can make and examine apologetic arguments, but apologists cannot make and examine philosophical arguments without using philosophy.

Next, Bowman writes, “My point is that philosophy and apologetics are both disciplines in their own right that study how to think about knowledge claims in other, more specific disciplines.” It is not overly clear what Bowman means by “knowledge claims.” Does he mean studying the nature of knowledge and the knowing process? Such would be epistemology. Does he mean seeking to find the truth value of a given claim or testing worldviews? In short, apologetics does not study how to think about knowledge claims. Philosophy studies the nature of knowledge and any discipline can be used to check the veracity of a given proposition that falls in its domain. It is not unique to apologetics, and I don’t think it makes sense to say apologetics does this. Checking a truth claim against reality is not unique to apologetics; it is something that everyone does. Such a claim, if this is what Bowman has in mind, seems to prove too much as then everything would be apologetics.

Finally, Bowman declares, “It is true, as Huffling points out, that most universities and other schools have teaching positions in philosophy but not in apologetics. This fact might be a good pragmatic reason not to pursue a major in apologetics per se if one’s goal is an appointment to a full-time faculty position somewhere. However, it is not a good argument against recognizing apologetics as a discipline.” I agree that this is a pragmatic reason not to major in apologetics if one wants to be an academics. However, it may be a good degree for other reasons. My position that apologetics is not a discipline does not derive from the fact that schools don’t have teaching positions in it. My argument is that apologetics does not have its own unique and well-defined body of knowledge. It uses actual disciplines from which to defend the faith. The fact that schools don’t have positions in apologetics is evidence of my claim but was not my argument for it.

Conclusion

I would like to thank Rob for spending the time interacting with my article. I was surprised he thought it worthy of mention! Apologetics is indeed important, even at the lay-level. We do need generalists, and we need apologetics taught in churches and para-church ministries. However, apologetics relies on the expertise of scholars in well-defined disciplines. This is not a negative quality for apologetics. It is simply how reasoning works. The fact that apologetics is based on specialists and scholars in various fields should give us confidence in our apologetic endeavors. Shouldn’t we want specialists defending the faith and telling us how secure the foundation for our beliefs is rather than relying on generalists? The generalist approach has its merits and appropriate venues, but apologetics as such is secured by specialists who are experts in solid and well-defined disciplines.

 


Original Blog Source: http://bit.ly/2EjrZ9M