Un caso contra el teísmo (Parte 1)

A while ago Jorge Gil received a message on one of his social networks from an atheist, it was a series of objections against theism. Of course, my friend Jorge does not have the time to respond to each of the messages or emails he receives, so he asked me to be the one to respond to the objections; and well, here I am. Since the text sent is extensive, I have decided to address his argument in four parts: three are objections to the general case in favor of theism and one is an atheological argument.

This is the first objection that Randy Riverol Arevalo, from Cuba, presents to us:

Hello, greetings from Cuba. I see that you are one of the few Spanish speakers who has a good command of the philosophy of religion. I wanted to explain my position and hear your thoughts on it.

I am an atheist, by this I mean that I believe that there are no arguments that indicate the existence of God. This is only valid if God is meant to be omniscient, omnipotent, omnibenevolent, and necessary. God’s properties are metaphysical (that is, they refer to the ontology and basis of reality), for these properties to be justified, they require metaphysical evidence, since, of the three categories: conceptual, empirical, and metaphysical, [these] require evidence of their respective category, and, therefore, you cannot prove a metaphysical property with empirical evidence. For example, philosophical naturalism is the claim that only the natural exists, even with all or much knowledge of the natural world we are not justified in concluding that everything that exists is natural, since there could be something that we do not know or have not discovered. To prove philosophical naturalism, you would need metaphysical evidence, which we do not currently have a methodology to obtain. Therefore, if you try to justify a metaphysical property with empirical evidence, it is not justified, and if you try to justify it with the fact that induction is not perfect and that it always has this margin of error, [well] that is my point, you are trying to obtain a “metaphysical” deductive conclusion using “empirical” induction, committing a category error.

Ok. Let’s go step by step:

The properties of God are metaphysical (that is, they refer to the ontology and basis of reality).

If by (a) you mean that properties tell us something about the essence of the object being predicated, then I see no problem.

…for these properties to be justified requires metaphysical evidence, since, of the three categories: conceptual, empirical and metaphysical, [these] require evidence from their respective category, and therefore, you cannot prove a metaphysical property with empirical evidence.

Talking about the nature of properties is one of the broadest topics in metaphysics, so much so that I find your classification insufficient and problematic. [1] For example, what do you mean by empirical properties? You offer no definition, not a single example. If I were to take your classification literally, an empirical property would be one that is subject to sensory experience, but how is this even possible? For example, from the statement Peter is good you seem to mean that since Peter is an object of our senses, so is the property of being good. Is this what you mean by an empirical property? This seems to me to make no sense at all; not even a Platonist would claim that the property of being good is some kind of empirical object.

Since you don’t set out any clear concepts for your classifications of properties, I find it very difficult to understand why an empirical property requires empirical evidence. What kind of empirical evidence do you have to justify Peter’s property of being good? Why believe that the property of being good is empirical in Peter, but metaphysical in, say, the angel Gabriel? It’s like saying that the property of being good has the property of being empirical in a physical object, but has the property of being metaphysical in a metaphysical object. This certainly seems to me to be a rather complicated, if not absurd, ontology of properties. I think it’s a language for talking about properties that no philosopher holds.

So, for the sake of argument, let’s say that I accept your classification of properties. So, in what sense should I take your statements about properties? It seems to me that conventional language without metaphysical baggage is the best option. Instead of asking: What empirical evidence do you have to justify the empirical property of being good in Peter? I would ask: How do you prove that Peter is good? In response to this question, one could simply tell you to observe Peter’s actions to know that he is good; testimonies from people who know Peter would also help. In this way, I would understand that this methodology cannot be applied in the case of immaterial beings like God because he cannot be observed as in the case of Peter, but it does not follow from that that it is therefore impossible to know the properties of God, the only thing that follows is that at least another type of methodology is required to know the properties of God.

To prove philosophical naturalism, you would need metaphysical evidence, which we currently have no methodology to obtain.

But Randy, why would you require metaphysical evidence to prove naturalism? If the claim of naturalism is that only the natural exists and under your own criteria of justification of properties, doesn’t this imply that you require physical evidence to prove naturalism and metaphysical evidence to prove supernaturalism? Now I don’t understand you.

…if you try to justify [a metaphysical property] with the fact that induction is not perfect and that it always has that margin of error, [well] that is my point, you are trying to obtain a “metaphysical” deductive conclusion using “empirical” induction, committing a category error.

The problem is that you never bother to define an empirical property. Furthermore, if we apply your criterion of justification that only the metaphysical can prove the metaphysical and only the empirical can prove the empirical, then how do you claim that metaphysical properties, which are non-physical entities, refer to the ontology of reality, which in your worldview is physical? In the end, your own criterion of justification makes your classification of properties impossible.

To summarize, there are two problems with your objection:

An insufficient and problematic classification of properties.

A criterion of justification for properties that conflicts with the very definition of metaphysical properties.

Note:

[1] https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/properties/#KinPro

Jairo Izquierdo is a member of the Social Media team and an author for the Christian organization Cross Examined . He studies philosophy and theology, with his current focus being classical logic, epistemology, Christian doctrines, and philosophy of language. He is co-founder of Filósofo Cristiano . He is a member of the Christian Apologetics Alliance and a worship director at the Christian Baptist church Cristo es la Respuesta in Puebla, Mexico.