Anti-Pelagianismo y la Resistibilidad de la Gracia

Introduction

When one thinks about the debate between the Sovereignty of God and the genuine responsibility of man, two positions are commonly presented with which one can identify, Calvinism and Arminianism [1] . In general, these perspectives are characterized by an emphasis (or over-emphasis) on the Sovereignty of God and the Freedom of Man respectively.

This endless discussion has led us to believe that at the heart of this dilemma lies the different approaches by which Christians throughout history have sought to solve it. “Arminians have a humanistic and man-centered gospel, while Calvinists focus on God and His Glory,” some Calvinist brothers tell us. Is that true? Does the problem lie in the approach with which we approach this matter at hand? [2]

Before we get into the subject, we must analyze the different presuppositions with which each perspective attempts to resolve this tension. One of the differences between Arminians and Calvinists is their definition of human freedom. While Arminians subscribe to a libertarian philosophical view of freedom, Calvinists, who are determinists, generally subscribe to a compatibilist definition of freedom. This issue is crucial and must be clarified before beginning to discuss the positions, since in a discussion both sides can debate for hours without reaching any conclusion, simply because of the lack of clear and well-defined concepts. From this point on, I will change the terms Arminian and Molinist to Libertarian and Calvinist to Compatibilist. [3]

The most common definition of Libertarian Liberty with which some libertarians, specifically Molinists such as Luis de Molina, William Lane Craig, and Kenneth Keathley, identify themselves, is:

“Freedom can be considered as opposed to necessity. Thus, a free agent is said to be one who, given all the requirements for acting, can act and not act, or do one thing as well as its opposite.” [4]

“Not being caused to do something by causes other than oneself. It is entirely my responsibility how I choose, and nothing determines my choice. Sometimes philosophers call this “agent causation.” The agent herself is the cause of her actions. Her decisions are distinguished from chance events by being made by the agent herself for reasons the agent has in mind.” [5]

“Libertarianism is the view that the morally responsible agent is in some sense the source of his choices, and that prior conditions such as circumstances are not the ultimate determinant for that agent.” [6]

Some contemporary philosophers usually understand Libertarianism as that position that contains the following statements:

(L1) An agent acts with free will, or is morally responsible for an action, only if the action is not ultimately causally determined by anything or being outside the agent.

(L2) An agent acts with free will, or is morally responsible for an action, only if he or she could have acted otherwise.

(L3) An agent acts with free will, or is morally responsible for an action, only if his own intellect and will are the sole and final causes of his action [7] .

Which brings us to the purpose of this article, how does this work with regard to the grace of God? Compatibilists believe in strict monergism, God sends irresistible [8] or effective grace to individuals He has chosen in advance, so that when this grace comes to them, they are renewed and their desires are transformed, and so they respond in faith to that effective call of God. Note the adjective “effective,” that is, if a person is touched with irresistible grace, he will necessarily respond in faith. Therefore, the compatibilist can say that everything is a work and labor of God, there is nothing that man does in the process of salvation. Certain compatibilists, in adopting this monergistic view, commonly view any other view that differs from theirs as a Pelagian or synergistic view.

To answer this charge, in this article I will propose to reflect on an essay by Dr. Richard Cross [9] analyzing this charge on behalf of our Reformed brethren. Does any position that does not presuppose irresistible grace really fall within the Pelagian definition? Or is it possible to construct some plausible model that allows us to affirm the resistibility of divine grace without falling into Pelagianism?

Definitions and Terms

We must be very careful with our definitions. I have found that the terms “Pelagianism” and “semi-Pelagianism” are used without awareness of their meaning and implications. Dr. Cross generally defines these views in the following paragraph [10] :

“In the Council of Orange (529) canon 9, every good act we do is produced in us by God…. The condemned view is that we can bring about our own salvation in any sense.” [11]

If we read this in parallel with canon 3, where

“The view that God’s grace ‘can be conferred by human invocation’ is condemned.” [12]

Then we can agree with canon 5 of the Council of Orange,

“Canon 5 of the Council condemns the view that the beginning of faith in us is not through the working of the gift of grace. This constitutes a rejection of the semi-Pelagian view that the beginning of our justification is from us, not from God.” (Emphasis added) [13]

Taking this into account, we understand these systems as follows:

Pelagianism: We are the cause of our justification. [14]

Semi-Pelagianism: We are the beginning of our justification, but not the cause of our own justification. [15]

Irresistibility of Grace vs. Pelagianism

Once we understand these perspectives, it seems to me that we can agree with Dr. Cross when he says:

“Pelagianism and the irresistibility of grace are logically incompatible. The problem arises since it is not so obvious whether it is possible to reject Pelagianism and Semi-Pelagianism, while still maintaining the resistibility of grace.” [16]

That is, we recognize that if grace is irresistible, then it is impossible for us to be the cause of our own justification [17] therefore, Pelagianism is false. Likewise, if we can cause our own justification, then grace is not irresistible.

“If either Pelagianism or Semi-Pelagianism is true, the irresistibility of grace is false.”

However,

“If either Pelagianism or Semi-Pelagianism is false, it is not necessary that the irresistibility of grace be true.” [18]

Cross tells us that while it is easy to recognize that the irresistibility of grace and Pelagianism/semi-Pelagianism are mutually exclusive, it is not so obvious to conclude that if we reject the irresistibility of grace we necessarily fall into these systems. In other words, to reject the irresistibility of grace is not necessarily to embrace Pelagianism .

“The resistibility of grace does not imply accepting either Pelagianism or Semi-Pelagianism.” [19]

It is also important to mention that the author points out:

“What unites the seven models of the offer of grace is the belief that justifying grace – justification – is resistible.” [20]

This will then imply that irresistible grace is presupposed to be false. Cross plans to explain why he thinks there are models that possibly allow us to maintain the resistibility of grace and at the same time reject Pelagianism and Semi-Pelagianism in a coherent and consistent way.

At this point Cross acknowledges that he has come to an issue that is apparently still being debated in academic circles. Both Pelagianism and Semi-Pelagianism involve the concept of cause in their definitions and failure to clarify what can be counted as a cause and what cannot has been the source of much misunderstanding when I have discussed these issues. This is why Cross himself acknowledges:

“It is difficult to determine what is a sufficient cause for some state of affairs, as well as what would be accepted as an initialization of a process that results in a certain state of affairs. I do not pretend to lay down principles for these analyses, because I am not sure that such principles exist in all cases, but I rely on intuitions. These seem to be firm enough to bear the weight I am putting on them. They are the same sort of principles considered reasonable and sufficient for the moral judgments we make in everyday life. But I will leave the plausibility of my intuitions to be judged by the reader.” [21]

It will be intuition itself that will tell us whether something can be counted as a sufficient cause for a state of affairs, in this case, for the justification of a person.

Introduction to the Seven Models

COVENANT THEOLOGY

This perspective can be summarized as follows:

“God promises to justify—or at least offer grace—to anyone who satisfies certain minimal ethical conditions.” [22]

I think it is quite clear what is being argued in this perspective, simply,

“Person X freely promises to do action A if person Y acts in a manner W.” [23]

If God is X and Y is any human being, God promises to do A , that is, to justify, if Y performs or fulfills W .

If Y → W .

Then, X → A .

We see then that person Y is solely the cause of W and not of A. While X is the sole and total cause of A. If we believe that God freely promises to bring justification to a person if that person meets certain moral requirements, then we can affirm that God is the cause of justification and not us.

I can already imagine the criticisms that arise in the minds of our deterministic brothers: “this system does not take into account the total depravity of man,” “this system ultimately amounts to salvation by works,” and a few others.

Domino effect

We know that God never breaks his promise, so if person Y fulfills the conditions ( W ), then he will necessarily receive grace and be saved. But this means that the cause of the ultimate effect is Y , since:

“And causing W is sufficient for X to cause A, Y is therefore the final cause of A.” [24]

Cross proposes an analogy that invites us to reflect on the conditions under which we assign blame to other people.

“Imagine an agent who is ‘programmed’ in such a way that he is always prevented from breaking his promise. The agent… is not, however, conspicuously good in any other sense. Suppose this agent freely promises to perform a bad action whenever I act in accordance with an obligation of mine.” [25]

I think we understand the issue at hand, can a person S be guilty or responsible for the actions of another agent P who has freely promised to act evilly if person S acts in a specific way? Cross tells us:

It seems to me that I cannot be blamed for the evil actions this person causes, even if I am aware of the promise he has made. The reason is because this person’s promise was free. He did not have to make it. It is his free promise that causes him to act the way he does, not my actions. [26]

I did not cause the evil agent’s actions, it was his promise that caused him to act evilly.

Cross concludes,

Pari passu, then, it is God’s free covenant that causes salvation in this medieval or Arminian view. [27]

Salvation by Works

But if the works I do meet the requirements God has imposed for salvation,

“Is this perspective not summed up in my actions deserving justification?” [28]

I believe this objection is the most common one to any view that denies the irresistibility of grace. For now, we will focus on the weight of this objection to God’s free covenant view of salvation.

The answer, as far as I can see, would simply be a straightforward ‘no’. For nothing we have said says that the works we do merit salvation in such a way that God must save us. That is, no one has claimed that fulfilling the requirements puts God in a position where he must necessarily save us.

“If we forget for a moment the divine promise, merit would only exist in the case where my actions placed God under some kind of obligation to justify me, or something functionally equivalent to obligation. And—leaving aside the divine promise—such an obligation or quasi-obligation could only exist if the nature of my actions were such that they would morally require justification as a reward.” [29]

Now, if we think about it carefully, if our actions are of such a nature that they would morally require justification as a reward , then the divine promise would be unnecessary. Since God must save me because of my works, His covenant would be merely a legal clause, so to speak.

“But, so far, nothing I have said implies that the minimal requirements that need to be satisfied for justification are such that justification is morally necessary.” [30]

Cross does take into account something known as congruous merit [31] , that is, the merit of certain actions for which it is indeed appropriate for God to reward some action. This kind of merit is commonly spoken of in works of charity in the context of Catholicism [32] . But he says,

But we need not speak of congruous merit either. God’s promise could be entirely gratuitous or unnecessary [gratitous], and nothing in my actions would have any intrinsic meritorious value. Apart from the divine promise, they would be worthless, and not even worthy of appropriating God’s reward. [33]

That is, nothing in my works makes them suitable for God to reward them with saving grace. Nothing we have said leads us to that conclusion. So we are not talking about works that merit salvation.

Therefore, the covenant view is not Pelagianism.

Semi-Pelagianism?

We have seen that the view of Covenant theology succeeds in evading the charge of being Pelagian. But what about semi-Pelagianism? The crucial question is, what initiates the process of justification?

God’s promise?

A person’s satisfaction of the moral requirements for justification? [34]

Cross acknowledges that it is possible that this view might be considered semi-Pelagianism, but he is not sure that there is a strong argument for this. The defender of this view might stress to us that the initialization is the divine promise. However, he concedes that in the initialization process of justification the idea that the promise is the beginning is not very convincing either:

The promise seems too remote, causally, to be counted as the initialization of such an instance. The promise is more like a general condition for justification. It is rather like the machinery of justification and not so much a causal part in the process. The promise is a way of setting up the process of justification, but what initiates the process is human action. [35]

That is to say, the mere fact that the promise exists is not a sufficient cause that initiates the process, even if it is a necessary cause.

So, on the basis of what we have seen, this view can really be considered Semi-Pelagianism. But Cross admits that this is not the end of the argument:

Nevertheless, I do not believe that this is a sufficient argument to convince someone strongly planted in the anti-Pelagian framework of a covenant theology. Such a person might insist that God’s promise counts as the initialization of any process of justification and therefore deny that his view is Pelagian or semi-Pelagian. [36]

It will be up to the reader to decide whether covenant theology seems to him to be a perspective that effectively evades the charges of Pelagianism and Semi-Pelagianism. If one adopts this position, it will be his duty to demonstrate that the initialization process is entirely God’s.

A clarification is necessary at this point:

The following six views are not Semi-Pelagian because they all insist that the initiation of individual justification is the offer of God’s Grace to an individual. But, this offer of grace requires some form of acceptance. And this is in no sense prior to the offer of grace to an individual. [37]

If the reader is perceptive, he will notice that, unlike covenant theology, the question will not be what initiates the process of salvation , but rather, is acceptance the result of grace or is it a work that we do on our own? For, as Cross says,

The acceptance of grace cannot be the necessary result of a divine gift. If this gift is irresistible, then grace is irresistible. If the gift of acceptance is resistible, then the gift of acceptance also needs acceptance. Ad infinitum. [38]

That is, if our acceptance is a gift God has irresistibly given to us, then grace is indeed irresistible. Since I do not see it as plausible that we have an infinite regression from acceptance of gifts of grace to acceptance, the acceptance of grace must come from our own volition. But…

Is it possible to combine an anti-Pelagianism with some view in which human acceptance of the offer of grace is not the result of grace? [39]

With that question in mind, let’s dive into our analysis of the following perspective:

SYNERGISM

In this perspective,

The acceptance of offered grace counts as a work—something which the person to whom the grace is offered actually does. It is a work which is entirely within the power of the agent, and entirely a result of the natural disposition and inclination of the agent. [40]

Of course, the mere mention of the word synergism will cause many, if not most, of our Reformed brethren to jump out of their seats and shout “Pelagianism!”

Cross argues that this perspective need not be Pelagian:

If we hold that Pelagianism boils down to the claim that we can sufficiently save ourselves by our own actions, then this version of synergism I am considering is not Pelagian. (Emphasis added) [41]

That is, if we define synergism as:

Synergism: Two necessary and sufficient causes in conjunction for our justification. [42]

Since we cannot sufficiently save ourselves, then it is not Pelagianism, no matter how much the defender of Irresistible Grace wants to claim it.

But, taking up the statements of previous councils, Cross reminds us:

However, if we read the Second Council of Orange, saying that no action of ours can have any causal role—even if it is not sufficient—in justification, then synergism in this case is Pelagianism. [43]

According to the council, “ we cannot in any sense cause our own salvation .” So synergism, by assigning a causal role to our acceptance, would in effect reduce itself to Pelagianism. Although, of course, this depends on how we read the council’s statements – is it in a strict sense? Or is there some flexibility, which would allow us to assign a role to acceptance and not fall into Pelagianism?

Some theologians in the past agreed with the strong interpretation since, if our own acceptance is required for justification, then God’s Grace is not completely reliable. [44]

That is, “If it requires us to accept grace, then we cannot put our trust for our salvation in God’s grace, but in our acceptance of it.” Or the classic argument, “then it is not God who saves you, but your acceptance of grace.” But Cross tells us that

However, this answer depends on accepting the doctrine of the irresistibility of grace, and for the purposes of this discussion, I am proceeding as if this doctrine were false. It seems to me that a question about the absolute reliability of grace is itself a question independent of Pelagianism. [45]

It seems to me that what Cross is trying to say is that people who make this objection presuppose that it is necessary for grace to be irresistible in order to trust God completely, and therefore it is a circular argument. However, there is another reason that Cross examines for accepting the strict reading of the councils.

The reason is that the offer of grace plus the acceptance by the individual could be considered as sequentially ordered parts in a process that ends in the salvation of the person.

In a sense one element in a process is not sufficient for the outcome of that process, it is merely necessary. And that is why some think this is Pelagianism. [46]

But the mere fact of a sequence in the process does not mean that one of the parts is a sufficient cause for it to be considered Pelagianism. Cross explains:

The sequential nature of a causal cooperation does not negate its being a cooperation, and so does not necessitate that the action late in the process be a sufficient cause for the effect. So Synergism would reduce to Pelagianism only if one thinks that ascribing a causal role to human activity in justification is Pelagianism. And it is not clear that a reading of the Council requires such an interpretation. [47]

So while it is not Semi-Pelagianism, it is not clear that Synergism is not Pelagianism. It all depends on how we read the council’s statements. Personally, I reject this kind of synergism because I reject the idea that man has any causal role in salvation. And that is why I am more in agreement with the following theories that start from the idea that there is no need for a real, positive act on the part of the individual in relation to grace.

I think it is possible to maintain that no act of acceptance is needed for divine grace to be received by a person to be justified, and that grace, however, can be resisted. [48]

For the following three perspectives, Cross makes clear what some of the presuppositions he will start from will be:

If a person P accepts grace it means that P does not resist the total execution of some action A, which in some resistible way is produced by God in P. [49]

In Cross’ words, for the following three perspectives:

The basic idea is that in someone whom God has chosen for justification, the reception of grace is the default position; grace is received automatically unless the person maintains an active block to the reception of grace—that is, unless the person actively resists grace. [50]

SUPERNATURAL INCLINATION

The third perspective that Cross examines is summarized as follows:

The relevant action is the causal result of a supernatural inclination. Such an inclination would be irresistibly given by God to a person, such that the inclination is sufficient for the action (unless it is impeded). The performance of the action counts as the acceptance of the grace. [51]

Ironically, Cross appeals to a kind of irresistible grace which is given to an agent. However, this grace does not irresistibly determine this agent to accept the effect of this grace, namely salvation. This grace is a sufficient causal factor to produce the effect, such that, if nothing prevents this grace from continuing its course, the agent will be justified.

Let us also understand that having an inclination toward grace is not the same as producing salvation in ourselves. So the charge of Pelagianism has been successfully evaded. For,

The inclination here is a tendency to perform an act, such that, if nothing intervenes, this act is produced. And acting in accordance with the inclination does not require any further causal cooperation on the part of the agent. (Emphasis added) [52]

That is, we do not require the agent to cooperate or act in any way to produce the effect. But simply,

The agent is not required to want or choose the relevant action A, but it is required that the agent does not want/choose/deliberately do something other than A. That is, it is not required that P wants A, but it is required that P does not want not-A. [53]

Where A is a morally good action. Although in theory, it is irrelevant which action A is .

However, the objection will immediately be raised, “Not wanting not-A is wanting A,” and therefore the effect would be a product of human action, as Cross recognizes,

The action, however, would count as a relevant action of a human person, since it is produced by something internal to the person, that is, the inclination.

A similar example. Consider an involuntary but controllable act such as blinking. My blinking is on automatic: I usually don’t want it, or even consciously cause it. But I can prevent it if I wish, at least for a while. I understand it in that I naturally have an inclination to blink, and the inclination is sufficient for the action. [54]

One could remain firm in saying that such an inclination is of divine origin and that therefore there is no synergism. Initial grace is irresistible and therefore there is nothing in man that produces this grace, unless it is conferred by God.

The divine inclination is sufficient (unless impeded) for an action A that constitutes the acceptance of grace, and this sufficiency means that the creature need not desire or choose A, or in some other causally additional way cooperate in A. [55]

But Cross admits,

Still, any causal contribution to the action internal to the agent may be felt to involve some kind of synergism. For, even if it is natural or divinely endowed in some special way, it is still the inclination of the agent, and as such is independent of the divine causal activity in the execution of the action. [56]

As already mentioned, this might imply synergism or even, it seems to me, an argument could be made to say that this position could be reduced to Semi-Pelagianism, but that is outside the scope of this paper. This, however, brings us to the description of our fourth perspective.

SUPERNATURAL CAUSATION

As the name suggests,

The relevant action is produced directly by God—and not by means of an inclination. God produces the complete mechanism in which some action A consists. [57]

As we said above, some may take not-willing or not-resisting A to be willing or doing A , given its causal connection to God’s grace. And Cross seeks to evade this with his fourth view,

This view involves a distinctive claim, that the agent’s not willing/choosing/doing not-A consists in the agent’s desiring* A. [58]

However , wanting* something is not the same as doing something. So the mere fact of wanting A is not a cause of A.

The notion that an interior act of will, such as the agent willing* A is distinct from the agent doing A. [59]

But from this perspective,

Could an agent want* A and there be a sense in which the agent’s desire is not a causally necessary condition for A to be realized? [60]

That is, can this view hold that God is the causer of A without the agent P having a causal role in the realization of A ?

Cross discusses two ways to answer “yes” to this question:

From the above, we established that A is produced by God. God separates whatever causal mechanisms obtain between the inner act—desiring A—and the outer act—doing A. Choosing or willing* has no causal role, since God’s action remains sufficient unless prevented. The creature’s choice or willing is counterfactually sufficient: It would have been sufficient if God had not been causally responsible for fully performing the action. [61]

So the causal role of the agent is secondary, not necessary. All that is necessary is the causal role of God and that the agent does not resist God. The second way Cross says we can answer this question affirmatively is:

A is causally overdetermined and sufficiently produced by God, and sufficiently produced by the created agent. We can claim both that A is produced by God, and that A is produced by the creature. Under this option we need to claim that A is salvific merely in the case where it is true that A is produced by God, without regard to the truth of the statement that A is produced by the creature. So the relevant salvific statement is that A is produced by God, and so Pelagianism is avoided. [62]

It seems to me that one could say that, in this context, action A could be said to have an excess of sufficient causes. A is produced by both God and the creature. But in the salvific context, the only cause of A is God, and the fact that the agent produced A is irrelevant.

I find this view somewhat redundant and confusing; I think that an excess of sufficient causes is unnecessary. The proponent of Supernatural Causation seems to be telling us that, although God and the agent caused A , A is only salvific because God brought it about and not because the agent brought it about.

The fifth view known to many as the Ambulance model is one that is embraced by a large number of Molinists. Kirk MacGregor appeals to it as a model that is consistent with and compatible with the doctrine of total or radical depravity held by our Reformed brethren.

AMBULANCE MODEL

This is the model that I find most persuasive of all the models explained by Cross. This model has been popularized in Dr. Kenneth Keathley’s book Salvation & Sovereignty , although the ambulance analogy was Cross’s original, hence the name. I’ll venture to say that it is the most popular theory in the Molinist camp, since the doctrine appears to most effectively uphold God’s sovereignty in salvation while at the same time upholding the libertarian freedom of human beings.

The main reason for this theory goes back to Augustine, who sought to formulate a position that rejected that of his contemporary Pelagius, without making human beings mere tools in the hands of God, robbing us of the personality that He endowed us with. Augustine sought to formulate a model that would allow us to give all the credit to God for salvation and at the same time place all the blame for condemnation on the person.

In view four, Cross seems to be telling us that it is at least possible for the agent to want to do A. But again, the determinist will immediately point to the radical depravity of man.

So this perspective of the ambulance tells us,

The action A itself is simply produced by God, without any causal origin in the person, or in an internal act of will. The created person wills neither A nor non-A; the person is simply indifferent to A. [63]

That is, here not wanting* A does not mean wanting* not-A but simply being indifferent to A. If we assume that A is the acceptance of grace, then God is the one who produces A in us , but this in the case in which we are indifferent to grace, that is, in the case in which we do not accept grace (wanting* A) but neither do we reject it (wanting* not-A ).

God moves the person as a puppet: God produces the complete movements of which action A consists. Unlike view 4, the moved person is not an act of self-will. There is no action in the creature. But the divine movement can be sufficient unless it is impeded. For prior to A, the creature can will*, choose, or do not-A. [64]

To be honest, the opening part of the above quote may be problematic for any non-determinist Christian. Moving the person around like a puppet? We are falling into precisely what we want to refute. But the ambulance analogy helps us see why this is not the case:

“Suppose… that I wake up to find that I am riding in an ambulance. Suppose also that at any moment that I am conscious of being in the ambulance, I have the option of not being there. Perhaps I can simply ask the driver to stop and let me out. If I do not do this, then I do not prevent the action being done to me—transporting me to the hospital, or whatever. But by the same token—I do not contribute to it, other than counterfactually (i.e., by not preventing it). Does not preventing A reduce to willing or doing A? Not generally, given the coherence of the notion of an inner act of will… If I do not do something, I remain in the ambulance. But it would be strange to describe this case as me going to the hospital or [me transporting myself to the hospital] (in contrast to me being brought to the hospital).” [65]

The analogy clearly reflects what was previously said, if the person is inside the ambulance he can get out at any time, but if he does not get out it does not mean that he transported himself to the hospital . But we must not confuse “not doing not-A ” with “wanting or doing A ”, since there is no positive exercise of will towards A. So, although initially the person was moved “like a puppet” to get into the ambulance, the person can get out at any time and, therefore, it is not determinism.

Eleonore Stump offers another analogy that may help us understand why, even though God is the ultimate and final cause of salvation in the person, the model is not deterministic. To do this, however, it is necessary to define some concepts about the volitions of human beings. “A volition is an effective desire, that is, a desire that is translated into an action if nothing external prevents it. A first-order volition is the will directing some faculty or body to do something. A second-order volition, in contrast, is a will to want something… When the will commands itself, its action is second-order . ” [66] The key that interests us here is second-order volitions. To understand this, let us imagine that someone has a first-order volition to eat meat, however, he also has the will to be a vegetarian. This would imply that it is possible for there to be conflicts between first-order volitions and second-order volitions. I suppose this is even supported biblically by the words of the apostle Paul in Romans 7:19 “For the good I want to do I do not do, but the evil I do not want to do I do.” We could say that Paul, like all human beings, has that inclination and desire to fall into temptation, but Paul, having known the truth, did not want to fall but to do what was right in the eyes of God. So his first-order desires were in conflict with his second-order desires. With this in mind, let’s look at Stump’s analogy:

“Suppose Smith wants to reform and stop smoking; he wants a will that does not want to smoke. But his second-order desire is in conflict with a very powerful first-order desire to smoke, and the conflict is usually won by that first-order desire… Now suppose there is some science-fiction device that operates on the will and that can be employed to make the will not want to smoke. For simplicity, suppose also that the device is such that Smith can put it on or take it off at any time he wants. The device operates on the will with causal efficacy but only so long as it remains attached to the person; and at any given time it is up to the person whether the device is attached or not. Let it be the case for the purposes of the example that the world is not causally determined and that the actions of Smith’s will are indeterminate in ordinary circumstances…” [67]

The question then is “is Smith’s decision to quit smoking free?” or “is Smith acting freely when he desires* not to smoke?” The answer is “Yes.” Since it is up to Smith whether the device is attached or not, it therefore meets the three conditions of libertarianism set out previously [68] . This is even if the first-order desire were irresistible and Smith were unable to generate a first-order volition not to smoke. [69]

So even if God or the device moves the person like a puppet , it is still possible to claim Libertarianism and the ambulance model is not deterministic.

Granted, I think Cross’s terminology is confusing, but if we reflect on this theory, I think it is one of the most plausible so far. If we acknowledge that the person has the capacity to resist divine movement, then the deterministic implications of the phrase “God moves the person like a puppet” begin to dissipate. For prior to A , it is possible for the person to will, choose, and perform non-A without God moving or determining him to do so. [70]

Why do some believe?

Cross acknowledges that this is a crucial point because it raises the question ‘why do some believe and others not?’, since, if we assume that God sends grace to all human beings, then the difference between the believer and the non-believer remains in the person himself.

It may be thought that the concession that a person can prevent God from producing A in her by preemptively doing not-A somehow makes her salvation dependent on her after all, since God’s doing A still depends on her not doing not-A. [71]

That is, if everything depends on whether or not the person does non-A , then salvation is still in the person’s hands. Some will say that “not doing non-A,” that is, not resisting, is a problematic notion and can be reduced to a choice on the part of the person. And so we are back to synergism. However, what is being said is not that the person should do an action but rather refrain from doing an action. That is, not resist God’s action A.

Again, Stump’s argument comes to explain this for us. Recall that what is sought is to formulate a way in which we can “hold that human beings are capable, of themselves, of rejecting grace without God being ultimately responsible for their doing so. So the will of faith [72] would be a gift from God, but it would depend on a human person whether he has such a will or not.” After examining various attempts by Augustine to try to formulate a coherent view on the matter, Stump indicates that one possible solution would be to adopt the moral psychology of Aquinas [73] , who holds that the will can assent to something or reject it , but it can also simply do nothing . [74] “If this view is right, then there are three possibilities for the will with respect to grace: the will can assent to grace, it can reject grace, or it can be quiescent to grace.” [75]

This can lead to a very interesting discussion about what could be considered a cause and what could not. I mean, if someone does not resist an action, is he performing an action? Is the absence of resistance a cause of some event? [76]

A number of philosophers agree that omissions of actions are not efficient causes of events. [77] Phil Dowe’s work can help illustrate this point [78] : if a father fails to pay attention to his son, is he to blame for his son running into the road? Our first reaction is to answer affirmatively since, if the father had paid adequate attention, then the accident would not have happened. However, the father did not cause the child to run, nor did he cause the car to speed. “What we mean is that his failure to watch his son is the cause [of the accident] in the sense that, had he watched him, the accident would not have happened… we mean that it was possible for him to have prevented the accident.” [79] Therefore, omissions are not efficient causes of events but counterfactuals of genuine causes, i.e., quasi-causes. [80]

I can still hear the determinist pressing the objection that despite the non-causality of omissions, salvation on this view is still in the hands of the person. This objection is met by an interesting distinction that Dr. Kevin Timpe makes in reflecting on this, that “omissions are quasi-causal” in the sense that they control events, but do not cause events. [81] It is said that “an agent can only be responsible for an event over which he has control” – that is, “An agent S is morally responsible for an event e only if S has (or at some point had) control over the occurrence of e.” [82] This does not deny times when a person directly causes an event or action. But Timpe tells us that we can call these cases cases of “direct control.” However, “If omissions are not causes, it is possible that genuine causation and control can be separated – an agent can control an event even if he does not actually cause it. He can control it by virtue of quasi-causing it. Let us call this ‘indirect control.’” [83] So I may have control over whether I stay in the ambulance or keep the anti-smoking device on by virtue of not getting out of the ambulance or not removing the device, but that does not mean that I caused the ride to the hospital or caused my volition not to want to smoke.

This seems to be what Dr. William Lane Craig is referring to when he says, “Our own eternal destiny is in our own hands. It is a matter of our choice where we will spend eternity.” [84] This may be considered very close to synergism, but as we have seen, it is neither synergism nor Pelagianism. By the law of identity, “close or similar to Pelagianism” does not equal “Pelagianism.” As long as we understand that God is the sufficient and only cause of saving grace and that all we can do is resist or do nothing.

So, in this proposal,

[The person] doing not-A at time t merely prevents God from producing A in her at t, so long as God does not coercively prevent her from doing not-A. This amounts to a kind of Augustinanism: damnation is, and salvation is not, something that is produced by the creature. [85]

As my friend Tim Stratton explained to me via personal message, “God is under no obligation to save anyone. There is nothing man can do to get to heaven. It is only by grace that heaven is possible.” That is, it is not that your “resistance” stops God from doing something, but rather God has sovereignly established not to do A if you do not-A , meaning God will not save you if you resist and reject His grace.

With this explained, Cross continues,

Is this view, on which a person can prevent God’s action by “getting there first,” a plausible view of resistance? It is, in the sense that not doing non-A is necessary for God to do A; and what is necessary in this case is only that the creature refrains from acting. [86]

As we mentioned above, Cross repeats it again, the question is not whether the creature performs an action, but rather “the creature refrains from performing a causal action,” in this case, an action of resistance.

While the most popular proponent of the ambulance model, Dr. Kenneth Keathley, is a Molinist, there is one Arminian who holds a very similar view. Dr. Roger Olson, in his lecture on Arminianism, draws out some distinctions between the most popular soteriological systems, in which he speaks of the Arminian model. For Dr. Olson, one of the central doctrines of Arminianism is prevenient grace [87] , which is resistible. To explain this more clearly, Olson makes use of what he calls the Wells Illustration :

“We are at the bottom of the pit in total depravity, totally incapable of doing anything. God sends a rope that represents the law, but we cannot do anything with it, we cannot use it to climb up.

But God doesn’t want to come down to save us unless we make a decision to accept Him. So He throws water into the bottom of the well and says, ‘My water will bring you up, just let My grace (water) bring you up.’

In other words, we are saved not because we did something to help (cooperate) with God’s grace. We just did not resist God’s grace. We cannot boast or be proud because we did not do anything to get out of the pit, but the water did everything to get us out” [88] .

Olson does not mention it, but if the person for whatever reason chooses not to get out of the well and swim down, he would be said to be to blame for his death at the bottom of the well. Whereas the person who gets out of the well cannot say “I pulled myself out of the well” [89] .

So it is clear that the water or ambulance representing God’s overcoming grace [90] “should and will be effective for all. The only thing that could stop it is if, inexplicably, a person decides to reject it” [91] . As Dr. Robert Picirilli puts it “[this grace] is so closely related to regeneration that it inevitably leads a person to regeneration unless resisted” [92] . Which Keathley points out is one of the benefits of the model, as it “shifts the evil of unbelief from God to the unbeliever” [93] . That is, the question is no longer “Why do some believe?” since they believe because of overcoming grace, but the question is “Why doesn’t everyone believe?” or “Why didn’t such and such a person believe?” Leaving that up to mystery to me is far better than the mystery of “deterministic predestination” that Calvinism sells us.

Meritorious Works

I want to respond to the desert objection that always arises in discussions of free will and salvation. Recall that in the first view we refuted this objection by mentioning that nothing in our actions classifies them in such a way that they “ deserve ” salvation. But still someone might still object that non-resistance is an act of the will toward grace. But again Timpe provides further reflection on this: “This objection misses the point of the view, namely, that one does not deserve credit for remaining quiescent precisely because quiescence is not a positive or good action of the will—but is a lack of an action of the will. But neither is the desire* to be quiescent with respect to divine grace something for which the agent deserves credit as long as that desire* with respect to grace is distinct from wanting* to accept grace itself…” [94] The response to the objection can be summarized thus:

Nothing has been said so far that would make anything in a human being worthy of salvation.

Being quiescent with respect to grace is not a causal action, it is the absence of an action, so there is no merit in an action that does not exist.

Even if there is a second-degree desire or volition to be quiescent, this volition is not meritorious either because a volition to be quiescent is distinct from a volition to accept grace. [95]

My comments on the last two perspectives will not take much time, since Cross himself devotes only a paragraph in his article to both perspectives. This is because they have great similarities with some of the previously analyzed perspectives. Even so, they deserve mention and analysis.

Cross begins by explaining what one of the presuppositions was for the previous perspectives and how this presupposition will change with the next two:

So far I have assumed that the acceptance of grace consists in the completed performance of some actual or counterfactual action. Traditionally, grace and the acceptance of grace are tied to the notion of faith. Suppose, for example, that justifying grace consists, or could consist, in divinely originated faith. Since I am assuming that grace is resistible, I need such faith to be a voluntary matter. Therefore, I need to posit that faith consists in or results from some interior act of the will distinct from an exterior act—distinct from a complete performance of the act. [96]

If we recall, so far, action A , it could be any morally good action. So, according to Cross, the following views will take this action A to be having or exercising faith within a second-degree volition or interior act , if I am interpreting it correctly. But the fact that faith is divinely originated should not be ignored .

INCLINATION TOWARDS FAITH

Remembering our perspective of the Supernatural Inclination ,

The relevant action is the causal result of a supernatural inclination. Such an inclination would be irresistibly given by God to a person, such that the inclination is sufficient for the action (unless it is impeded). The performance of the action counts as the acceptance of the grace.

However, in our sixth anti-Pelagian perspective,

God gives someone the inclination to an act of faith, such that such inclination is sufficient unless he is impeded from the act of faith. This view continues the same as view three, except that such inclination is for an interior act, not for the complete performance of some act. [97]

That is, while in the Supernatural Inclination the inclination is to perform an act… and if nothing intervenes, this act is produced , in the Inclination toward Faith it will be not to perform an act but to the act itself, in other words, it is not for a volition in the first degree, but is toward a volition in the second degree. Another difference is also that in (3), if person P does not want non-A then the grace of God is sufficient to produce A ( A being the complete act of salvation). Whereas in (5), we add one more step and the inclination is merely toward an act of faith and person P can refrain from exercising faith and therefore not be saved.

AMBULANCE MODEL AND FAITH

This perspective correlates with the seventh so we apply the clauses of (5) in (7) with a slight distinction,

The direct action of God is sufficient unless it is impeded for the interior act of faith—as for the Anti-Pelagian strategy [seven], mutatis mutandis. [98]

Just as in the previous perspective, we merely shift the inclination or emphasis of grace from an outward act to an inward act. I don’t really see a clear distinction there. We will see this more clearly in other articles defending the plausibility and coherence of the Ambulance model.

CONCLUSION

The above views allow us to affirm a resistibility of grace and deny Pelagianism; of course, it should be noted that some are more plausible than others. However, given their variety, anyone who would argue that libertarians in denying irresistible grace affirm Pelagianism or Semi-Pelagianism must not only present arguments in favor of their claim, but also demonstrate that the six views presented here (and the one I present here) are inconsistent or fail in their attempt to relate the resistibility of grace and a rejection of Pelagianism.

I do not pretend to have solved a conflict that has lasted for years, a conflict that every generation deals with and will deal with until Jesus Christ returns and explains the issue to us. It is possible that all of us, Calvinists, Arminians and Molinists alike, are wrong. For now, all we can do is continue studying and delving deeper into these issues, not to debate and create conflict, but to learn more about God and glorify Him by making use of the thought He has given us.

Grades

[1] However, this ignores the fact that there are other perspectives that seek to solve the problem, such as Molinism and Open Theism. Personally, I identify myself as a Molinist and reject Open Theism as a position that undermines the Ultimate Greatness of God.

[2] The heart of the problem is not there. It is true that the presuppositions we hold influence the conclusions we reach, but the difference between Libertarians and Compatibilists is not in their view of man’s freedom, but in their view of God’s Love. Dr. Jerry Walls emphasizes this point quite well at the end of his lecture What’s Wrong with Calvinism?

[3] A specific definition of each can be found at the following link. Both Molinists and Arminians subscribe to a Soft Libertarian perspective. Calvinists subscribe to a Soft Determinism or Compatibilism perspective. Open Theists are strong libertarians.

[4] de Molina, Luis. Concord of Free Will; Dispute II. Translation Antonio Hevia Echeverría. (2007). Page 46.

[5] Dr. William Lane Craig: https://es.reasonablefaith.org/question-answer/search/el-libre-albedrio

[6] Keathley, Kenneth. Salvation & Sovereignty: A Molinist Approach . Ed. B&H Publishing Group (2010) Page 54.

[7] Stump, Eleonore. Augustine on free will . Cambridge University Press, (2006). Eleonore makes a brief survey of Augustine’s position on grace and free will. But she points out that not all philosophers agree that Libertarianism must necessarily affirm (L2). The position that affirms all three statements will be known as Common Libertarianism while the position that merely affirms (L1) and (L3) will be called Modified Libertarianism ; it is beyond the scope of this paper to argue for either proposition, the reader is free to identify with either.

[8] For a refutation of the doctrine of irresistible grace, visit the following link: “Petals Fall: Why Calvinism is Impossible.” “Petals Fall” is a series consisting of four articles that you can find here.

[9] I highly recommend reading the full article. English only.

[10] Unless otherwise indicated, these definitions will be used throughout the article.

[11] Cross, R. Anti-Pelagianism and The Resistibility of Grace , Faith and Philosophy Vol. 22. No. 2, April 2005. Page 200.

[12] Ibid. Cited by Cross.

[13] Ibid.

[14] Ibid.

[15] Ibid.

[16] Ibid. Page 199

[17] The author will use justification as a synonym for salvation, but he does not affirm any particular theory of justification. He is only interested in how justification is obtained , not in what it consists of. Nor does he adopt any theory about redemption. Nor do he adopt theories that link justification with redemption.

[18] Representation in logical symbology:

“If either Pelagianism or Semi-Pelagianism is true, the irresistibility of grace is false.”

(P v SP) → ¬ IG

“If either Pelagianism or Semi-Pelagianism is false, it is not necessary that the irresistibility of grace be true.”

(P v SP) → ¬(□IG)

Where:

Q: Pelagianism.

SP: Semi-Pelagianism

IG: Irresistibility of Grace.

[19] Cross, R. Anti-Pelagianism and The Resistibility of Grace, Page 199.

[20] Ibid.

[21] Ibid. Page 200

[22] Ibid. p. 201.

[23] Ibid.

[24] Ibid.

[25] Ibid. Of course, none of us would accept the idea that God is programmed to do anything. God is free to act and nothing determines or programs his actions. However, every Christian recognizes that God cannot do certain actions such as sinning and performing logical absurdities. So it is metaphysically impossible for God to break a promise.

[26] Cross, R. p. 201.

[27] Ibid.

[28] Ibid.

[29] Ibid.

[30] Ibid.

[31] http://dle.rae.es/?id=P0mceZI

[32] “Meritorious works that at most have the right to reward or honor due to equity or simple distributive justice (ex justitia distributiva), as is the case of military gratifications and decorations.” See the following link http://ec.aciprensa.com/wiki/M%C3%A9rito .

[33] Cross, R. p. 202.

[34] Ibid. p. 202.

[35] Ibid.

[36] Ibid.

[37] Ibid. p. 202.

[38] Ibid. p. 203.

[39] Ibid.

[40] Ibid.

[41] Ibid.

[42] Ibid.

[43] Ibid.

[44] Ibid.

[45] Ibid. pp. 203 – 204.

[46] Ibid. p. 204.

[47] Ibid.

[48] ​​Ibid.

[49] Ibid.

[50] Ibid.

[51] Ibid. p. 205.

[52] Ibid.

[53] Ibid.

[54] Ibid.

[55] Ibid.

[56] Ibid.

[57] Ibid.

[58] Ibid. The verb here is “to will” which has no literal translation in English. “To will” expresses an exercise of will or an inclination toward something, not merely “to want something.” The confusion arises because there are two words in English that are translated as “wanting” or “desiring,” “to want” and “to will.” The first of these is what we know as “wanting something” in the sense of having a desire for it. While the second can be specified as a volition of the agent. For simplicity, whenever I refer to “wanting” or “desiring” in the sense of an exercise of will I will add a (*) for the reader.

[59] Ibid.

[60] Ibid.

[61] Ibid. p. 206

[62] Ibid.

[63] Ibid.

[64] Ibid.

[65] Ibid. p. 207.

[66] Stump, Eleonore. Augustine on free will. Cambridge University Press, (2006), p. 126.

[67] Ibid, p. 127.

[68] Ibid, pp. 127-129.

[69] Ibid., pp. 129-130. Even if we assume that “without the device the first-order desire is irresistible,” the case still meets all three conditions of libertarianism. “Even though Smith’s will is determined by his strong desire [to smoke], he has the device available to him, and he can use it if he so chooses.” Someone might argue that if the first-order volition is irresistible, then Smith could not desire to quit smoking; it would be impossible for his second-order volition to control his first-order volition to quit smoking. But the second-order desire may be effective in doing something other than controlling his first-order desire; and that other thing may be effective at least in preventing the first-order desire from being transformed into an action (something other than using the device).

Since it is open to Smith whether to smoke or not to smoke, he satisfies (L2).

If Smith smokes, it was because he willed not to use the device and to let his desire take its course; if Smith wills not to smoke it was because he willed to use the device. So his will has been ultimately determined by his own intellect and will, and consequently has not been ultimately determined by anything outside Smith. So it satisfies (L1) and (L3).

[70] In some sense of prior, since if the creature performs non-A, there will be no act with respect to which it is prior.

[71] Cross, R. p. 206.

[72] The ‘will of faith’ or ‘will of faith’ refers to a second-order volition to have faith or to stop rejecting grace. That is, a desire of the will to want to have saving faith. This will of faith is not sufficient to will saving faith because our first-order volitions do not desire such faith. Augustine describes these second-order volitions as an acceptance of grace, a desire for a right will, a will to believe, or even merely as faith. Stump, Eleonore. Augustine on free will. Cambridge University Press, (2006), p. 136.

[73] Stump, Eleonore. Augustine on free will. Cambridge University Press, (2006), p. 126. Timpe, Kevin. Grace and Controlling what we do not Cause. Faith and Philosophy, (July 3, 2007), p. 287.

[74] Summa Theologiae Part I-IIae Question 9 – Article 1.

[75] Stump, Eleonore. Augustine on free will. Cambridge University Press, (2006), p. 140.

[76] This argument by the Reformed, “non-resistance is a cause” reminds me of the mistake that atheistic physicist Lawrence Krauss makes when he tries to argue about the universe coming into existence from nothing. (See video min. 0:52 – 1:26). “Nothing is unstable,” he tells us, “nothing will always produce something.” Sadly for Krauss and the cast of unbelievers who follow him, scholars in physics and philosophy have refuted his argument time and time again. (See video min. 6:15 onwards). When he says that the universe could have come from nothing, he is not using the word “nothing” as an ordinary person would, but rather he is referring to empty space with a physical structure, not “nothing.” Nothing, properly understood, is the absence of anything. Likewise, are we calling non-resistance a cause? If so, we would be committing the same fallacy of equivocation that Krauss commits.

[77] P Dowe, “A Counterfactual Theory of Prevention and ‘Causation’ by Omissions,” Australian Journal of Philosophy 79:2 (June 2001): 216-26; J. J. Thomson, “Causation: Omissions,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66:1 (January 2003): 81-103; y S. McGrath, “Causation by Omission: A Dilemma,” Philosophical Studies 123 (2005): 125-48.”

[78] P Dowe, “A Counterfactual Theory of Prevention and ‘Causation’ by Omissions,” Australian Journal of Philosophy 79:2 (June 2001): 216-26. Del mismo autor ver también capítulo 6 de Physical Causation (Cambridge University Press, 2000).

[79] Dowe, Physical Causation, pág. 125.

[80] Aquí está el análisis de Dowe sobre la “causación por omisión”, donde A y B son eventos positivos y x es una variable que oscila entre estos eventos:

no-A cuasi-causa a B si B ocurriera y A no, y sucede una x tal que

(O1) x causó a B, y

(O2) si A hubiera ocurrido entonces A hubiera prevenido B al interactuar con x.

(Tomado de Physical Causation, pág. 124).

[81] Ver Timpe, “Controlling What We Do Not Cause,” 290-99.

[82] Ibíd, 291. Aunque esto no está afirmando que meramente “tener control” sobre un evento es suficiente para que un agente sea moralmente responsable de un evento. – ciertamente hay otras condiciones que son necesarias para la responsabilidad moral. En pocas palabras, el control es una condición necesaria pero no suficiente. El punto simplemente es que su control sobre un evento es requerido para responsabilidad moral, y hay dos maneras en la que una persona puede ejercer tal control.

[83] Ibíd.

[84] Ver: http://www.reasonablefaith.org/how-can-christ-be-the-only-way-to-god (inglés)

[85] Cross, R. pág. 206.

[86] Ibíd. pág. 207

[87] Sin embargo, en el modelo Arminiano descrito por Olson afirma que la gracia preveniente habilita al hombre depravado a responder positivamente al evangelio. Sin esa gracia preveniente, nadie sería capaz de responder al evangelio. Lo cual no refleja específicamente la intención del modelo de la ambulancia, sino que tiene mayor similitud con las perspectivas (1), (2) o (3). Pero cuando Olson describe su modelo de manera gráfica, con algunas modificaciones, parece ser que se conlleva las mismas implicaciones que el modelo de la ambulancia de Cross y Keathley.

[88] Cabe mencionar que el uso de analogías es meramente ilustrativo. Ninguna analogía es perfecta y debemos procurar entender la analogía mediante el punto que se intenta explicar.

[89] Hay claras distinciones entre el Arminianismo y el Molinismo, aspectos que van más allá de este escrito. Sin embargo, es sorprendente la similitud de las implicaciones de analogías que se usan para explicar la gracia resistible y cómo evadir la acusación de Pelagianismo.

[90] Overcoming Grace is the name Kenneth Keathly coined for the model. This would be the “O” in his acronym ROSES, for “Overcoming Grace,” which refers to a grace that overcomes our obstinacy and rebellion that we humans possess without God.

[91] Keathley, Kenneth. Salvation & Sovereignty: A Molinist Approach. Ed. B&H Publishing Group (2010), p. 77.

[92] R. Picirilli, Grace, Faith, Free Will (Nashville: Randall House 2002), 156. Emphasis added.

[93] Keathley, K. p. 77.

[94] Timpe, “Controlling What We Do Not Cause,” Reference (49) 298.

[95] Still, the reformed will press the point, saying, “But it is better not to resist than to resist, therefore the person may boast.” But Timpe reminds us that superlatives do not presuppose positives. That is, just because something is better than something else does not imply that the former is a positive thing to boast about. For example, suppose Joe has the opportunity to steal $100 from his boss, but only steals $20. Joe’s action is better than it would have been, but it does not mean that Joe deserves any moral merit for the action he did take.

[96] Cross, R. p. 207.

[97] Ibid. p. 207-208.

[98] Ibid. p. 208 Cross comments that it is not necessary to define saving faith precisely for the purposes of his analysis. Since faith is intended to be a voluntary act, faith is viewed as a trust in the offer of salvation and in the Savior, rather than as a belief in certain propositions.

Raúl Jaramillo is a graduate in Telecommunications Engineering from the Autonomous University of San Luis Potosí. Certified by the Reasonable Faith ministry as an apologetics teacher and leader of a study group or chapter of the ministry. Guest writer on Chris Du Pond’s blog veritasfidei.org , founding member of the Christian Philosopher ministry . Raúl has dedicated the last 10 years to promote the distribution of apologetic material in Spanish supporting Reasonable Faith with articles, conferences and debates; and Free Thinking Ministries with weekly articles. He has held debates on free will from a Molinist worldview making a strong criticism of Calvinist determinism. He is currently the Regional Director of Reasonable Faith Chapters for Latin America and Spain.